Sustainability-oriented equity mandates have spent a decade building around a practical constraint: ESG data for small cap companies is less available and less reliable than its large cap counterparts. Third-party ratings agencies often concentrate their analytical resources on large caps, where disclosure is richer and the revenue-per-company economics make coverage worthwhile. The consequence has been a structural underweight in small caps across ESG portfolios that is a data artifact rather than a deliberate investment judgment.

Over the twelve months ending June 30, 2026, that underweight cost money. The Russell 2000 returned 40% and in the first half of 2026 alone, the Russell 2000 outperformed the S&P 500 by more than 12 percentage points, its best start to a year since 1991.

The deeper issue for sustainability mandates is that low scores and missing scores are treated as equivalent signals of ESG risk, when in most cases they reflect nothing more than the disclosure practices of a company with less staff dedicated to the investor relations function.

We propose a different entry point: rather than relying on ratings coverage that does not exist, we identify small cap companies where observable, verifiable sustainability events have recently occurred or are imminent – first ESG reports, CDP initiation, SBTi validation, board-level governance upgrades, etc. These triggers do not require proprietary data infrastructure. They require reading company filings, sustainability reports, and proxy statements, which is what active small cap managers already do. The re-rating that follows is systematic and documented: research published in 2025 found that MSCI ESG rating changes drive abnormal returns over multiple months after the change, with institutional investor repositioning as the primary transmission mechanism.

The implication is actionable: in small caps, identify the companies that are publishing the required data and own them before the agencies react.

 

The Investment Thesis

When a company improves its sustainability posture in a material, verifiable way, the re-rating tends to follow a predictable sequence. First, the company appears in sustainability-focused screening databases (MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, ISS) with an upgraded score. This typically takes 12 to 24 months from the triggering event. Second, institutional mandates with ESG minimum screens begin to include the name in their eligible universe, generating incremental demand that is largely independent of traditional fundamental catalysts. Third, coverage by sustainability-focused analysts follows, compounding the effect.

Companies know that improving their sustainability posture is good for their stock price; the survey results showed in the chart below highlight that companies believe the main opportunities related to ESG ratings are acquiring and retaining interest in their stock.

It is logical that the re-rating premium would be amplified in small caps relative to large caps because the starting ownership base is dominated by generalist managers who have not priced sustainability improvement into their valuation. There are some practical signals that investors can track to anticipate a re-rating:

Where to Look

The most fertile ground for the improvers investment thesis sits in sectors where SASB-defined material sustainability topics are operationally manageable at scale for a small company, but where disclosure has historically been minimal. Industrial services, specialty chemicals, and building products are all areas where energy intensity, waste management, and worker health and safety are financially material (under SASB) and operationally addressable without the capital requirements that make transition difficult. A small industrial company that installs remote energy monitoring across its facilities, reduces its recordable incident rate, and publishes a first SASB-aligned sustainability report is doing all three things at once – and doing them in a way that is both financially rational and likely to trigger a meaningful ESG re-rating within two years.

The Counter-Argument

A skeptic may point to three things that undermine the arguments above:

These are real risks, but they can be mitigated by concentrating on companies whose underlying operational improvements are genuine and financially material, rather than those pursuing disclosure as a cosmetic exercise. For example, an emissions intensity trend that tracks with capital investment in energy efficiency is credible, while an emissions intensity trend that appears only in the sustainability report – without corresponding capex – is not.

Investment Implications

For small cap equity managers, a systematic scan for the leading indicators listed above (sustainability report publication, CDP participation, SBTi commitment, and board changes) applied across the portfolio universe can generates a watchlist of names likely to re-rate within 24 months.

In the section below, we highlight companies that qualify for a “sustainability re-rating” based on the criteria identified above.

 

Small Cap Sustainability Improvers Ripe for Re-Rating

  1. Onterris Inc (ONT-US)

Market cap: $750M | SASB sector: Waste Management / Environmental Services

Onterris, an environmental and engineering consulting firm, had its near-term SBTi target and long-term net-zero target formally validated by the Science Based Targets initiative in early 2025. SBTi validation is arguably the most credible sustainability event a company can execute. Ratings agencies like MSCI operate on annual review cycles, meaning a company that validates SBTi targets today is unlikely to see a formal rating upgrade until the next scheduled assessment, usually annually.

Onterris has published annual SASB-aligned sustainability reports for three consecutive years and participates in CDP. Revenue approached $900M in 2025 and 2026 guidance is above that level. The business is growing into the disclosure infrastructure rather than shrinking, which gives the rating upgrade a durable foundation.

It is also worth noting that until recently, the company operated under the name Montrose Environmental Group, but rebranded as Onterris in April 2026. Corporate identity resets of this kind often precede a broader ESG narrative refresh and tend to attract new analyst attention. 

  1. Dexterra Group (DXT-CA)

Market cap: CAD $880M | SASB sector: Professional & Commercial Services / Industrial Support Services

Dexterra provides supports services for the creation, management and operation of infrastructure. The company published its first-ever comprehensive, GRI-aligned sustainability report in March 2025, including a quantified Scope 1 and Scope 2 baseline following the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard. Prior reports were informal communications without a quantified emissions baseline.. Importantly, the business is financially robust: Q1 2026 revenue grew 15% year on year, and earnings beat estimates by approximately 40%. This removes the risk that sustainability commitments get deprioritized because of financial stress.

  1. John B. Sanfilippo & Son (JBSS-US)

Market cap: ~$990M | SASB sector: Processed Food

JBSS, a leading American processor of tree nuts and related snacks, has quietly built one of the more comprehensive environmental disclosure programs among U.S. food small caps without having published a formal consolidated sustainability report. The company participates in CDP across all three disclosure streams simultaneously (climate change, water security, and forests), which is rare at this market cap. The company discloses scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. In fiscal year 2025, total emissions intensity declined 8.3%. The company updated its Environmental Policy in May 2024, conducts water risk analysis using WRI’s Aqueduct Atlas across all six production facilities, and holds Energy Star Partner of the Year recognition. It reached 89.5% recyclable packaging by weight. SASB material topics for processed food (energy, water management, packaging waste, food safety) are each being actively addressed. The re-rating catalyst here is specific: MSCI and Sustainalytics currently rate JBSS without a published PDF sustainability report to anchor on, meaning the quantitative data sitting on its website is likely being partially discounted or missed. Publication of a first formal consolidated report would immediately elevate the company’s data quality score.

  1. Ag Growth International (AFN-CA)

Market cap: CAD $450M | SASB sector: Industrial Machinery & Goods

AGI makes grain handling, aeration, and storage equipment, placing it in a sustainability-adjacent commercial position (food security infrastructure) that creates natural demand for ESG transparency. Their 2024 Sustainability Report, released in June 2025, was the first to include a SASB Index and a standalone TCFD-aligned supplemental disclosure, neither of which appeared in the 2023 report. This is a meaningful escalation from narrative-only sustainability communication to framework-indexed disclosure, which is exactly what most ratings agencies require to move from qualitative to quantitative scoring. The Board operates a Governance and Sustainability Committee. On the quantitative side, AGI set a target in 2023 to reduce Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions intensity by 25% by 2030 against a 2021 baseline; in 2024, it had already achieved a 16% reduction, keeping the trajectory on track. Safety performance improved sharply: lost-time incident rate down 46% and total recordable incident rate down 49% year on year, both SASB material metrics for this sector.

It is important to note that the names highlighted here are cited uniquely based on an expectation that financial market participants will latently give credit to their sustainability efforts; For example, AGI carries a highly leveraged balance sheet and has been under financial stress from agricultural equipment cycle headwinds: the sustainability re-rating is an independent catalyst, but the equity thesis depends on stabilization of the underlying business.

In the table below, we summarize the main sustainability re-rating triggers for the aforementioned companies, plus six more that we believe could benefit from the same dynamic.

The sustainable investment industry has spent two years debating whether defence is a sustainable investment. That is the wrong question. Whether Rheinmetall qualifies for an Article 9 fund misses what actually matters: whether investors have the analytical tools to hold defence companies to account for what they make, who their customers are, and what happens when their products reach the battlefield. Responsibility, rather than sustainability, is the appropriate standard, and it is a more demanding one than any taxonomy classification.

Data published this month records 65 active armed conflicts in 2025, the highest count since records began in 1946, with 244,600 people killed in organised violence, the second deadliest total since the Rwanda genocide in 1994. Eight of those conflicts are interstate wars, the most since World War II.  

As a logical consequence, world military expenditure reached $2.8 trillion in 2025, up 41% since 2015, with forecasts pointing to $6.6 trillion by 2035. Europe’s ReArm Europe plan commits €800 billion; the United Kingdom has pledged 5% of GDP in defence spending by 2035. The capital flows are real, growing, and unlikely to reverse whether or not an Article 9 fund knows what to call them.

This note builds on the SMS framework introduced in our March 2025 note “The European Defense Offensive: From Peace Dividend to War Premium”, which identified five screening criteria (Controversial Weapons Exclusions, Allied Revenue Alignment, Government Independence, R&D Investment, and Strategic Defence Orientation) and a cohort of European specialists we termed the second wave.

Between July 2022 and the publication of our March 2025 European Defence Offensive, the SMS European Defence Specialists Basket delivered approximately 550% in total return. That performance continued for some time but has corrected heavily since the February 2026 peak. Over the fifteen months since publication, the basket, the S&P 500, and the American Defence Primes delivered 28%, 27%, and 25% respectively – effectively the same trade. The valuation re-rating of underowned European specialists as defence budgets re-accelerated is complete. The entry point that defined the first and second waves is gone.

The chart above is the investment case for this note: the opportunity that justified the first note has closed, and a new one has opened. What follows is where the next leg of returns will come from.

 

Red Lines That No Longer Hold

There was a time when a blanket defence exclusion was defensible. The sector consisted predominantly of identifiable end-products: tanks, artillery, fighter jets, submarines. Revenue streams were opaque but outputs were not. An investor that decided it did not want to own defence companies could draw a clean line around the category and walk away without much analytical strain.

That is no longer the case. The reason is dual-use, a property that once described finished technology products but now runs the entire length of the value chain, from raw materials to drones.

Upstream, the rare earth elements that power an EV motor, a wind turbine, or a smartphone are chemically identical to those in a drone motor, a missile guidance system, or an electronic warfare suite. Neodymium is neodymium. MP Materials (MP-US) is the only integrated rare earth mine and mill in the United States, indispensable to the domestic clean energy supply chain AND is simultaneously supplying the Pentagon under a ten-year offtake agreement backed by $400 million in government investment. An exclusionary policy that excludes MP Materials while retaining clean energy exposure would apply different standards to identical atoms depending on who writes the purchase order. Some investors will make that choice deliberately, as an expression of values. The point is that it is a values choice, not an analytical finding, and the clean line it tries to draw no longer maps cleanly onto the physical world.

Downstream, the same logic applies in reverse. The satellite constellation that provides broadband internet provides battlefield targeting. The AI platform that optimises logistics for a retailer optimises resupply for a military base. The same imaging system that monitors agricultural land monitors conflict zones. Revenue segmentation by end-use is rarely disclosed at the granularity a meaningful screen requires, and when it is, it rarely captures what happens to the technology once it leaves the company.

This is why the third wave which we discussed in this week’s note is different in character from the first and second.

The Rare Earth Elements (REE) Megatrend

Permanent magnets made from neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium are the enabling component in precision guidance systems, drone motors, missile actuators, electronic warfare equipment, and submarine propulsion. Demand for magnet rare earths has doubled since 2015, with defence among the structural growth drivers alongside EVs and wind. China processes approximately 85-95% of these materials at the midstream metallization and separation stage – a share the IEA projects will remain at 75% by 2035 even under an optimistic build-out scenario.

We have covered the OECD REE investment case in depth across three prior notes, beginning with “Critical Minerals, Critical Moves” (May 2025) and “Rare Opportunities in Rare Earths” (November 2025), and most recently in “From Transition Play to Arms Race: A Critical Materials Reset” (May 28, 2026) – published days before China’s June escalation. Readers seeking the full company-level analysis of the OECD REE basket should refer to these notes. What follows is specific to the defence demand driver and the regulatory timeline it has introduced.

That pressure reached a new peak just a couple weeks ago, in the week of June 15, 2026. The G7 set a target of no single country supplying more than 60% of each member’s rare-earth imports by 2030; the European Council proposed a formal de-risking mechanism; and China responded on June 22 with targeted export controls on US defence companies and rare-earth mining firms. Washington had already anticipated this: from January 1, 2027, a federal rule (DFARS) bans the Pentagon from procuring any system containing permanent magnets originating from China, a deadline China’s own controls have now made considerably harder to ignore. Active inventory depletion sharpens the timeline: the US has reportedly consumed approximately 45% of its Precision Strike Missile stockpile and 30% of its Tomahawk inventory, and restocking every unit requires REE-dependent components that cannot contain Chinese-origin material after that date.

The bottleneck is not mining but the midstream. A separation facility without downstream magnet makers has no local market, and magnet makers need committed offtake from defence, automotive, wind, and industrial customers simultaneously. The mine-to-magnet loop is only investable when all links close at once. The gap between stated policy ambition and physical processing capacity is precisely where the returns are.

The Investable OECD REE Basket

Most of the names below will be familiar to readers of our prior REE note series. Our conviction on the core positions is unchanged.

The three core positions remain MP Materials (MP-US), Lynas Rare Earths (LYC-AU), and Energy Fuels (UUUU-US). MP Materials is the only integrated US rare earth mine and mill, backed by a $400 million Pentagon investment, with REE separation commissioning at Mountain Pass by mid-2026. Lynas, the largest non-Chinese REE company at $13.5 billion, is completing its Texas REE separation facility with DoD funding. Energy Fuels received a $725 million conditional DoD loan commitment on June 18 and disclosed the $1.9 billion acquisition of Vacuumschmelze (VAC), the German precision magnet manufacturer. VAC holds existing qualification relationships with defence OEMs, bypassing the multi-year approval cycles new entrants face. The combined entity is the only OECD operation with a credible mine-to-magnet platform connecting US processing to European defence manufacturing. At $3.5 billion market cap, it looks underpriced relative to the strategic value of the VAC qualification book.

Two smaller names address specific gaps the core three do not cover. NEO Performance Materials (NEO-CA) is ramping its Estonia magnet factory to 2,000 tpa by end-2026, entirely outside Chinese processing influence. REalloys (ALOY-US) is building the largest REE metallization facility outside China in partnership with the Saskatchewan Research Council, with a 15-year offtake from the Tanbreez project in Greenland. It is important to note that REalloys came to market via reverse merger and is the highest-risk name in the basket. 5N Plus (VNP-CA) rounds out the basket with exposure to gallium, germanium, indium, and bismuth – the four materials subject to China’s August 2023 export controls and directly applied in compound semiconductors, radar, and night vision systems.

The REE basket has delivered; but unlike the European defence name re-rating, which converged to S&P 500 performance after March 2025, we do not believe this trade is over. The structural drivers – China’s escalating export control posture, a federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin magnets effective January 2027, and a supply chain buildout still measured in years rather than quarters – have not been resolved by the price action.

Third Defence Wave: Beyond the Primes

The REE basket addresses the supply side of the thesis. The names below address the demand side: platform specialists, systems integrators, and software-adjacent companies whose growth directly drives REE demand. What distinguishes them from the first and second wave is selectivity, not valuation re-rating – that trade is complete. Defence budgets are accelerating in unmanned systems, electronic warfare, naval domain awareness, and AI-assisted decision-making. The five names below are positioned where the spending is going and have not yet been fully absorbed by institutional capital.

 

Most of the basket has underperformed the MSCI World in the last year. That underperformance is the entry point, not a reason for caution.

The structural case has not deteriorated. It has strengthened. The Bundeswehr’s €100 billion fund is disbursing. NATO navies are ordering. The federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin rare earth magnets takes effect in seven months. Hensoldt and Renk enter this note’s coverage at a correction that their underlying order books do not justify. Booz Allen has been caught in the crossfire of US government IT spending reviews that are, by design, temporary.

The first and second wave re-rated on valuation. The third wave will re-rate on earnings, driven by a procurement cycle accelerating into the specific sub-sectors where these names face no credible competition from the large primes. The gap between the chart above and the order books behind these companies is where the next leg of returns is.

A new manifesto came out of Silicon Valley last week from Palantir’s founder Alex Karp. It suggests that Tech executives ought to embrace patriotism to preserve the values of the Republic. For many observers, this contrasts with Big Tech’s original mantra of pluralism and openness. This is especially true if one considers that most of Big Tech companies such as Meta, Google and Tesla have now mostly reverted towards more cooperation with the Trump administration.  

The growing cooperation between Tech and State is getting especially visible on issues pertaining to data privacy – whereby Silicon Valley firms such as Palantir are directly scraping your visual ID – or firms like Meta, Google and Tesla – that indirectly scrape your data – even if it to use it against you at the government’s request. Against this backdrop, it’s no surprise to see that trust vis-à-vis governments and Big Tech firms’ is waning.

A sign of the times is that Google searches for “Data Privacy” (how ironic!) in the U.S, are at a five-year high. We expect this interest to endure as AI continues to scrape the world.

Despite this growing interest in data privacy, users are typically ignoring the fine print regarding what Big Tech and Governments are doing with their data. As early as 2023, a Pew Research survey suggested that as much as six out of ten Americans skip reading privacy policies when signing up to apps. This means that they basically agree to give away whatever data on them that Big Tech firms are looking for. This is somewhat surprising given that about eight-in-ten of those familiar with AI also say that its use by companies will lead to people’s personal information being used in ways they won’t be comfortable with or that weren’t originally intended. Data privacy issues have resurfaced in the past few months during anti-ICE demonstrations across the U.S.: Homeland Security department was using data found on Facebook and Instagram to track, arrest and deport immigrants and arrest protesters.

This prompts a sharper look at the data privacy policies of Big Tech. We examined the policies of major technology firms regarding the sale of personal data, third-party sharing, disclosure to governments, AI training, and consent – only to realize that Big Tech not only owns your data but could also decide to use it against you if requested.

Big Tech & Data Privacy – Pick Your Poison, Choose Your Pain

It is interesting to compare the U.S.’ Big Tech regulation about data privacy to that of their Chinese and EU counterparts. While the EU is the most protective of personal data, there remains a lot of concern for Chinese companies’ proximity to Beijing. According to Beijing’s Cybersecurity Law, every Chinese company – including companies such as BYD and Huawei – are legally obligated to cooperate with state intelligence services. There is no judicial warrant process, no legal mechanism through which either company could refuse a government data request, and no external party can audit compliance or detect covert cooperation. Furthermore, communist party cells are also embedded inside major Chinese companies, providing informal intelligence conduits beyond the formal legal framework. This means the question is not whether Chinese companies would hand over your data, but whether the technical architecture enables them to do so – and the answer is yes on both counts.

Ineffective Investor Pressure: Is Tech Still Investable?

The lack of government oversight over data privacy – and now over the development of AI – forces investors to take a harder look at their Big Tech holdings data privacy policies. That said, given that Big Tech is such a massive chunk of the market – Mag-7 companies still represent about one-third of the market cap in the U.S. equity market – it remains difficult to divest out of these stocks solely based on their data malpractices.

It’s even harder to divest when the Tech sector outperforms the market like it has been doing these past few years. Furthermore, many of these companies have had tailwinds since Trump’s re-election, especially Palantir (which supplies surveillance software to the government) and Google (which knows everything about everyone) – a precious asset in an increasingly repressive world.

Five years of investor engagement with Palantir, Meta, and Google has produced letters, risk briefings, shareholder proposals, one landmark divestment, and a $190 million legal settlement – and virtually zero durable change in corporate behaviour across any of the three firms. The failure operates on three distinct but mutually reinforcing elements.

The first is structural governance. Palantir’s Class F share architecture grants its founders effective veto power over any shareholder resolution; Meta’s dual-class structure allows Mark Zuckerberg to override supermajorities of independent shareholders – including the 62% who voted for the 2022 surveillance advertising proposal – with his personal voting bloc; Alphabet is similarly insulated. These are not governance oversights; they are deliberate and permanent shields, and activist investors have known this for years.

The second element is the absence of a financial transmission mechanism. At Meta and Google, the theory of engagement is that reputational damage translates into advertiser flight, which translates into revenue pressure, which translates into behavioural change. That chain has never closed at scale: both companies continued to grow revenues through every major data privacy controversy, every EU General Data Protection Regulation fine, and every congressional hearing, because their advertising monopolies absorb the cost of controversy without altering the underlying surveillance business model.

The third and most structurally important failure Is that major institutions appear to be throwing in the towel. For example, Norges Bank suspended its own ethics council earlier this year under geopolitical pressure and actually increased its Palantir position despite obvious governance flaws and data privacy issues while simultaneously backing a human rights proposal at Microsoft. We think this highlights reactive positioning and signals that the responsible investment ecosystem lacks the tools and cohesion to hold surveillance-era technology firms to any consistent standard. Taken in this context, Dutch Pension fund ABP’s €825M Palantir divestment and CalSTRS’s $190M Meta settlement appear as rounding errors against the combined market capitalisation and government revenue streams of these firms.

Last week’s analysis focused on Greenland and Greenbacks and examined how escalating geopolitical tensions could influence peripherally developed bond markets. This week, we shift our focus to the global green bond market. Note that your Editors at Sustainable Market Strategies have historically viewed green bonds as primarily a labeling exercise—more beneficial to asset owners than as genuine instruments of environmental change. Though the market continues to grow, our stance remains largely unchanged; we remain sceptical that green bond products offer much in terms of positive environmental outcomes.

The pricing of green debt now generally aligns with that of non-green bonds, with the exception of emerging market (EM) debt, which still carries a slight double-digit spread. Additionally, developed market green sovereign bonds tend to have a 1-2 basis point spread due to their relative illiquidity compared to conventional bonds. We see two main reasons why green bonds now trade more like conventional bonds. First, countries like Germany have pioneered the development of comprehensive green benchmark curves across all maturities, facilitating more accurate pricing of green debt relative to risk-free rates.

 

Second, the ECB now integrates a “Climate Factor” into its collateral framework. As such, as the ECB confirmed that assets with high carbon footprints would face larger “haircuts” (reductions in value) when pledged as collateral, which prompted banks to immediately increase their demand for green bonds to ensure they had high-quality, “climate-safe” collateral to pledge for ECB liquidity. This creates a structural bid for green paper that has driven up interest and secondary market activity.

Green vs. Conventional Bonds: Similar Pricing but Different Impact?

Recent research from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicates that issuing green bonds can lead to measurable environmental benefits, countering the notion that they are merely marketing tools. A key study found that, on average, issuers’ carbon emissions decreased by approximately 10% to 13% within 2 to 4 years following issuance. The reduction in emission intensity—emissions per unit of revenue—was even more significant, dropping by as much as 20% to 30%. These findings suggest that companies are becoming considerably more carbon-efficient, even amid business growth.

Interestingly, the most substantial post-issuance emission reductions are often observed in carbon-intensive sectors such as utilities, energy, and manufacturing. For these industries, green bonds typically finance specific transition projects—like retrofitting power plants or upgrading manufacturing technology—that lead to significant, measurable decreases in carbon output. For these heavy emitters, green bonds serve as a credible signal to investors of their commitment to long-term environmental goals, a trend supported by the data.

Despite a challenging history, interest in green debt remains resilient even after the 2022 ESG market collapse. Indeed, the table below shows that issuance of green, sustainability, sustainability-linked and step-up bonds have been stable to rising in the past five years. Whether this trend continues depends on whether the market can withstand the rise of anti-ESG policies under Trump 2.0 and the global backlash against sustainability initiatives. With governments, corporations, and investors rapidly reversing their sustainability commitments, policy shifts could further weaken this sector’s growth prospects.

 

Green debt instruments vary significantly in their structure and impact. While green bonds and sustainability-linked bonds typically allocate proceeds for specific environmental or social goals, step-up bonds offer a different incentive. They provide issuers with a bonus, such as a reduced interest rate, if they meet predetermined sustainability targets, potentially encouraging more sustainable practices. However, recent research, including a report by IFC/World Bank (2023), questions the effectiveness of sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs). The study highlights a ‘structural design flaw’ related to their optionality and notes that these bonds often fail to drive meaningful behavior change due to weak financial incentives, limiting their overall impact on sustainability goals.

The rapidly expanding segment of the green debt market is Sustainability-Linked Loans (SLLs). Questions arise about whether Treasurers of leading SLL issuers can genuinely lower financing costs by linking sustainability targets to each issuance. Additionally, it is worth considering if these goals had been achieved regardless of issuing an SLL, assuming the company would have continued its existing sustainability path. This raises concerns about the actual impact and motivation behind SLLs.

Looking at the sovereign space, European countries – and Chile – have led the pack in cumulative sovereign green bond issuance over the past five years. With many issuing governments now moving to the right, one can wonder for how long the global sovereign green bond will survive.

The global green bond market has expanded over the past five years, yet its added value in addressing sustainability challenges remains uncertain. After all, if investors face no additional risks when investing in green paper, it’s difficult to argue that their impact surpasses that of non-green debt investments. Consequently, green bonds may offer more financial flexibility or indulgences rather than genuine environmental impact to allocators looking to shade their portfolio in green. This raises questions about their true effectiveness in promoting sustainability, emphasizing the need for clearer metrics and accountability in green bond investments.

Donald Trump’s Arctic ambitions are sending a chill through the Treasury market. Among President Trump’s most recent altercations with the free world, the diplomatic spat over the fate of Greenland stands out as particularly surreal. Yet, while the President’s offer to purchase the world’s largest island to “appease tensions” was largely dismissed by the public as geopolitical theater, the behavior is beginning to register as a genuine risk factor for the world’s most significant allocators of capital: defined benefit pension funds.

In a quiet but notable shift, some of the largest Nordic pension funds – stalwarts of global asset allocation known for their prudent, long-term horizons – have begun to divest from U.S. Treasuries (USTs). They describe this not merely as a portfolio rebalancing, but as a financial “defense” strategy. While this selling pressure currently represents a fraction of the colossal USD 700 billion to USD 1 trillion daily trading volume in the Treasury market, it serves as a canary in the coal mine: traditional funding sources of U.S. government debt are becoming increasingly wary of financing the hegemon’s ambitions when those ambitions seem divorced from good governance.

The Erosion of Stewardship

To understand why an unpopular real estate deal in the Arctic matters to the bond market, one must look beyond the headlines to the underlying metrics of institutional health. Trump’s geopolitical gyrations are simply the accelerant for a fire that has been smoldering for years.

A cursory glance at the Chandler Good Government Index confirms what many asset managers have quietly feared: the U.S.’ governance indicators have deteriorated substantially. Most damning is the metric of “Financial Stewardship”, which includes fiscal stewardship, where the U.S. arguably fails to meet the standards of a developed reserve currency nation. In fact, the U.S. rank for financial stewardship has plummeted to 63rd in the world within the index’s database over the past 5 years – the worst performance among all G7 nations.

For decades, the global bond market operated on the assumption of American exceptionalism – that the U.S. political system, however messy, would ultimately safeguard the creditworthiness of the dollar. That assumption is now being stress-tested. The combination of chronic fiscal deficits, recurring brinkmanship over the debt ceiling, and now, executive capriciousness on the global stage, has led to a derating by credit agencies. These agencies, which will surely feel the President’s wrath soon enough, are merely acknowledging the mathematical reality: the U.S. fiscal and debt outlook is on an unsustainable trajectory.

 

The Search for Safer Harbors

As a result of this erosion in trust, international investors are engaging in a rigorous search for alternatives. In a twist that would have seemed improbable a decade ago, German and increasingly, Canadian sovereign debt – are being reassessed not just as diversification tools, but as superior risk-adjusted assets.

While U.S. yields remain higher than their G7 peers, the risk premium required to hold American debt is rising, as evidenced by the table below. Investors are asking whether the extra yield is worth the volatility injection coming from the White House.

In this context, Canadian debt, in particular, is looking increasingly attractive. With a banking sector renowned for its stability, a resource-rich economy, and a comparative adherence to fiscal sanity, Canada offers a “boring” reliability that is suddenly in high demand; the table below shows that the bond spread of various countries with U.S. Treasurys is narrowing, which offers one indication of comparatively more demand for non-U.S. bonds. Considering the growing borrowing needs of Germany, Japan, and Canada in the coming years to fund energy transitions and demographic shifts, bond investors will find an ample supply of high-quality debt securities in which to park their capital outside the blast radius of Washington D.C.

The De-Dollarization Trend

This migration away from U.S. assets was well underway before the Greenland affair. It is being driven by the fundamental mechanics of macroeconomics: falling real U.S. dollar rates amid persistent inflation. This toxic combination is the classic trigger for debasement fears, prompting sophisticated investors to dump dollars in favor of hard assets like gold – a trend that reached a fever pitch this past week.

As an example of recent changes in the global market for USTs, China, the second largest holder of U.S. debt, has been a net seller of USTs over the past year. Beijing is keenly aware of the precedent set in the Spring of 2018, when Russia liquidated approximately USD 80 billion worth of Treasuries within a single month to insulate itself from pending financial sanctions. While the Russian liquidation was barely a blip in the deep ocean of the global UST market, a sustained withdrawal by China (even if unlikely), combined with the “quiet quitting” of European pension funds, would be  different beast entirely.

The Pension Fund Dilemma

This brings us to the acute dilemma facing domestic asset managers, particularly in countries like Canada. Conversely to the global trend, many Canadian investors have actually increased their positions in USTs recently as per the chart above, driven by a desire to hedge against domestic equity risk and speculate on lower U.S. rates. However, this strategy is becoming politically and financially fraught.

As Mark Carney alluded to in his speech at Davos earlier this month, the logic of the past thirty years is fracturing. One must wonder how a country’s public sector pension funds can justify financing the deficit of a foreign power that explicitly threatens to hurt its neighbors with tariffs and/or absorb their territories; we expect there is significant justification and momentum for Canadian and other “aligned countries” asset owners to increasingly repatriate capital.

The Rise of Economic Nationalism

We are most likely witnessing the dawn of a new era of economic nationalism, and defined benefit pension schemes are on the front lines. Until the late 1990s, Canadian pension funds were constrained by the “Foreign Property Rule,” which capped international investments at 20%. When this rule was abolished in the early 2000s, Canadian funds rushed to internationalize, becoming some of the world’s most sophisticated global investors. They became “Maples” – massive, distinct entities investing in everything from Chilean toll roads to Manhattan skyscrapers.

Now, the pendulum is swinging back. Pressure groups and corporate interests are increasingly demanding that pension capital be repatriated to support the domestic economy. Beyond the political pressure, it is also becoming a risk management necessity. Allocators are finding that as correlation between global asset classes rises during geopolitical crises, the safety of “foreign” risk-free assets is illusory.

Managers are being cornered into a riskier world where they must divest from what was once perceived as the bedrock of safety (USTs) – and move into more complex, illiquid, domestically focused assets. Given the limited supply of palatable non-U.S. government deb securities (compared to the huge size of the UST market), this means that those investors will be forced to look at debt attached to riskier infrastructure projects in countries which plan to either rebuild their economies, either/or re-arm themselves.

Over the last month, political and security turbulence has escalated on multiple fronts. The shooting of conservative commentator Charlie Kirk dominated headlines, amplifying the discourse around political violence. Donald Trump made waves by renaming the Department of Defense to the Department of War. Against this backdrop, Pete Hegseth has convened a special meeting of Department of War leaders this week. Across the Atlantic, a series of Russian drone incursions into allied airspace highlighted the fragility of European security.

In our previous note, “The European Defense Offensive: From Peace Dividend to War Premium”, March 6, 2025, we discussed how guns and drones can help to achieve security and how drones are reshaping entire civilian sectors. The central task for policymakers and investors is to channel these tools toward stability, innovation, and resilience.

 

Back to the Battlefield: The Resurgence of Geopolitics

Since 1980, we experienced a relative period of geopolitical calm, shaped by the end of the Cold War, expanding globalization, and the absence of direct large-scale conflict between major powers. However, this environment has been progressively shifting toward conflicts, with renewed great-power rivalries, regional wars, trade tensions, and escalating competition over resources and technology.

The table below shows the most important conflicts since the beginning of the century. The same conflicts are repeated as they generally remain unresolved as more are added to the list. The projected increases in defense spending for most countries in the world tend to confirm our assessment that tensions are accelerating globally.

The Drone Disruption: From Battlefields to Boardrooms

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought the extensive use of drone for reconnaissance and direct attacks into focus and shows how innovation changes the nature of wars. Twenty-five years ago, in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgents relied on classic guerilla tactics of ambushes and mobility to counter Western military strength. In Ukraine however, drones now serve a similar role. Cheap, nimble, and precise, they harass supply lines and equipment much like guerilla fighters once did.

The chart below shows the exponential rise in demand for drones over the past five years as well as the  continued exponential growth expected to occur in future years. As described above, military use is growing due to larger defense budgets and the transformation of armed forces towards more drone usage. In the civilian sector there are increasing commercial and societal uses.

From an investment perspective, the combination of military and non-military uses is appealing since it amounts to a certain diversification in demand; military spending does not tend to follow the economic cycle, whereas drone demand from non-military sources tends to more cyclical.

Indeed, for sustainable investors, drones are increasingly being deployed in ways that deliver tangible benefits for society:

Importantly, this civilian transformation of drone technology echoes a broader historical pattern: many advances that originated in military research such as GPS, the internet, and satellite imaging eventually delivered immense benefits for public use. In the same way, drones are now transitioning from instruments of conflict to powerful tools for society where demand is growing.

 

The Gun Market’s Surprising Stall

Surprisingly even with greater polarization, gun demand in the U.S. has plateaued following the post-COVID surge. Several forces explain this: many households already own multiple guns, crisis fatigue has diminished the urgency to arm, and inflation has constrained discretionary spending.

The chart below shows two indicators highlighting the COVID peak in gun demand and the recent plateauing in the United States; the largest market in the world. Background checks from the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NCIS) are a good leading indicator of new gun demand in the United States whereas firearms manufacturing from the Annual Firearms Manufacturing and Export Report (AFMER) is a coincident to lagging indicator because manufacturers respond to current demand.

Despite persistently high homicide rates in the U.S., the political landscape leaves little room for meaningful gun legislation, and this affects the firearms market. Paradoxically, in the past, fears of tighter regulation have triggered surges in gun sales, i.e. people purchase guns in anticipation of not being able to in the future. However, with a Supreme Court broadly supportive of expansive Second Amendment rights, the likelihood of new restrictions is low, which removes the urgency to purchase additional firearms.

The map below shows that the U.S., Mexico and Brazil have among the highest firearms homicide rates and yet stronger gun control legislation is unlikely in the near future. In the United States, the current administration does not favor stricter rules. In Mexico, civilian ownership is tightly regulated but illicit firearms traficking is a powerful source of demand. In Brazil, Bolsanaro loosened gun laws when he was president while Lula has issued executive orders to tighten gun control because the Brazilian Congress is ambivalent to enact stronger regulation.

The Promise of Drones (Go Long) vs. the Limits of Guns (Be Short)

Unlike drones, which have evolved from military origins to offer wide-ranging civilian and environmental benefits, guns and munitions lack such positive spillover potential for society. Firearms are designed with a single purpose: to wound or kill, and their civilian proliferation is more often linked to rising homicide rates, accidents, and social costs rather than broad social gains.

The table below shows drone and drone-adjacent companies that offer societal benefits and positive financial attributes and gun companies to avoid from a sustainable investment standpoint.

The chart below shows market capitalization, sustainability scores, growth in sales and price to sales for companies in our targeted long and short sectors There are not yet many large companies considered to be specializing in drones; the larger companies like Nokia, Honeywell and Leonardo manufacture components used in drones as part of their much larger organization. The same can be said for gun manufacturers as they remain small capitalization. As expected from our sectoral analysis above, drone companies are experiencing strong growth: for example, Red Cat has had exceptional growth in the last five years (78% growth in sales), it is also expected to continue as its price-to-sales of 128 highlights. On the other hand, gun companies have had close to zero growth in sales and trade at depressed price-to-sales. We expect this trend to continue: high valuation in the growth segment of drones and low valuation in the stagnating gun segment.

Nine months into Trump’s presidency, its contours are taking shape. Beyond campaign promises—tax cuts, manufacturing revival, and drilling expansion – the U.S. government has taken a strong tack toward interventionism. From interference at the Fed to taking stakes in American companies, Trump’s republicanism is vastly different from preceding Presidents of the same party.

Indeed, Trump’s growing intervention, especially in corporate affairs, is fueling concerns that the U.S. is shifting away from the so-called laissez-faire economy. That said, with equity markets at new highs and both government and corporate bond yields trading in a relatively tight range, one might be hard pressed to find evidence that it matters, yet!

In 2021, we published a note ( “Macro Goes ESG” July 8, 2021) that outlined our high conviction view that fiscal and industrial policy would become dominant policy levers in the coming decade. Although we were far too optimistic that interventionist governments would address voter preferences such as climate change and socioeconomic inequalities, our forecast of government interventionist policies is proving true.  

Important for investors is that unlike monetary policy which “lifts (sinks) all boats”, fiscal and industrial policy creates winners and losers. This is true for sustainability themes and financial markets at large.

In today’s Macro Meets Sustainability quarterly update, we discuss the three main U.S. government interventions that have evolved since Trump took office.

  1. Mar-A-Lago and USD: Beware the Kindleberger Trap

The Kindleberger Trap – named for economic historian Charles Kindleberger – posits that global stability depends on a leading power that is willing and able to supply public goods that benefit the international community. When the dominant power fails to fulfill this role, the international system becomes prone to conflict and economic crisis.

For investors, the essential public good that keeps the global economy out of the Kindleberger trap is the U.S. dollar acting as the world’s reserve currency. Reserve currencies are necessary in global trading systems to facilitate international transactions and act as a store of value, and they tend to impose two characteristics on the reserve status country:

The so-called Mar-a-Lago Accord is an attempt in our view to have one’s cake (low interest rates, access to capital) and eat it too (revive the domestic industrial and manufacturing sector) but does not consider the consequences of falling into a “Kindleberger trap”.   If the U.S. is unable or unwilling to maintain policy that ensures the greenback as the world’s reserve currency, it is unlikely that foreign nations and investors will risk asset value erosion by currency devaluation or inflation (see the section below).

To this end, there is more evidence that investors are becoming nervous about the impacts of U.S. policy on the greenback: equity investors are aggressively increasing currency hedges. According to a recent FT article and Deutsche Bank data, over 80% of the 7 billion USD that has flowed into foreign domiciled U.S. ETFs in the past three months has been on a hedged basis, compared to 20% at the beginning of the year. In other words, investors still want to own U.S. equities but are wary of the currency.

The bottom line is the current U.S. administration’s desire to decrease the trade deficit risks obliterating a key public good – a stable reserve currency – and sending the global economy into a Kindleberger trap, with the concomitant increase in volatility in financial markets. We believe that currency hedging is fully justified for non-U.S. investors exposed to U.S. markets and/or the currency risk should create a significant home bias in sustainable investments.

2. Monetary Interference: Stoking Inflation

Recent events and nominations at the Fed underscore President Trump’s intention to politicize the central bank and the outcome of last week’s FOMC meeting gave a good indication of how investors should think about policy stimulus in the current regime. Recall that last week, the FOMC voted to lower interest rates while simultaneously upgrading the economic outlook and increasing its expectation for inflation over the next year (to a level well above 2%). Thus, we believe that investors should position for both lower central bank rates and higher inflation, as it marks an important deviation from the conventional central bank’s playbook. Since 1982 (when Volcker broke the back of runaway inflation), monetary policy generally fell into four quadrants:  

  1. Interest rates are becoming stimulative (rates are below the neutral rate and falling while the economy is weakening and lower inflation is anticipated)
  2. Interest rates are becoming less stimulative (rates are below the neutral rate and rising while economic growth is bottoming and higher inflation is anticipated).
  3. Interest rates are becoming increasingly restrictive (rates are above the neutral rate and rising because the economy is running hot and higher inflation is anticipated).
  4. Interest rates are becoming less restrictive (rates are above the neutral rate and falling as economic growth is peaking and lower inflation is anticipated).

By signaling that rates can go lower while economic and inflation accelerates, it is becoming more probable that the Fed will de-emphasize its objective on inflation stability and focus on maximum employment and low interest rates.  

Historically, low rate and higher inflation environments have favored real estate plays and other real assets. For ideas that fit squarely within a sustainability framework, please see our recent notes on this subject: It’s About to Get Real, August 21, 2025 and The Age of Opportunity: Investments in Eldercare April 23, 2025.

  1. Corporate Interventionism: From Invisible Hand to Tightening Grip

In 2024, the IMF published a new data set that documents emergent patterns of policy intervention associated with the return of industrial policy. In one year, they recorded over 2,500 new industrial policies worldwide, of which 71% are considered trade distorting. This is perhaps not surprising to anyone watching the news flow. In the past quarter alone, the following U.S. developments have occurred:

These are perhaps the most jaw-dropping developments, not least of all because they occurred at the firm-specific level, which represents almost half of all the interventions documented by the IMF (see table below).

The IMF’s database also categorizes policy interventions by their motivating factor. Interestingly, supply chains and climate change – considerations that both fit squarely within sustainability investing – feature prominently (see the chart below). The one caveat is that the data was collected from 2009 to 2023 and researchers noted that in the most recent year, measures focused increasingly on national security, and less on competitiveness.

The rise of industrial policy and interventionist governments is far from a uniquely U.S. phenomenon (see the table below). A case in point is this month’s announcement from Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney, which unveiled the first phase of the country’s “nation building” projects, all five of which could be classified by the IMF as being motivated by climate change or supply chains and include energy production (nuclear), energy transport (LNG), mineral production (copper, gold) and supply chains (port expansion).

An investment backdrop that is dominated by political catalysts implies an environment where active portfolio management is necessary because sectoral, thematic, and geographic winners and losers will be produced. Critically, this applies equally to sustainability themes. While ESG has become a touchy subject and there is no longer a wholesale buying of related equity products, companies that derive revenue from specific sustainability themes (e.g. waste management, green infrastructure, carbon) have had excellent performance so far during Trump’s reign.  

Sustainability winners and losers are likely to run along thematic lines that are heavily influenced by both perceived threats and actual policy pivots; carbon is an excellent example, as discussed in last week’s note (Contrarians in the Green,  September 18, 2025).

The opening months of 2025 have seen market swings, volatility spikes and ripening conditions for a bear market. Politics and geopolitics have taken central stage and will drive investment outcomes for sustainability portfolios for the remainder of the year and beyond. In this installment of our quarterly update on Macro Meets Sustainability, we argue that despite the noise emanating from Washington, in terms of concrete policy action, the euro area’s recent (fiscal) policy moves are the more significant market driver. We also underscore our view, outlined in several recent notes, that global inflation risks are rising while economic growth momentum is slowing, creating a stagflationary environment. The implication is that the rotation to defensive sectors and to euro area stocks has further to go.  

U.S. Noise and Euro Area Action

Contrary to mainstream media and financial pundits, our observation is that U.S. policy changes have underwhelmed so far in 2025; the biggest surprises and significant policy action have occurred in the euro area:

In the U.S., the daily headlines of federal firings, deportations, and tariff threats means the Trump’s administration occupies most of the space. However, what has actually been accomplished on any of these fronts?

In terms of DOGE, it’s difficult to know exactly how many layoffs have taken place but estimates of federal job separations in February were about 60 000, an insignificant number in an economy that employs over 160 million people. To be sure, the immeasurable loss of experience in federal institutions is lamentable and sows the seeds for challenges in the future. However, the impact on economic activity in the near term is likely to be very low.

Meanwhile, although much has been threatened, tariffs imposed on trading partners are so far only slightly more punitive than what occurred during Trump’s first term, which had little impact on overall global activity. The range of possibilities on what comes next is extremely wide, but a pattern has emerged whereby U.S. tariff barks have been worse than the bites.

Finally, while we continue to believe that over time, the level of illegal (and legal) immigration to the U.S. will be aggressively curbed, ICE is operating with the same budget that it had on Jan. 19. This suggests that it is highly unlikely that the government’s targets of over 1000 arrests per day are even close to being met; only the most migrant worker-dependent sectors like agriculture will feel the near-term impacts of current U.S. immigration policy.

In contrast, the threats and proclamations of the Trump administration have been sufficient to shake European policymakers out of their torpor as they seem to be working with renewed vigor. On Tuesday, the German parliament approved Chancellor Merz’s plan to spend up to €1 trillion in coming years on infrastructure and defense. EUR500B is earmarked for infrastructure and green initiatives. This massive spending deal means that just the infrastructure fund alone adds over 1% to GDP over the next decade, even without applying a fiscal multiplier (i.e. positive knock-on effect). Added on to this is the announcement in early March by Ursula von der Leyen that the new “ReArm Europe” investment plan will unlock a €150 billion loan scheme to help Member States invest in key military capabilities.

Our key takeaway is that while investors must stay attuned to possible impacts on global growth and financial markets stemming from the U.S., so far in 2025, realized policy activity has been more significant in Europe than in North America. This provides at least a partial foundation for why we expect the outperformance of euro area equities to continue for the next few quarters.

It’s Still The Economy, Stupid

Although it is well known that financial markets respond poorly to economic and policy uncertainty, the current instability in risk assets can not be solely attributed to uncertainty arising from Trump’s leadership style (described as “flooding the zone”). Indeed, U.S. economic growth was losing momentum well before Trump moved into the White House, and earnings expectations were also ratcheting down prior to Trump’s inauguration.

One very well-known and favored indicator is the economic surprise index, which tracks the strength of incoming data relative to expectations. In the U.S., the economic surprise index peaked in November and is now in negative territory, meaning that data is weaker than forecasted. In the euro area the indicator displays the opposite trend (data is surprising to the upside). The chart below shows the surprise indicator for the U.S.  

Of course, the above analysis is only useful in that it helps explain what has already happened. However, in the U.S. there is likely to be more months of negative surprises before an inflection point is reached because economic surprise indices tend to be mean-reverting and swing in regular patterns – it takes time for expectations adjust to economic reality.  

Beyond this, there are three reasons we expect that the environment for euro area stocks will support continued performance for the next few quarters:

1. More room for fiscal and monetary support outside of the U.S.: though it’s unknown to what extent Trump’s ambitions will translate into action, the direction of travel on virtually all of his stated plans translates to: more inflation and less growth in the near-term. We have written about the inflationary impulse in previous notes (for example, see “Food Fight: Policy’s Effect on Food Producers & Inflation”, February 13, 2025 and “Playing the Trump Card”, November 21, 2024) and the Fed’s updated FOMC projections yesterday are very much in line with our view. In plain language, Federal Reserve Chair Jay Powell acknowledged that further progress on inflation was likely to be “delayed for the time being”. The corollary is that the U.S. Federal Reserve may not have the leeway to loosen monetary policy given its 2% inflation target. Indeed, the OECD recently updated its inflation forecasts. With assumptions about future tariffs, the inflationary impact is strongest in North America.  

As discussed above, Germany is already forging a new path for fiscal policy and we expect other countries with the fiscal space will follow suit, whether it be in the form of relief to businesses to offset the tariff shock (as announced in Canada) or to raise defense spending.

2. Euro area sustainability stocks still trade at a discount relative to their U.S. counterparts. Euro area stocks have been comparatively cheap for years, but the recent divergence in price performance has done little to correct this gap. This is also true for the Sustainable Market Strategies’ sustainability universe. The average forward P/E for euro area stocks in our universe is 18 compared to 29 for the U.S.

3. The U.S. has Mag 7, but the euro area has defense stocks. The U.S. equity outperformance streak in 2023-2024 was without a doubt characterized by a strong tailwind emanating from the Magnificent 7 stocks and a bubble for everything artificial intelligence. China’s Deepseek helped to burst the bubble earlier this year. In contrast, we believe the prime candidate for a future “bubble” sector in the euro area is still in full swing. As we wrote in a recent note, “The European Defense Offensive: From Peace Dividend to War Premium”, the European Commission has recently unveiled an ambitious plan to mobilize approximately $840 billion to bolster the EU’s collective defense capabilities. There is a clear bias for European countries to invest in European defense companies, and despite the near parabolic rise in the biggest defense names, there are still several companies with moderate valuations that satisfy our strict sustainability criteria. But even for investors that do not wish to be long defense companies, the “euphoria” surrounding this sector will likely lift related stocks, especially euro area industrials. On this basis, just as the U.S. tech sector is becoming a drag on broad U.S. equity indices, the bull market in the euro area defense sector could boost European indices.

In sum, despite the fact that geopolitical tensions are emanating from the U.S. and onto the rest of the world, we expect that euro area stocks will continue to outperform.

Defensive Rotation Is Justified  

Stocks in defensive sectors like health care, consumer staples and utilities outperform when uncertainty is high and/or when recession risks are elevated because it is difficult to cut back on essential spending.

From a sustainability standpoint these sectors are often appealing because underlying products and services can create positive impact on individual lives. In recent weeks, we have written notes on two of these critical sectors – health care and food staples – and how sustainability investors should maintain a postive bias in this space despite needing to navigate the ongoing policy crosscurrents. Developments over the past few weeks only serve to strengthen our conviction. Interestingly, euro area stock markets tend to have a greater exposure to defensive sectors (healthcare is about 16% in the Eurostoxx 600 index versus 10% in the S&P 500), which also helps to explain some of the European outperformance in recent weeks.  

Almost two years ago, we wrote what was then a controversial note about the role of defense companies in sustainable investing (see Defending the indefensible? An ESG perspective, May 11, 2023). Fast-forward to today, and this topic has become much more accepted, though still not quite mainstream.

In our previous note, we argued that a subset of the defense sector—specifically what we called the “European Defense Specialists” as opposed to the “American Defense Primes“—should be considered by sustainability-minded investors. Our thesis was based on two key factors: European defense companies demonstrate significantly stronger governance than their American counterparts, and European defense expenditures were poised for massive increases. This strategy has performed exceptionally well, with the SMS European Defense Specialists Basket dramatically outperforming both American Defense Primes and the S&P 500 since our May 2023 publication.

The End of Pax Americana

Recent geopolitical developments, including the Oval Office showdown between Zelenskyy, Trump, and Vance that led to the immediate freezing of all U.S. military support to Ukraine, only strengthen our thesis. What we're witnessing is essentially the end of the post-Cold War "peace dividend" era. For decades, European nations comfortably operated under the Pax Americana security umbrella, maintaining modest defense budgets while focusing on social spending and economic integration. This convenient arrangement—Europeans handling "soft power" (diplomatic influence, cultural appeal, economic incentives, and humanitarian aid) while America provided "hard power" (military might and security guarantees)—is now being fundamentally reconsidered.

Prior to 2022, only the UK, Poland, and France among major European powers were approaching or exceeding NATO's 2% target. Faced with the stark realization of their strategic vulnerability, European nations have been forced to step up.

The ReArm Europe Initiative

Earlier this week, the European Commission unveiled an ambitious plan to mobilize approximately $840 billion to bolster the EU's collective defense capabilities. This plan, dubbed "ReArm Europe," aims to provide European countries with the financial resources to modernize their armies, enhance their collective defense systems, and increase support for Ukraine.

The initiative includes a new fund worth more than $150 billion to support EU members' defense investments, while simultaneously relaxing the bloc's debt rules (effectively the "debt brake" to allow for higher defense spending). Additionally, the EU plans to leverage profits from sanctioned Russian assets (approximately $200 billion held in Europe) to help finance military assistance to Ukraine. While some, like President Zelenskyy, have floated the idea to seize and redirect these $200 billion towards security, France's finance minister has expressed opposition to this mechanism as these are Russian central bank assets and are protected by international banking agreements.

 

The Global Defense Spending Shift

The chart below illustrates the dramatic shift in the global balance of defense spending from 2011 to 2023. The United States has experienced a steady decline in its proportion of global defense spending, dropping from over 50% in 2011 to just 37.7% by 2023. Even in absolute terms (using constant 2022 USD), U.S. spending fell from nearly $1 trillion in 2010 to approximately $880 billion in 2023—a reduction of 12%.

Conversely, Europe (including the UK) has demonstrated remarkable growth, particularly in recent years. From 2011 to 2021, European defense spending as a percentage of the global total increased modestly from 17.9% to 19.8%. However, 2022-2023 showed dramatic acceleration, with Europe's share jumping to 24.4% by 2023—a clear response to the radically altered security environment following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. With the implementation of the ReArm Europe initiative, Europe's defense expenditures could represent over one-third of global defense spending within the next few years.

 

A More Sophisticated Screening Approach

These developments reinforce our conviction to focus on European Defense Specialists rather than American Defense Primes. We've expanded our analysis to include several additional critical factors:

  1. Allied Revenue Alignment: We assess the proportion of revenue derived from NATO and other allied nations, aiming to minimize exposure to companies with significant revenues from potentially misaligned or authoritarian regimes.
  2. Government Independence: We evaluate the percentage of each company owned by governments. Generally, we favor greater independence from government control to maximize innovation potential and governance quality.
  3. R&D Investment: We analyze R&D expenditure as a percentage of revenue. Modern warfare demands constant technological advancement—companies that fail to innovate today will be irrelevant tomorrow.
  4. Strategic Defense Orientation: We focus on companies specializing in technologies and systems designed primarily for defensive purposes—such as air defense systems, cybersecurity solutions, and intelligence platforms—rather than offensive-oriented activities like armored assault vehicles, strike missiles, and tactical combat systems.

Based on this multi-factor approach, six companies stand out as meeting most of our criteria (highlighted in green in the table above).

Unsurprisingly, all six companies have performed exceptionally well since Russia's invasion of Ukraine three years ago. Even the weakest performer in our selection managed to outperform the S&P 500 by a factor of three. However, the performance disparities within the group are notable and raise a critical question: Can this level of outperformance be sustained?

To assess whether these companies can maintain their momentum or if “laggards” might catch up, we look at forward valuations using 12-month price-to-earnings ratios.

While Saab and Leonardo predictably command higher valuations given their remarkable performance runs, what's truly surprising is that despite their extraordinary performance, their P/E ratios remain below 35x—relatively reasonable for companies experiencing such dramatic growth.

Nevertheless, considering the parabolic trajectories of Leonardo and Saab, a prudent alternative strategy would be to shift focus toward the "second wave" of European Defense Specialists. These companies—Thales SA (HO-FR), BAE Systems plc (BA-GB), Indra Sistemas SA (IDR-ES), and QinetiQ Group plc (QQ-GB)—stand to benefit substantially from the recently announced ReArm Europe program and have yet to experience a dramatic valuation expansion.