Personalization – the use of machine learning models trained on individual-level data to tailor a product, prediction, or treatment to a specific person rather – is not a single phenomenon that artificial intelligence applies uniformly across the economy. Its success is governed by three measurable variables: 1. the cost of acquiring data, 2. the cost of a wrong prediction, and 3. the speed of the feedback loop between action and outcome.

Health care is simultaneously the sector with the strongest scientific justification for personalization and the sector most prone to expensive overpromising, since the same conditions that make personalization valuable also make it slow, costly, and difficult to validate.

Why Personalization by AI isn’t Fungible Across Sectors

The “personalization of everything” narrative incorrectly suggests that Netflix’s recommendation engine, Amazon’s product suggestions, and an AI-matched cancer therapy as points on the same continuum. Media and retail personalization succeeded quickly and cheaply because the underlying data is abundant and continuously regenerated by user behavior, a wrong recommendation costs the company almost nothing (the user simply scrolls past it), and the feedback loop between a suggestion and its outcome is measured in seconds. An industry like precision agriculture occupies a middle position: sensor and satellite data are becoming cheap, but the feedback loop is a full growing season, and an error costs real yield, which is why adoption has been steady rather than explosive.

Health care sits at the opposite pole: clinical and genomic data are expensive to generate, fragmented, and constrained by privacy regulation that has no analogue in ad-tech: a wrong prediction risks patient fatality rather than simply waste an advertising impression. In addition, the feedback loop connecting a treatment decision to its true outcome, survival, recurrence, or long-term toxicity, can run into years, far too slow to train and correct a model the way a recommendation algorithm corrects itself in real time.

Health care outcomes are surely one of the most impactful use for artificial intelligence, with personalization an important pathway. Earlier this summer, financial participants confirmed this view: in August, Moderna stock surged because its personalized mRNA cancer vaccine – AI helps identify the right targets for each patient – showed success in a pivotal trial. Of course, the story is larger than AI in medicine: investors cheered because it provided clinical validation that mRNA can work in cancer, not just infectious diseases.

Whether the optimism is warranted is yet to be seen, as real-world failures also do exist: between 2025 and 2022, IBM spent roughly $4 billion building Watson Health on the premise that a system trained the way Watson beat Jeopardy! could generalize to oncology. Internal documents later showed the system generating “unsafe and incorrect” treatment recommendations, with failures traced directly to training on a small number of synthetic cases that reflected one hospital’s practice patterns rather than diverse, real-world outcomes data. IBM sold off the unit’s data and analytics assets in 2022 for roughly $1 billion, a fraction of what had been invested.

Nonetheless, it’s becoming clear that artificial intelligence has the potential to personalize treatments and therefore significantly improve outcomes in a high impact sector like health care. Today’s Note identifies the companies and investment opportunities related to this theme.

 

Health Care Personalization: Who Does What

To evaluate “AI plus health care”, we immediately notice that a lower risk strategy is to own the “picks and shovels” (or infrastructure) of personalized medicine rather than the biotech companies that own the therapies. The table below highlights why this is the case, but put simply, biotech companies own the regulatory and clinical risk and commercial risk whereas the suppliers of the inputs to the final drug treatments, i.e. the picks and shovels, are relatively shielded from these unknowns.

 

Below, we separate the three layers that must each work for personalized medicine to reach a patient: the data that makes personalization possible, the software and diagnostics that turn that data into a decision, and the manufacturing capacity that actually produces a personalized product at scale.

 

1. Data Generation

When it comes to personalized medicine, the first step requires data generation companies that produce the raw genomic, single-cell, or spatial biology data, through sequencing instruments and sample-preparation tools, that all downstream personalization applications depend on. The clearest illustration of the importance of this layer occurred in August 2026, when Merck (MRK-US) and Moderna (MRNA-US) reported the first positive Phase 3 result for any individualized neoantigen therapy, in resected melanoma. The therapy is, in effect, one drug per patient: each dose requires that bioinformatics pipeline that selects which specific mutations to encode. This essential manufacturing input enables the therapy to exist and falls outside the category of discretionary diagnostic tests subject to payer discretion. Two companies in this space stand out:

 

2. Data-to-Decision

Data-to-decision companies turn raw data into an actionable clinical choice, such as which diagnostic test result, drug, or dose is right for a specific patient. This is the layer generating the most investor attention, partly because of its reliance on AI in specific products and partly because the category has adopted “AI” as a branding convention. The companies doing this work have divergent financial profiles, making for a tricky backdrop for investors:  

 

 

 

3. Manufacturing at Scale

Manufacturers physically produce personalized or small-batch biologic therapies (mRNA vaccines, cell and gene therapies). This is the bottleneck that determines whether personalized medicine can move beyond rare-disease niches into broader clinical use.

Bespoke, per-patient biologic manufactured in small batches is the structural opposite of the blockbuster-drug economics that built the modern pharmaceutical business model.

 

The summary table above shows the large dispersion in the financial performance of the major actors in health care personalization. Revenue growth, gross margin, and profitability vary significantly; owning a basket of companies may be a more appropriate strategy than bearing single name risk.

With AI agents now roaming the virtual corridors of the services industry, it’s fair to ask how far this technology ultimately displaces workers across finance, legal, accounting, and HR functions at larger organizations. Agentic AI platforms let firms create and train agents in a way that effectively builds “digital twins” of entire services’ workforces. Where firms used to add headcount, often through temp staffing agencies, they can now nurture agents natively trained on their own context and workflows. In this not-so-utopian world, now at our doorstep, it’s fair to wonder whether temp staffing companies retain a durable role, and whether the sector’s historically controversial labor model becomes a smaller share of how large employers fill gaps.

The most rigorous data point on employer intent comes from the Adecco Group’s Workforce Trends 2026 Report, a survey of roughly 2,000 C-suite executives and 37,500 workers across 13 countries. Forty-five percent of business leaders expect AI agents to be fully integrated into workflows within twelve months, yet only 36% say their talent strategy clearly communicates that AI will create opportunities for employees rather than displace them, and just 22% are confident they are building the digital capabilities their workforce actually needs.

The gap cuts the other way too: 70% of non-managerial employees say they would be comfortable collaborating with AI agents, compared with only 39% of leaders who believe their staff feel that way. The implication is that AI agent execution risk sits with management confidence and change management, not worker resistance. PwC’s AI agent survey corroborates this pattern: 75% of executives report confidence in their AI agent strategy, but describe the near-term effect as redeploying staff to new tasks rather than eliminating headcount outright. Census Bureau firm-level tracking adds a useful reality check: among companies currently using AI, 87% report it displaces only a small number of tasks, with large-scale task replacement still confined to under 1% of firms.

Taken together, the evidence does not support a clean substitution thesis in which AI agents are displacing temporary or contingent labor at scale today. Instead, it points to a slower, uneven redesign of work in which the binding constraint is organizational trust and skills investment, not the technology’s raw capability to replace tasks currently filled by temp staffing.

Build vs. Buy, and the “Enshittification” Risk

Outsourcing to temp staffing versus building in-house AI agents is a classic build-versus-buy tradeoff, with each option carrying a distinct risk profile rather than one being categorically superior. Temp staffing converts labor into a variable cost, transfer screening, compliance, and turnover risk to the agency, and, critically, carries a network effect: a temp worker arrives having already seen how dozens of other employers solve the same problem, so each placement imports cross-company best practice and gives the employer an external market check on quality. A temp’s output is benchmarked against a market rate and a market skill pool, and underperformance is cheap to terminate.

In-house AI agents have no equivalent mechanism. They are trained and reinforced almost entirely on one company’s own data, KPIs, and management preferences, so they tend to optimize for pleasing the existing hierarchy rather than for ground truth. The upfront cost is largely sunk (data infrastructure, fine-tuning, integration, governance), but the marginal cost of each additional task approaches zero once built, which is the entire investment case for agentic automation. The catch is that there is no natural market discipline, forcing a reset the way a temp worker’s next assignment does. An agent fine-tuned on a company’s own historical decisions and success metrics will tend to reproduce and amplify that company’s existing blind spots and internal politics.

For investors evaluating a company’s AI agent buildout, the diligence question is not simply how much capex is going into it, but whether implementing agents can occur while avoiding enshittification – the idea that your employees start drinking the corporate kool aid a bit too much, i.e., whether the company has built independent evaluation benchmarks, external data grounding, and adversarial red teaming to substitute for the cross-employer network effect that in-house agents structurally lack.

ESG: The Temp Staffing Risks that AI Agents Sidestep

Temp staffing practices typically split legal employment (the agency) from operational control (the client), which creates accountability gaps. For instance, temp staffing companies have been historically accused of precarious pay and hours, wage theft, discrimination, weak safety training for high-risk placements, and even recruitment-fee debt bondage or forced labor among migrant workers, alongside erosion of union bargaining power. These risks translate financially into litigation exposure, joint-employer liability, regulatory fines, higher insurance costs, and lost contracts, especially as supply-chain due-diligence rules tighten globally. By deploying AI agents in lieu of temp workers, a company can sidestep this entire risk category.

How Big is the Temp Market, Really?

Temp employment peaked at 2.5% of total U.S. non-farm employment in 2020 and now stands at roughly 1.5% of the employed workforce. With job openings now back near 2019 levels, the current low level of temp staffing may be explained as much by the temporary sluggishness of the broader job market as by any AI-driven substitution effect.

Looking at the past six months, BLS data offers a more nuanced picture than the popular “AI is gutting white-collar jobs” narrative suggests: temp staffing employment has in fact increased by 34,800 jobs (+1.4%).

That said, there is considerable dispersion across industries. Temp staffing for financial activities and information services show genuine, broadening contraction, down 57,000 (-0.6%) and 35,000 (-1.2%) respectively over six months. This contraction is concentrated in insurance carriers, credit intermediation, and computer systems design, precisely the automatable back-office and technical functions linked to the fastest AI adoption rates. Legal services and accounting, by contrast, show no aggregate displacement at all: legal payrolls are up 11,300 (+0.9%) and accounting is roughly flat over the same window. Healthcare remains the only sector still driving overall job growth (+2.9% YoY through March 2026, across all healthcare employment, not just temp placements), while temp staffing specifically has stabilized after last year’s slide, both supporting the case that clinical staffing demand is more insulated from AI substitution than white-collar temp placement. The Dallas Federal Reserve and Anthropic research suggest the likely explanation is that AI’s labor impact so far shows up as a freeze in entry-level hiring, associates, junior auditors, rather than incumbent layoffs, a dynamic that is invisible in aggregate industry headcount data but very real for the cohort it affects.

Agents Are Priced In

Publicly listed temp staffing companies have derated substantially over the past year and underperformed the broader indices. Thin profit margins, flattening revenue growth, and a slower overall job market have taken the air out of the post-Covid staffing bubble.

Within the group, Robert Half looks most vulnerable to agentic AI, given its strong exposure to back-office financial functions, precisely the roles most likely to be automated within the next five years. AMN Healthcare, by contrast, provides staff that remain far harder to replace given the clinical nature of the work, which should make it more resilient to AI displacement, at least until humanoid robotics make meaningful inroads into care settings.

From an operational standpoint, most staffing firms now have an explicit AI strategy, often centered on using AI tools to streamline their own HR and placement processes. In addition, they will increasingly compete for client budgets with management consultants and IT integrators, which are also pitching “build your agentic workforce” engagements to the same corporate buyers, as the strategies highlighted in the table below suggest.

Equity market participants have reacted quickly to the disruption narrative. Short interest in Robert Half has reached 24%, reflecting a deep-seated conviction that AI will permanently erode demand for white-collar placement services, even as domestic staffing trends are inflecting toward recovery, a combination that could set up a short squeeze as sentiment catches up to improving operational realities. ManpowerGroup carries more moderate short interest of roughly 15%.

The Paradox at the Heart of the Grid

AI is both a source of the problem and the most credible solution to it. Global data center electricity consumption reached approximately 415 TWh in 2024, growing at 12% per year since 2017, and the IEA projects this figure could reach up to 1,200 TWh by 2030. A single AI-focused data center today consumes as much electricity as 100,000 households. At the same time, the electricity grid is increasingly unreliable: the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) flagged rising shortfall risk under both extreme and normal conditions in its latest Long-Term Reliability Assessment, and grid outages already cost U.S. businesses roughly $150 billion annually.

The irony is that the same computing paradigm generating this demand surge is also the most capable tool available to manage it. The question for investors is not whether AI will change how electricity is produced, distributed, and consumed. It will. The question is which companies in the stack are positioned to capture durable, recurring revenue from that shift.

 

Two Domains, Two Mechanisms

Grid Optimization

AI’s most direct contribution to grid efficiency operates at the level of real-time sensing, forecasting, and control. Smart meters and IoT sensors generate continuous operational data; AI algorithms process that data to build a live picture of grid state and issue control signals in milliseconds, far faster than human operators can respond.

The IEA’s 2025 “Energy and AI” report identifies AI-based fault detection as one of the highest-impact near-term applications, with documented reductions in outage durations of 30-50%. Given the $150 billion annual cost of outages, a 30% improvement represents tens of billions in recoverable economic value, even before accounting for carbon savings from avoided backup generation.

Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) represent the next frontier. These systems aggregate small-scale distributed resources, including behind-the-meter solar, batteries, demand-response loads, and EV chargers, and coordinate them through AI to respond to grid signals in real time. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that tripling VPP scale in America alone could reduce grid costs by $10 billion per year, primarily by deferring expensive peak capacity additions. As the share of intermittent renewables grows, the economic case for AI-driven aggregation and dispatch becomes progressively stronger.

Industrial Process Optimization

Industry and commercial buildings together account for roughly 64% of U.S. electricity demand, making them the largest addressable market for AI efficiency tools. Here, the applications are more granular but no less material. We see 4 key industrial sectors where AI could markedly optimize production and reduce energy costs:

Steel: Steel is an instructive case. ArcelorMittal (MT-US) partnered with energy AI specialist Energiency to deploy machine learning models that predict and control energy consumption continuously across its smelting operations, achieving 2-5% annual energy savings on an energy bill that represents roughly one quarter of total production costs. A separate deployment using C3.ai’s energy management platform at a different major steel producer generated $14 million in annual energy cost savings at a single hot roll mill, alongside a 40 MW reduction in monthly utility demand charges.

Cement : Cement, which another thermodynamically constrained industry, can also achieve more efficiency using AI. A 2026 peer-reviewed analysis found 3-9% net energy and CO2 reductions from AI-optimized kiln controls, after explicitly subtracting the energy cost of running the AI itself. For an industry running near thermodynamic limits, 5% is financially significant and competes favorably with far more expensive physical decarbonization options.

Cooling : For cooling and facility management, the IEA independently cites a 23% cooling energy saving from AI-optimized controls as a representative industrial deployment benchmark. Across optimizable industrial subsystems more broadly, documented savings commonly reach 20-30% of the targeted system’s energy consumption, though total plant-level savings are typically 5-15% given that no single subsystem represents the entire load.

Chemicals: Chemical production offers one of the highest AI optimization ceilings in heavy industry. Energy costs represent 40-60% of variable production costs at specialty chemical and petrochemical facilities, and process complexity (multi-variable reactor management, distillation train sequencing, heat integration across unit operations) creates exactly the conditions where narrow ML models identify non-obvious savings that rule-based controls miss. AI-optimized process control at chemical plants has demonstrated sustained energy reductions of 3-8% on targeted units, with the strongest results on distillation columns where temperature and pressure gradients interact in ways that respond well to continuous model retraining. At industrial scale, a 5% energy reduction at a large petrochemical complex running 200-400 GWh annually translates to $3-8 million per year at current industrial power prices, with no capital expenditure on physical equipment.

A useful way to frame AI’s efficiency contribution is to ask what energy is consumed by the AI relative to what it saves. The answer varies dramatically depending on the type of AI deployed, and investors who treat all AI as equivalent in energy intensity will systematically misread this opportunity.

Industrial process optimization does not rely on large language models. It uses narrow, purpose-built machine learning models, often small enough to run on edge hardware or modest on-premise servers. A factory consuming 100 GWh per year that deploys a continuous ML optimization model on local hardware might consume 0.01-0.1 GWh annually on inference. If that model saves 5% of plant energy, or 5 GWh, the implied leverage ratio is 50:1 to 500:1 in energy saved per unit of AI energy consumed. This is not marginal: it is strongly net positive, and it is precisely why the IEA’s analysis of well-scoped industrial applications concludes that AI is energy-additive rather than energy-neutral.

The energy paradox narrative applies to large language models and generative AI, where a single query consumes 3-30 times the energy of a typical web search, and training runs consume electricity equivalent to small towns. But these architectures are not what drives a cement kiln or optimizes a steel furnace. The AI that matters most for industrial efficiency is lean, specialized, and deployed close to the process. The companies building and selling that software are not competing against data center scale-up; they are competing against the baseline of unoptimized industrial operations, and winning.

Where the Investment Opportunity Sits

The most defensible long-term positions across this theme sit with the large-cap infrastructure companies in the coverage universe. Their combination of certified field service networks, multi-decade customer relationships, and systems integration depth creates a moat that pure software entrants cannot replicate quickly.

Schneider Electric (SU-FR) is the most fully integrated play in the coverage universe. Its EcoStruxure platform spans building management, grid automation, and industrial control as a unified software stack, and recurring software and services revenue is growing as a share of EBITA. The company’s dominant position in data center power distribution gives it direct exposure to the AI infrastructure build-out, independent of any efficiency software thesis.

GE Vernova (GEV-US) sells grid software through a customer base it already serves with physical grid hardware and services contracts, which substantially lowers sales friction. GridOS, GEV’s advanced distribution management system, addresses dispatch optimization, fault detection, and VPP orchestration directly, covering the three highest-value AI grid applications identified by the IEA.

Eaton (ETN-US) is the most hardware-proximate name in the group, but its power management franchise is increasingly software-defined. Its fastest-growing segments (data center and industrial power quality) are exactly where AI-driven efficiency generates the clearest and most measurable ROI for end customers.

ABB (ABBN-CH) brings the deepest industrial automation capability in the group. Its ABB Ability digital suite is most concentrated in process industries (chemicals, mining, pulp and paper) where energy optimization ROI is highest and willingness to pay for proven software is well established. ABB’s multi-year portfolio restructuring has improved capital returns without eroding its technical position.

C3.ai (AI-US) is the primary enterprise software plays with revenue concentrated in industrial energy management. C3.ai’s documented results in steel energy forecasting are among the most quantified in the public domain.

Itron (ITRI-US) and Landis+Gyr (LAND-CH) offer small-cap exposure to the smart metering and grid sensing layer, which is foundational infrastructure without which AI optimization algorithms have no data to work with. Landis+Gyr is exclusively a smart grid company; Itron earns approximately 67% of revenues from smart grid products. Both carry higher execution risk than the large-cap names, but provide concentrated exposure to grid digitization spending.

Vertiv (VRT-US) manufactures the thermal management systems and power distribution infrastructure that sit inside data centers and determine how efficiently electricity is converted into compute. As AI chips generate five to ten times more heat per rack than conventional servers, the hardware required to cool them becomes more complex and more expensive, expanding Vertiv’s addressable market with every GPU cluster installed.

The YTD performance dispersion within the coverage universe is instructive. Vertiv’s 75% gain reflects the market’s pricing of several years of AI cooling demand; the thesis is sound but execution risk is now fully reflected in the price. The large-cap infrastructure names (Schneider, GE Vernova, Eaton, and ABB) have been relative laggards and offer better risk-adjusted entry given backlog-supported earnings visibility and growing recurring revenue. The pure software layer (AI-US, AZPN-US) requires higher conviction on near-term revenue inflection; C3.ai in particular has not yet demonstrated a durable path to profitability despite strong individual customer case studies.

 

Sustainability-oriented equity mandates have spent a decade building around a practical constraint: ESG data for small cap companies is less available and less reliable than its large cap counterparts. Third-party ratings agencies often concentrate their analytical resources on large caps, where disclosure is richer and the revenue-per-company economics make coverage worthwhile. The consequence has been a structural underweight in small caps across ESG portfolios that is a data artifact rather than a deliberate investment judgment.

Over the twelve months ending June 30, 2026, that underweight cost money. The Russell 2000 returned 40% and in the first half of 2026 alone, the Russell 2000 outperformed the S&P 500 by more than 12 percentage points, its best start to a year since 1991.

The deeper issue for sustainability mandates is that low scores and missing scores are treated as equivalent signals of ESG risk, when in most cases they reflect nothing more than the disclosure practices of a company with less staff dedicated to the investor relations function.

We propose a different entry point: rather than relying on ratings coverage that does not exist, we identify small cap companies where observable, verifiable sustainability events have recently occurred or are imminent – first ESG reports, CDP initiation, SBTi validation, board-level governance upgrades, etc. These triggers do not require proprietary data infrastructure. They require reading company filings, sustainability reports, and proxy statements, which is what active small cap managers already do. The re-rating that follows is systematic and documented: research published in 2025 found that MSCI ESG rating changes drive abnormal returns over multiple months after the change, with institutional investor repositioning as the primary transmission mechanism.

The implication is actionable: in small caps, identify the companies that are publishing the required data and own them before the agencies react.

 

The Investment Thesis

When a company improves its sustainability posture in a material, verifiable way, the re-rating tends to follow a predictable sequence. First, the company appears in sustainability-focused screening databases (MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, ISS) with an upgraded score. This typically takes 12 to 24 months from the triggering event. Second, institutional mandates with ESG minimum screens begin to include the name in their eligible universe, generating incremental demand that is largely independent of traditional fundamental catalysts. Third, coverage by sustainability-focused analysts follows, compounding the effect.

Companies know that improving their sustainability posture is good for their stock price; the survey results showed in the chart below highlight that companies believe the main opportunities related to ESG ratings are acquiring and retaining interest in their stock.

It is logical that the re-rating premium would be amplified in small caps relative to large caps because the starting ownership base is dominated by generalist managers who have not priced sustainability improvement into their valuation. There are some practical signals that investors can track to anticipate a re-rating:

Where to Look

The most fertile ground for the improvers investment thesis sits in sectors where SASB-defined material sustainability topics are operationally manageable at scale for a small company, but where disclosure has historically been minimal. Industrial services, specialty chemicals, and building products are all areas where energy intensity, waste management, and worker health and safety are financially material (under SASB) and operationally addressable without the capital requirements that make transition difficult. A small industrial company that installs remote energy monitoring across its facilities, reduces its recordable incident rate, and publishes a first SASB-aligned sustainability report is doing all three things at once – and doing them in a way that is both financially rational and likely to trigger a meaningful ESG re-rating within two years.

The Counter-Argument

A skeptic may point to three things that undermine the arguments above:

These are real risks, but they can be mitigated by concentrating on companies whose underlying operational improvements are genuine and financially material, rather than those pursuing disclosure as a cosmetic exercise. For example, an emissions intensity trend that tracks with capital investment in energy efficiency is credible, while an emissions intensity trend that appears only in the sustainability report – without corresponding capex – is not.

Investment Implications

For small cap equity managers, a systematic scan for the leading indicators listed above (sustainability report publication, CDP participation, SBTi commitment, and board changes) applied across the portfolio universe can generates a watchlist of names likely to re-rate within 24 months.

In the section below, we highlight companies that qualify for a “sustainability re-rating” based on the criteria identified above.

 

Small Cap Sustainability Improvers Ripe for Re-Rating

  1. Onterris Inc (ONT-US)

Market cap: $750M | SASB sector: Waste Management / Environmental Services

Onterris, an environmental and engineering consulting firm, had its near-term SBTi target and long-term net-zero target formally validated by the Science Based Targets initiative in early 2025. SBTi validation is arguably the most credible sustainability event a company can execute. Ratings agencies like MSCI operate on annual review cycles, meaning a company that validates SBTi targets today is unlikely to see a formal rating upgrade until the next scheduled assessment, usually annually.

Onterris has published annual SASB-aligned sustainability reports for three consecutive years and participates in CDP. Revenue approached $900M in 2025 and 2026 guidance is above that level. The business is growing into the disclosure infrastructure rather than shrinking, which gives the rating upgrade a durable foundation.

It is also worth noting that until recently, the company operated under the name Montrose Environmental Group, but rebranded as Onterris in April 2026. Corporate identity resets of this kind often precede a broader ESG narrative refresh and tend to attract new analyst attention. 

  1. Dexterra Group (DXT-CA)

Market cap: CAD $880M | SASB sector: Professional & Commercial Services / Industrial Support Services

Dexterra provides supports services for the creation, management and operation of infrastructure. The company published its first-ever comprehensive, GRI-aligned sustainability report in March 2025, including a quantified Scope 1 and Scope 2 baseline following the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard. Prior reports were informal communications without a quantified emissions baseline.. Importantly, the business is financially robust: Q1 2026 revenue grew 15% year on year, and earnings beat estimates by approximately 40%. This removes the risk that sustainability commitments get deprioritized because of financial stress.

  1. John B. Sanfilippo & Son (JBSS-US)

Market cap: ~$990M | SASB sector: Processed Food

JBSS, a leading American processor of tree nuts and related snacks, has quietly built one of the more comprehensive environmental disclosure programs among U.S. food small caps without having published a formal consolidated sustainability report. The company participates in CDP across all three disclosure streams simultaneously (climate change, water security, and forests), which is rare at this market cap. The company discloses scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. In fiscal year 2025, total emissions intensity declined 8.3%. The company updated its Environmental Policy in May 2024, conducts water risk analysis using WRI’s Aqueduct Atlas across all six production facilities, and holds Energy Star Partner of the Year recognition. It reached 89.5% recyclable packaging by weight. SASB material topics for processed food (energy, water management, packaging waste, food safety) are each being actively addressed. The re-rating catalyst here is specific: MSCI and Sustainalytics currently rate JBSS without a published PDF sustainability report to anchor on, meaning the quantitative data sitting on its website is likely being partially discounted or missed. Publication of a first formal consolidated report would immediately elevate the company’s data quality score.

  1. Ag Growth International (AFN-CA)

Market cap: CAD $450M | SASB sector: Industrial Machinery & Goods

AGI makes grain handling, aeration, and storage equipment, placing it in a sustainability-adjacent commercial position (food security infrastructure) that creates natural demand for ESG transparency. Their 2024 Sustainability Report, released in June 2025, was the first to include a SASB Index and a standalone TCFD-aligned supplemental disclosure, neither of which appeared in the 2023 report. This is a meaningful escalation from narrative-only sustainability communication to framework-indexed disclosure, which is exactly what most ratings agencies require to move from qualitative to quantitative scoring. The Board operates a Governance and Sustainability Committee. On the quantitative side, AGI set a target in 2023 to reduce Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions intensity by 25% by 2030 against a 2021 baseline; in 2024, it had already achieved a 16% reduction, keeping the trajectory on track. Safety performance improved sharply: lost-time incident rate down 46% and total recordable incident rate down 49% year on year, both SASB material metrics for this sector.

It is important to note that the names highlighted here are cited uniquely based on an expectation that financial market participants will latently give credit to their sustainability efforts; For example, AGI carries a highly leveraged balance sheet and has been under financial stress from agricultural equipment cycle headwinds: the sustainability re-rating is an independent catalyst, but the equity thesis depends on stabilization of the underlying business.

In the table below, we summarize the main sustainability re-rating triggers for the aforementioned companies, plus six more that we believe could benefit from the same dynamic.

The sustainable investment industry has spent two years debating whether defence is a sustainable investment. That is the wrong question. Whether Rheinmetall qualifies for an Article 9 fund misses what actually matters: whether investors have the analytical tools to hold defence companies to account for what they make, who their customers are, and what happens when their products reach the battlefield. Responsibility, rather than sustainability, is the appropriate standard, and it is a more demanding one than any taxonomy classification.

Data published this month records 65 active armed conflicts in 2025, the highest count since records began in 1946, with 244,600 people killed in organised violence, the second deadliest total since the Rwanda genocide in 1994. Eight of those conflicts are interstate wars, the most since World War II.  

As a logical consequence, world military expenditure reached $2.8 trillion in 2025, up 41% since 2015, with forecasts pointing to $6.6 trillion by 2035. Europe’s ReArm Europe plan commits €800 billion; the United Kingdom has pledged 5% of GDP in defence spending by 2035. The capital flows are real, growing, and unlikely to reverse whether or not an Article 9 fund knows what to call them.

This note builds on the SMS framework introduced in our March 2025 note “The European Defense Offensive: From Peace Dividend to War Premium”, which identified five screening criteria (Controversial Weapons Exclusions, Allied Revenue Alignment, Government Independence, R&D Investment, and Strategic Defence Orientation) and a cohort of European specialists we termed the second wave.

Between July 2022 and the publication of our March 2025 European Defence Offensive, the SMS European Defence Specialists Basket delivered approximately 550% in total return. That performance continued for some time but has corrected heavily since the February 2026 peak. Over the fifteen months since publication, the basket, the S&P 500, and the American Defence Primes delivered 28%, 27%, and 25% respectively – effectively the same trade. The valuation re-rating of underowned European specialists as defence budgets re-accelerated is complete. The entry point that defined the first and second waves is gone.

The chart above is the investment case for this note: the opportunity that justified the first note has closed, and a new one has opened. What follows is where the next leg of returns will come from.

 

Red Lines That No Longer Hold

There was a time when a blanket defence exclusion was defensible. The sector consisted predominantly of identifiable end-products: tanks, artillery, fighter jets, submarines. Revenue streams were opaque but outputs were not. An investor that decided it did not want to own defence companies could draw a clean line around the category and walk away without much analytical strain.

That is no longer the case. The reason is dual-use, a property that once described finished technology products but now runs the entire length of the value chain, from raw materials to drones.

Upstream, the rare earth elements that power an EV motor, a wind turbine, or a smartphone are chemically identical to those in a drone motor, a missile guidance system, or an electronic warfare suite. Neodymium is neodymium. MP Materials (MP-US) is the only integrated rare earth mine and mill in the United States, indispensable to the domestic clean energy supply chain AND is simultaneously supplying the Pentagon under a ten-year offtake agreement backed by $400 million in government investment. An exclusionary policy that excludes MP Materials while retaining clean energy exposure would apply different standards to identical atoms depending on who writes the purchase order. Some investors will make that choice deliberately, as an expression of values. The point is that it is a values choice, not an analytical finding, and the clean line it tries to draw no longer maps cleanly onto the physical world.

Downstream, the same logic applies in reverse. The satellite constellation that provides broadband internet provides battlefield targeting. The AI platform that optimises logistics for a retailer optimises resupply for a military base. The same imaging system that monitors agricultural land monitors conflict zones. Revenue segmentation by end-use is rarely disclosed at the granularity a meaningful screen requires, and when it is, it rarely captures what happens to the technology once it leaves the company.

This is why the third wave which we discussed in this week’s note is different in character from the first and second.

The Rare Earth Elements (REE) Megatrend

Permanent magnets made from neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium are the enabling component in precision guidance systems, drone motors, missile actuators, electronic warfare equipment, and submarine propulsion. Demand for magnet rare earths has doubled since 2015, with defence among the structural growth drivers alongside EVs and wind. China processes approximately 85-95% of these materials at the midstream metallization and separation stage – a share the IEA projects will remain at 75% by 2035 even under an optimistic build-out scenario.

We have covered the OECD REE investment case in depth across three prior notes, beginning with “Critical Minerals, Critical Moves” (May 2025) and “Rare Opportunities in Rare Earths” (November 2025), and most recently in “From Transition Play to Arms Race: A Critical Materials Reset” (May 28, 2026) – published days before China’s June escalation. Readers seeking the full company-level analysis of the OECD REE basket should refer to these notes. What follows is specific to the defence demand driver and the regulatory timeline it has introduced.

That pressure reached a new peak just a couple weeks ago, in the week of June 15, 2026. The G7 set a target of no single country supplying more than 60% of each member’s rare-earth imports by 2030; the European Council proposed a formal de-risking mechanism; and China responded on June 22 with targeted export controls on US defence companies and rare-earth mining firms. Washington had already anticipated this: from January 1, 2027, a federal rule (DFARS) bans the Pentagon from procuring any system containing permanent magnets originating from China, a deadline China’s own controls have now made considerably harder to ignore. Active inventory depletion sharpens the timeline: the US has reportedly consumed approximately 45% of its Precision Strike Missile stockpile and 30% of its Tomahawk inventory, and restocking every unit requires REE-dependent components that cannot contain Chinese-origin material after that date.

The bottleneck is not mining but the midstream. A separation facility without downstream magnet makers has no local market, and magnet makers need committed offtake from defence, automotive, wind, and industrial customers simultaneously. The mine-to-magnet loop is only investable when all links close at once. The gap between stated policy ambition and physical processing capacity is precisely where the returns are.

The Investable OECD REE Basket

Most of the names below will be familiar to readers of our prior REE note series. Our conviction on the core positions is unchanged.

The three core positions remain MP Materials (MP-US), Lynas Rare Earths (LYC-AU), and Energy Fuels (UUUU-US). MP Materials is the only integrated US rare earth mine and mill, backed by a $400 million Pentagon investment, with REE separation commissioning at Mountain Pass by mid-2026. Lynas, the largest non-Chinese REE company at $13.5 billion, is completing its Texas REE separation facility with DoD funding. Energy Fuels received a $725 million conditional DoD loan commitment on June 18 and disclosed the $1.9 billion acquisition of Vacuumschmelze (VAC), the German precision magnet manufacturer. VAC holds existing qualification relationships with defence OEMs, bypassing the multi-year approval cycles new entrants face. The combined entity is the only OECD operation with a credible mine-to-magnet platform connecting US processing to European defence manufacturing. At $3.5 billion market cap, it looks underpriced relative to the strategic value of the VAC qualification book.

Two smaller names address specific gaps the core three do not cover. NEO Performance Materials (NEO-CA) is ramping its Estonia magnet factory to 2,000 tpa by end-2026, entirely outside Chinese processing influence. REalloys (ALOY-US) is building the largest REE metallization facility outside China in partnership with the Saskatchewan Research Council, with a 15-year offtake from the Tanbreez project in Greenland. It is important to note that REalloys came to market via reverse merger and is the highest-risk name in the basket. 5N Plus (VNP-CA) rounds out the basket with exposure to gallium, germanium, indium, and bismuth – the four materials subject to China’s August 2023 export controls and directly applied in compound semiconductors, radar, and night vision systems.

The REE basket has delivered; but unlike the European defence name re-rating, which converged to S&P 500 performance after March 2025, we do not believe this trade is over. The structural drivers – China’s escalating export control posture, a federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin magnets effective January 2027, and a supply chain buildout still measured in years rather than quarters – have not been resolved by the price action.

Third Defence Wave: Beyond the Primes

The REE basket addresses the supply side of the thesis. The names below address the demand side: platform specialists, systems integrators, and software-adjacent companies whose growth directly drives REE demand. What distinguishes them from the first and second wave is selectivity, not valuation re-rating – that trade is complete. Defence budgets are accelerating in unmanned systems, electronic warfare, naval domain awareness, and AI-assisted decision-making. The five names below are positioned where the spending is going and have not yet been fully absorbed by institutional capital.

 

Most of the basket has underperformed the MSCI World in the last year. That underperformance is the entry point, not a reason for caution.

The structural case has not deteriorated. It has strengthened. The Bundeswehr’s €100 billion fund is disbursing. NATO navies are ordering. The federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin rare earth magnets takes effect in seven months. Hensoldt and Renk enter this note’s coverage at a correction that their underlying order books do not justify. Booz Allen has been caught in the crossfire of US government IT spending reviews that are, by design, temporary.

The first and second wave re-rated on valuation. The third wave will re-rate on earnings, driven by a procurement cycle accelerating into the specific sub-sectors where these names face no credible competition from the large primes. The gap between the chart above and the order books behind these companies is where the next leg of returns is.

Few moments may feel less “sustainable” than a Trump-led government waging a war in the Middle East. Most people will agree that Trump’s second stint in the White House has been remarkably controversial — though perhaps not for the reasons one might expect. The U.S. president has rolled back major environmental policies, ignited a conflict without clearly communicating the strategic objective, and unleashed AI technologies without giving too much thought to its societal consequences. Yet, in a twist reminiscent of the early 2020s, Trump is now indirectly fueling an uptrend in equity prices of many companies that fit squarely within sustainability portfolios.  

After a strong run in the early 2020s, sustainability had become a fatigued investment theme between 2022 and 2025, with a few exceptions, such as nuclear energy and grid plays. Whereas the pre-2022 wave of enthusiasm centered on EVs strongly participating in the energy transition (witness the run-up in stock prices like Tesla and ChargePoint) and themes such as plant‑based food (Beyond Meat, Oatly), this new cycle is being driven by transition-oriented segments such as solar, grid infrastructure, batteries, and transition materials.

With the exception of food sustainability, most SMS environmental themes have outperformed the MSCI World ACWI since April 2, 2025 — the day Trump announced that his economic agenda would once again unleash the U.S’. “animal spirits”.

A look at the composition of these themes shows that they are mostly tilted toward industrials and transition plays, explaining their resilience in the current environment -whereby a rotation away from AI and tech appears underway.

In this context, our alternative energy theme (top ten equal-weighted companies per SMS theme average) has performed strongly – but certain names appear expensive, especially as grid and AI-related investments have dominated investor attention over the past year. Looking at materials in particular, the AI and Grid themes have pushed multiples of companies producing copper and nickel to record levels.

A Look at SMS’ Resilient ‘Nuggets’

Looking at SMS’ long universe of 500+ investable names out of the MSCI World Index, we find a few interesting plays which have derated perhaps a bit too much considering their fundamentals amid current technological and economic tailwinds. What’s more, these names remain on the margin of the AI trade – i.e. they’ve either somewhat already derated because of the software-to-AI rotation and remain relatively immune from a further markdown in AI-related plays.

LKQ — One of the world’s largest automotive recyclers. LKQ’s industry‑leading car‑part sorting technology should help consumers extend the life of their vehicles, particularly in an environment of elevated fuel and car prices amid persistent inflation. The stock is trading near recent lows, offering attractive upside potential.

Autodesk — Despite suffering from a rotation away from software toward AI, Autodesk remains deeply embedded in engineering workflows. While AI will without a doubt reshape its business, it will more likely be integrated into existing processes than replace them. Autodesk offers a compelling entry point, supported by strong ROE and a growing water‑efficiency business — increasingly valuable in a world where water assets are becoming scarce and pricier.

Kepco Electric — Korea’s main electric utility. The country remains a major industrial hub and stands to benefit from its renewed alignment with the U.S. Like other Korean equities, Kepco trades at a low P/E despite a stable economic backdrop and global momentum behind nuclear power – including from sustainability-minded investors who now consider nuclear as a sustainable power source.

WSP — The world’s largest engineering. As Europe, the U.S., and Canada strengthen their push for a more resilient economic foundation, WSP is well positioned to play a central role.

Alstom — The global leader in rail solutions. Alstom stands to benefit from its sizable backlog and the growing need to refurbish and expand rail infrastructure worldwide.

LG Energy Solutions — A key battery supplier to major automakers. The slowdown in U.S. EV manufacturing appears mostly priced in. Elevated energy prices should support the broader EV ecosystem, where sentiment has turned excessively negative. LG Energy Solutions also benefits from the expansion of its energy‑storage division.

Sustainability shifting toward the “Resiliency Trade”

Finally, a notable feature of Trump’s second term is the shift from the early‑2020s sustainability narrative to one centered on resiliency. Many companies and investors have adjusted their framing accordingly, often without altering their actual strategies. Aside from a few U.S. automakers withdrawing from EV development — at a time when gas prices have reached five‑year highs (see our February 26 note, Detroit Goes Into Full Reverse) — SMS themes have largely stayed true to their underlying objectives despite this new investment regime.

In reality, resiliency is not so different from sustainability. It refers to an organization’s ability to withstand shocks, adapt to structural change, and preserve long‑term value creation. For investors, this spans several dimensions:

Markets are increasingly rewarding companies capable of navigating environmental, regulatory, and economic disruptions while capitalizing on innovation and the transition to a low‑carbon economy. As such, resiliency is not merely a defensive trait — it is becoming a driver of durable returns and downside risk mitigation. This dynamic explains why the Industrials and Materials sectors align well with the sustainability–resilience nexus.

As an example of how this also translates into the political sphere, energy efficiency is being promoted as a nation-building priority in countries like Canada. Many other countries are reviving energy-saving policies that were enacted during the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In Asia, work from home policies are increasingly promoted as one way to save fuel. So it seems that resiliency is the new yet less politically loaded word for sustainability.

In just the last week, OpenAI (ChatGPT) has come under scrutiny for failing to report the Tumbler Ridge mass killer while Anthropic (Claude) was in a standoff with the U.S. government for refusing to remove restrictions on how the military can use its models; it may seem like the wild west in the AI industry.

To be sure, artificial intelligence capabilities are accelerating far faster than legal frameworks: in the U.S. and Canada, there are no federal regulations outlining any prohibitions on AI or surrounding the safety of the technology. The European Union passed the AI act in 2024, with most high-risk AI obligations only taking effect in 2027.

This leaves the private sector largely in charge of overseeing their own AI activities. While this may seem extremely imprudent, it creates a significant opportunity for the testing, inspection and certification (TIC) industry.

What is TIC?

The TIC sector consists of conformity assessment bodies who provide services ranging from auditing and inspection to testing, verification, quality assurance and certification. Many TIC companies were founded in the 18th and 19th century to provide information to shipping underwriters about the condition of ships and equipment. Today, TIC companies may be most associated with standards like ISO 9001, though their operations are far reaching and span across industries that are at the core of sustainability mandates: environmental protection, food, crop, health science, road safety, etc.

Indeed, we wrote about the sustainability merits of TIC companies in previous research (please see our note “Testing the (TIC) Market”, June 6, 2024). Given that TIC companies are paid to ensure the quality of others, it should not be a surprise that the household names in this industry have impeccable ESG records.

TIC companies – the majors include Bureau Veritas (BVI-FR), SGS (SGSN-CH) and Intertek (ITRK-GB) – are considered to operate in staid business lines; their stock prices tend to be highly correlated and have a beta to the global equity market of well under one. This is no doubt because many of the companies derive significant revenue from the public sector and because it is difficult to reduce expenditure on testing and assurance, even during economic downturns. These companies operate with high moats: relationships and reputation are crucial.

The TIC industry typically grows at a reliable 3 – 4% per year, avoiding major dips, but rarely experiencing excessive growth spurts; most third-party market insight reports forecast 3% CAGR for the 2026 – 2030 period. We believe these underestimate the role of AI, not least through novel new business lines like AI assurance.

TIC and AI: An Underpriced Opportunity

Historically, the TIC industry has thrived by monetizing both regulation complexity and safety requirements. AI is likely to massively increase both of these things as governments will eventually require proof that AI is safe, non-biased, cybersecure, and explainable. This creates a new industry involving the auditing of algorithms: AI assurance.

There are already new standards emerging for AI, such as ISO 42001, which is an ISO standard for AI management systems. Many TIC companies have received accreditation to certify companies under ISO 42001 thus enabling global AI audits.

Since the standard is relatively new – officially launched in December 2023 – no information is yet available on how many companies have implemented the standard. However, there are over 1.3 million companies that use ISO 9001, the global benchmark in quality management systems. The market size for AI management is likely to be equivalent.

TIC companies are just getting started when it comes to capitalizing on AI certification opportunities. SGS acquired AI certification specialist CertX in late 2024 specifically to build digital trust capabilities. They then joined NVIDIA’s Halos AI Systems Inspection Lab ecosystem, which is an inspection framework for physical AI systems (autonomous vehicles, robotics, industrial AI). The lab is intended to integrate functional safety, cybersecurity and AI assurance, provide standardized inspection reports and accelerate certification for AI systems globally,

Since NVIDIA cannot certify every AI system themselves without losing neutrality, independent certification via companies like SGS provides regulatory legitimacy, liability protection, and standardized compliance pathways.

SGS’ role is to verify that AI systems using NVIDIA platforms are safe enough for deployment: NVIDIA builds the AI engine and SGS certifies it is safe to operate in society.

In this sense, the potential role for TIC companies can be viewed as the equivalent of the big four auditors for accounting rules. Just like accountants, AI auditors will be needed across industries and sectors: AI deployment will likely require third-party verification across regulated sectors such as autonomous driving, medical AI, industrial robotics, defense systems, smart infrastructure, data centers, etc.

It is likely that established TIC companies will dominate the third-party verification (auditing) market because they already have accreditation authority, regulator relationships and global audit networks; they already have the credibility and reputation to provide this trust layer.

 

TIC Upside

Investors currently price TIC companies as slow industrial service providers, reflecting stable dividends and modest growth assumptions. But AI is opening new streams of revenue including recurring AI certification and embedded partnerships with hyperscalers like NVIDIA: TIC entities may just become mandatory infrastructure for AI deployment and regulation.

Indeed, once government regulations inevitably fall into place (e.g. the EU AI Act, automotive AI safety, etc.) demand for AI assurance services is likely to rise exponentially.

In this environment, a re-rating of TIC companies is possible with several possible triggers including:

Note that so far, our bullish case for TIC and AI outlined above only hinges on the possibility of new AI revenue streams becoming available. TIC companies present solid use cases for artificial intelligence given that most aspects of testing, certification and inspection involves processing large amounts of data; machine learning and computer vision are already automating high-precision inspections, predictive analytics are catching defects earlier and generative AI can streamline report generation and anomaly detection. In other words, we believe that AI assurance is additive to TIC revenues while traditional business lines will also benefit from productivity improvements.

Our thesis that AI will bring new revenue streams to TIC companies is not currently reflected in stock prices. The table below shows financial details of the three major TIC incumbents: SGS, Bureau Veritas and Intertek. Note that in all three cases, P/Es remain at the low end of their historic range – there has been no re-rating to date.

To be sure, these companies are just beginning to discuss the upside to their businesses. Below are highlights from recent earnings calls:

SGS: The company has a “digital trust” unit where management sees “demand for digital trust services particularly strong in the U.S., with significant requirements around cyber resilience, AI algorithm validation for bias, and compliance testing. SGS is investing in building new service offerings in digital trust through both organic development and strategic acquisitions, with this area representing a key component of the megatrends driving future growth”.

Bureau Veritas: the company achieved 30% organic growth year-on-year in data center activities and continues to benefit from the structural need for data center expansion driven by AI infrastructure buildup. “Bureau Veritas is building AI assurance capabilities to help customers verify and validate that AI models are aligned with their values and policies, compliant with legal frameworks, and responsive to stakeholder expectations, especially as the regulatory landscape around AI assurance evolves”.

Intertek: The company has launched an AI lab to support global teams to develop the right AI solutions for the business. The company believes “there is a significant opportunity to help clients manage risk associated with investment in AI, and has launched AI², an independent end-to-end AI assurance program to help customers operate smarter and safer with the right trust in AI algorithms”.

Note the recent stock performance of TIC companies in the chart below. Over the past two years, the companies that now seem destined to become the auditors of AI have massively lagged the AI producers and first users (tech companies). We expect a catch-up phase is ahead as investors recognize the role TIC companies will play in the AI supply chain. Note that Intertek looks like a particularly interesting buying opportunity; the company announced earnings earlier this week and investors did not like that the strengthening sterling against major currencies significantly impacted results. On a day when the FTSE was down sharply due to geopolitical turmoil (Iran), Intertek stock took an exaggerated dive which we believe makes an alluring buying opportunity.

In 2025, many ESG monikers like “greenwashing” and “net zero” fell by the wayside. However, a fancy term to describe accelerating inequalities has made its way into public discourse: the “K-shaped” economy refers to bifurcated labor, wealth and spending patterns, with the upper arm of the “K” representing wealthy asset owners and high-skilled professionals who are thriving, while the lower arm represents low-to-middle-income earners who are facing stagnant wages and rising costs.

As a result, differentiated spending patterns emerge and creates a stark contrast in prosperity across different groups within the economy.

The bland sobriquet – K-shaped economy – may lull some readers to sleep…but it shouldn’t. It’s just a polite way of saying that U.S. income and wealth inequality is accelerating.

Usually, in a “normal” recovery (V or U-shaped), all boats rise, even if the yachts rise faster than the rowboats. The harsh reality is that U.S. income and wealth inequality is accelerating and bringing it with alarming consequences.

What’s To Blame?

 There are three main factors that we highlight that are driving the divergence in income, wealth and spending:

 
1.
To Own or Not to Own?

The single largest driver of the K is the gap between those who own assets and those who rely solely on labor for income.

 

This is what the hard data tells us, but one can also see it the performance of stock prices.

For example, the media has already made much of the fact that Delta airlines stock have diverged markedly from their peers. This is in large part because the company has focused on higher-tier travel: the majority of their profits are now generated from business and first class tickets. Last year, sales of economy tickets contracted by 7% while premium ticket sales rose by 9%.  

Another example is the banking industry, where there have been clear winners from the “K” – those that cater to high-net worth individuals have seen their stock prices blast off in the past year, while lower tiered banks – those catering to a more diversified clientele – have lagged.

2. The AI Divide

Both the anecdotal and data evidence is making clear that the rapid adoption of Artificial Intelligence is creating a skills gap that serves to reinforces the K-shape.

For example, an analysis of how Anthropic’s chatbot Claude is used by businesses and consumers around the world suggests that richer countries are much more likely to adopt AI. Claude usage per capita remains highly uneven and strongly correlated with GDP, with currently no evidence that low-use countries are catching up.

Equally significant is who is using AI within countries. Research from Anthropic suggests that more educated users are reaping greater productivity benefits from AI because they can give AI chatbots more sophisticated prompts and therefore get better responses. According to Anthropic, “While Claude is able to respond in a highly sophisticated manner, it tends to do so only when users input sophisticated prompts.”

In other words, the rewards from AI are going to higher educated workers who tend to be at the higher end of the income scale (there are exceptions: tech jobs, once considered high-paying and high-demand, are leading the layoffs precisely due to the AI pivot).


3. Asymmetric Impact of Inflation

 U.S. inflation has been running hotter than the Fed’s 2% target for almost half a decade now, but the extra increases in prices don’t hit everyone equally. Essentials like food and housing take up a much larger percentage of low-income budgets and the prices of these items have been rising faster than other consumer prices.

Indeed, households in the bottom 20% of wage earners allocate approximately 63% of their total expenditures to just three categories: housing, food, and transportation. These categories are considered inelastic spending so any price increase in these areas acts as a direct reduction in a family’s standard of living.

 

In contrast, the highest 20% of earners spend roughly 30-35% of their income on these same essentials. When the price of these essential items goes up, wealthier households simply reduce non-essential spending, while for the lower arm of the “K”, that money often comes out of an emergency fund or basic nutrition.

 

How Can Sustainability Investors Navigate the K?

For investors focused on sustainability strategies and outcomes, a K-shaped economy, i.e. the speeding up of income and wealth inequalities, can feel like losing the battle. Indeed, many of the potential winners of inequality are not names one would naturally find on the long side of sustainability themed portfolios (premium banks, private jets, yacht builders, etc.)

Nonetheless, there are many themes that are either orthogonal or even aligned to the realities of a split economy. We highlight three below:

Circular Economy: From an environmental perspective, transforming from a linear to circular economy is widely viewed as necessary because it is considered the only legitimate solution to limiting environmental degradation – the ultimate goal is to decouple resources consumption from economic growth.

From an economic perspective, a decline in purchasing-power for the majority of the population implies more interest and demand for recycling, refurbishing, and “product-as-a-service” (i.e. renting or leasing) models.

Business models based on using less raw inputs, extending the economic life of a product and aiming for substantial improvement in resource performance along the way should be seen as increasingly attractive and a major differentiator. We plan to update our previous work on this subject (Circular Economy: When Going Around in Circles is the Right Thing to Do, April 13, 2022) in the weeks ahead.

Social And Sustainability Bonds: While the interest for green bonds has most likely passed the hype phase of the early 2020s, there appears to be steady interest in other fixed income products tied to sustainability. Social bonds offer a steady yield while directly addressing the “downward” trajectory of the lower-K population.

Earlier this month, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) issued a $2 billion Social Bond The proceeds are specifically earmarked for low-income communities in emerging markets, focusing on healthcare, sanitation, and education. The bond was oversubscribed by an impressive 2.7 times. For investors wanting to make real social impact, financing that is tied to specific project outcomes is a direct way to achieve it.

Sustainable Regenerative Agriculture: With climate-related disasters costing well over 100 billion USD again in 2025, we have argued that climate adaptation (i.e. resilience) will become a necessary investment priority. As we noted above and in previous notes, food prices will continue to outpace generalized inflation due in large part to climate change.

Investing in sustainable farmland and timberland are one of the main ways to combat the impacts of climate change while mitigating risks in our food supply chain (please see, Environmental Assets in Short Supply, October 9, 2025). These assets also provide a hedge against inflation (the lower-K struggle).

For decades, logistics was the invisible infrastructure of globalization – cheap, frictionless, and engineered for cost minimization rather than resiliency. COVID exposed those assumptions, and the system never fully recovered. As manufacturing re-shores to North America and Europe, trade policy becomes more protectionist, and corporates confront the limits of net-zero commitments, logistics has shifted from a background function to a material sustainability and financial risk factor.

When production sat in low-cost geographies, moving goods thousands of miles was still cheaper than manufacturing locally – making inefficiencies tolerable. Re-shoring changes the equation. The two charts below make the re-shoring trend unmistakable: manufacturing construction spending and re-shoring job announcements have both accelerated dramatically since COVID. If one assumes that the proposed Trump-era tariff regime materializes (a big IF), the next few years could see further re-shoring as firms hedge against heightened trade friction.

 

More volume must now be processed closer to end markets, last-mile and returns networks must tighten, and transportation costs re-enter the foreground. This is not “sustainability as virtue signaling”: for many companies, improving logistics efficiency is simply good business.

From a regulatory perspective, Europe’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is reshaping cross-border cost structures by attaching carbon pricing to imports. At the same time, mandatory disclosure frameworks – most notably the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) – require companies to measure and report Scope 3 emissions across their full value chain, placing scrutiny on the largest share of their footprint. With most corporates having already captured the low-hanging Scope 1 and 2 reductions, the decarbonization frontier has shifted upstream and downstream to suppliers.

The chart below shows how sharply the emissions profile has tilted. Operational emissions (Scopes 1 and 2) have fallen by roughly 15% from their 2019 peak, but this progress has driven Scope 3 to more than 90% of total emissions among the world’s 500 largest companies – up from about 75% in 2014.

The final catalyst is that logistics networks built for 2010 demand patterns are misaligned with 2025 realities. E-commerce growth, SKU proliferation, labor shortages, congested ports, and high empties (nearly 33% of U.S. truck miles still run unloaded) are pushing the system to its limits. At the same time, cutting-edge technologies like automation, robotics, AI-driven routing, and end-to-end visibility platforms are finally mature enough to produce step-change efficiency gains. The timing is consequential: structural stress is colliding with tools capable of materially reducing it.

 

Three Pillars of the Sustainable Logistics Investment Theme

The structural pressures reshaping global supply chains create an investment landscape that echoes past infrastructure transitions: a system operating at its physical limits, a new cohort of technologies capable of relieving those constraints, and a geopolitical alignment where countries are focusing more on themselves. But the logistics transformation is fundamentally distributed. It unfolds simultaneously in buildings, transport networks, and the digital orchestration layer that stitches everything together.

Sustainable logistics is therefore best understood as a multi-sector theme with heterogeneous business models and risk profiles. On one end sit the Logistics Real Estate Companies, providing the physical backbone where goods are stored, sorted, and processed. In the middle are the Transportation & Logistics Operators, the firms that actually move products across increasingly complex global and regional networks. Layered above both is the fast-growing class of Software & System Optimizers, the digital infrastructure orchestrating flows, improving asset utilization, and maximizing emissions efficiency across the entire “supply chain of supply chains.”

This week’s note will highlight the leading companies in each subsector for investors seeking exposure to the ongoing transformation of sustainable logistics.

I. Logistics Real Estate: Warehousing as Critical Infrastructure

Warehousing has become one of the most structurally constrained components of the global economy. Despite intermittent recession fears, U.S. industrial vacancy remains near 4%, well below historical averages. European markets are even tighter, with modern logistics space in the Netherlands and Germany at sub-3% vacancy. When space is available, much of the global stock is outdated – not designed for automation, electrification, or high-velocity returns. The result: lower storage density, inefficient material flows, and higher energy use per pallet.

As throughput requirements surge and tenants electrify fleets, grid capacity, rooftop solar, EV-charging yards, and digital backbones have become mission-critical. This is pushing logistics real estate owners into the role of modernization utilities – enabling tenants to meet operational, emissions, and resilience requirements that legacy warehouses simply cannot support.

Within the subsector, Prologis stands out as the most advanced on sustainability investment, supported by green-financing programs, integrated climate governance, and large-scale infrastructure upgrades across its portfolio. Segro plc is a close second followed by Goodman Group with credible long-term decarbonization strategies and capex commitments.

II. The Transportation & Logistics Operators: Fixing the Network Itself

If logistics real estate companies control the physical nodes, transportation and logistics operators manage the edges – the links that move goods between every point in the system. Those links remain structurally inefficient. U.S. trucking networks still operate with about a third of empty miles, and global road-freight emissions reached a record 2.2 Gt CO₂ in 2023. Inefficiency is both a cost burden and an emissions problem.

Operators such as C.H. Robinson, DSV, SG Holdings, and Brambles are increasingly closing these gaps with software-driven, data-coordinated transport networks. Freight brokerage has become algorithmic; consolidation and routing decisions are automated; and real-time emissions data is shaping modal-shift decisions. Asset-sharing systems – most notably Brambles’ CHEP pallet-pooling model – reduce waste, improve reuse rates, and drive circularity at global scale.

Within this subsector, Brambles stands out as the sustainability benchmark due to the inherent circularity of its CHEP model and its progress against science-based targets. DSV ranks as the strongest of the global Third-Party Logistics companies (3PLs), supported by robust absolute emissions-reduction commitments and leading disclosure. SG Holdings has quietly built a high-quality sustainability profile. C.H. Robinson is making credible improvements and launching customer-facing tools, but its transitions appear more incremental relative to the leaders.

III. Software & System Optimizers: The Intelligence Layer

The third pillar – and the highest-growth, highest-margin segment – is the software and data infrastructure that orchestrates modern logistics. This includes warehouse management systems (WMS), transportation management systems (TMS), real-time visibility platforms, RFID ecosystems, and automation-control engines. As regulatory scrutiny tightens and operational complexity scales, the digital layer offers the fastest, most capital-efficient path to emissions reductions and productivity gains.

Several technology vectors are now converging. RFID adoption has finally passed its inflection point: global shipments exceeded 30 billion tags in 2023, up 25% year-over-year. Persistent labour shortages are accelerating warehouse automation capex, which is expanding 10–12% annually. And visibility tools that were niche pre-COVID are now mainstream, with 70% of Fortune 500 shippers deploying real-time tracking, exception management, and digital documentation.

Companies such as Zebra Technologies, Descartes, and WiseTech Global increasingly run the critical logic of logistics. Their platforms determine pallet routing, slotting optimization, picking sequences, carrier selection, and customs compliance. The impact is measurable: shrinkage reductions of up to 30%, stockout improvements of 10–20%, and materially higher asset-utilization rates across fleets, containers, and warehouse equipment.

Within this subsector, Zebra Technologies and WiseTech Global emerge as the clearest sustainability leaders, integrating emissions-aware tools and efficiency metrics directly into their solutions. Descartes remains an essential enabler of efficient logistics flows with solid ESG reporting, though it communicates its sustainability positioning more quietly than peers.

 

Sustainability x Financial Analysis

Building on the investment theses for each subsector, we evaluate the selected companies through a dual lens of sustainability and financial performance. The names highlighted in yellow represent our top picks, offering the most compelling intersection of ESG impact and valuation.

Ultimately, this theme offers a distinct advantage for portfolio construction: it provides natural diversification across asset classes and business models. Logistics Real Estate Companies provide defensive ballast through real-asset duration, inflation-linked income, and structurally tight markets. Transportation & Logistics Operators add cyclical torque, outperforming when global trade accelerates and capacity tightens. Software & System Optimizers supply the long-duration growth engine, driven by automation, digitization, and the rising value of real-time data. Combined, these segments create a tunable mix of quality, growth, and cyclicality depending on an investor’s risk posture.

Taken together, these three pillars form an ecosystem undergoing simultaneous modernization. Buildings are being retrofitted, networks are being re-optimized, and software is finally coordinating the whole system with real-time data. It is rare to find a theme where physical infrastructure, operational networks, and digital layers are all experiencing multi-year investment cycles in parallel – and rarer still when the economics and decarbonization objectives align this cleanly.

Nine months into Trump’s presidency, its contours are taking shape. Beyond campaign promises—tax cuts, manufacturing revival, and drilling expansion – the U.S. government has taken a strong tack toward interventionism. From interference at the Fed to taking stakes in American companies, Trump’s republicanism is vastly different from preceding Presidents of the same party.

Indeed, Trump’s growing intervention, especially in corporate affairs, is fueling concerns that the U.S. is shifting away from the so-called laissez-faire economy. That said, with equity markets at new highs and both government and corporate bond yields trading in a relatively tight range, one might be hard pressed to find evidence that it matters, yet!

In 2021, we published a note ( “Macro Goes ESG” July 8, 2021) that outlined our high conviction view that fiscal and industrial policy would become dominant policy levers in the coming decade. Although we were far too optimistic that interventionist governments would address voter preferences such as climate change and socioeconomic inequalities, our forecast of government interventionist policies is proving true.  

Important for investors is that unlike monetary policy which “lifts (sinks) all boats”, fiscal and industrial policy creates winners and losers. This is true for sustainability themes and financial markets at large.

In today’s Macro Meets Sustainability quarterly update, we discuss the three main U.S. government interventions that have evolved since Trump took office.

  1. Mar-A-Lago and USD: Beware the Kindleberger Trap

The Kindleberger Trap – named for economic historian Charles Kindleberger – posits that global stability depends on a leading power that is willing and able to supply public goods that benefit the international community. When the dominant power fails to fulfill this role, the international system becomes prone to conflict and economic crisis.

For investors, the essential public good that keeps the global economy out of the Kindleberger trap is the U.S. dollar acting as the world’s reserve currency. Reserve currencies are necessary in global trading systems to facilitate international transactions and act as a store of value, and they tend to impose two characteristics on the reserve status country:

The so-called Mar-a-Lago Accord is an attempt in our view to have one’s cake (low interest rates, access to capital) and eat it too (revive the domestic industrial and manufacturing sector) but does not consider the consequences of falling into a “Kindleberger trap”.   If the U.S. is unable or unwilling to maintain policy that ensures the greenback as the world’s reserve currency, it is unlikely that foreign nations and investors will risk asset value erosion by currency devaluation or inflation (see the section below).

To this end, there is more evidence that investors are becoming nervous about the impacts of U.S. policy on the greenback: equity investors are aggressively increasing currency hedges. According to a recent FT article and Deutsche Bank data, over 80% of the 7 billion USD that has flowed into foreign domiciled U.S. ETFs in the past three months has been on a hedged basis, compared to 20% at the beginning of the year. In other words, investors still want to own U.S. equities but are wary of the currency.

The bottom line is the current U.S. administration’s desire to decrease the trade deficit risks obliterating a key public good – a stable reserve currency – and sending the global economy into a Kindleberger trap, with the concomitant increase in volatility in financial markets. We believe that currency hedging is fully justified for non-U.S. investors exposed to U.S. markets and/or the currency risk should create a significant home bias in sustainable investments.

2. Monetary Interference: Stoking Inflation

Recent events and nominations at the Fed underscore President Trump’s intention to politicize the central bank and the outcome of last week’s FOMC meeting gave a good indication of how investors should think about policy stimulus in the current regime. Recall that last week, the FOMC voted to lower interest rates while simultaneously upgrading the economic outlook and increasing its expectation for inflation over the next year (to a level well above 2%). Thus, we believe that investors should position for both lower central bank rates and higher inflation, as it marks an important deviation from the conventional central bank’s playbook. Since 1982 (when Volcker broke the back of runaway inflation), monetary policy generally fell into four quadrants:  

  1. Interest rates are becoming stimulative (rates are below the neutral rate and falling while the economy is weakening and lower inflation is anticipated)
  2. Interest rates are becoming less stimulative (rates are below the neutral rate and rising while economic growth is bottoming and higher inflation is anticipated).
  3. Interest rates are becoming increasingly restrictive (rates are above the neutral rate and rising because the economy is running hot and higher inflation is anticipated).
  4. Interest rates are becoming less restrictive (rates are above the neutral rate and falling as economic growth is peaking and lower inflation is anticipated).

By signaling that rates can go lower while economic and inflation accelerates, it is becoming more probable that the Fed will de-emphasize its objective on inflation stability and focus on maximum employment and low interest rates.  

Historically, low rate and higher inflation environments have favored real estate plays and other real assets. For ideas that fit squarely within a sustainability framework, please see our recent notes on this subject: It’s About to Get Real, August 21, 2025 and The Age of Opportunity: Investments in Eldercare April 23, 2025.

  1. Corporate Interventionism: From Invisible Hand to Tightening Grip

In 2024, the IMF published a new data set that documents emergent patterns of policy intervention associated with the return of industrial policy. In one year, they recorded over 2,500 new industrial policies worldwide, of which 71% are considered trade distorting. This is perhaps not surprising to anyone watching the news flow. In the past quarter alone, the following U.S. developments have occurred:

These are perhaps the most jaw-dropping developments, not least of all because they occurred at the firm-specific level, which represents almost half of all the interventions documented by the IMF (see table below).

The IMF’s database also categorizes policy interventions by their motivating factor. Interestingly, supply chains and climate change – considerations that both fit squarely within sustainability investing – feature prominently (see the chart below). The one caveat is that the data was collected from 2009 to 2023 and researchers noted that in the most recent year, measures focused increasingly on national security, and less on competitiveness.

The rise of industrial policy and interventionist governments is far from a uniquely U.S. phenomenon (see the table below). A case in point is this month’s announcement from Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney, which unveiled the first phase of the country’s “nation building” projects, all five of which could be classified by the IMF as being motivated by climate change or supply chains and include energy production (nuclear), energy transport (LNG), mineral production (copper, gold) and supply chains (port expansion).

An investment backdrop that is dominated by political catalysts implies an environment where active portfolio management is necessary because sectoral, thematic, and geographic winners and losers will be produced. Critically, this applies equally to sustainability themes. While ESG has become a touchy subject and there is no longer a wholesale buying of related equity products, companies that derive revenue from specific sustainability themes (e.g. waste management, green infrastructure, carbon) have had excellent performance so far during Trump’s reign.  

Sustainability winners and losers are likely to run along thematic lines that are heavily influenced by both perceived threats and actual policy pivots; carbon is an excellent example, as discussed in last week’s note (Contrarians in the Green,  September 18, 2025).