There is an old market cliché that investors like divided government because politicians cannot do very much. The logic is straightforward: when neither party can pass its agenda unilaterally, the odds of sweeping changes to taxes, regulation and spending fall, and companies can plan around a narrower range of outcomes. The 2026 midterms provide an unusually revealing test of that idea. Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress while President Trump remains in the White House, leaving neither side with the votes required to impose a broad policy reset. The likely result is not stability in the conventional sense, but a narrower range of federal outcomes, more aggressive congressional oversight, and a larger role for states in determining how energy, infrastructure, and healthcare policy evolves over the next two years.
The initial market response was consistent with this interpretation, although it was far from uniform. We track four SMS policy baskets, labeled B1 to B4 in the chart below: Transition Utilities (B1), Grid & AI Enablers (B2), the Solar Value Chain (B3) and Medicaid & ACA-Exposed (B4). The SMS Solar Value Chain and Medicaid & ACA-Exposed baskets rallied sharply around the election, Transition Utilities also advanced, and the Grid & AI Enablers basket sold off. The split looks like a repricing of political downside where it had been concentrated, alongside a reassessment of areas where expectations, valuations and public resistance had already climbed.
The return of the policy floor
For much of the past two years, investors in clean energy and healthcare faced more than ordinary regulatory uncertainty. Unified Republican control created the possibility that executive actions could be reinforced through budget reconciliation, appropriations and durable statutory changes. Democratic control of Congress does not make policy supportive, but it reduces the probability that another large legislative package will deepen the retrenchment already enacted under the Trump administration.
That difference matters for valuation because a sector does not need a new subsidy or entitlement expansion to rerate. When expectations are depressed, a lower probability of the worst outcome can be sufficient. The immediate rallies in solar and healthcare therefore look less like forecasts of a new progressive policy cycle than recognition that the distribution of possible outcomes has narrowed. Investors are pricing a floor, not yet a catalyst.
Basket 1: Transition Utilities
The Transition Utilities basket captures companies positioned to earn regulated or contracted returns from the buildout of cleaner generation, transmission, distribution, and grid resilience. The basket is less dependent on a new federal subsidy package than the solar manufacturers and installers, but it is highly sensitive to state regulation, allowed returns, permitting, and the allocation of infrastructure costs.
States may matter more than Congress
The federal result will dominate headlines, but the state-level shift may have more direct investment consequences. Five governorships moved from Republican to Democratic control, while Democratic gains in attorney-general and regulatory offices change who shapes implementation, enforcement and utility planning. Energy policy in the United States is already highly federalized: states influence utility rate cases, transmission siting, integrated resource plans, renewable procurement, net metering and building standards.
This creates an important asymmetry for Transition Utilities. The basket does not require Washington to pass another national climate package. The companies need permission to deploy capital, recover investments through rates and earn returns on transmission, generation and resilience spending. A supportive governor or public utility commission can therefore influence earnings visibility even when Congress remains deadlocked.
There is, however, a less comfortable side to the state-policy argument. If voters have become more sensitive to electricity affordability, utilities are not automatically beneficiaries simply because regulators shift costs away from data centers or favor clean investment. The same commissions that approve grid spending also determine how quickly utilities recover that spending and what returns shareholders are allowed to earn. A campaign against electricity bills can therefore become a campaign against the pace of capital spending, cost recovery or allowed returns. The investment question is not simply whether infrastructure is necessary, but whether utilities can demonstrate that it lowers system costs and allocate those costs in a way regulators will continue to accept.
Basket 2: Grid & AI Enablers
The Grid & AI Enablers basket represents the physical layer behind electrification and digital growth. These companies benefit from the need for substations, transformers, switchgear, transmission lines, cooling systems and specialized construction. Their exposure is broader than clean energy, which gives the basket a stronger secular demand base but also links it to data-center capital spending and the politics of electricity affordability.
Why Grid & AI Enablers sold off
The decline in Grid & AI Enablers is the most useful counterweight to a simple blue-wave narrative. The basket had already been one of the strongest trades of 2026, supported by data-center construction, manufacturing investment and the expectation of a long grid-capital cycle.
Campaign politics supports part of the sell-off. Many Democrats ran against data centers: campaigns spent more than $380 million on television ads mentioning them, and Democrats outspent Republicans on the topic by more than three to one. Of the 34 governors elected in races AP called, 32 back stronger regulation and 12 back bans or moratoria. Tougher permitting, ratepayer-protection rules and local moratoria are now more likely, and they land on the demand that Grid & AI Enablers had been valued on.
The size of the move may still overstate the damage to this basket. Developers facing multi-year interconnection queues have been turning to behind-the-meter generation, and one tracker counts roughly 90 GW of announced behind-the-meter capacity, more than a quarter of planned US data-center capacity. Projects that supply their own power sidestep much of the ratepayer-cost argument, but they still need switchgear, transformers and electrical construction. Rules that make data centers pay for their own grid upgrades could push more projects on-site instead of cancelling them
In short, the election results do not eliminate the infrastructure opportunity for Eaton [ETN-US], Quanta Services [PWR-US] or EMCOR Group [EME-US], but it can slow the conversion of a powerful long-term theme into near-term revenue and make elevated valuations more sensitive to disappointment.
Basket 3: Solar Value Chain
The Solar Value Chain basket is the most direct policy-duration trade in the group. It spans domestic manufacturing, utility-scale equipment and residential deployment, so the companies respond differently to tariffs, tax credits, interest rates and state-level rules. What unites the basket is that the probability of further policy deterioration can matter almost as much as the probability of new support.
Solar: a repricing of survival, not a return to the IRA
The post-election solar rally should not be mistaken for a restoration of the Biden-era policy architecture. President Trump retains control of the executive branch and the veto, while many of the incentives weakened under unified Republican government cannot be readily restored. Trade policy, federal permitting and agency implementation also remain important sources of risk.
What changed is that the clean-energy industry now has additional institutional defenses. Democratic committee chairs can conduct oversight, slow appropriations language, scrutinize agency implementation and use must-pass legislation to seek targeted concessions. State governments can also sustain renewable portfolio standards, storage programs, distributed-solar rules and procurement mandates. For a basket that remained deeply negative for the year even after the November rally, reducing the probability of another policy shock can have a disproportionate effect.
Basket 4: Medicaid & ACA-Exposed Healthcare
The healthcare basket combines managed-care organizations, hospital operators and a healthcare property company. The common thread is exposure to insured patient volumes and public reimbursement, but the transmission mechanism differs: Centene and Molina are directly affected by enrollment and rate setting, while hospitals are affected through payer mix, uncompensated care and utilization.
Healthcare: gridlock can still protect earnings
The healthcare basket may be the clearest expression of the policy-floor thesis. Democratic control of Congress does not automatically repeal the Medicaid financing changes and ACA provisions enacted under President Trump. The White House can veto a broad reversal, and Senate rules remain an obstacle to standalone legislation. Providers and managed-care companies should therefore not assume that the pre-2025 policy environment will return.
Nevertheless, the election changes the negotiating environment around additional cuts and implementation. Healthcare affordability was a major voting concern, and Democrats now control the committees, hearings and legislative calendar in Congress. Partial mitigation through budget negotiations, implementation delays, targeted ACA support or relief for hospitals is more plausible than it was before the election. Those changes can matter materially at the company level because managed-care enrollment, reimbursement and hospital uncompensated care respond to policy at the margin.
The next two years are about floors, not catalysts
The four baskets point to a differentiated conclusion. Transition Utilities gain from a lower federal downside tail and potentially friendlier state regulation. Solar receives the largest policy rerating because the sector had absorbed the greatest policy damage, although the rally does not by itself establish a new bull market. Medicaid- and ACA-exposed companies benefit from a reduced probability of further retrenchment and a greater chance of targeted mitigation. Grid & AI Enablers retain the strongest secular demand case, but they also face the clearest risk that electricity affordability and local opposition complicate the investment cycle.
The central question after an election is usually what the winners will do. In this case, investors may get more insight by asking what each side can no longer do alone. Democrats cannot rebuild the old policy regime while Trump controls the White House, but Trump can no longer rely on a compliant Congress to deepen it. For sectors carrying significant policy scars, fragmented government can function as downside protection. The 2026 blue wave may matter less because it puts Democrats in control of Congress than because it fragments control of policy across Washington, state capitals and regulatory bodies.
Sustainable Market Strategies has a long-standing, high-conviction structural view that climate-linked supply disruptions in key agricultural inputs are a structural, not transitory, phenomenon and that food inflation will chronically outpace other inflation categories. Indeed, we view the effects of climate change – including eroding soil fertility, water constraints, pest outbreaks and volatile weather patterns – as the main drivers of a sustained increase in food costs globally.
However, in recent months, risks around the cost of food have been focused on the impacts of politics and geopolitics. For instance, much has been made about fertilizer supply constraints due to the shutting of the Strait of Hormuz as well as global diesel shortages that make food transport far more costly. In today’s Note, we answer top questions about what truly matters for the outlook for global food supply and related investments.
Question 1: What Is the Impact of the Iran War on Food Prices?
The closing of the Strait of Hormuz has created supply chain agony for many of the world’s largest industries, not least of which is diesel. Diesel prices surged due to constrained refining capacity in the middle East, and the food sector is highly exposed: in the U.S., transportation costs in the food supply chain accounts for 9 % of retail food cost (over 70 % of food relies on trucks to transport from farms, wholesalers, retailers, and eventually to consumers). Historically, a 10% rise in diesel price has been associated with about a 0.15% rise in U.S. food prices six to twelve months out, but diesel is up more than 100% this year, which points to a further 0.5 percentage point still to come.
Along with diesel disruptions, the Iran War has also affected fertilizer supply. Farmers rely on three primary nutrients: nitrogen (in the form of urea and ammonia), phosphorus (phosphate) and potassium (potash).
In 2023, imports from the Gulf accounted for about 17% of U.S. phosphate supply and 12% of urea supply. Fertilizer shipments through the strait are currently near zero. The table below shows that prices for phosphate still reflect this, while urea has returned to January levels.
Sulphur, a secondary macronutrient along with calcium and magnesium, has become a fourth point of concern this year. Gulf producers supply roughly half of seaborne sulphur, global elemental sulphur exports fell by about a third in the first half of 2026, and sulphur is the feedstock for the sulphuric acid used to make phosphate.
Fertilizer accounts for between 15% and 35% of total farm expenses and a spike in these input costs can significantly harm profitability. However, fertilizer is a relatively minor expense by the time our food gets to the grocery store. The U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Dollar Report measures costs of food by attributing the shares of value to different sources the food supply chain. The table below shows where one dollar of spending on food “goes”, whether it be at grocery stores or restaurants. Fertilizers are listed as part of “agribusiness” which accounts for only 3 cents of every dollar we spend at the grocery store.
Fertilizers are listed as part of “agribusiness” which accounts for only 3 cents of every dollar we spend at the grocery store.
Note that other fertilizer prices have been stable over the past year. About 25% of all fertilizer used is potash, virtually all of it imported from Canada. Canadian potash is exempted from tariffs and despite Trump’s desire to import more from Belarus, geopolitics are unlikely to change the pricing markedly in the near future. Overall, rising fertilizer and diesel prices do exert upward pressure on food bills, but most of the pain is felt far earlier in the supply chain.
Question 2: What Do Rising Fertilizer and Fuel Costs Mean for Sustainability?
When input prices rise, the normal economic reaction is to explore efficiency gains or substitutions. Witness the rise in heat pump sales (energy efficiency) and solar panel installation (substitutes) as a reaction to the 2022 fossil fuel price spike during the first year of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which have led to permanent reductions in fossil fuel dependence.
We are pessimistic that current price dynamics will lead to improved sustainability outcomes in agriculture. Although there are reports that farmers have reduced fertilizer use in 2026 as a reaction to costs, it is most likely short-term rationing rather than a structural change. For example, cutting phosphate and potash creates a two-to-three-year gap before yield losses appear; this is soil mining, not a durable reduction in dependence.
Moreover, after the last surge in fertilizer prices in 2022, there was no meaningful move away from fertilizer and move toward precision tools or regenerative farming. Unlike for solar panels and heat pumps, where the payback period of investing in new energy systems is dropping thanks to improved technology and green energy subsidies, alternatives to heavy fertilizer use have been slow to develop. Indeed, payback periods for investment in precision tools and regenerative farming are far longer than the short-term loss in crop yields from temporary fertilizer reductions. Even worse, current incentives favor dirty farming techniques: as we wrote in our 2022 note (Biodiversity: Valuing the Invaluable, March 31, 2022), 90% of global subsidies given to farmers every year are considered harmful to the environment, including subsidies for fertilizers and pesticides. In other words, agricultural policy is blunting the price signal from the spike in fertilizer prices.
Question 4: If Fertilizer and Fuel Don’t Matter for My Grocery Bill, What Does?
In the table below, we use the CPI Food categories published by the BLS to highlight those foods with the greatest price rises over the past five years. Readers can see in the final column that climate change and weather – and to a lesser extent tariffs – are driving food price increases.
When climate change affects a specific crop for one or two seasons, it is relatively easy for consumers to find substitutes. However, the list above demonstrates that the impact of extreme weather and climate change is becoming broad and sustained.
How To Invest for Rising Food Prices?
Our approach is to avoid the headline trade and own the businesses that benefit from scarcity of climate-resilient supply, while staying underweight packaged food companies whose margins are squeezed from both sides. The obvious response to a food inflation story is to buy staples with pricing power or to buy fertilizer producers on the Strait of Hormuz disruption. We would not do either, for the reasons set out above: fertilizer and diesel are cyclical and reversible, whereas weather-driven costs and shortages are not, and consumers may have run out of tolerance for further price increases.
Stay underweight margin-exposed branded food. Input costs for cocoa, coffee, sugar and packaging are rising while volumes face structural pressure. As we argued in our June 18 note, “Big Food Goes on a Diet,” food prices will rise while branded manufacturers’ margins fall. We maintain our short views on Mondelez International (MDLZ-US), Hershey (HSY-US) and Pepsi Co (PEP-US), all of which are exposed to crops with supply constraints (cocoa and sugar). A 2026 rally in raw sugar prices has not yet reached U.S. shelves, because U.S. quotas and tariffs insulate the domestic market, but it is a 2027 cost risk.
From an asset allocation perspective, there is a strong likelihood that rising food costs related to climate change will add to structurally higher generalized inflation. Our conclusions from our strategic allocation work in 2023 (Climate Change and Strategic Allocation, August 24, 2023), still hold: investors should consider greater allocation to natural resource assets.
Personalization – the use of machine learning models trained on individual-level data to tailor a product, prediction, or treatment to a specific person rather – is not a single phenomenon that artificial intelligence applies uniformly across the economy. Its success is governed by three measurable variables: 1. the cost of acquiring data, 2. the cost of a wrong prediction, and 3. the speed of the feedback loop between action and outcome.
Health care is simultaneously the sector with the strongest scientific justification for personalization and the sector most prone to expensive overpromising, since the same conditions that make personalization valuable also make it slow, costly, and difficult to validate.
Why Personalization by AI isn’t Fungible Across Sectors
The “personalization of everything” narrative incorrectly suggests that Netflix’s recommendation engine, Amazon’s product suggestions, and an AI-matched cancer therapy as points on the same continuum. Media and retail personalization succeeded quickly and cheaply because the underlying data is abundant and continuously regenerated by user behavior, a wrong recommendation costs the company almost nothing (the user simply scrolls past it), and the feedback loop between a suggestion and its outcome is measured in seconds. An industry like precision agriculture occupies a middle position: sensor and satellite data are becoming cheap, but the feedback loop is a full growing season, and an error costs real yield, which is why adoption has been steady rather than explosive.
Health care sits at the opposite pole: clinical and genomic data are expensive to generate, fragmented, and constrained by privacy regulation that has no analogue in ad-tech: a wrong prediction risks patient fatality rather than simply waste an advertising impression. In addition, the feedback loop connecting a treatment decision to its true outcome, survival, recurrence, or long-term toxicity, can run into years, far too slow to train and correct a model the way a recommendation algorithm corrects itself in real time.
Health care outcomes are surely one of the most impactful use for artificial intelligence, with personalization an important pathway. Earlier this summer, financial participants confirmed this view: in August, Moderna stock surged because its personalized mRNA cancer vaccine – AI helps identify the right targets for each patient – showed success in a pivotal trial. Of course, the story is larger than AI in medicine: investors cheered because it provided clinical validation that mRNA can work in cancer, not just infectious diseases.
Whether the optimism is warranted is yet to be seen, as real-world failures also do exist: between 2025 and 2022, IBM spent roughly $4 billion building Watson Health on the premise that a system trained the way Watson beat Jeopardy! could generalize to oncology. Internal documents later showed the system generating “unsafe and incorrect” treatment recommendations, with failures traced directly to training on a small number of synthetic cases that reflected one hospital’s practice patterns rather than diverse, real-world outcomes data. IBM sold off the unit’s data and analytics assets in 2022 for roughly $1 billion, a fraction of what had been invested.
Nonetheless, it’s becoming clear that artificial intelligence has the potential to personalize treatments and therefore significantly improve outcomes in a high impact sector like health care. Today’s Note identifies the companies and investment opportunities related to this theme.
Health Care Personalization: Who Does What
To evaluate “AI plus health care”, we immediately notice that a lower risk strategy is to own the “picks and shovels” (or infrastructure) of personalized medicine rather than the biotech companies that own the therapies. The table below highlights why this is the case, but put simply, biotech companies own the regulatory and clinical risk and commercial risk whereas the suppliers of the inputs to the final drug treatments, i.e. the picks and shovels, are relatively shielded from these unknowns.
Below, we separate the three layers that must each work for personalized medicine to reach a patient: the data that makes personalization possible, the software and diagnostics that turn that data into a decision, and the manufacturing capacity that actually produces a personalized product at scale.
1. Data Generation
When it comes to personalized medicine, the first step requires data generation companies that produce the raw genomic, single-cell, or spatial biology data, through sequencing instruments and sample-preparation tools, that all downstream personalization applications depend on. The clearest illustration of the importance of this layer occurred in August 2026, when Merck (MRK-US) and Moderna (MRNA-US) reported the first positive Phase 3 result for any individualized neoantigen therapy, in resected melanoma. The therapy is, in effect, one drug per patient: each dose requires that bioinformatics pipeline that selects which specific mutations to encode. This essential manufacturing input enables the therapy to exist and falls outside the category of discretionary diagnostic tests subject to payer discretion. Two companies in this space stand out:
- Illumina (ILMN-US) develops and manufactures life science tools and integrated systems for large-scale analysis of genetic variation and function. It is considered a mature, profitable incumbent whose sequencing platforms generate the raw genomic data every downstream application depends on. Second-quarter 2026 revenue grew 9.5% year-over-year, and the business is comfortably profitable.
- 10x Genomics (TXG-US) provides single-cell and spatial biology tools that capture the kind of granular data bulk sequencing cannot. Its 2026 revenue guidance implies roughly flat to modestly positive growth, but gross margin improved to 70% in the first quarter and net losses narrowed meaningfully. It is a smaller and more cyclical business than Illumina but one sitting directly upstream of the next generation of personalization applications: most of 10x’s workflows are ultimately sequenced on Illumina instruments, but Illumina has also built competing single-cell and spatial product lines.
2. Data-to-Decision
Data-to-decision companies turn raw data into an actionable clinical choice, such as which diagnostic test result, drug, or dose is right for a specific patient. This is the layer generating the most investor attention, partly because of its reliance on AI in specific products and partly because the category has adopted “AI” as a branding convention. The companies doing this work have divergent financial profiles, making for a tricky backdrop for investors:
- Natera (NTRA-US) is a diagnostics company, which engages in the discovery, development, and commercialization of genetic testing services. Second-quarter 2026 revenue grew 37%, management raised full-year revenue guidance and reiterated guidance for positive full-year cash flow, a rare combination of hypergrowth and a credible, near-term path to self-funding.
- Tempus AI (TEM-US) is a precision medicine company, historically centered on oncology, that runs two linked businesses: diagnostics and data. Diagnostics account for about three quarters of revenue, running genomic and molecular test on tumor samples. (about three-quarters of revenue). The data division keeps de-identified clinical and molecular patient records. It licenses that data, and the AI tools built on it, to pharmaceutical companies for drug discovery, trial design, and finding patients for trials. The company grew revenue 22% in the second quarter and posted a small profit, its first,
- Guardant Health (GH-US) is a “precision” oncology company, which provides treatment selection for cancer through the use of proprietary blood-based tests, vast data sets, and advanced analytics. In their most recent earnings results, they reported oncology test volume up 63% year-over-year, although net losses widened over the same period.
- Certara (CERT-US) provides software and technology-enabled services for drug developers including cell and gene therapy, clinical pharmacology, complex biologics, decision analytics and modeling. The company reported roughly flat second-quarter 2026 revenue and reported a small loss (compare to a profit gains in the previous quarters).
3. Manufacturing at Scale
Manufacturers physically produce personalized or small-batch biologic therapies (mRNA vaccines, cell and gene therapies). This is the bottleneck that determines whether personalized medicine can move beyond rare-disease niches into broader clinical use.
Bespoke, per-patient biologic manufactured in small batches is the structural opposite of the blockbuster-drug economics that built the modern pharmaceutical business model.
- Lonza (LONN-CH) is a Swiss company founded in 1897 that is a manufacturing partner for biopharmaceuticals. Historically, the company has “mass produced” popular treatments, but they now have a dedicated line of business develops, de-risk, commercializes, and scales emerging therapies. Sales growth was reported at over 20% in 2025, across mRNA, cell and gene therapy, and biologics manufacturing capacity.
The summary table above shows the large dispersion in the financial performance of the major actors in health care personalization. Revenue growth, gross margin, and profitability vary significantly; owning a basket of companies may be a more appropriate strategy than bearing single name risk.
For six years, Shein, the world’s largest fast fashion retailer, wandered from New York to London to Hong Kong before finally completing its stock market debut on September 1, 2026, an odyssey that ended in a muted trading debut and a valuation of roughly $26 billion – a fraction of the $100 billion it commanded at its 2022 funding peak. ESG scrutiny genuinely contributed to that delay. The company faced scrutiny from U.S. lawmakers over supply chain labor practices and forced-labor allegations tied to Xinjiang cotton. In the U.K., risk-disclosure requirements tied to Shein’s Chinese supply chain killed the London listing option. When Shein finally debuted in Hong Kong, the offering raised $1.7 billion, at a fraction of prior valuations.
It would be a fantasy to believe that Shein’s difficulty to secure a listing as proof that the fast fashion business model is failing. After all, Shein remains the world’s largest fast fashion retailer, and the industry of fast fashion has consistently outgrown the broader apparel market over the past several years.
When consumers spend money at Shein, they are doing so with little concern for environmental and social considerations. The implication is that consumers, voting with their pocketbooks, have not embraced eco-conscious choices on any great scale: the worst fashion polluters with the most environmentally destructive business models continue to gain market share. And if consumer sentiment is not enough to shift the needle in an ESG-indefensible industry, what can? In today’s Note, we argue that fast fashion’s business model IS more vulnerable today: policy, technology, and regulation are three levers that are working in place of consumers’ good intentions.
Trade Policy: A Fast Fashion Faux Pas
For the first time in fast fashion’s two-decade run, the mechanism forcing a cost increase on the sector’s most environmentally reckless business models is not activist pressure or consumer preference. It is trade policy pursued for reasons that have nothing to do with sustainability. First, the U.S. imposed steep Section 301 tariffs on Chinese-origin apparel and footwear, then extended sweeping “reciprocal” tariffs to nearly every other apparel-exporting nation under an April 2025 executive order. Companies operating in China rerouted supply chains through Vietnam, Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia to avoid the steepest China-specific rates. Then, in August 2025, the U.S. ended its de minimis exemption, the rule that let packages under $800 enter duty-free, and which Shein and Temu had built their entire unit economics around: garments now face tariffs as high as 46% depending on country of origin and product classification. The weighted average U.S. tariff on apparel and footwear imports spiked from 13% to 54% in spring 2025 before settling around 36%, still roughly double the broader U.S. import tariff average, in a sector where the U.S. imports 89% of the apparel and leather goods it sells. The European Union is following with its own repeal of the €150 de minimis exemption in 2026, closing the same loophole on the other side of the Atlantic.
Note that tariffs are a blunt instrument with no environmental objective behind them. Tariffs raise the cost of doing business in one jurisdiction; they do nothing to address overproduction, hazardous chemical use, or the underlying twenty-four-season production cycle. Tariffs may be working to stymy the sales of fast fashion brands, and therefore indirectly (and temporarily?) curb related environmental and social woes. However, they are a blunt instrument, easily reversed should the political winds change.
Technology: Making Apparel Circularity Feasible, But Not Inevitable
The single biggest change in the past five years when it comes to environmental impacts in the textile industry is arguably the technology that enables recycling. Fiber-to-fiber recycling has moved from laboratory concept to commercial reality. For example, Econyl is a branded regenerated nylon yarn made by the Italian company Aquafil, which chemically recycles nylon waste (like discarded fishing nets, carpet scraps, and industrial plastic) into new nylon fiber that is chemically identical to virgin nylon and can be reused infinitely without loss of quality; it’s already integrated at commercial volume into products from major fashion and swimwear brands rather than existing only as a pilot or lab-scale demonstration. Meanwhile, chemical recycling platforms like Circulose and Circ are running functioning pilot-to-commercial operations for cellulosic fibers and polyester-cotton blends, the two hardest categories to recycle. McKinsey estimates that with €6 to €7 billion of capital expenditure, fiber-to-fiber recycling could reach 18% to 26% of gross textile waste in Europe by 2030, up from under 1% today.
That said, readiness is not the same as adoption, and the industry’s own recent history is the clearest warning against declaring victory. Renewcell, the most heavily publicized textile-to-textile recycling company in the sector, filed for bankruptcy in February 2024 despite years of branded partnership announcements with major retailers. The brands signed offtake agreements, but they did not buy enough actual volume to keep the Renewcell solvent. That gap between announced ambition and executed procurement is the major bottleneck: industry-wide recycled fiber content remains stuck under 8%, Collection infrastructure, the unglamorous prerequisite for feeding any of this technology, still captures only 30% to 35% of textile waste in Europe, the most advanced market globally. The conclusion for investors is that circularity is now technically possible in a way it was not five years ago, which removes the industry’s best-worn excuse, but the constraint has shifted from engineering to capital allocation and brand purchasing commitment.
EU Regulation: Making Fast Fashion Unprofitable
Where technology has matured and tariffs remain a blunt, environmentally agnostic instrument, the European Union is the first jurisdiction to pair financial penalties directly with design incentives. Extended Producer Responsibility schemes rolling out under the EU’s Sustainable and Circular Textiles Strategy use eco-modulated fees: producers pay more for garments that are less durable, less recyclable, or contain less recycled content.
France has gone furthest and fastest. Coincidentally, its anti-ultra-fast-fashion law took effect on the same day as Shein’s IPO (September 1, 2026), imposing fees of up to 50% of a garment’s pre-tax selling price and banning advertising for platforms explicitly named in the legislative debate, Shein and Temu among them. France’s law targets the business model directly: it is designed around overproduction and environmental damage, not import protectionism or fiscal revenue. The EU’s parallel move to end its €150 de minimis exemption in 2026 closes the same loophole the U.S. closed a year earlier, but layered on top of EPR and the French penalty regime, it represents a more coordinated attempt to make the ultra-fast-fashion model structurally unprofitable in the EU market specifically.
Investment Implications
In the section below, we identify apparel retailers considered the biggest winner and losers from ongoing tariffs, recycling technology and EU regulation.
Losers:
- Structurally exposed to the de minimis/tariff mechanism: PDD Holdings (PDD-US), owner of Temu, and Shein (0625-HK) face the most direct hit, since their entire cost advantage was built on duty-free small-parcel shipping, no longer possible in both the U.S. and EU. Stanford GSB research shows they’re diversifying markets rather than restructuring the underlying model, which caps the damage but doesn’t reverse it.
- Asia-sourcing-concentrated apparel manufacturers with thin margins and limited pricing power: G-III Apparel Group (GIII-US, withdrew guidance entirely), VF Corporation (VFC-US, down roughly 20% since May 2026), Gap Inc. (GAP-US, $200-300 million quantified tariff cost), Columbia Sportswear (COLM-US), and American Eagle Outfitters (AEO-US, down 37% YTD). None of these carry the brand pricing power to fully pass costs to consumers, and their Vietnam and China sourcing concentration puts them squarely in the highest-tariff bracket.
- Companies with pledges but no capital behind them: as we discussed, brands whose recycled-content commitments are percentage targets without disclosed offtake agreements are exposed to reputational and potentially regulatory risk under the EU’s eco-modulated EPR fee structure, which will increasingly reward demonstrable recycled content and durability, not stated ambition. Nike, Inc. (NKE-US) face an active class action lawsuit alleging that up to 90% of items in its own “Sustainability” collection are not actually made with recycled fibers as advertised, and the company overstated recycled content claims. Meanwhile, Shein was fined €1 million by Italy’s Competition Authority in August 2025 specifically for misleading sustainability claims.
Winners:
- Brands with genuine pricing power and premium positioning are passing through tariff costs: Ralph Lauren (RL-US) has pushed through explicit price increases with limited demand destruction, and as a premium brand tariff costs are small as a share of retail price makes the entire tariff regime close to immaterial for them financially. Note that on an operational basis, Ralph Lauren is an industry leader, based on CSRHub score metrics.
- Nearshored or diversified-sourcing manufacturers: Gildan Activewear Inc. (GIL-CA), with manufacturing concentrated in Central and North America, it is a beneficiary of USMCA and CAFTA preferential treatment, and carries structurally lower Asia tariff exposure than peers. Like Ralph Lauren, Gildan is an operational leader, according to CSRHub scores.
- Brands that made real capital commitments to recycling infrastructure early: Inditex (ITX-ES) and H&M (HMB-SE) – once considered the worst fast fashion offenders – are now best positioned to benefit from EU eco-modulated EPR fees specifically because their offtake agreements with recycled textile manufacturers give them defensible, auditable recycled-content claims exactly when regulators start checking. This is a case where genuine capital deployed years before the regulation bites becomes a real competitive moat rather than a marketing line.
Commercially mature recycling technology suppliers: Unifi (UFI-US), through its REPREVE fiber business, and Lenzing AG (LNZ-AT), through Refibra/TENCEL, sit downstream of both the EU regulatory push and brand offtake demand, positioned to capture volume regardless of which individual apparel brand wins market share, a more diversified way to express the circularity thesis than betting on any single retailer.
With AI agents now roaming the virtual corridors of the services industry, it’s fair to ask how far this technology ultimately displaces workers across finance, legal, accounting, and HR functions at larger organizations. Agentic AI platforms let firms create and train agents in a way that effectively builds “digital twins” of entire services’ workforces. Where firms used to add headcount, often through temp staffing agencies, they can now nurture agents natively trained on their own context and workflows. In this not-so-utopian world, now at our doorstep, it’s fair to wonder whether temp staffing companies retain a durable role, and whether the sector’s historically controversial labor model becomes a smaller share of how large employers fill gaps.
The most rigorous data point on employer intent comes from the Adecco Group’s Workforce Trends 2026 Report, a survey of roughly 2,000 C-suite executives and 37,500 workers across 13 countries. Forty-five percent of business leaders expect AI agents to be fully integrated into workflows within twelve months, yet only 36% say their talent strategy clearly communicates that AI will create opportunities for employees rather than displace them, and just 22% are confident they are building the digital capabilities their workforce actually needs.
The gap cuts the other way too: 70% of non-managerial employees say they would be comfortable collaborating with AI agents, compared with only 39% of leaders who believe their staff feel that way. The implication is that AI agent execution risk sits with management confidence and change management, not worker resistance. PwC’s AI agent survey corroborates this pattern: 75% of executives report confidence in their AI agent strategy, but describe the near-term effect as redeploying staff to new tasks rather than eliminating headcount outright. Census Bureau firm-level tracking adds a useful reality check: among companies currently using AI, 87% report it displaces only a small number of tasks, with large-scale task replacement still confined to under 1% of firms.
Taken together, the evidence does not support a clean substitution thesis in which AI agents are displacing temporary or contingent labor at scale today. Instead, it points to a slower, uneven redesign of work in which the binding constraint is organizational trust and skills investment, not the technology’s raw capability to replace tasks currently filled by temp staffing.
Build vs. Buy, and the “Enshittification” Risk
Outsourcing to temp staffing versus building in-house AI agents is a classic build-versus-buy tradeoff, with each option carrying a distinct risk profile rather than one being categorically superior. Temp staffing converts labor into a variable cost, transfer screening, compliance, and turnover risk to the agency, and, critically, carries a network effect: a temp worker arrives having already seen how dozens of other employers solve the same problem, so each placement imports cross-company best practice and gives the employer an external market check on quality. A temp’s output is benchmarked against a market rate and a market skill pool, and underperformance is cheap to terminate.
In-house AI agents have no equivalent mechanism. They are trained and reinforced almost entirely on one company’s own data, KPIs, and management preferences, so they tend to optimize for pleasing the existing hierarchy rather than for ground truth. The upfront cost is largely sunk (data infrastructure, fine-tuning, integration, governance), but the marginal cost of each additional task approaches zero once built, which is the entire investment case for agentic automation. The catch is that there is no natural market discipline, forcing a reset the way a temp worker’s next assignment does. An agent fine-tuned on a company’s own historical decisions and success metrics will tend to reproduce and amplify that company’s existing blind spots and internal politics.
For investors evaluating a company’s AI agent buildout, the diligence question is not simply how much capex is going into it, but whether implementing agents can occur while avoiding enshittification – the idea that your employees start drinking the corporate kool aid a bit too much, i.e., whether the company has built independent evaluation benchmarks, external data grounding, and adversarial red teaming to substitute for the cross-employer network effect that in-house agents structurally lack.
ESG: The Temp Staffing Risks that AI Agents Sidestep
Temp staffing practices typically split legal employment (the agency) from operational control (the client), which creates accountability gaps. For instance, temp staffing companies have been historically accused of precarious pay and hours, wage theft, discrimination, weak safety training for high-risk placements, and even recruitment-fee debt bondage or forced labor among migrant workers, alongside erosion of union bargaining power. These risks translate financially into litigation exposure, joint-employer liability, regulatory fines, higher insurance costs, and lost contracts, especially as supply-chain due-diligence rules tighten globally. By deploying AI agents in lieu of temp workers, a company can sidestep this entire risk category.
How Big is the Temp Market, Really?
Temp employment peaked at 2.5% of total U.S. non-farm employment in 2020 and now stands at roughly 1.5% of the employed workforce. With job openings now back near 2019 levels, the current low level of temp staffing may be explained as much by the temporary sluggishness of the broader job market as by any AI-driven substitution effect.
Looking at the past six months, BLS data offers a more nuanced picture than the popular “AI is gutting white-collar jobs” narrative suggests: temp staffing employment has in fact increased by 34,800 jobs (+1.4%).
That said, there is considerable dispersion across industries. Temp staffing for financial activities and information services show genuine, broadening contraction, down 57,000 (-0.6%) and 35,000 (-1.2%) respectively over six months. This contraction is concentrated in insurance carriers, credit intermediation, and computer systems design, precisely the automatable back-office and technical functions linked to the fastest AI adoption rates. Legal services and accounting, by contrast, show no aggregate displacement at all: legal payrolls are up 11,300 (+0.9%) and accounting is roughly flat over the same window. Healthcare remains the only sector still driving overall job growth (+2.9% YoY through March 2026, across all healthcare employment, not just temp placements), while temp staffing specifically has stabilized after last year’s slide, both supporting the case that clinical staffing demand is more insulated from AI substitution than white-collar temp placement. The Dallas Federal Reserve and Anthropic research suggest the likely explanation is that AI’s labor impact so far shows up as a freeze in entry-level hiring, associates, junior auditors, rather than incumbent layoffs, a dynamic that is invisible in aggregate industry headcount data but very real for the cohort it affects.
Agents Are Priced In
Publicly listed temp staffing companies have derated substantially over the past year and underperformed the broader indices. Thin profit margins, flattening revenue growth, and a slower overall job market have taken the air out of the post-Covid staffing bubble.
Within the group, Robert Half looks most vulnerable to agentic AI, given its strong exposure to back-office financial functions, precisely the roles most likely to be automated within the next five years. AMN Healthcare, by contrast, provides staff that remain far harder to replace given the clinical nature of the work, which should make it more resilient to AI displacement, at least until humanoid robotics make meaningful inroads into care settings.
From an operational standpoint, most staffing firms now have an explicit AI strategy, often centered on using AI tools to streamline their own HR and placement processes. In addition, they will increasingly compete for client budgets with management consultants and IT integrators, which are also pitching “build your agentic workforce” engagements to the same corporate buyers, as the strategies highlighted in the table below suggest.
Equity market participants have reacted quickly to the disruption narrative. Short interest in Robert Half has reached 24%, reflecting a deep-seated conviction that AI will permanently erode demand for white-collar placement services, even as domestic staffing trends are inflecting toward recovery, a combination that could set up a short squeeze as sentiment catches up to improving operational realities. ManpowerGroup carries more moderate short interest of roughly 15%.
Sustainability-oriented equity mandates have spent a decade building around a practical constraint: ESG data for small cap companies is less available and less reliable than its large cap counterparts. Third-party ratings agencies often concentrate their analytical resources on large caps, where disclosure is richer and the revenue-per-company economics make coverage worthwhile. The consequence has been a structural underweight in small caps across ESG portfolios that is a data artifact rather than a deliberate investment judgment.
Over the twelve months ending June 30, 2026, that underweight cost money. The Russell 2000 returned 40% and in the first half of 2026 alone, the Russell 2000 outperformed the S&P 500 by more than 12 percentage points, its best start to a year since 1991.
The deeper issue for sustainability mandates is that low scores and missing scores are treated as equivalent signals of ESG risk, when in most cases they reflect nothing more than the disclosure practices of a company with less staff dedicated to the investor relations function.
We propose a different entry point: rather than relying on ratings coverage that does not exist, we identify small cap companies where observable, verifiable sustainability events have recently occurred or are imminent – first ESG reports, CDP initiation, SBTi validation, board-level governance upgrades, etc. These triggers do not require proprietary data infrastructure. They require reading company filings, sustainability reports, and proxy statements, which is what active small cap managers already do. The re-rating that follows is systematic and documented: research published in 2025 found that MSCI ESG rating changes drive abnormal returns over multiple months after the change, with institutional investor repositioning as the primary transmission mechanism.
The implication is actionable: in small caps, identify the companies that are publishing the required data and own them before the agencies react.
The Investment Thesis
When a company improves its sustainability posture in a material, verifiable way, the re-rating tends to follow a predictable sequence. First, the company appears in sustainability-focused screening databases (MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, ISS) with an upgraded score. This typically takes 12 to 24 months from the triggering event. Second, institutional mandates with ESG minimum screens begin to include the name in their eligible universe, generating incremental demand that is largely independent of traditional fundamental catalysts. Third, coverage by sustainability-focused analysts follows, compounding the effect.
Companies know that improving their sustainability posture is good for their stock price; the survey results showed in the chart below highlight that companies believe the main opportunities related to ESG ratings are acquiring and retaining interest in their stock.
It is logical that the re-rating premium would be amplified in small caps relative to large caps because the starting ownership base is dominated by generalist managers who have not priced sustainability improvement into their valuation. There are some practical signals that investors can track to anticipate a re-rating:
- First publication of a sustainability report (particularly if structured around SASB materiality topics)
- Adoption of science-based emissions targets or commitment to SBTi validation
- Board composition changes (addition of an independent director with sustainability credentials; board-level committee dedicated to ESG oversight)
- First participation in CDP disclosure (Carbon Disclosure Project questionnaire responses carry significant weight in downstream rating models)
- Emissions intensity reduction documented over two consecutive years (a single year is insufficient signal; agencies require a trend)
Where to Look
The most fertile ground for the improvers investment thesis sits in sectors where SASB-defined material sustainability topics are operationally manageable at scale for a small company, but where disclosure has historically been minimal. Industrial services, specialty chemicals, and building products are all areas where energy intensity, waste management, and worker health and safety are financially material (under SASB) and operationally addressable without the capital requirements that make transition difficult. A small industrial company that installs remote energy monitoring across its facilities, reduces its recordable incident rate, and publishes a first SASB-aligned sustainability report is doing all three things at once – and doing them in a way that is both financially rational and likely to trigger a meaningful ESG re-rating within two years.
The Counter-Argument
A skeptic may point to three things that undermine the arguments above:
- The re-rating timeline of 12 to 24 months is long, and the path is uncertain: a company can publish a sustainability report without triggering any rating agency review if the report is judged insufficiently substantive.
- The sustainability reporting landscape is not frictionless: first-time reporters routinely publish reports of uneven quality, and a poorly constructed first report can lock in a low score rather than improve it.
- The liquidity premium embedded in small caps is not always fully compensated: if a sustainability-driven re-rating coincides with a broad risk-off environment, the demand lift from ESG-screened mandates may be insufficient to offset market-wide selling.
These are real risks, but they can be mitigated by concentrating on companies whose underlying operational improvements are genuine and financially material, rather than those pursuing disclosure as a cosmetic exercise. For example, an emissions intensity trend that tracks with capital investment in energy efficiency is credible, while an emissions intensity trend that appears only in the sustainability report – without corresponding capex – is not.
Investment Implications
For small cap equity managers, a systematic scan for the leading indicators listed above (sustainability report publication, CDP participation, SBTi commitment, and board changes) applied across the portfolio universe can generates a watchlist of names likely to re-rate within 24 months.
In the section below, we highlight companies that qualify for a “sustainability re-rating” based on the criteria identified above.
Small Cap Sustainability Improvers Ripe for Re-Rating
- Onterris Inc (ONT-US)
Market cap: $750M | SASB sector: Waste Management / Environmental Services
Onterris, an environmental and engineering consulting firm, had its near-term SBTi target and long-term net-zero target formally validated by the Science Based Targets initiative in early 2025. SBTi validation is arguably the most credible sustainability event a company can execute. Ratings agencies like MSCI operate on annual review cycles, meaning a company that validates SBTi targets today is unlikely to see a formal rating upgrade until the next scheduled assessment, usually annually.
Onterris has published annual SASB-aligned sustainability reports for three consecutive years and participates in CDP. Revenue approached $900M in 2025 and 2026 guidance is above that level. The business is growing into the disclosure infrastructure rather than shrinking, which gives the rating upgrade a durable foundation.
It is also worth noting that until recently, the company operated under the name Montrose Environmental Group, but rebranded as Onterris in April 2026. Corporate identity resets of this kind often precede a broader ESG narrative refresh and tend to attract new analyst attention.
- Dexterra Group (DXT-CA)
Market cap: CAD $880M | SASB sector: Professional & Commercial Services / Industrial Support Services
Dexterra provides supports services for the creation, management and operation of infrastructure. The company published its first-ever comprehensive, GRI-aligned sustainability report in March 2025, including a quantified Scope 1 and Scope 2 baseline following the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard. Prior reports were informal communications without a quantified emissions baseline.. Importantly, the business is financially robust: Q1 2026 revenue grew 15% year on year, and earnings beat estimates by approximately 40%. This removes the risk that sustainability commitments get deprioritized because of financial stress.
- John B. Sanfilippo & Son (JBSS-US)
Market cap: ~$990M | SASB sector: Processed Food
JBSS, a leading American processor of tree nuts and related snacks, has quietly built one of the more comprehensive environmental disclosure programs among U.S. food small caps without having published a formal consolidated sustainability report. The company participates in CDP across all three disclosure streams simultaneously (climate change, water security, and forests), which is rare at this market cap. The company discloses scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. In fiscal year 2025, total emissions intensity declined 8.3%. The company updated its Environmental Policy in May 2024, conducts water risk analysis using WRI’s Aqueduct Atlas across all six production facilities, and holds Energy Star Partner of the Year recognition. It reached 89.5% recyclable packaging by weight. SASB material topics for processed food (energy, water management, packaging waste, food safety) are each being actively addressed. The re-rating catalyst here is specific: MSCI and Sustainalytics currently rate JBSS without a published PDF sustainability report to anchor on, meaning the quantitative data sitting on its website is likely being partially discounted or missed. Publication of a first formal consolidated report would immediately elevate the company’s data quality score.
- Ag Growth International (AFN-CA)
Market cap: CAD $450M | SASB sector: Industrial Machinery & Goods
AGI makes grain handling, aeration, and storage equipment, placing it in a sustainability-adjacent commercial position (food security infrastructure) that creates natural demand for ESG transparency. Their 2024 Sustainability Report, released in June 2025, was the first to include a SASB Index and a standalone TCFD-aligned supplemental disclosure, neither of which appeared in the 2023 report. This is a meaningful escalation from narrative-only sustainability communication to framework-indexed disclosure, which is exactly what most ratings agencies require to move from qualitative to quantitative scoring. The Board operates a Governance and Sustainability Committee. On the quantitative side, AGI set a target in 2023 to reduce Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions intensity by 25% by 2030 against a 2021 baseline; in 2024, it had already achieved a 16% reduction, keeping the trajectory on track. Safety performance improved sharply: lost-time incident rate down 46% and total recordable incident rate down 49% year on year, both SASB material metrics for this sector.
It is important to note that the names highlighted here are cited uniquely based on an expectation that financial market participants will latently give credit to their sustainability efforts; For example, AGI carries a highly leveraged balance sheet and has been under financial stress from agricultural equipment cycle headwinds: the sustainability re-rating is an independent catalyst, but the equity thesis depends on stabilization of the underlying business.
In the table below, we summarize the main sustainability re-rating triggers for the aforementioned companies, plus six more that we believe could benefit from the same dynamic.
The sustainable investment industry has spent two years debating whether defence is a sustainable investment. That is the wrong question. Whether Rheinmetall qualifies for an Article 9 fund misses what actually matters: whether investors have the analytical tools to hold defence companies to account for what they make, who their customers are, and what happens when their products reach the battlefield. Responsibility, rather than sustainability, is the appropriate standard, and it is a more demanding one than any taxonomy classification.
Data published this month records 65 active armed conflicts in 2025, the highest count since records began in 1946, with 244,600 people killed in organised violence, the second deadliest total since the Rwanda genocide in 1994. Eight of those conflicts are interstate wars, the most since World War II.
As a logical consequence, world military expenditure reached $2.8 trillion in 2025, up 41% since 2015, with forecasts pointing to $6.6 trillion by 2035. Europe’s ReArm Europe plan commits €800 billion; the United Kingdom has pledged 5% of GDP in defence spending by 2035. The capital flows are real, growing, and unlikely to reverse whether or not an Article 9 fund knows what to call them.
This note builds on the SMS framework introduced in our March 2025 note “The European Defense Offensive: From Peace Dividend to War Premium”, which identified five screening criteria (Controversial Weapons Exclusions, Allied Revenue Alignment, Government Independence, R&D Investment, and Strategic Defence Orientation) and a cohort of European specialists we termed the second wave.
Between July 2022 and the publication of our March 2025 European Defence Offensive, the SMS European Defence Specialists Basket delivered approximately 550% in total return. That performance continued for some time but has corrected heavily since the February 2026 peak. Over the fifteen months since publication, the basket, the S&P 500, and the American Defence Primes delivered 28%, 27%, and 25% respectively – effectively the same trade. The valuation re-rating of underowned European specialists as defence budgets re-accelerated is complete. The entry point that defined the first and second waves is gone.
The chart above is the investment case for this note: the opportunity that justified the first note has closed, and a new one has opened. What follows is where the next leg of returns will come from.
Red Lines That No Longer Hold
There was a time when a blanket defence exclusion was defensible. The sector consisted predominantly of identifiable end-products: tanks, artillery, fighter jets, submarines. Revenue streams were opaque but outputs were not. An investor that decided it did not want to own defence companies could draw a clean line around the category and walk away without much analytical strain.
That is no longer the case. The reason is dual-use, a property that once described finished technology products but now runs the entire length of the value chain, from raw materials to drones.
Upstream, the rare earth elements that power an EV motor, a wind turbine, or a smartphone are chemically identical to those in a drone motor, a missile guidance system, or an electronic warfare suite. Neodymium is neodymium. MP Materials (MP-US) is the only integrated rare earth mine and mill in the United States, indispensable to the domestic clean energy supply chain AND is simultaneously supplying the Pentagon under a ten-year offtake agreement backed by $400 million in government investment. An exclusionary policy that excludes MP Materials while retaining clean energy exposure would apply different standards to identical atoms depending on who writes the purchase order. Some investors will make that choice deliberately, as an expression of values. The point is that it is a values choice, not an analytical finding, and the clean line it tries to draw no longer maps cleanly onto the physical world.
Downstream, the same logic applies in reverse. The satellite constellation that provides broadband internet provides battlefield targeting. The AI platform that optimises logistics for a retailer optimises resupply for a military base. The same imaging system that monitors agricultural land monitors conflict zones. Revenue segmentation by end-use is rarely disclosed at the granularity a meaningful screen requires, and when it is, it rarely captures what happens to the technology once it leaves the company.
This is why the third wave which we discussed in this week’s note is different in character from the first and second.
The Rare Earth Elements (REE) Megatrend
Permanent magnets made from neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium are the enabling component in precision guidance systems, drone motors, missile actuators, electronic warfare equipment, and submarine propulsion. Demand for magnet rare earths has doubled since 2015, with defence among the structural growth drivers alongside EVs and wind. China processes approximately 85-95% of these materials at the midstream metallization and separation stage – a share the IEA projects will remain at 75% by 2035 even under an optimistic build-out scenario.

We have covered the OECD REE investment case in depth across three prior notes, beginning with “Critical Minerals, Critical Moves” (May 2025) and “Rare Opportunities in Rare Earths” (November 2025), and most recently in “From Transition Play to Arms Race: A Critical Materials Reset” (May 28, 2026) – published days before China’s June escalation. Readers seeking the full company-level analysis of the OECD REE basket should refer to these notes. What follows is specific to the defence demand driver and the regulatory timeline it has introduced.
That pressure reached a new peak just a couple weeks ago, in the week of June 15, 2026. The G7 set a target of no single country supplying more than 60% of each member’s rare-earth imports by 2030; the European Council proposed a formal de-risking mechanism; and China responded on June 22 with targeted export controls on US defence companies and rare-earth mining firms. Washington had already anticipated this: from January 1, 2027, a federal rule (DFARS) bans the Pentagon from procuring any system containing permanent magnets originating from China, a deadline China’s own controls have now made considerably harder to ignore. Active inventory depletion sharpens the timeline: the US has reportedly consumed approximately 45% of its Precision Strike Missile stockpile and 30% of its Tomahawk inventory, and restocking every unit requires REE-dependent components that cannot contain Chinese-origin material after that date.
The bottleneck is not mining but the midstream. A separation facility without downstream magnet makers has no local market, and magnet makers need committed offtake from defence, automotive, wind, and industrial customers simultaneously. The mine-to-magnet loop is only investable when all links close at once. The gap between stated policy ambition and physical processing capacity is precisely where the returns are.
The Investable OECD REE Basket
Most of the names below will be familiar to readers of our prior REE note series. Our conviction on the core positions is unchanged.
The three core positions remain MP Materials (MP-US), Lynas Rare Earths (LYC-AU), and Energy Fuels (UUUU-US). MP Materials is the only integrated US rare earth mine and mill, backed by a $400 million Pentagon investment, with REE separation commissioning at Mountain Pass by mid-2026. Lynas, the largest non-Chinese REE company at $13.5 billion, is completing its Texas REE separation facility with DoD funding. Energy Fuels received a $725 million conditional DoD loan commitment on June 18 and disclosed the $1.9 billion acquisition of Vacuumschmelze (VAC), the German precision magnet manufacturer. VAC holds existing qualification relationships with defence OEMs, bypassing the multi-year approval cycles new entrants face. The combined entity is the only OECD operation with a credible mine-to-magnet platform connecting US processing to European defence manufacturing. At $3.5 billion market cap, it looks underpriced relative to the strategic value of the VAC qualification book.
Two smaller names address specific gaps the core three do not cover. NEO Performance Materials (NEO-CA) is ramping its Estonia magnet factory to 2,000 tpa by end-2026, entirely outside Chinese processing influence. REalloys (ALOY-US) is building the largest REE metallization facility outside China in partnership with the Saskatchewan Research Council, with a 15-year offtake from the Tanbreez project in Greenland. It is important to note that REalloys came to market via reverse merger and is the highest-risk name in the basket. 5N Plus (VNP-CA) rounds out the basket with exposure to gallium, germanium, indium, and bismuth – the four materials subject to China’s August 2023 export controls and directly applied in compound semiconductors, radar, and night vision systems.
The REE basket has delivered; but unlike the European defence name re-rating, which converged to S&P 500 performance after March 2025, we do not believe this trade is over. The structural drivers – China’s escalating export control posture, a federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin magnets effective January 2027, and a supply chain buildout still measured in years rather than quarters – have not been resolved by the price action.
Third Defence Wave: Beyond the Primes
The REE basket addresses the supply side of the thesis. The names below address the demand side: platform specialists, systems integrators, and software-adjacent companies whose growth directly drives REE demand. What distinguishes them from the first and second wave is selectivity, not valuation re-rating – that trade is complete. Defence budgets are accelerating in unmanned systems, electronic warfare, naval domain awareness, and AI-assisted decision-making. The five names below are positioned where the spending is going and have not yet been fully absorbed by institutional capital.
- Hensoldt (HAG-DE) is Germany’s pure-play radar, electronic warfare, and optronics specialist. Its TRML-4D radar and Kalaetron electronic warfare suite are on order across multiple NATO allies. Revenue for FY2025 was approximately €2.1 billion against a backlog exceeding three times that figure.
- Renk Group (RENK-DE) is the sole supplier of tank transmissions for the Leopard 2 and propulsion systems for Germany’s Type 212 submarines, with no direct European competitor in naval propulsion at its scale. Revenue is approximately €1.1 billion with an order book accelerating across European navies and armoured forces. The demand trajectory is the strongest of any name in this section.
- Exail Technologies (EXA-FR) operates in the fastest-growing segment of naval spending: underwater domain awareness. Its DriX unmanned surface vessel and Gaps autonomous underwater vehicle serve both oceanographic and military customers, with NATO’s post-Ukraine emphasis on submarine detection providing a direct demand catalyst. The civilian revenue base diversifies against defence budget cyclicality.
- Kratos Defense (KTOS-US) is the closest pure-play on the affordable autonomous systems thesis: drones cheap enough to deploy in volume and lose in combat. This technology sits in a sub-sector where the US Air Force has no incumbent prime to protect. Revenue for FY2025 was approximately $1.2 billion.
- Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH-US) is the primary beneficiary of AI adoption within the US defence and intelligence establishment, bringing the cleared workforce and contract vehicles that pure technology platforms cannot replicate. Revenue for FY2025 was approximately $11.5 billion. The thesis is durable margin expansion as AI tooling reduces contract delivery costs. Government contractor risk is endemic to the category and priced into the current multiple.
Most of the basket has underperformed the MSCI World in the last year. That underperformance is the entry point, not a reason for caution.
The structural case has not deteriorated. It has strengthened. The Bundeswehr’s €100 billion fund is disbursing. NATO navies are ordering. The federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin rare earth magnets takes effect in seven months. Hensoldt and Renk enter this note’s coverage at a correction that their underlying order books do not justify. Booz Allen has been caught in the crossfire of US government IT spending reviews that are, by design, temporary.
The first and second wave re-rated on valuation. The third wave will re-rate on earnings, driven by a procurement cycle accelerating into the specific sub-sectors where these names face no credible competition from the large primes. The gap between the chart above and the order books behind these companies is where the next leg of returns is.
Food sits at the intersection of virtually every sustainability theme we track. The sector is responsible for roughly one-third of global greenhouse gas emissions, is the single largest driver of land use change and biodiversity loss, and places enormous pressure on freshwater systems. At the same time, the products that food companies sell shape the health outcomes of billions of people; the social impact is both direct and, as the obesity epidemic makes clear, financially enormous. Few industries make the case for double materiality as compellingly as food: sustainability factors are reshaping the financial performance of food companies while these companies shape sustainability outcomes.
The modern Big Food conglomerate was built on a simple and highly effective premise: branded consumer staples businesses generate reliable, recurring cash flows that can support significant debt, while scale in manufacturing, distribution, and marketing creates durable competitive advantages that justify paying premium prices for acquisitions. Indeed, from the 1980s through the mid-2010s, companies like Nestlé, Kraft, Unilever, and PepsiCo assembled vast brand portfolios through successive acquisitions, financing them with cheap debt and integrating them through aggressive cost reduction.
This model historically brought investors steady returns in the form of rich dividends and stable prices; food companies traditionally provided a safe harbor during equity bear markets. But the last few years have been wrought with unfulfilled expectations – even in market downturns, food companies have been unable to generate market returns (please see the chart below).
Indeed, even these properties – stability and recession proofing – are now under fire. The financial model of food company success assumed two things that are no longer true: that volumes would remain stable or grow as populations expanded and emerging market consumers traded up, and that brand loyalty in packaged food was durable enough to support perpetual price increases. Both assumptions have been invalidated simultaneously. We identify six forces – the bulk of which are environmental and social issues – that are stacked against Big Food. We then identify the biggest losers: companies that we believe make superior short candidates at the current juncture.
1. GLP-1: Structural Demand Destruction
There is now sufficient evidence that GLP-1 drug adoption is in full swing and related behaviors tend to be long lasting: a person who loses 15-20% of body weight on semaglutide and recalibrates their relationship with food is not coming back as a Frito-Lay customer in the same way.
As we highlighted in our January 2025 note, The Weight Loss Heavyweights Still Lead the GLP-1 Revolution, households with at least one GLP-1 user cut grocery spending by 6%, with the sharpest cuts in calorie-dense processed and snack foods. That number will only grow as penetration expands; semaglutide U.S. prescriptions went from roughly 2 million adults in 2021 to an estimated 15 million in early 2026.
This matters particularly for companies like Mondelez (MDLZ-US), Hershey’s (HSY-US) and PepsiCo (PEP-US) because their revenue is disproportionately concentrated in exactly the product categories GLP-1 users reduce first: chips, cookies, crackers, and sugary beverages. There is no hedge within their portfolios, as the table below highlights: we show the revenue derived from unhealthy snacks and drinks.
2. Input Cost Pressure is Not Going Away
We have written many times about our high conviction view that that climate-linked supply disruptions in key agricultural inputs are a structural, not transitory, phenomenon and that food inflation will chronically outpace other inflation categories (for example, please see our March 2024 note, No Free Lunch: Challenges and Opportunities for Engagement in the Food Supply Chain).
High and volatile prices of coffee, cocoa, oranges, palm oil, and now tomatoes, are direct input costs for food manufacturers. Rising or volatile agricultural prices feed directly into margins, making for sustained downward pressure on profitability.
3. A Decade of Pricing Power Is Exhausted
Big Food spent the first part of the 2020s using inflationary cover to push through price increases to protect margins when agricultural input costs rose. Today, however, there are increasing signs that consumers have exhausted their tolerance for higher shelf prices. Several major players (General Mills (GIS-US), Campbell’s (CPB-US), Kraft Heinz (KHC-US), etc.) have been reporting consecutive quarters of volume declines that increases can no longer offset. Consumers are increasingly opting for store brands: the private label share of grocery sales in the U.S. hit multi-decade highs in 2025.
4. MAHA: Muted but Not Irrelevant
Our August 2025 note “MAHA: All Hat and No Cattle” concluded that MAHA was lacked regulatory teeth on both pesticide use and ultra-processed food consumption, and Big Ag lobbying had effectively defused the most threatening policy proposals.
That conclusion stands, but the impact of the MAHA movement should not be entirely dismissed. It has sustained negative media attention on food additives, dyes, and ultra-processed ingredients, which has pushed some companies into reactive reformulation commitments to remove artificial dyes and reduce sodium that add cost without necessarily winning back consumers who have already changed their purchasing behavior. And it has kept Big Food in a defensive posture at exactly the moment they need to be investing offensively in portfolio repositioning.
5. Interest Rates and the Debt Overhang
Consumer staples were bid up during the zero-rate era as bond proxies because they offered reliable dividends, stable earnings, and inflation pass-through. The repricing of that trade as rates rose has been brutal for the sector. More concretely, the M&A-built balance sheets across Big Food carry substantial debt loads that are now being refinanced at materially higher rates. Kraft Heinz’s long-term debt remains north of $20 billion. For companies facing both revenue pressure and margin compression, the combination of higher interest expense and reduced operating cash flow narrows the room to invest in brand renovation.
6. The Conglomerate Model Has Broken Down
The Big Food conglomerate model is to buy brands, cut costs aggressively, lever up, extract synergies, use pricing power to grow cash flows. This works when volumes are growing or stable and interest rates are low. However, that model seems to have reached its endpoint: companies that built scale through acquisition are sitting on portfolios of brands with very different growth profiles – while some are growing, many are mature or declining, and investors appear no longer willing to reward the diversification.
Divestitures currently represent about half of total consumer products M&A activity, and that share is expected to continue to rise according to a recent Bain survey: 42% of M&A executives in the industry are prepping an asset for sale over the next three years. High-profile examples of recent activity include Kellogg’s split into Kellanova (snacks) and WK Kellogg Co. (cereals), Unilever’s spinoff of its ice cream business (Ben & Jerry’s, Magnum, Wall’s), Nestlé shedding of its water portfolio and underperforming brands, and General Mills’ announcement earlier this month that it will sell its Häagen-Dazs shops in mainland China. Meanwhile, Kraft Heinz, while staying together for now, suffered intense speculation throughout 2025 about a breakup.
To be sure, many of the forces described above have occurred before: it is not the first time that Big Food has navigated input cost spikes, consumer downtrading, private label competition, and leveraged balance sheets. However, it is rare that all these forces happen simultaneously, with a structural demand destruction driver (GLP-1) to boot.
Given this challenging environment, and despite the already poor performance of many food companies, we find it more relevant to pursue opportunities to short sell (rather than buy) food manufacturing companies.
What To Short Now
In previous research, we have identified several food and agri-businesses that we consider solid short candidates from a sustainability perspective, whether it be environmental, labor or governance concerns. On the flipside, we find very few food companies in our long universe: “sustainable winners” are difficult to find since many of the food majors are fraught with controversy risk and derive significant revenue portions from unhealthy and unsustainable business lines (please see our note February 13, 2025 Food Fight: Policy’s Effect on Food Producers & Inflation).
From our universe of short candidates, we screen for those that are most exposed to the headwinds described above: rising input costs, high debt loads, inability to raise prices, sales volume slowdown due to declining popularity of product offerings, current valuations and recent stock price action. The following table ranks the major players:
At the top of the list is Mondelez – the maker of Oreos, Cadbury, Ritz crackers, Toblerone and countless other snacks and desserts. The stock rallied 15% in 2026, sending the stock’s twelve-month trailing P/E to over 31 times, a 30% premium over the 5-year average P/E. We find this rich valuation impossible to defend. First and foremost, in El Nino years like this one, uncertainty about future cocoa prices tend to surge and as described above, consumers’ appetite to absorb higher input costs by way of paying more for junk food has been fully squashed. With little room for volume or price expansion, current valuations suggest a very challenging environment for Mondelez’s new CFO to deliver.
A second favored stock to short is Hershey, which is also trading higher than its historical valuation, remarkable given the company faces a more acute version of Mondelez’s input cost problem: cocoa is Hershey’s primary cost of goods. The stock is about flat YTD, which implies investors may not be worried about the cocoa cost trajectory and/or are downplaying the GLP-1 demand headwind on chocolate. One material factor that could be putting a floor under Hershey stock is possible M&A activity: Mondelez has repeatedly explored a Hershey acquisition, though has so far been unsuccessful. Mondelez’s own balance sheet and the cocoa cost exposure makes the economics of such a deal increasingly questionable.
PepsiCo also ranks highly on our short candidate list using the logic articulated above, although the stock has already corrected from its February highs, suggesting that at least part of this trade has already occurred. Investors should wait for a better opportunity before adding to short positions.
One company that we notably leave off our short list is Monster Beverage. Energy drinks have so far been immune to changing consumption behaviours regarding GLP-1 use. GLP-1 patients frequently report fatigue and seek ways to sustain energy; Monster’s products appear to fit the bill. Q1 2026 was the company’s best quarter ever, with revenue increasing 27% annually.
A new manifesto came out of Silicon Valley last week from Palantir’s founder Alex Karp. It suggests that Tech executives ought to embrace patriotism to preserve the values of the Republic. For many observers, this contrasts with Big Tech’s original mantra of pluralism and openness. This is especially true if one considers that most of Big Tech companies such as Meta, Google and Tesla have now mostly reverted towards more cooperation with the Trump administration.
The growing cooperation between Tech and State is getting especially visible on issues pertaining to data privacy – whereby Silicon Valley firms such as Palantir are directly scraping your visual ID – or firms like Meta, Google and Tesla – that indirectly scrape your data – even if it to use it against you at the government’s request. Against this backdrop, it’s no surprise to see that trust vis-à-vis governments and Big Tech firms’ is waning.
A sign of the times is that Google searches for “Data Privacy” (how ironic!) in the U.S, are at a five-year high. We expect this interest to endure as AI continues to scrape the world.
Despite this growing interest in data privacy, users are typically ignoring the fine print regarding what Big Tech and Governments are doing with their data. As early as 2023, a Pew Research survey suggested that as much as six out of ten Americans skip reading privacy policies when signing up to apps. This means that they basically agree to give away whatever data on them that Big Tech firms are looking for. This is somewhat surprising given that about eight-in-ten of those familiar with AI also say that its use by companies will lead to people’s personal information being used in ways they won’t be comfortable with or that weren’t originally intended. Data privacy issues have resurfaced in the past few months during anti-ICE demonstrations across the U.S.: Homeland Security department was using data found on Facebook and Instagram to track, arrest and deport immigrants and arrest protesters.
This prompts a sharper look at the data privacy policies of Big Tech. We examined the policies of major technology firms regarding the sale of personal data, third-party sharing, disclosure to governments, AI training, and consent – only to realize that Big Tech not only owns your data but could also decide to use it against you if requested.
Big Tech & Data Privacy – Pick Your Poison, Choose Your Pain
It is interesting to compare the U.S.’ Big Tech regulation about data privacy to that of their Chinese and EU counterparts. While the EU is the most protective of personal data, there remains a lot of concern for Chinese companies’ proximity to Beijing. According to Beijing’s Cybersecurity Law, every Chinese company – including companies such as BYD and Huawei – are legally obligated to cooperate with state intelligence services. There is no judicial warrant process, no legal mechanism through which either company could refuse a government data request, and no external party can audit compliance or detect covert cooperation. Furthermore, communist party cells are also embedded inside major Chinese companies, providing informal intelligence conduits beyond the formal legal framework. This means the question is not whether Chinese companies would hand over your data, but whether the technical architecture enables them to do so – and the answer is yes on both counts.
Ineffective Investor Pressure: Is Tech Still Investable?
The lack of government oversight over data privacy – and now over the development of AI – forces investors to take a harder look at their Big Tech holdings data privacy policies. That said, given that Big Tech is such a massive chunk of the market – Mag-7 companies still represent about one-third of the market cap in the U.S. equity market – it remains difficult to divest out of these stocks solely based on their data malpractices.
It’s even harder to divest when the Tech sector outperforms the market like it has been doing these past few years. Furthermore, many of these companies have had tailwinds since Trump’s re-election, especially Palantir (which supplies surveillance software to the government) and Google (which knows everything about everyone) – a precious asset in an increasingly repressive world.
Five years of investor engagement with Palantir, Meta, and Google has produced letters, risk briefings, shareholder proposals, one landmark divestment, and a $190 million legal settlement – and virtually zero durable change in corporate behaviour across any of the three firms. The failure operates on three distinct but mutually reinforcing elements.
The first is structural governance. Palantir’s Class F share architecture grants its founders effective veto power over any shareholder resolution; Meta’s dual-class structure allows Mark Zuckerberg to override supermajorities of independent shareholders – including the 62% who voted for the 2022 surveillance advertising proposal – with his personal voting bloc; Alphabet is similarly insulated. These are not governance oversights; they are deliberate and permanent shields, and activist investors have known this for years.
The second element is the absence of a financial transmission mechanism. At Meta and Google, the theory of engagement is that reputational damage translates into advertiser flight, which translates into revenue pressure, which translates into behavioural change. That chain has never closed at scale: both companies continued to grow revenues through every major data privacy controversy, every EU General Data Protection Regulation fine, and every congressional hearing, because their advertising monopolies absorb the cost of controversy without altering the underlying surveillance business model.
The third and most structurally important failure Is that major institutions appear to be throwing in the towel. For example, Norges Bank suspended its own ethics council earlier this year under geopolitical pressure and actually increased its Palantir position despite obvious governance flaws and data privacy issues while simultaneously backing a human rights proposal at Microsoft. We think this highlights reactive positioning and signals that the responsible investment ecosystem lacks the tools and cohesion to hold surveillance-era technology firms to any consistent standard. Taken in this context, Dutch Pension fund ABP’s €825M Palantir divestment and CalSTRS’s $190M Meta settlement appear as rounding errors against the combined market capitalisation and government revenue streams of these firms.
Global governments have hit a structural fiscal wall. Advanced economies are carrying debt loads that would have been considered a sovereign crisis scenario twenty years ago. Japan has long since departed the realm of conventional fiscal analysis with its 215% debt-to-GDP ratio. Rather than unwinding this burden in the years following the pandemic, governments doubled down with stimulus packages, energy subsidies, and increased defence spending. Now, with interest rates firmly in the “higher for longer” camp, compounding debt service costs is turning this burden into an active crisis.
To make matters worse, governments are currently facing four compounding pressures with no cyclical release valve. Entitlement obligations from an aging population are accelerating against a shrinking tax base, while geopolitical reality has locked in permanent, irreversible defence spending floors. Furthermore, the massive fiscal overhang of the pandemic remains entirely unresolved. Crucially, the era of zero-interest rates that made this leverage manageable has ended. Today, OECD governments spend more on debt service than on defence. In the United States alone, interest payments consumed nearly $1 trillion in 2025. That is money that does not build a single hospital, repair a single bridge, fix a school, or connect a single household to clean water.
Because sovereign balance sheets are now increasingly captured by these legacy obligations, the resulting fiscal deficit is massive. The global infrastructure funding gap – the difference between what is being spent and what is needed – is projected to reach $15 trillion by 2040. The post-war model in which the sovereign state financed, built, and operated public infrastructure is, in most of the world, functionally over.
Private Capital Enters the Chat
When governments cannot write the cheque, they turn to the private sector. This is not a new phenomenon – infrastructure privatization has been happening in waves since the 1980s – but the scale and urgency of the current moment are genuinely without precedent. The fiscal constraint is no longer a temporary condition to be managed through one or two budget cycles; it is a permanent feature of the sovereign landscape.
Private capital can participate in infrastructure through several distinct models, each with a different logic and a materially different risk-return profile.
The PPP model stands out because it is the model that resolves the core problem most directly. The government needs infrastructure it cannot afford to build – and maintain. The private sector gets a long-term contract backed by a sovereign counterparty. Risk is allocated to whoever can best manage it: construction and operational risk to the developer, demand risk either shared or retained by the state depending on the structure.
After a brief COVID-induced pause, global PPP deal flow has accelerated through its previous 2018 ceiling.
The regional breadth of the recovery is telling: Sub-Saharan Africa posted a 133% increase year-on-year, Europe and Central Asia 91%, and Latin America and the Caribbean 36%. In the United States alone, 36 states now have dedicated P3 enabling legislation, up from fewer than 15 a decade ago. The UK’s National Wealth Fund, launched in 2024, has an explicit PPP co-investment mandate. The G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment targets $600 billion in private infrastructure mobilization by 2027. The trend is structural, it is broad-based, and it is accelerating precisely when government balance sheets are least able to offer an alternative.
Beyond the Toll Booth: The New Face of PPPs
The PPP model has existed in modern form since the late 1980s, when developing countries began reversing decades of nationalization. In its early incarnation, it was almost exclusively about economic infrastructure: telecom licenses, power purchase agreements, and toll road concessions. In the World Bank’s PPI database, transport and telecom together accounted for over 60% of all private infrastructure investment through the 1990s.
In the early 2000s, the introduction of the availability payment (AP) model – where governments pay a fixed fee for the private sector to design, build, finance, and operate social infrastructure – opened the doors for PPPs to manage hospitals, schools, prisons, and courthouses.
Post-2010, low-carbon projects in the World Bank PPI database outnumber conventional ones by more than two to one (1,915 low-carbon vs. 815 conventional).
The sector diversification is now visible even in a single market snapshot. In Europe in 2024, education PPPs doubled in project count year-on-year (15 transactions versus 8 in 2023). Italy completed the first sovereign data centre PPP in European history, with €331 million in EIB financing for digital cloud infrastructure serving Italian public administration. The UK closed a €605 million district heating network PPP. The old caricature of PPPs as a motorway financing mechanism for governments that cannot be bothered to collect tolls themselves has been thoroughly overtaken by events.
The SDG Multiplier Effect
For a sustainability-minded investor, the PPP landscape presents an immediate challenge: not all PPP concessions are created equal through an impact lens. A managed toll lane serving commuters in Texas or Melbourne is, without question, a sound investment. The cash flows are contracted, the regulatory framework is mature, and the inflation linkage is explicit. But it would be a stretch to characterize it as SDG-aligned infrastructure. The user is, in most cases, a private motorist with alternatives. The social additionality is limited.
This matters because the case for infrastructure as a sustainable asset class rests on considerably broader foundations. As we documented in our October 2023 note, Inflation-Proofing and SDG-Boosting, research published in Nature Sustainability (Thacker et al.) found that infrastructure either directly or indirectly influences all 17 SDGs, encompassing 121 of the 169 targets – 72% of the entire SDG framework. More pointedly, for five SDGs – SDG 3 (Good Health), SDG 6 (Clean Water), SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities) – every single target is influenced by infrastructure investment.
Infrastructure, in other words, is more than an inflation hedge or a portfolio diversifier. When properly targeted, it is the most direct mechanism available to listed equity investors for deploying capital toward global sustainability commitments. The question is not whether to invest in infrastructure, but which infrastructure.
Toll roads in advanced economies and airports serving leisure tourism in mature markets are excluded from our focus – not because they are poor investments, but because they do not represent the category of infrastructure where the PPP growth wave is most pronounced, nor where the impact additionality is most compelling. Our attention is concentrated on operators and developers whose PPP concession pipelines are anchored in social infrastructure (healthcare, public transit, sanitation, water access) and environmental infrastructure (clean energy, waste treatment).
First Responders to the Infrastructure Deficit
The five operators and developers we favour share three characteristics that distinguish them from the broader infrastructure universe: their revenues flow predominantly from government counterparties under long-term concession or availability-payment structures; their pipelines are expanding, not managing decline; and their assets serve populations where private capital is genuinely additional – not merely convenient.
Acciona (ANA-ES) is the most diversified single expression of this thesis. Its Pernambuco water and sanitation concession – €2.38 billion, 35 years, seven million people in one of Brazil’s poorest states – is the largest SDG 6 PPP transaction closed by any listed company in 2025, and it sits alongside São Paulo Metro Line 6, renewable energy transmission concessions in Peru and Australia, and an active bid pipeline in US managed lanes. Acciona’s EBITDA from concessions grew 103% in FY2025. The market continues to price it as a construction company. Veolia (VIE-FR) completes the environmental picture on the water side: as the world’s largest operator of municipal water systems under delegated public service contracts, it holds the most geographically diversified portfolio of government-backed water PPP revenues available in listed equity markets, spanning France, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.
Sacyr (SCYR-ES) occupies the social infrastructure end of the spectrum that most sustainable infrastructure portfolios systematically miss. Hospital PPPs – availability-based, long-duration, government-backed – are structurally identical to road concessions in their cash flow profile but carry materially stronger SDG 3 alignment. Sacyr has been winning them consistently across Spain, Chile, and Colombia while simultaneously developing water treatment PPPs and bidding US managed lane concessions. Ten new concession wins in 2024–25 across five countries. It is the most prolific listed PPP developer by contract count, in an investment category that most European fund managers have never analyzed.
In Brazil, Motiva (MOTV3-BR) brings urban mobility into the mix. Beyond its four major highway concession wins in 2024–25, Motiva operates São Paulo’s Metro Line 4, the Salvador metro, and multiple BRT corridors – giving it genuine SDG 11 exposure in Brazil’s most underserved urban centres, in a market where the federal government’s R$1.7 trillion infrastructure programme is generating the deepest PPP deal flow of any emerging economy.
Finally, Mota-Engil (EGL-PT) occupies territory no other listed operator will enter: road concessions in Angola and Mozambique, the Lobito Corridor railway maintenance agreement running to 2054, and the operating contract for Luanda’s new international airport. Africa’s infrastructure deficit is the largest in the world. Mota-Engil is, for now, one of the few listed companies being paid to close it.
The EBITDA margin column deserves careful reading. Motiva at 46% reflects a fully concession-derived business: government-contracted revenues, limited variable costs, predictable cash generation. Sacyr at 27% carries a residual construction division that blends the number down, though 93% of its EBITDA originates from concession assets. Acciona and Veolia, both near 15%, operate larger services and construction platforms alongside their concession portfolios.
The group trades between 5.1x and 8.4x EV/EBITDA, which is modest given the contractual duration and government-backed nature of the revenues. Mota-Engil at 5.1x carries a construction multiple, not a concession one. The Lobito corridor, the Luanda airport, and the Santos-Guarujá tunnel generate no visible premium in the current price. Whether that gap closes as concession EBITDA matures is the core of the investment thesis.
Dividends are a hallmark of infrastructure investing, and two distinct approaches appear in this table. Veolia’s 4.3% yield reflects a mature portfolio of long-term municipal service contracts generating stable, predictable cash flows that management is comfortable distributing. Acciona’s 1.9% reflects a deliberate choice to retain capital: with Pernambuco, Metro Line 6, and a €301bn project pipeline actively consuming investment, the priority is deployment over distribution. Both are rational strategies given where each company sits in its concession development cycle.
Acciona has returned roughly 120% over the two-year period shown, against 40% for the MSCI World and mid-single-digit returns for Veolia and Mota-Engil. Acciona’s re-rating reflects the market finally pricing diversified concession pipelines correctly. Sacyr’s recent upward break suggests this recognition is spreading.