Today’s note looks at four leading nature markets – or environmental markets – i.e. markets where the underlying asset or commodity has positive environmental benefits or attributes. We look at recent advances, setbacks, leaders and the implications for the investability of environmental markets.

COPped out

Neither Conference of Parties (COP) meetings of the past few weeks changes where the four environmental markets (water, compliance and voluntary carbon, biodiversity) are heading. Below is a summary of the main developments in each market:

Compliance carbon markets: COP31 closes on November 20 and policymakers have not yet produced a final text. So far, the draft proposes a global effort to lift electricity to 35% of final energy by 2035, which supports demand for grids, storage and electrified end uses, while the fossil-fuel language is still contested and may be dropped. Interestingly, the fossil-fuel roadmap is being built outside the formal process by a voluntary coalition of 57 countries. This in itself tells a lot about the usefulness of the COP process). The case for grids and storage therefore rests on economics and national policy, not on a COP mandate.
Voluntary carbon markets: A coalition of governments has published a playbook to build demand for high-integrity credits. That should support quality credits but not a broad rebound in voluntary prices, because no COP decision sets a price.
Biodiversity: COP17 on Biodiversity closed on October 31 and changed disclosure and process with little if any implication for markets. It produced nearly USD 2bn of new funding – against USD 7.3 trillion of nature-negative flows.
Water : Water has no COP of its own, and its nearest catalyst is the UN Water Conference on December 8 to 10. The link to the climate COPs runs through adaptation finance, where the COP31 draft proposes that the Belém pledge to triple it by 2035 should reach at least USD 120bn, against estimated needs of about USD 305bn a year.

1. Energy Transition: Clean Power Outruns Demand

Clean power covered all of the growth in global electricity demand in 2025. Ember’s Global Electricity Review 2026 reports that solar rose by a record 636 TWh, that wind and solar together met 99% of the increase in demand, and that fossil generation fell 0.2%, the first decline since 2020. Renewables (33.8%) also overtook coal (33.0%) for the first time in the modern power system. Carbon Brief’s summary of the review adds that the global electric vehicle fleet now displaces 1.8 million barrels of oil a day.

Capital continues to move towards energy transition complex – but its mix is changing. The IEA’s World Energy Investment 2026 puts energy investment at USD 3.4 trillion in 2026, with about USD 2 trillion going to grids, power supply and electrification and USD 940bn going to China alone. Renewables investment has flattened after several years of rapid growth, partly because equipment got cheaper, so the growth in spending came from grids, storage and gas. Gas plant orders reached 130 GW in 2025, driven by US data centres. Energy security now ranks alongside cost in many import-dependent economies, which has also revived interest in coal in some of them.

Leadership sits with a handful of countries. China supplied 336 TWh of solar growth, and India cut fossil generation by 3.3% as record additions of solar and wind outran demand. For investors, generation is becoming a commodity, so the margin goes to the owners of the scarce pieces around it, such as interconnection, transformers, storage and dispatchable capacity. Equity markets have drawn a similar line. In the year to November 17, the grid infrastructure ETF (GRID-US) returned 5.1% while the broad clean energy ETF (ICLN-US) lost 9.6%, and both trailed the 12.2% return of the S&P 500.

2. Carbon Markets: Still on the Way Up

Carbon pricing has spread further than most investors assume. The World Bank’s State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026 counts 87 pricing instruments covering 29% of global emissions, with India and Viet Nam the newest to join, and finds that carbon pricing raised more than USD 107bn for public budgets in 2025. The EU adopted its 90% target for 2040 but delayed ETS2 (European Trading Scheme) to 2028, and in July the Commission proposed an Industrial Decarbonisation Bank and a route for permanent removals inside the ETS. California extended Cap-and-Invest to 2045, and CARB’s May update lets the emissions ceiling fall 11% a year this decade.

Compliance prices have firmed up while voluntary prices have slipped. The latest California-Québec joint auction, held on August 19, settled at USD 32.48 (CAD 45.11), up from USD 28.81 in May and USD 4.54 above the USD 27.94 floor. All 49.0 million current-vintage allowances sold for the fifth consecutive time, at a cover ratio of 1.31. Compliance entities took 77.8% of the allowances against 81.3% in May, which points to more participants coming from the financial sector. It was also the first auction since CARB finalised its May update, and California, Washington and Québec signed a linkage agreement in the interval. Carbon ETFs have recovered from spring lows but still trail equities: in the year to November 17, the California allowance ETF (KCCA-US) returned 7.9% and the global carbon ETF (KRBN-US) 3.4%, against 12.2% for the S&P 500.

In the voluntary market, MSCI reports that the average price index slipped to USD 3.5 per tonne in 2025 from USD 4.3, even though credits rated BBB and above rose by more than 20% to USD 6.8. The market for renewable energy credits shrank by a quarter, and the market as a whole has held near USD 1.4bn for four years. Dependence on a single buyer is a further weakness, as Microsoft’s April pause in removal purchases showed.

3. Biodiversity: All Talk, and Some Reporting

A recent UN report suggests that 22 of 23 targets biodiversity targets were missed by national entities, Furthermore, the USD 20bn international finance pledge for 2025 was missed, and 84% of countries missed the subsidy-identification deadline. Still, the agreed TNFD framework now counts 830 adopters, and Ceres notes that more than 680 investors now integrate nature into their processes.

The gap between ambition and allocation of capital is clearest if one looks at financial flows towards nature. UNEP’s State of Finance for Nature 2026 shows USD 7.3 trillion of nature-negative flows in 2023 – i.e. an economic activity or financial flow that contributes to the degradation of nature, rather than its protection or restoration – against USD 220bn for nature-based solutions, of which only USD 23bn was private. That works out to roughly thirty dollars for activities that degrade nature for every dollar that protects it.

4. Water: Infrastructure and Treatment, Not a Price

Water remains stressed in many regions of the world. UNU-INWEH reports that about 70% of major aquifers are declining and that drought costs USD 307bn a year. Investment of about USD 380bn a year compares with a need of more than USD 1 trillion, and UN DESA and Goldman Sachs Asset Management put the public share of that at 85% to 90%. In Canada, the gap is local as well as global. IISD cites a C$270bn municipal infrastructure deficit, which shows that water is constrained as much by governance and municipal capacity as by capital.

Listed water stocks have not consistently beaten global equities over ten years. It’s true that Goldman Sachs Asset Management reports outperformance against the MSCI ACWI IMI over the ten years to mid-2025 on a broad definition of water providers, and sector capex is rising. However, on investable water indices, the lead of the global funds has gone. To November 17, 2026, the S&P Global Water and Nasdaq Global Water funds returned 10.2% and 9.3% a year in US dollars against 12.2% for the MSCI ACWI proxy, having led it until April 2025 and May 2024 respectively, while the two US water funds returned 12.3% and 12.6% a year, slightly ahead of it.

Except for a few occurrences in the U.S. and Australia (mostly water rights in the Ag sector), water remains a non-tradable commodity. For their part, costs associated to delivering water, i.e.  municipal infrastructure, have lagged overall inflation through the 2022 shock but have outpaced it since mid-2024. Over the five years to October 2026, US consumer prices for water, sewer and trash collection rose 27.7% against 22.0% for all items, and EU water supply prices rose 31.9% against 26.0%. That supports the revenue case for regulated utilities, although bills that outrun household inflation also raise the risk of affordability caps. Overall, it seems that anything related to water theme has been gaining in value these past few years.

The NOAA, the key U.S. weather forecaster, gives an 83% chance that El Niño reaches historic strength in October to December, exceeding any event since 1950, and likely persisting into spring 2027, with effects on crops and supply chains running into 2028. Weaker trade winds will let warm water spread east across the Pacific and shift rainfall: drought in Southern Africa, Southeast Asia and Australia, heavy rain on the Peruvian coast, and wind shear that suppresses Atlantic hurricanes.

El Niño is a natural cycle, but climate change raises the cost of each event by amplifying heat, evaporation and rainfall extremes, a pattern that underpins our view that weather is now a lasting driver of food price inflation. This year’s event is already disrupting industries such as fisheries, while for others the shocks will play out later. The table below illustrates when various industries are likely to be affected: we offer three trade ideas that leverage a strong El Niño effect.

 

Trade #1: Marine Feed: The Visible Shock

One of the first major disruptions from this year’s El Niño to occur is in marine feed. The term marine feed refers to the ingredients derived from marine organisms used in animal feed, particularly for aquaculture (e.g. fishmeal, fish oil and algae).  It is produced mainly from small pelagic fish like anchovy, sardine, and herring.   

On October 16th, Peru cancelled its second anchovy season, after the first season was stopped in June with only about a quarter of its quota caught. Peru supplies about 20% of global fishmeal and fish oil, and IFFO (The Marine Ingredients Organization) projects 2026 fishmeal supply at its lowest since 2016. According to the IMF, fishmeal prices increased  89% in the past year. Oceanographic conditions were the culprit behind the closure: warm waters caused by El Niño have changed anchovy distribution and forced schools into deeper water.

Fishmeal and fish oil are globally traded, so the shortfall raises feed costs for fish farmers everywhere, but not equally. In the case of Mowi (MOWI-NO), the company manufactures its own feed for its own seafood farms, so Mowi retains the feed margin and has procurement scale and forward cover, whereas Lerøy (LSG-NO) and most other producers buy feed from external manufacturers with no retained margin. Share prices among salmon farmers are highly correlated, but El Niño opens a window for Mowi to outperform in 2027, which we would capture with a pair trade, long Mowi against short Lerøy, or simply by overweighting Mowi.

 

Trade #2: Copper in El Niño’s path?  

El Niño matters for copper because supply sits in its path. Countries like Chile, Peru, Zambia and Indonesia are known to experience strong El Niño effects and together mine about 42% of the world’s copper: Chile about a quarter, Peru about an eighth, Zambia about 4% and Indonesia about 3%.

The mechanism and timing differ by region. In South America (Chile and Peru), excess rainfall, flooding, landslides, and port closures directly halt or slow mine operations and logistics. Meanwhile in southern Africa the rains fail, the Zambezi basin dries and the hydropower grid feeding the Copperbelt has less water. Similarly, Indonesia is facing severe drought due to El Niño, which perhaps surprisingly, is actually helping Freeport-McMoRan’s repair its Grasberg mine after massive mud slides last year.

The El Niño effect for 2026 in Chile has already largely occurred and total output losses have been relatively subdued. Companies like Antofagasta (ANTO-GB) and Lundin Mining (LUN-CA) were forced to halt production in July after heavy snow and rain and power outages. Both companies slightly cut 2026 production guidance and the Chilean Copper Commission, cut its national 2026 forecast to 5.27 million tonnes, a 2.6% decline from 2025.  

In Africa, the impact on copper mining is still ahead of us. In the African Copperbelt, significant production depends on Kariba lake hydropower, which is filled by rain in the upper Zambezi basin and drawn down through the dry season. A severe drought would mean the impact on copper would be felt starting in March, 2027 should lack of hydroelectric power affect mine production. Many companies do have contingency plans in place. For example, First Quantum (FM-CA) has the ability to import much of its power needs from neighbouring companies, albeit at higher prices which add to mining cash costs.

In sum, El Niño is a short-term supply risk for copper. The Chilean disruption has largely played out, while Zambian hydropower risks from March 2027 are still ahead. Investors who want to reduce geopolitical and carbon risk can own copper recyclers rather than miners like Aurubis (NDA-DE), please see Dig, Squeeze and Recycle: Rewiring the Copper Market July 17, 2025.  Alternatively, investors can increase exposure to miners that have limited or no operations in Africa such as Freeport McMoRan (FCX-US), Lundin Mining (LUN-CA); they will benefit from a global rise in copper prices while avoiding production challenges related to the remaining Niño weather impacts.  

Trade #3: A Palm Oil Squeeze

 

Palm oil has one of the strongest documented links to El Niño, and its biology means the damage arrives late. Indonesia and Malaysia grow roughly 80% of the world’s palm oil, a crop that provides about a third of global vegetable oil. Palm is a perennial that cannot be replanted in response to a drought: water stress cuts the share of fruit-bearing flowers about two years before harvest and causes flowers to abort in the final months, so a dry spell depresses output across two seasons rather than one.

August rainfall across the palm belt was 53% below normal, and 2027 output estimates are down 4.0% in Malaysia and 3.0% in Indonesia. This is coming at a time when Indonesia’s new B50 biodiesel mandate adds a further claim on supply, with an estimated 35% of Indonesian output about to go to fuel. We therefore expect tightening of palm oil supplies, though it is hard to trade directly because parties that bear the loss are mostly outside our investable universe: smallholders with no price hedge, standalone mills squeezed on fruit costs, and low-income households in importing countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Nonetheless, the El Niño effect on palm oil (and other ag products) supports our house view that climate change and extreme weather is a structural driver of sustained food price inflation, and we have written extensively about the resulting margin squeeze for food manufacturers (please see Weather, Not War: Why Higher Food Inflation is Here to Stay October 15, 2026). Palm is a smaller input than cocoa, sugar and dairy for companies like Mondelez (MDLZ-US) and Hershey (HSY-US), but it is hard to replace in confectionery and bakery fats and it adds to an ingredient basket where costs are already rising. Both companies also face deforestation and sourcing scrutiny, a separate regulatory and reputational exposure. We maintain our negative stance.

If any investor has the scale and resources to build adaptation exposure deliberately, it is Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM). The fund manages about NOK 22,700bn, holds 7,077 companies in 54 countries and owns an average of 1.2% of each. Its returns therefore rise and fall with the global economy and climate rather than with any single company. Like many peers, NBIM has raised climate issues with companies since 2006, and its mandate has treated climate change as an investment risk since 2022. It is also a useful case study because it publishes its holdings, allowing us to measure what it owns rather than estimate its exposure. NBIM’s 2030 Climate Action Plan shows how a leading owner approaches adaptation. One priority is a stronger focus on nature, physical climate risk, adaptation and resilience. The fund stress-tests its equity portfolio against extreme climate scenarios and conducts physical-risk analysis of real assets. It has also added government bonds to its analysis and created a climate focus list that includes physically vulnerable companies while bringing adaptation more explicitly into engagement meetings. Even so, many of these actions remain geared toward climate risk management and mitigation, with limited detail on capital allocated directly to adaptation. Many institutional climate strategies have the same limitation because they were built around decarbonisation targets and stewardship rather than adaptation.

In past notes, ‘Climate Change and Strategic Asset Allocation‘ (August 24, 2022), we argued that climate belongs in long-term capital market assumptions, with inflation, especially food inflation, the main channel and a case for more inflation-protected and natural-resource assets. Moreover, our ‘Weatherproofing Portfolios: Resilience as the New Alpha‘ (September 11, 2025) and ‘Adaptation Investing: Survival of the Funded‘ (May 7, 2026) notes showed private adaptation finance at only about 0.5% of climate finance, kept low because adaptation pays in avoided losses, not cash flows. Today’s note looks at how to take climate adaptation into SAA a step further.

How we measure exposure: the SMS Climate Adaptation Index

To measure exposure to climate adaptation, we use the SMS Climate Adaptation Index, a rules-based thematic index built in four steps. We first define five drivers that frame the theme: water and flood resilience, urban and built environment resilience, grid and energy resilience, agriculture adaptation, and climate risk intelligence and insurance. We then screen a developed-market all-cap universe for companies whose reported revenues align with products and services tied to those drivers, using revenue data classified into granular business activities rather than broad sector codes. Our research team adds a bottom-up review where disclosure is thin, and the final portfolio applies controversy and other responsible-investment screens, then weights companies by free-float market cap with a 5% cap per name. The index holds 72 companies, 71 of which are priced: 15 in water and flood, 18 in urban and built environment, 14 in grid and energy, 12 in agriculture and 13 in climate risk intelligence and insurance. The index measures what a company sells, not how it describes itself, which gives peers a transparent yardstick.

NBIM’s 1.3% of NAV is low only against a deliberate allocation, not against the market. For its part, the SMS index covers about 1.6% of the free-float value of the MSCI ACWI IMI, and NBIM holds it at 1.8% of its equities, at or slightly above market weight and more than twice its unlisted renewable infrastructure (0.5% of NAV). The gap is therefore one of intent: a benchmark-hugging fund owns the theme in proportion to its small market size, so only an explicit mandate can raise it. Looking at recent performance, the SMS Climate Adaptation Index has tracked the MSCI World (URTH) closely in recent months.

Against the SMS index, NBIM holds 62 of the 71 priced names, worth about NOK 290bn, or 1.3% of the fund, so the companies are in the portfolio and the exposure is incidental. Market-cap weights put about 40% of that exposure into four industrial giants and 46% into grid and energy, against 31% in the SMS index, while water and flood account for 4% against 10%. A peer with a global market-cap equity book should expect a similar tilt.

What peers stand to gain: a better-diversified equity book, not a storm shelter

Measured against a replica of NBIM’s equity mix, the SMS index adds breadth, inflation sensitivity and a small-cap tilt, while giving up low volatility and commodity exposure (see figure below). Those loadings come mostly from the companies rather than the weighting. For a pension plan with inflation-linked liabilities, allocating to an index such as the SMS Climate Adaptation Index could broaden and diversify the fund’s equity exposure. In 2022, when equities and bonds fell together, the index lost far less than global equities, although that year sits within a hindsight-biased sample.

The table shows what a move toward higher targets would have produced over ten years. The result hinges on how much of the index’s excess return persists, and the record is a flattering, hindsight-biased sample led by Quanta Services (PWR-US), which gained more than 2,000%. At 5% of assets, the added return ranges from 0.16 pp a year if none of the SMS Climate Adaptation Index’s excess return persists in the future to 0.27 pp at full persistence, or roughly USD 160m to 270m a year per USD 100bn before costs. The benefit shrinks toward zero if the excess return vanishes.

The climate adaptation index will not shelter a portfolio from a potential financial storm. Its downside beta is above 1, and it has no significant loading on agriculture, duration or commodities, the channels used in NBIM’s extreme-weather scenario. A larger allocation would therefore lose slightly more than equities in that shock. What it offers is diversification and a modest return improvement, paid for in tracking error, which for a fund on a tight risk budget is the binding constraint.

 

 

 

Sustainable Market Strategies has a long-standing, high-conviction structural view that climate-linked supply disruptions in key agricultural inputs are a structural, not transitory, phenomenon and that food inflation will chronically outpace other inflation categories. Indeed, we view the effects of climate change – including eroding soil fertility, water constraints, pest outbreaks and volatile weather patterns – as the main drivers of a sustained increase in food costs globally.

However, in recent months, risks around the cost of food have been focused on the impacts of politics and geopolitics. For instance, much has been made about fertilizer supply constraints due to the shutting of the Strait of Hormuz as well as global diesel shortages that make food transport far more costly.  In today’s Note, we answer top questions about what truly matters for the outlook for global food supply and related investments.

Question 1: What Is the Impact of the Iran War on Food Prices?

 The closing of the Strait of Hormuz has created supply chain agony for many of the world’s largest industries, not least of which is diesel. Diesel prices surged due to constrained refining capacity in the middle East, and the food sector is highly exposed: in the U.S., transportation costs in the food supply chain accounts for 9 % of retail food cost (over 70 % of food relies on trucks to transport from farms, wholesalers, retailers, and eventually to consumers).  Historically, a 10% rise in diesel price has been associated with about a 0.15% rise in U.S. food prices six to twelve months out, but diesel is up more than 100% this year, which points to a further 0.5 percentage point still to come.

Along with diesel disruptions, the Iran War has also affected fertilizer supply. Farmers rely on three primary nutrients: nitrogen (in the form of urea and ammonia), phosphorus (phosphate) and potassium (potash).

In 2023, imports from the Gulf accounted for about 17% of U.S. phosphate supply and 12% of urea supply. Fertilizer shipments through the strait are currently near zero. The table below shows that prices for phosphate still reflect this, while urea has returned to January levels.

Sulphur, a secondary macronutrient along with calcium and magnesium, has become a fourth point of concern this year. Gulf producers supply roughly half of seaborne sulphur, global elemental sulphur exports fell by about a third in the first half of 2026, and sulphur is the feedstock for the sulphuric acid used to make phosphate.

Fertilizer accounts for between 15% and 35% of total farm expenses and a spike in these input costs can significantly harm profitability. However, fertilizer is a relatively minor expense by the time our food gets to the grocery store. The U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Dollar Report measures costs of food by attributing the shares of value to different sources the food supply chain. The table below shows where one dollar of spending on food “goes”, whether it be at grocery stores or restaurants. Fertilizers are listed as part of “agribusiness” which accounts for only 3 cents of every dollar we spend at the grocery store. 

Fertilizers are listed as part of “agribusiness” which accounts for only 3 cents of every dollar we spend at the grocery store.  

Note that other fertilizer prices have been stable over the past year. About 25% of all fertilizer used is potash, virtually all of it imported from Canada. Canadian potash is exempted from tariffs and despite Trump’s desire to import more from Belarus, geopolitics are unlikely to change the pricing markedly in the near future. Overall, rising fertilizer and diesel prices do exert upward pressure on food bills, but most of the pain is felt far earlier in the supply chain.

 

Question 2: What Do Rising Fertilizer and Fuel Costs Mean for Sustainability?

When input prices rise, the normal economic reaction is to explore efficiency gains or substitutions. Witness the rise in heat pump sales (energy efficiency) and solar panel installation (substitutes) as a reaction to the 2022 fossil fuel price spike during the first year of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which have led to permanent reductions in fossil fuel dependence.

We are pessimistic that current price dynamics will lead to improved sustainability outcomes in agriculture. Although there are reports that farmers have reduced fertilizer use in 2026 as a reaction to costs, it is most likely short-term rationing rather than a structural change. For example, cutting phosphate and potash creates a two-to-three-year gap before yield losses appear; this is soil mining, not a durable reduction in dependence.

Moreover, after the last surge in fertilizer prices in 2022, there was no meaningful move away from fertilizer and move toward precision tools or regenerative farming. Unlike for solar panels and heat pumps, where the payback period of investing in new energy systems is dropping thanks to improved technology and green energy subsidies, alternatives to heavy fertilizer use have been slow to develop. Indeed, payback periods for investment in precision tools and regenerative farming are far longer than the short-term loss in crop yields from temporary fertilizer reductions. Even worse, current incentives favor dirty farming techniques: as we wrote in our 2022 note (Biodiversity: Valuing the Invaluable, March 31, 2022), 90% of global subsidies given to farmers every year are considered harmful to the environment, including subsidies for fertilizers and pesticides. In other words, agricultural policy is blunting the price signal from the spike in fertilizer prices.

Question 4: If Fertilizer and Fuel Don’t Matter for My Grocery Bill, What Does?

 In the table below, we use the CPI Food categories published by the BLS to highlight those foods with the greatest price rises over the past five years. Readers can see in the final column that climate change and weather – and to a lesser extent tariffs – are driving food price increases.

When climate change affects a specific crop for one or two seasons, it is relatively easy for consumers to find substitutes. However, the list above demonstrates that the impact of extreme weather and climate change is becoming broad and sustained.

How To Invest for Rising Food Prices?

Our approach is to avoid the headline trade and own the businesses that benefit from scarcity of climate-resilient supply, while staying underweight packaged food companies whose margins are squeezed from both sides. The obvious response to a food inflation story is to buy staples with pricing power or to buy fertilizer producers on the Strait of Hormuz disruption. We would not do either, for the reasons set out above: fertilizer and diesel are cyclical and reversible, whereas weather-driven costs and shortages are not, and consumers may have run out of tolerance for further price increases.

Stay underweight margin-exposed branded food. Input costs for cocoa, coffee, sugar and packaging are rising while volumes face structural pressure. As we argued in our June 18 note, “Big Food Goes on a Diet,” food prices will rise while branded manufacturers’ margins fall. We maintain our short views on Mondelez International (MDLZ-US), Hershey (HSY-US) and Pepsi Co (PEP-US), all of which are exposed to crops with supply constraints (cocoa and sugar). A 2026 rally in raw sugar prices has not yet reached U.S. shelves, because U.S. quotas and tariffs insulate the domestic market, but it is a 2027 cost risk.

From an asset allocation perspective, there is a strong likelihood that rising food costs related to climate change will add to structurally higher generalized inflation. Our conclusions from our strategic allocation work in 2023 (Climate Change and Strategic Allocation, August 24, 2023), still hold: investors should consider greater allocation to natural resource assets.

A core principle of economics is that scarcity drives price. But several environmental assets are currently running counter to this principle. As we wrote in Environmental Assets in Short Supply (October 9, 2025), “many environmental assets have not re-priced in times of scarcity or are simply not priced at all.” We have tracked environmental scarcity across seven distinct resources since 2018:

 

Three Investment Strategy Pillars

For each of the resources described above, our research has implicitly relied on the same three pillars to find investable equity opportunities within environmental assets in short supply.

 

We mapped our equity coverage against this framework of beneficiary, solver and protector. The table below highlights sample companies with high revenue alignment to each of the scarce environmental assets and pillars.

The result is a diversified universe, albeit one that is weighted toward Beneficiaries. This is not a surprise: investors can easily buy a phosphate miner or a timber REIT when they expect the price of the underlying commodity to increase. However, it is more difficult to buy exposure to wetland restoration, aquifer recharge, or pollinator habitat protection, since financial vehicles to do so are not prevalent. Indeed, the Protector role has the lightest coverage of our three pillars: where restoration and conservation activity exists, it is overwhelmingly private, philanthropic or embedded as a minor revenue line inside diversified conglomerates (certification bodies, testing labs, satellite monitoring firms) rather than expressed through dedicated public companies.

Why This Matters Now

We believe that two developments in the past eighteen months – the buildout of AI infrastructure and the increase in global trade barriers – have made it more relevant for investors to consider the supply-side of physical inputs within equity portfolio construction.

Regarding artificial intelligence, AI data center buildout is simultaneously accelerating demand for water (cooling load), copper (grid and data center wiring) and critical material (rare earths used in photonic chips for AI data centers and 6G networks). The AI buildout comes on top of what were already separate scarcity stories with independent underlying drivers. Take water. Agriculture usage and more frequent droughts had already been pushing pressure on utilities and industrial companies to improve water efficiency as articulated clearly by executives at Schneider Electric. Water cooling demands from AI act to accentuate these forces and it’s happening across other environmental inputs like rare earths, copper, etc.

Meanwhile, supply side constraints are also occurring due to geopolitics. A less friendly global trade backdrop means that both raw inputs and finished goods flow less freely at a time when greater raw materials are needed to build domestic capacity (reshore). China’s April 2025 rare earth export restrictions provided a glimpse of the potential for supply chain disruption in strategic sectors like defense and technological infrastructure.

Sustainability-oriented equity mandates have spent a decade building around a practical constraint: ESG data for small cap companies is less available and less reliable than its large cap counterparts. Third-party ratings agencies often concentrate their analytical resources on large caps, where disclosure is richer and the revenue-per-company economics make coverage worthwhile. The consequence has been a structural underweight in small caps across ESG portfolios that is a data artifact rather than a deliberate investment judgment.

Over the twelve months ending June 30, 2026, that underweight cost money. The Russell 2000 returned 40% and in the first half of 2026 alone, the Russell 2000 outperformed the S&P 500 by more than 12 percentage points, its best start to a year since 1991.

The deeper issue for sustainability mandates is that low scores and missing scores are treated as equivalent signals of ESG risk, when in most cases they reflect nothing more than the disclosure practices of a company with less staff dedicated to the investor relations function.

We propose a different entry point: rather than relying on ratings coverage that does not exist, we identify small cap companies where observable, verifiable sustainability events have recently occurred or are imminent – first ESG reports, CDP initiation, SBTi validation, board-level governance upgrades, etc. These triggers do not require proprietary data infrastructure. They require reading company filings, sustainability reports, and proxy statements, which is what active small cap managers already do. The re-rating that follows is systematic and documented: research published in 2025 found that MSCI ESG rating changes drive abnormal returns over multiple months after the change, with institutional investor repositioning as the primary transmission mechanism.

The implication is actionable: in small caps, identify the companies that are publishing the required data and own them before the agencies react.

 

The Investment Thesis

When a company improves its sustainability posture in a material, verifiable way, the re-rating tends to follow a predictable sequence. First, the company appears in sustainability-focused screening databases (MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, ISS) with an upgraded score. This typically takes 12 to 24 months from the triggering event. Second, institutional mandates with ESG minimum screens begin to include the name in their eligible universe, generating incremental demand that is largely independent of traditional fundamental catalysts. Third, coverage by sustainability-focused analysts follows, compounding the effect.

Companies know that improving their sustainability posture is good for their stock price; the survey results showed in the chart below highlight that companies believe the main opportunities related to ESG ratings are acquiring and retaining interest in their stock.

It is logical that the re-rating premium would be amplified in small caps relative to large caps because the starting ownership base is dominated by generalist managers who have not priced sustainability improvement into their valuation. There are some practical signals that investors can track to anticipate a re-rating:

Where to Look

The most fertile ground for the improvers investment thesis sits in sectors where SASB-defined material sustainability topics are operationally manageable at scale for a small company, but where disclosure has historically been minimal. Industrial services, specialty chemicals, and building products are all areas where energy intensity, waste management, and worker health and safety are financially material (under SASB) and operationally addressable without the capital requirements that make transition difficult. A small industrial company that installs remote energy monitoring across its facilities, reduces its recordable incident rate, and publishes a first SASB-aligned sustainability report is doing all three things at once – and doing them in a way that is both financially rational and likely to trigger a meaningful ESG re-rating within two years.

The Counter-Argument

A skeptic may point to three things that undermine the arguments above:

These are real risks, but they can be mitigated by concentrating on companies whose underlying operational improvements are genuine and financially material, rather than those pursuing disclosure as a cosmetic exercise. For example, an emissions intensity trend that tracks with capital investment in energy efficiency is credible, while an emissions intensity trend that appears only in the sustainability report – without corresponding capex – is not.

Investment Implications

For small cap equity managers, a systematic scan for the leading indicators listed above (sustainability report publication, CDP participation, SBTi commitment, and board changes) applied across the portfolio universe can generates a watchlist of names likely to re-rate within 24 months.

In the section below, we highlight companies that qualify for a “sustainability re-rating” based on the criteria identified above.

 

Small Cap Sustainability Improvers Ripe for Re-Rating

  1. Onterris Inc (ONT-US)

Market cap: $750M | SASB sector: Waste Management / Environmental Services

Onterris, an environmental and engineering consulting firm, had its near-term SBTi target and long-term net-zero target formally validated by the Science Based Targets initiative in early 2025. SBTi validation is arguably the most credible sustainability event a company can execute. Ratings agencies like MSCI operate on annual review cycles, meaning a company that validates SBTi targets today is unlikely to see a formal rating upgrade until the next scheduled assessment, usually annually.

Onterris has published annual SASB-aligned sustainability reports for three consecutive years and participates in CDP. Revenue approached $900M in 2025 and 2026 guidance is above that level. The business is growing into the disclosure infrastructure rather than shrinking, which gives the rating upgrade a durable foundation.

It is also worth noting that until recently, the company operated under the name Montrose Environmental Group, but rebranded as Onterris in April 2026. Corporate identity resets of this kind often precede a broader ESG narrative refresh and tend to attract new analyst attention. 

  1. Dexterra Group (DXT-CA)

Market cap: CAD $880M | SASB sector: Professional & Commercial Services / Industrial Support Services

Dexterra provides supports services for the creation, management and operation of infrastructure. The company published its first-ever comprehensive, GRI-aligned sustainability report in March 2025, including a quantified Scope 1 and Scope 2 baseline following the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard. Prior reports were informal communications without a quantified emissions baseline.. Importantly, the business is financially robust: Q1 2026 revenue grew 15% year on year, and earnings beat estimates by approximately 40%. This removes the risk that sustainability commitments get deprioritized because of financial stress.

  1. John B. Sanfilippo & Son (JBSS-US)

Market cap: ~$990M | SASB sector: Processed Food

JBSS, a leading American processor of tree nuts and related snacks, has quietly built one of the more comprehensive environmental disclosure programs among U.S. food small caps without having published a formal consolidated sustainability report. The company participates in CDP across all three disclosure streams simultaneously (climate change, water security, and forests), which is rare at this market cap. The company discloses scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. In fiscal year 2025, total emissions intensity declined 8.3%. The company updated its Environmental Policy in May 2024, conducts water risk analysis using WRI’s Aqueduct Atlas across all six production facilities, and holds Energy Star Partner of the Year recognition. It reached 89.5% recyclable packaging by weight. SASB material topics for processed food (energy, water management, packaging waste, food safety) are each being actively addressed. The re-rating catalyst here is specific: MSCI and Sustainalytics currently rate JBSS without a published PDF sustainability report to anchor on, meaning the quantitative data sitting on its website is likely being partially discounted or missed. Publication of a first formal consolidated report would immediately elevate the company’s data quality score.

  1. Ag Growth International (AFN-CA)

Market cap: CAD $450M | SASB sector: Industrial Machinery & Goods

AGI makes grain handling, aeration, and storage equipment, placing it in a sustainability-adjacent commercial position (food security infrastructure) that creates natural demand for ESG transparency. Their 2024 Sustainability Report, released in June 2025, was the first to include a SASB Index and a standalone TCFD-aligned supplemental disclosure, neither of which appeared in the 2023 report. This is a meaningful escalation from narrative-only sustainability communication to framework-indexed disclosure, which is exactly what most ratings agencies require to move from qualitative to quantitative scoring. The Board operates a Governance and Sustainability Committee. On the quantitative side, AGI set a target in 2023 to reduce Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions intensity by 25% by 2030 against a 2021 baseline; in 2024, it had already achieved a 16% reduction, keeping the trajectory on track. Safety performance improved sharply: lost-time incident rate down 46% and total recordable incident rate down 49% year on year, both SASB material metrics for this sector.

It is important to note that the names highlighted here are cited uniquely based on an expectation that financial market participants will latently give credit to their sustainability efforts; For example, AGI carries a highly leveraged balance sheet and has been under financial stress from agricultural equipment cycle headwinds: the sustainability re-rating is an independent catalyst, but the equity thesis depends on stabilization of the underlying business.

In the table below, we summarize the main sustainability re-rating triggers for the aforementioned companies, plus six more that we believe could benefit from the same dynamic.

Our climate trajectory is now less about what happens if we fail to act and more about how severe are the consequences of the warming already set in motion. Floods, droughts, wildfires, and extreme storms have become present and worsening conditions under which economies, infrastructure, and communities must now operate.

The disconnect between this physical reality and the structure of global capital allocation remains striking: we have noted several times that climate finance has remained overwhelmingly oriented toward mitigation – reducing the emissions that drive further warming – while adaptation, the work of hardening systems against the disruption already underway, continues to attract a fraction of what the scale of the problem demands.

Why is it so difficult to attract capital to climate adaptation solutions? Mainly because it collides with one of the oldest problems in economics: the public goods problem. The benefits of resilient infrastructure – a coastal flood barrier, a drought-resistant water system, an upgraded stormwater network – are largely non-excludable: once built, they protect everyone in the area regardless of whether they contributed to the cost. Private capital cannot capture all of that diffuse value because not all of the beneficiaries will have clean contractual relationships with the investor that built the asset. This is not a market failure that better pricing will fix; it is a structural feature of the asset class that requires public capital to bridge.

A second problem is that climate adaptation investments generate value as avoided costs rather than as positive cash flows. A seawall that prevents hundreds of millions in annual flood damages is enormously valuable but not necessarily as a revenue line for the infrastructure owner. Contrast this with mitigation: a solar farm sells electricity under a long-term power purchase agreement; a carbon capture project generates credits that can be sold on carbon markets. Both produce a monetisable cash flow stream that private capital can underwrite. Adaptation tends to produce the absence of losses that would otherwise have occurred, which is more difficult to price, attribute, and securitise.

 

Adaption and National Security: Two Sides of the Same Coin

The notion that climate adaptation infrastructure is a public good has strong overlap with national defense. Consider what national security requires: a standing army, a naval fleet, an intelligence apparatus, a cyber defense infrastructure. None of these generate a commercial return and none have a paying customer, and yet no serious observer argues that national defense should therefore go unfunded.

This logic has become more acute in an era of accelerating deglobalization. As we documented in previous notes (for example, please see Shift Happens: From Globalization to Reshoring, August 14 2024), the post-Cold War assumption that global interdependence would provide security through mutual economic dependency is being challenged. As we discussed in A Matter of National Security, November 2, 2022, the war in Ukraine revealed how in Europe, governments that had outsourced their energy security to global markets found themselves exposed in ways that no amount of financial hedging could address. Since then, the national security prerogative has intensified for an ever-expanding list of countries; perhaps most notable is the attention accorded to Mark Carney’s “middle power” speech at Davos earlier this year.

The same lesson now applies to climate resilience; a nation whose water supply is degraded by prolonged drought, whose food production is disrupted by extreme heat, whose coastal infrastructure is periodically overwhelmed by storm surge, or whose power grid fails under unprecedented thermal load is suffering more than just an economic inconvenience, it weakens a nation’s ability to defend itself and to act autonomously.

This is not a new concept: in 2007, the term “threat multiplier” was coined by the U.S. Department of Defense and in 2014, climate change was formally designated as a threat multiplier. The most recent DoD climate adaptation plan covers the 2024 -2027 period (although the current administration dismisses global warming). The Pentagon historically funded these plans because the operational exposure is real and quantifiable. In other words, climate adaptation can now be seen as functionally inseparable from national security – therefore the intellectual case for public capital in adaptation is already settled.

Capital Needs a Counterparty

If climate adaptation – or national security – needs are public goods then it’s no wonder public capital should be involved, just like all previous public goods challenges that have been tackled at scale. The interstate highway system, municipal water and sewage networks, electrical grid buildout, are almost never financed purely by private markets; the return structure of public goods investments requires a counterparty willing to absorb diffuse social benefits.

Earlier this month, we addressed the public-private-partnership (PPP) model Outsourcing the Sovereign: The PPP Bailout, April 23 2026). We argued that PPPs were becoming increasingly necessary because governments around the world simply do not have the fiscal fortitude to undertake major works projects without private participation. The global infrastructure funding gap – the difference between what is being spent and what is needed – is projected to reach $15 trillion by 2040 and simply cannot be closed by the public sector alone.

In the case of climate adaptation infrastructure, the PPP model is especially symbiotic: governments may lack the funds to build the required infrastructure, but the private sector lacks the revenue structure to make the investment viable.

An example where this works well is in Australia. The AquaSure consortium built and operates Victoria’s desalination plant under a formal PPP structure. The plant was designed as a drought-proof water supply for Melbourne and Geelong – a rainfall-independent source that complements reservoir storage during dry periods. Melbourne Water, a government entity, pays AquaSure a fixed fee of A$608 million per year for 27 years regardless of how much water is actually ordered – the government pays for the availability of drought-proof water, not for the water itself. The private sector financed construction, bears operational risk, and maintains the asset; the public sector bears the water demand risk and pays for the public good of water security. The model has been criticized during wet years when the plant sits idle and payments continue but this misses the point; the payment is the insurance premium for drought resilience, not a payment for water delivered.

A second model is to have a dedicated public investment vehicle. The most tempting shortcut for governments facing large public goods funding gaps is to eye the pools of long-term capital already sitting in national pension systems and attempt to redirect it toward national priorities, whether it be climate adaptation, defense, or something else. Several governments have acted on this instinct:

Governments are increasingly building separate, dedicated vehicles with explicitly different mandates, and to invite pension capital into those vehicles as a willing commercial co-investor rather than a conscripted one. For example:

In each case, pension funds participate as co-investors on commercial terms, attracted by the de-risked deal structures that public anchor capital makes possible.

Global governments have hit a structural fiscal wall. Advanced economies are carrying debt loads that would have been considered a sovereign crisis scenario twenty years ago. Japan has long since departed the realm of conventional fiscal analysis with its 215% debt-to-GDP ratio. Rather than unwinding this burden in the years following the pandemic, governments doubled down with stimulus packages, energy subsidies, and increased defence spending. Now, with interest rates firmly in the “higher for longer” camp, compounding debt service costs is turning this burden into an active crisis.

To make matters worse, governments are currently facing four compounding pressures with no cyclical release valve. Entitlement obligations from an aging population are accelerating against a shrinking tax base, while geopolitical reality has locked in permanent, irreversible defence spending floors. Furthermore, the massive fiscal overhang of the pandemic remains entirely unresolved. Crucially, the era of zero-interest rates that made this leverage manageable has ended. Today, OECD governments spend more on debt service than on defence. In the United States alone, interest payments consumed nearly $1 trillion in 2025. That is money that does not build a single hospital, repair a single bridge, fix a school, or connect a single household to clean water.

Because sovereign balance sheets are now increasingly captured by these legacy obligations, the resulting fiscal deficit is massive. The global infrastructure funding gap – the difference between what is being spent and what is needed – is projected to reach $15 trillion by 2040. The post-war model in which the sovereign state financed, built, and operated public infrastructure is, in most of the world, functionally over.

Private Capital Enters the Chat

When governments cannot write the cheque, they turn to the private sector. This is not a new phenomenon – infrastructure privatization has been happening in waves since the 1980s – but the scale and urgency of the current moment are genuinely without precedent. The fiscal constraint is no longer a temporary condition to be managed through one or two budget cycles; it is a permanent feature of the sovereign landscape.

Private capital can participate in infrastructure through several distinct models, each with a different logic and a materially different risk-return profile.

The PPP model stands out because it is the model that resolves the core problem most directly. The government needs infrastructure it cannot afford to build – and maintain. The private sector gets a long-term contract backed by a sovereign counterparty. Risk is allocated to whoever can best manage it: construction and operational risk to the developer, demand risk either shared or retained by the state depending on the structure.

After a brief COVID-induced pause, global PPP deal flow has accelerated through its previous 2018 ceiling.

The regional breadth of the recovery is telling: Sub-Saharan Africa posted a 133% increase year-on-year, Europe and Central Asia 91%, and Latin America and the Caribbean 36%. In the United States alone, 36 states now have dedicated P3 enabling legislation, up from fewer than 15 a decade ago. The UK’s National Wealth Fund, launched in 2024, has an explicit PPP co-investment mandate. The G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment targets $600 billion in private infrastructure mobilization by 2027. The trend is structural, it is broad-based, and it is accelerating precisely when government balance sheets are least able to offer an alternative.

Beyond the Toll Booth: The New Face of PPPs

The PPP model has existed in modern form since the late 1980s, when developing countries began reversing decades of nationalization. In its early incarnation, it was almost exclusively about economic infrastructure: telecom licenses, power purchase agreements, and toll road concessions. In the World Bank’s PPI database, transport and telecom together accounted for over 60% of all private infrastructure investment through the 1990s.

In the early 2000s, the introduction of the availability payment (AP) model – where governments pay a fixed fee for the private sector to design, build, finance, and operate social infrastructure – opened the doors for PPPs to manage hospitals, schools, prisons, and courthouses.

Post-2010, low-carbon projects in the World Bank PPI database outnumber conventional ones by more than two to one (1,915 low-carbon vs. 815 conventional).

The sector diversification is now visible even in a single market snapshot. In Europe in 2024, education PPPs doubled in project count year-on-year (15 transactions versus 8 in 2023). Italy completed the first sovereign data centre PPP in European history, with €331 million in EIB financing for digital cloud infrastructure serving Italian public administration. The UK closed a €605 million district heating network PPP. The old caricature of PPPs as a motorway financing mechanism for governments that cannot be bothered to collect tolls themselves has been thoroughly overtaken by events.

The SDG Multiplier Effect

For a sustainability-minded investor, the PPP landscape presents an immediate challenge: not all PPP concessions are created equal through an impact lens. A managed toll lane serving commuters in Texas or Melbourne is, without question, a sound investment. The cash flows are contracted, the regulatory framework is mature, and the inflation linkage is explicit. But it would be a stretch to characterize it as SDG-aligned infrastructure. The user is, in most cases, a private motorist with alternatives. The social additionality is limited.

This matters because the case for infrastructure as a sustainable asset class rests on considerably broader foundations. As we documented in our October 2023 note, Inflation-Proofing and SDG-Boosting, research published in Nature Sustainability (Thacker et al.) found that infrastructure either directly or indirectly influences all 17 SDGs, encompassing 121 of the 169 targets – 72% of the entire SDG framework. More pointedly, for five SDGs – SDG 3 (Good Health), SDG 6 (Clean Water), SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities) – every single target is influenced by infrastructure investment.

Infrastructure, in other words, is more than an inflation hedge or a portfolio diversifier. When properly targeted, it is the most direct mechanism available to listed equity investors for deploying capital toward global sustainability commitments. The question is not whether to invest in infrastructure, but which infrastructure.

Toll roads in advanced economies and airports serving leisure tourism in mature markets are excluded from our focus – not because they are poor investments, but because they do not represent the category of infrastructure where the PPP growth wave is most pronounced, nor where the impact additionality is most compelling. Our attention is concentrated on operators and developers whose PPP concession pipelines are anchored in social infrastructure (healthcare, public transit, sanitation, water access) and environmental infrastructure (clean energy, waste treatment).

First Responders to the Infrastructure Deficit

The five operators and developers we favour share three characteristics that distinguish them from the broader infrastructure universe: their revenues flow predominantly from government counterparties under long-term concession or availability-payment structures; their pipelines are expanding, not managing decline; and their assets serve populations where private capital is genuinely additional – not merely convenient.

Acciona (ANA-ES) is the most diversified single expression of this thesis. Its Pernambuco water and sanitation concession – €2.38 billion, 35 years, seven million people in one of Brazil’s poorest states – is the largest SDG 6 PPP transaction closed by any listed company in 2025, and it sits alongside São Paulo Metro Line 6, renewable energy transmission concessions in Peru and Australia, and an active bid pipeline in US managed lanes. Acciona’s EBITDA from concessions grew 103% in FY2025. The market continues to price it as a construction company. Veolia (VIE-FR) completes the environmental picture on the water side: as the world’s largest operator of municipal water systems under delegated public service contracts, it holds the most geographically diversified portfolio of government-backed water PPP revenues available in listed equity markets, spanning France, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.

Sacyr (SCYR-ES) occupies the social infrastructure end of the spectrum that most sustainable infrastructure portfolios systematically miss. Hospital PPPs – availability-based, long-duration, government-backed – are structurally identical to road concessions in their cash flow profile but carry materially stronger SDG 3 alignment. Sacyr has been winning them consistently across Spain, Chile, and Colombia while simultaneously developing water treatment PPPs and bidding US managed lane concessions. Ten new concession wins in 2024–25 across five countries. It is the most prolific listed PPP developer by contract count, in an investment category that most European fund managers have never analyzed.

In Brazil, Motiva (MOTV3-BR) brings urban mobility into the mix. Beyond its four major highway concession wins in 2024–25, Motiva operates São Paulo’s Metro Line 4, the Salvador metro, and multiple BRT corridors – giving it genuine SDG 11 exposure in Brazil’s most underserved urban centres, in a market where the federal government’s R$1.7 trillion infrastructure programme is generating the deepest PPP deal flow of any emerging economy.

Finally, Mota-Engil (EGL-PT) occupies territory no other listed operator will enter: road concessions in Angola and Mozambique, the Lobito Corridor railway maintenance agreement running to 2054, and the operating contract for Luanda’s new international airport. Africa’s infrastructure deficit is the largest in the world. Mota-Engil is, for now, one of the few listed companies being paid to close it.

The EBITDA margin column deserves careful reading. Motiva at 46% reflects a fully concession-derived business: government-contracted revenues, limited variable costs, predictable cash generation. Sacyr at 27% carries a residual construction division that blends the number down, though 93% of its EBITDA originates from concession assets. Acciona and Veolia, both near 15%, operate larger services and construction platforms alongside their concession portfolios.

The group trades between 5.1x and 8.4x EV/EBITDA, which is modest given the contractual duration and government-backed nature of the revenues. Mota-Engil at 5.1x carries a construction multiple, not a concession one. The Lobito corridor, the Luanda airport, and the Santos-Guarujá tunnel generate no visible premium in the current price. Whether that gap closes as concession EBITDA matures is the core of the investment thesis.

Dividends are a hallmark of infrastructure investing, and two distinct approaches appear in this table. Veolia’s 4.3% yield reflects a mature portfolio of long-term municipal service contracts generating stable, predictable cash flows that management is comfortable distributing. Acciona’s 1.9% reflects a deliberate choice to retain capital: with Pernambuco, Metro Line 6, and a €301bn project pipeline actively consuming investment, the priority is deployment over distribution. Both are rational strategies given where each company sits in its concession development cycle.

Acciona has returned roughly 120% over the two-year period shown, against 40% for the MSCI World and mid-single-digit returns for Veolia and Mota-Engil. Acciona’s re-rating reflects the market finally pricing diversified concession pipelines correctly. Sacyr’s recent upward break suggests this recognition is spreading.

When it comes to water risks, investor attention has increasingly gravitated toward the water intensity of artificial intelligence and data centers. This is perhaps unsurprising – financial markets tend to overweight fast-growing, uncertain risks, particularly when tied to new technologies. Based on estimates from the IEA and company disclosures, data center water usage represents well below 1% of industrial demand and a negligible share of total consumption. But data centers are often in direct competition with municipal water needs, making them prime political fodder. And while forecasts project water demand rising with the expansion of AI, we think data centers are a red herring: solutions exist and economic incentives to curb water use are falling into place. Water usage in data centers is a relatively small problem and one that is highly investable.

Conversely, agriculture dominates global freshwater withdrawals, accounting for roughly 70% of usage, and is uniquely exposed to both chronic scarcity and acute volatility. There is no substitute for water in the food supply chain, which creates systemic and underappreciated risks – the problem is vast but direct investment opportunities are limited.


Water Terminology

To understand where real water scarcity risk sits, one must first distinguish between consumptive and non-consumptive water use. Consumptive use represents water effectively removed from the hydrological system – absorbed by crops, evaporated, or incorporated into products – not to be replenished on any reasonable timeline. Non-consumptive use involves withdrawals largely returned to the same watershed, typically at a different time, temperature, or quality.

Agricultural water use is consumptive. Most industrial processes and data centers are non-consumptive.

From a purely volumetric perspective, agriculture exerts a far more structural and cumulative pressure on freshwater resources than any industrial or municipal user. Non-consumptive use is not benign – discharge timing and quality create real localized constraints – but consumptive use drives long-term, system-level scarcity risk. This is the foundational distinction that investor discourse around AI water has almost entirely overlooked.


Data Centres: An Exaggerated Water Risk?

Data center water usage is by and large non-consumptive. In a recent by Global Water Intelligence webcast, analysts quantified the water impact of 30 minutes of AI usage at 616 ml – of which 91% is returned and only 9% consumed. So why has data center water use become such a point of contention? The answer lies in geography: data centers and municipalities frequently draw from the same local freshwater systems, creating direct competition for shared resources in basins where even non-consumptive competition matters.

Data center sites are typically selected based on power availability and cost, land and permitting feasibility, proximity to clients, and fiscal incentives. Water availability is a tertiary concern at best – which is precisely why data centers so often end up in water-stressed areas. To assess the full footprint, three components must be considered:

Power generation accounts for a remarkable ~74% of total data center water usage. Since most U.S. data centers are powered by water-intensive fossil fuels (thermal power), significant reductions in AI’s water intensity could be achieved simply by switching to renewable energy – solar and wind are among the least water-intensive generation types.

Semiconductor manufacturing requires ultrapure water, produced at a ratio of up to 4m³ of feedwater per 1m³ of output. Fabs cluster in Taiwan and the U.S. Southwest – water-stressed regions chosen for infrastructure access, regulatory incentives, and supply chain proximity, not water availability. Because fab relocation is effectively impossible, there is a strong economic incentive to innovate in large-scale water reuse and zero-liquid-discharge (ZLD) systems. The ultrapure water ecosystem spans large, diversified players (Ecolab ECL-US, Xylem XYL-US) and high-purity specialists (Kurita Water 6370-JP, Organo Corporation 6368-JP) that offer more targeted exposure.

Onsite cooling is increasingly shifting from air to liquid systems, improving water efficiency per unit of compute. We cover the liquid cooling investment landscape in detail in our note Hot Picks for the Heat Economy, August 7, 2025. Schneider Electric (SU-FR) and Vertiv (VRT-US) are the most liquid public-market expressions of this theme; several pure-play specialists remain private or have recently been acquired.

The data center water challenge is real but structurally tractable. The exponential demand growth that is frequently forecasted is avoidable: renewable energy, closed-loop cooling, and advanced water recycling together address the largest components of the footprint.

 

Water and Ag: The real risk

The scale of the structural imbalance in agriculture deserves more than a passing reference. The Ogallala Aquifer – underlying eight U.S. states from South Dakota to Texas and supplying roughly one-quarter of all U.S. agricultural water – has been declining since the mid-20th century at rates orders of magnitude faster than its natural recharge. In southwest Kansas, aquifer levels dropped 1.52 feet in 2024, and northwest Kansas saw a 1.34-foot decline, nearly three times its 2023 pace. As a result, some portions of western Kansas are estimated to have fewer than 25 years of viable groundwater remaining – a timeline well within most institutional investment horizons. The aquifer supports roughly 20% of U.S. wheat, corn, cotton, and cattle production.

The Ogallala is not an isolated case. Another example is India’s Indo-Gangetic Plain – producing most of the country’s wheat and rice – faces among the fastest groundwater depletion rates in the world. In each case, the political response has lagged the physical reality by years or decades. The investment risk is not linear depletion – it is the regulatory or physical threshold that forces a discontinuous adjustment in water allocation, land productivity, and input costs.

Unlike industrial or municipal demand, agricultural water use is poorly priced, weakly regulated, and highly sensitive to climate variability. Declining snowpack and shifting precipitation patterns are already eroding supply reliability – witness the current record early drought in the U.S., which is already wreaking havoc on expected crop yields for this year. These dynamics translate directly into yield volatility, rising input costs, stranded land values, and food price inflation.

We consider four partial solutions – pricing reform, precision irrigation, drought-resistant genetics, and dietary shift – none of which fully resolves the problem, but each of which carries distinct investment implications.

Pricing reform: Water is often the most efficiently addressed via pricing, and yet it remains the least taxed of all environmental inputs. For the one-third of the world’s irrigated crops, a credible price signal would rationalize allocation in ways that current subsidies suppress entirely. The investment implication is step-change risk: when allocation tightens abruptly – as it did in Australia when water trading markets were forced into existence – the adjustment is sudden and disorderly, creating stranded asset risk for water-intensive operations and opportunity for efficiency providers. That said, water demand has proven considerably less price-elastic than carbon (see our note Portfolio Strategy With (Water) Constraints, October 30, 2025): pricing reform is necessary but not sufficient, and investors should not expect it to function as a clean market-clearing mechanism.

Precision irrigation: With or without price signals, precision irrigation reduces consumptive losses through evaporation and runoff. Advanced sensors and data analytics determine optimal timing and volume per plant; drip systems can reduce agricultural water use by 30–50% relative to flood irrigation. The technology is commercially proven. Valmont Industries (VMI-US) and Lindsay Corporation (LNN-US) offer the most direct listed exposure in center-pivot and smart irrigation systems, respectively; Netafim (Orbia subsidiary) leads in drip irrigation but is not independently listed.

Drought-resistant seeds: The commercial genetically modified (GM) seed market is overwhelmingly oriented around herbicide tolerance (HT) traits – not water efficiency. Over 90% of U.S. cotton and large shares of corn and soybean acreage carry HT traits that have no meaningful impact on water demand; their bundled seed-herbicide business models actively reinforce chemical input dependency. Genuine drought-resistance traits – which improve water-use efficiency through stomatal regulation and root architecture modifications – remain a small and largely pre-commercial segment, estimated at ~$136M globally in 2024. Investors should not assume that exposure to major agri-science companies confers meaningful exposure to the water-efficiency solution set. Screen specifically for companies with commercially deployed drought-tolerance products whose revenue model does not depend on maximizing chemical input sales alongside them.

Dietary shift and alternative protein: The most structurally impactful lever on agricultural water demand is diet. Producing one kilogram of beef requires approximately 15,000 liters of water, compared to 1,500–2,000 liters for wheat. Even modest population-level shifts in protein consumption would dwarf the aggregate impact of precision irrigation and GM seed programs combined. For investors, dietary shift is not a direct pure-play water thesis – but it surfaces a critical risk screen. Consumer staples companies with heavy exposure to beef and feed grain supply chains, without credible transition strategies toward lower-water-intensity proteins, carry embedded and underpriced water transition risk. Diversified food companies with growing alternative protein exposure (Nestlé NESN-CH, Unilever ULVR-GB) offer partial alignment with this transition, though dedicated pure-play public-market liquidity in alternative proteins remains limited. The FAIRR Initiative’s  water-stress screening framework for livestock supply chains is the most rigorous tool available for applying this lens directly to portfolio holdings.

Few moments may feel less “sustainable” than a Trump-led government waging a war in the Middle East. Most people will agree that Trump’s second stint in the White House has been remarkably controversial — though perhaps not for the reasons one might expect. The U.S. president has rolled back major environmental policies, ignited a conflict without clearly communicating the strategic objective, and unleashed AI technologies without giving too much thought to its societal consequences. Yet, in a twist reminiscent of the early 2020s, Trump is now indirectly fueling an uptrend in equity prices of many companies that fit squarely within sustainability portfolios.  

After a strong run in the early 2020s, sustainability had become a fatigued investment theme between 2022 and 2025, with a few exceptions, such as nuclear energy and grid plays. Whereas the pre-2022 wave of enthusiasm centered on EVs strongly participating in the energy transition (witness the run-up in stock prices like Tesla and ChargePoint) and themes such as plant‑based food (Beyond Meat, Oatly), this new cycle is being driven by transition-oriented segments such as solar, grid infrastructure, batteries, and transition materials.

With the exception of food sustainability, most SMS environmental themes have outperformed the MSCI World ACWI since April 2, 2025 — the day Trump announced that his economic agenda would once again unleash the U.S’. “animal spirits”.

A look at the composition of these themes shows that they are mostly tilted toward industrials and transition plays, explaining their resilience in the current environment -whereby a rotation away from AI and tech appears underway.

In this context, our alternative energy theme (top ten equal-weighted companies per SMS theme average) has performed strongly – but certain names appear expensive, especially as grid and AI-related investments have dominated investor attention over the past year. Looking at materials in particular, the AI and Grid themes have pushed multiples of companies producing copper and nickel to record levels.

A Look at SMS’ Resilient ‘Nuggets’

Looking at SMS’ long universe of 500+ investable names out of the MSCI World Index, we find a few interesting plays which have derated perhaps a bit too much considering their fundamentals amid current technological and economic tailwinds. What’s more, these names remain on the margin of the AI trade – i.e. they’ve either somewhat already derated because of the software-to-AI rotation and remain relatively immune from a further markdown in AI-related plays.

LKQ — One of the world’s largest automotive recyclers. LKQ’s industry‑leading car‑part sorting technology should help consumers extend the life of their vehicles, particularly in an environment of elevated fuel and car prices amid persistent inflation. The stock is trading near recent lows, offering attractive upside potential.

Autodesk — Despite suffering from a rotation away from software toward AI, Autodesk remains deeply embedded in engineering workflows. While AI will without a doubt reshape its business, it will more likely be integrated into existing processes than replace them. Autodesk offers a compelling entry point, supported by strong ROE and a growing water‑efficiency business — increasingly valuable in a world where water assets are becoming scarce and pricier.

Kepco Electric — Korea’s main electric utility. The country remains a major industrial hub and stands to benefit from its renewed alignment with the U.S. Like other Korean equities, Kepco trades at a low P/E despite a stable economic backdrop and global momentum behind nuclear power – including from sustainability-minded investors who now consider nuclear as a sustainable power source.

WSP — The world’s largest engineering. As Europe, the U.S., and Canada strengthen their push for a more resilient economic foundation, WSP is well positioned to play a central role.

Alstom — The global leader in rail solutions. Alstom stands to benefit from its sizable backlog and the growing need to refurbish and expand rail infrastructure worldwide.

LG Energy Solutions — A key battery supplier to major automakers. The slowdown in U.S. EV manufacturing appears mostly priced in. Elevated energy prices should support the broader EV ecosystem, where sentiment has turned excessively negative. LG Energy Solutions also benefits from the expansion of its energy‑storage division.

Sustainability shifting toward the “Resiliency Trade”

Finally, a notable feature of Trump’s second term is the shift from the early‑2020s sustainability narrative to one centered on resiliency. Many companies and investors have adjusted their framing accordingly, often without altering their actual strategies. Aside from a few U.S. automakers withdrawing from EV development — at a time when gas prices have reached five‑year highs (see our February 26 note, Detroit Goes Into Full Reverse) — SMS themes have largely stayed true to their underlying objectives despite this new investment regime.

In reality, resiliency is not so different from sustainability. It refers to an organization’s ability to withstand shocks, adapt to structural change, and preserve long‑term value creation. For investors, this spans several dimensions:

Markets are increasingly rewarding companies capable of navigating environmental, regulatory, and economic disruptions while capitalizing on innovation and the transition to a low‑carbon economy. As such, resiliency is not merely a defensive trait — it is becoming a driver of durable returns and downside risk mitigation. This dynamic explains why the Industrials and Materials sectors align well with the sustainability–resilience nexus.

As an example of how this also translates into the political sphere, energy efficiency is being promoted as a nation-building priority in countries like Canada. Many other countries are reviving energy-saving policies that were enacted during the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In Asia, work from home policies are increasingly promoted as one way to save fuel. So it seems that resiliency is the new yet less politically loaded word for sustainability.