2025 proved to be a pivotal transition year for global carbon markets, marked by geopolitical upheaval and sharply diverging regional dynamics. The total global value of carbon markets declined slightly to €791 billion, representing a modest 4% drop from the €825 billion recorded in 2024 and placing the market broadly in line with levels observed in 2021. At first glance, this contraction may appear surprising given the continued expansion of carbon pricing schemes worldwide. In reality, the slowdown reflects a year in which climate policy temporarily lost political momentum across several major jurisdictions.
Europe itself was not immune to this shift. Political support for climate policy in the European Union weakened during 2025, with a watered-down agreement on the bloc’s 2040 climate targets and the partial unravelling of the EU’s flagship 2035 internal combustion engine ban late in the year. Decarbonization policy increasingly had to compete for political oxygen in a tense geopolitical environment dominated by security concerns, trade tensions, and economic uncertainty.
Across the Atlantic, political turbulence in the United States amplified these headwinds. In April 2025, the Trump administration issued an executive order explicitly targeting state-led cap-and-invest programs, triggering fears of federal intervention in sub-national carbon markets. International climate cooperation also faced significant setbacks. The International Maritime Organization’s proposed Net Zero Framework was effectively shelved following aggressive pushback from the United States, while Washington’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement introduced new uncertainty into global climate diplomacy and contributed to turbulence in the CORSIA aviation carbon framework.
Yet while policy uncertainty slowed momentum in some areas, the year also revealed a striking divergence in carbon price performance across major markets. European Union Allowances (EUAs) rallied strongly, while carbon prices within the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) weakened considerably.
In Europe, EUA prices averaged €74.40 per tonne in 2025, up from €66.50 the previous year. The rally was fueled by growing expectations of structural supply tightening, combined with record long positions accumulated by investment funds ahead of a sharply reduced auction calendar in 2026. In North America, however, WCI prices moved in the opposite direction, falling below the $30 per tonne threshold by the end of the year. This regional decoupling reflects two very different policy environments: Europe continued tightening supply and embedding carbon pricing deeper into its industrial framework, while the WCI faced prolonged regulatory uncertainty tied to delayed rulemaking by the California Air Resources Board and the lingering psychological overhang of federal legal challenges.
As the dust settles on this volatile year, however, 2026 may mark the moment when carbon markets move into structural expansion. In Europe, a major review of the EU Emissions Trading System and the operational launch of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will further tighten the link between carbon pricing, trade, and industrial policy. In North America, the potential expansion of the Western Climate Initiative suggests that regional carbon markets may continue to grow even in the absence of federal climate leadership.
The EU ETS: 2026 Review and the CBAM Reality
The European Union’s carbon market is about to enter another defining phase as it marks its 21st anniversary. In 2026, the European Commission will undertake a comprehensive review of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), examining key structural features including the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), free allocation mechanisms, and the potential expansion of the system to additional sectors. The review will also integrate several recent political compromises, including the newly negotiated 2040 climate targets and broader adjustments to the EU’s decarbonization strategy.
Investors vividly remember the last major ETS overhaul. The 2021 review fundamentally reshaped the system by tightening the emissions cap and strengthening the Market Stability Reserve – changes that helped drive the price of EU carbon allowances to triple over the following two years. The upcoming 2026 review is unlikely to produce changes of the same magnitude; most analysts view it as a fine-tuning exercise ahead of the next phase of the ETS beginning in 2031. Even so, regulatory clarity matters enormously in carbon markets. When emitters and investors gain visibility into the long-term trajectory of supply, they are far more willing to implement sophisticated carbon management strategies that rely on banking, hedging, and actively trading EUAs to optimize compliance costs.
Overlaying this regulatory review is another structural shift: 2026 marks the first operational year of the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). As we stated in our note “Carbon Protectionism: Winners and Losers under EU’s Carbon Border Plan” (July 25, 2024), the mechanism represents one of the most consequential developments in global carbon pricing, fundamentally altering the incentives facing companies that export carbon-intensive goods into the European market.
Under CBAM, importers of products such as steel, cement, aluminum, fertilizers, hydrogen, and electricity must purchase and surrender CBAM certificates reflecting the carbon content of those imports. The price of these certificates is directly linked to EU ETS allowance prices, effectively extending the influence of the EU carbon market beyond the bloc’s borders.
The CBAM phase-in also triggers an equally important transformation within Europe itself. The policy is designed to gradually eliminate the free allocation of EU ETS allowances for sectors covered by CBAM over a nine-year period from 2026 to 2034. The phase-out begins slowly before accelerating toward the end of the transition period and corresponds directly to the CBAM ramp-up. During the transition phase, CBAM will only apply to the portion of emissions that is no longer covered by free allowances under the EU ETS.
In other words, the incentives game is changing. European industry will progressively lose the buffer of free permits while foreign producers face a growing carbon price at the border. Early commentary around the system suggests this dynamic may already be creating a new category of market activity sometimes referred to as “CBAM proxy hedging.” Industrial importers and traders are beginning to position themselves in the EUA market to hedge future CBAM liabilities, in some cases securing a significant portion of expected carbon exposure several years in advance.
The combined effect of CBAM implementation and the gradual disappearance of free allocations ensures that an ever-larger share of industrial emissions in Europe will be exposed to the full market price of carbon. For companies operating in carbon-intensive sectors, carbon management is no longer a theoretical policy discussion – it is rapidly becoming a central financial variable.
WCI: Sub-National Resilience and North American Expansion
While Europe’s carbon market tightens structurally, North America’s Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is quietly demonstrating that sub-national jurisdictions are not waiting for Washington to resolve the climate debate.
The release of a draft linkage agreement on March 3, 2026 outlining the integration of Washington State’s Cap-and-Invest program into the California–Quebec carbon market marks a potentially historic moment for North American carbon pricing. If implemented, the agreement would harmonize compliance instruments, enable joint auctions, and integrate registry systems across participating jurisdictions – effectively expanding the WCI into a larger regional carbon market spanning multiple economies.
For investors watching the political drama unfold in Washington, the move also sends a clear signal: state-level carbon markets are far more resilient than many feared. Despite the Trump administration’s attempts to challenge state cap-and-trade systems, legal scholars and environmental policy experts widely argue that federal executive actions face significant jurisdictional hurdles when attempting to dismantle state-regulated emissions markets. California’s cap-and-trade system is deeply embedded in state law and supported by an established regulatory framework, making it difficult to unwind through federal intervention alone.
At the same time, the broader economic environment could unexpectedly provide support for carbon prices within the WCI system. A new wave of tariffs and industrial policy aimed at reshoring manufacturing to North America is beginning to reshape supply chains across several sectors. As production capacity shifts back toward domestic markets, a greater share of industrial emissions may fall under the jurisdiction of regional cap-and-trade programs.
In a market where emissions caps tighten year after year, increased industrial activity within participating jurisdictions translates directly into greater demand for compliance allowances. If Washington State successfully joins the Western Climate Initiative – with trading potentially beginning as early as 2027 – the expansion of the market, combined with a resurgence in domestic manufacturing, could create the conditions for stronger carbon prices in North America over the coming decade.
For now, however, the key takeaway is simple: while federal climate policy in the United States remains politically contested, regional carbon markets continue to expand and evolve, quietly reinforcing their role as one of the most durable pillars of North American climate policy.
Recent news that America’s leading automakers have effectively written down the value of their EV divisions to zero signals a significant strategic reset in the U.S. auto industry. This shift coincides with the Trump administration’s announcement of the end of EPA emissions rules—removing regulatory pressure to boost fleet fuel efficiency. Together, these developments mark a notable retreat from the aggressive electrification plans of the past decade.
While EV demand has slowed in the U.S. and Canada, global markets tell a different story. Sales remain robust across Europe and Asia (see Charging Up on Cheap EV Stocks, Nov. 13, 2025). Norway is an extreme case: only seven gas‑powered vehicles were sold in December 2025. Yet American consumers remain unconvinced that EVs meet their needs as well as ICE vehicles have over the past century. High sticker prices (even if total cost of ownership is competitive) and an inconsistent national charging network continue to hold back adoption. Layered on top are waning auto sales overall amid rising living costs and declining consumer confidence.
Bank lending has also tightened. Auto loan growth has slowed as subprime delinquency rates reach 30‑year highs, constraining access to financing at a time when affordability is already stretched.
Despite these pressures, America remains a car‑centric society, and purchase intentions remain resilient. Surveys indicate more Americans plan to buy a vehicle within the next six to twelve months than at any point in the past three years. A recent TransUnion survey finds that 40% of U.S. adults are considering purchasing a vehicle within the next year.
This backdrop helps explain why U.S. automaker stock prices more than doubled over the past year—with the exception of Stellantis, whose sizable European operations and its own EV write‑downs weighed on performance. GM and Ford in particular have rallied sharply: GM trades at a 3‑year high and Ford at a 10‑year high.
Both have benefited from the AI‑driven industrial construction boom and the ongoing demand for work trucks (notably Ford Pro and GM’s truck lineup). Yet the combination of stretched consumers and rising subprime defaults signals that the domestic auto cycle may be nearing a turning point. Moreover, prices of foreign EVs continue to fall much faster than those of U.S.-made EVs or ICE vehicles—raising other concerns about U.S. competitiveness.
By comparison, Korean automakers have soared. Following Hyundai’s robotaxi debut at CES 2026, Hyundai and Kia shares are up 80% and 60% YTD, respectively, and have tripled over the past year (see Back to Basics: Sustainable Alpha for 2026, Jan. 8, 2026).
Financial and operational metrics underline the widening performance gap. Ford continues to trail GM in its transition from a legacy automaker to a more EV‑ready competitor. GM appears better positioned domestically in EVs, while Ford’s debt-to-equity ratio above 4 leaves it more exposed than GM and most foreign peers. With both stocks sitting near multi‑year highs, valuations appear stretched given a slowing economy and rapidly falling EV prices.
Sustainability investors love a good cost-decline chart. Over the past decade, solar delivered the mother of all learning curves: a >90% drop in module prices that transformed photovoltaics from a subsidized niche into the cheapest source of electricity across much of the world.
What rarely makes it into the slide deck is that this cost revolution was quietly enabled by a commodity that traded sideways for years. Silver—the most conductive metal and a critical input in solar cell metallization—remained a stable $20–25/oz for most of the early 2020s. That era has ended.
Silver reached an all-time high of $121/oz on January 29, 2026. Even after speculative liquidation drove a sharp correction, prices remain near ~$75—roughly triple early-2024 levels. The structural backdrop remains intact: five consecutive years of supply deficits, cumulative shortfalls of ~820Moz, and a supply base that is largely unresponsive to price signals because 70–80% of silver production is a byproduct of copper, lead, zinc, and gold mining.
Not All That Glitters Is Gold
The distinction between gold and silver is fundamental. Gold functions primarily as a monetary asset: jewelry and central bank reserves account for roughly 70–75% of demand, while industrial uses represent only ~7–8%. When gold rallies, it is typically a macro story—currency hedging, inflation protection, geopolitical stress. Please see our note “Go for the Gold” on this subject, March 13, 2024
Silver is structurally different. While still used as an investment and store of value, industrial applications now represent 59% of global demand, up from 50% a decade ago, driven by solar PV, electronics, EVs, 5G infrastructure, and AI-related hardware. This dual identity—monetary and industrial—amplifies volatility. It attracts safe-haven flows while remaining highly sensitive to economic demand. The “Devil’s Metal” nickname reflects precisely that dynamic.
The implication is straightforward: when gold prices double, jewelers absorb the cost. When silver prices triples, manufacturers’ margins compress. For solar producers, that distinction is existential.
Silver’s Role in Solar: From Rounding Error to Margin Pressure
Silver paste is screen-printed onto silicon solar cells to form conductive grid lines (“fingers” and “busbars”) that collect current. The quantity per cell is small—roughly 10–13 mg/W for mainstream TOPCon technology—but at current prices, those milligrams are economically material.
In 2023, at ~$23/oz silver, paste costs were roughly $0.008/W, or 3–5% of total cell production costs. By late 2025, at $80+/oz, that figure rose to approximately $0.022/W—approaching 30% of module selling prices in certain markets. When industry gross margins hover near $0.01/W, a $0.014/W increase in a single input materially alters profitability.
Manufacturers have aggressively “thrifted” silver—reducing loadings from ~40 mg/W a decade ago to <10 mg/W today through thinner lines and multi-busbar designs. However, incremental efficiency gains are reaching diminishing returns. Further reductions increasingly require architectural change rather than process optimization.
The Great Decoupling: Technologies and Their Silver Dependencies
Silver inflation is accelerating technological bifurcation within solar manufacturing. Architectures capable of copper substitution gain structural leverage; those dependent on high-temperature silver processes face prolonged margin risk.
TOPCon: The 70% Constraint
Tunnel Oxide Passivated Contact (TOPCon) cells command about 70% global market share but face the most complex copper substitution challenge. The high-temperature manufacturing process (~800°C) enables copper atoms to diffuse into the silicon and degrade cell performance. This leaves the technology’s dominant producers — JinkoSolar (JKS-US), Canadian Solar (CSIQ-US), and Hanwha Qcells (009830-KR) — structurally exposed to silver prices for the foreseeable future.
HJT and Back-Contact: Copper-Compatible Alternatives
Two minority cell architectures offer a faster path off silver. Heterojunction (HJT) and Back-Contact (BC) cells represent just 13–15% of global production today, but their low-temperature manufacturing processes make copper substitution far more feasible than in TOPCon. This compatibility advantage, once a technical footnote, has become a commercial selling point as silver prices force the industry to rethink its metallization roadmap. LONGi (601012-CN), the world’s largest solar manufacturer, is betting on this shift: the company is targeting mass production of copper-metallized BC cells by Q2 2026, which would make it the first top-five producer to achieve silver-free output at scale.
CdTe Thin Film: The Structural Outlier
First Solar (FSLR-US), the only American/non-Chinese top-five solar panel manufacturer, relies on cadmium telluride (CdTe) technology that uses no silver. Its cost structure is structurally insulated from precious metal volatility. While CdTe historically trailed crystalline silicon on efficiency, the new Series 7 modules are narrowing the gap. As silver prices rise, CdTe’s technology becomes incrementally more competitive.
The Innovators’ Edge: Financial Positioning
Our preferred companies within the solar panel manufacturing industry share a defining characteristic: structural insulation from sustained silver inflation—through technology differentiation (First Solar), architectural pivot (LONGi), or policy-protected manufacturing (Hanwha Qcells).
In the section below, we contrast these companies with Canadian Solar, which remains exposed to conventional TOPCon economics without a visible substitution roadmap.
1. First Solar (FSLR-US): The Silver-Free Fortress
First Solar remains the clearest structural beneficiary of high silver prices. The company delivered 5.3 GW of module sales in Q3 2025 and is adding 3.7 GW of incremental US finishing capacity. Its ~54.5 GW contracted backlog provides multi-year visibility.
Risks center on execution (Series 7 ramp) and contract dynamics, but not commodity exposure. In a sustained silver inflation regime, relative margin stability is a differentiator.
2. LONGi Green Energy (601012-CN): Architectural Pivot
LONGi’s HPBC 2.0 platform, targeting Q2 2026 copper mass production, positions it as an early mover in base-metal metallization. BC modules already represented >25% of shipments by Q3 2025. Execution risk remains elevated given 2025 losses, but a successful copper transition would structurally rebase its cost curve into 2026–27.
3. Hanwha Solutions (009830-KR): Policy + Integration
Hanwha Solutions continue to be exposed to rising silver prices, however the company’s U.S. manufacturing footprint (8.4 GW planned capacity in Georgia) provides tariff protection and 45X tax credit eligibility. Near-term execution remains challenged—shipment guidance reduced from 9 GW to 6 GW and plant delays into 2026—but vertical integration (ingots through modules) directly addresses tightening U.S. trade enforcement.
Overall, although Hanwha’s commodity exposure is intact, policy support will at least partially offset input cost volatility.
4. Canadian Solar (CSIQ-US): Structural Exposure
Canadian Solar operates conventional TOPCon technology without disclosed copper metallization initiatives. The company’s energy storage division (e-STORAGE, $3.1B backlog) has provided a partial buffer, but not enough to offset the damage at the cell level: three consecutive quarters of net losses (~$75M cumulative) illustrate how little insulation conventional TOPCon offers against input cost inflation.
If silver remains above $60/oz through 2027, TOPCon producers without substitution pathways face sustained profitability pressure.
Financial Divergence: Growth and Margin Separation
The divergence in cost structure between these four companies is increasingly visible in reported fundamentals. Over the past three years, First Solar delivered 24% revenue CAGR with 44% gross margins — an outlier versus peers experiencing revenue contraction (–13% to –26%) and single-digit or negative margins. R&D intensity also diverges, with First Solar allocating materially more capital to innovation relative to revenue.
Equity markets have noticed. Since January 2024 (see chart below), First Solar — the only manufacturer with zero silver exposure — has outperformed the MSCI World index, while every silver-dependent manufacturer has underperformed. The gap is striking: First Solar trades roughly 40-50% higher than in 2024, while Hanwha Solutions has been cut in half and Canadian Solar has lost roughly a third of its value. The message is unambiguous: investors are already rewarding silver immunity.
If 2025 taught us anything, it is that the impact of Trump’s political orientations on equity prices is often far from what conventional wisdom would predict. In our final note of last year, we highlighted a plethora of sustainability themes that performed far differently than consensus expectations predicted under a Trump government.
Indeed, last year showed investors, including your SMS editors, the need for critical ignoring in order to truly parse the signal from the noise. Though we doubt that Trump will take less space in the news cycle, our 2026 investment outlook is a return to two fundamental questions of investing:
- Will monetary and fiscal policy settings offer a tailwind or headwind to equity prices?
- Which economic sectors offer the most attractive risk/reward backdrop to investors?
Our relatively sanguine view on equity markets stems from a cool-headed analysis of policy settings. In the U.S., fiscal policy is projected to be modestly positive in 2026 whereas it was restrictive in 2025. There is likely to be Q1 pop in fiscal thrust – thanks to a resumption in federal spending after the shutdown, as well as OBBBA tax cuts that will boost spending (see chart below).
Meanwhile, as the chart below highlights, overall financial conditions have been favourable for some time, and it is hard to see that changing for the foreseeable future; politics at the Fed suggest a dovish configuration for 2026 and beyond.
To be sure, an economic recession in the U.S., occurring in parallel with major weakness in China would put a damper on our moderately bullish thesis. The American labor market is a sore spot – the majority of jobs created over the past year have been in the hospitality and health care sectors, both of which offer under-average wage compensation. But hiring managers still report unfilled positions and continue to be optimistic about hiring; we are resolved to wait until there are definitive signs of a labor market breakdown or unmistakable evidence of a recession before becoming more bearish on risk assets.
Given the above-described policy settings: which sectors offer an attractive risk/reward backdrop to investors in 2026? Below we highlight six sustainable equity investment ideas that can benefit from mildly favorable policy settings that we believe are primed to outperform.
Idea #1: The Grid Super-Cycle: Expansion vs. Integration
Investing in the grid is hardly a contrarian take in 2026. In fact, it is arguably the most crowded trade on the street – but the “why” matters more than the “what.” Most analysis treats the grid as a monolith, indiscriminately buying utilities and equipment makers. We see it differently. The global grid trade has bifurcated into two distinct markets with opposing drivers: the U.S. is in a frantic race for expansion (more capacity for AI), while Europe is fighting for integration (more stability for renewables).
The U.S. “Expansion” Trade: As we discussed in our October 16, 2025, note “The Energy Transition Just Switched Time Zones”, the U.S, power grid is in aggressive growth mode for the first time in two decades. The driver is no longer just replacing aging poles; it is raw load growth from data centers requiring massive amounts of firm power.
- The Signal: The clearest sign of scarcity came in July 2025, when PJM (the largest U.S. grid operator) saw its 2026/2027 capacity auction clear at a record $329.17 per MW-day – a near 10x spike from previous lows. This proves that demand has critically outpaced supply, confirming that the market is now forced to pay unprecedented premiums to secure the limited “connected capacity” required for growth.
- The Play: Buy the “Connectors.”
- Eaton (ETN-US): The hardware monopoly. Data centers cannot function without their specific switchgear and transformers, and order books are full well into 2027. Critically, the stock has not followed the hype yet (-4% in 2025), making it a prime candidate for a catch-up trade as earnings finally reflect the backlog.
- Quanta Services (PWR-US): As the dominant “boots on the ground” builder, Quanta’s record backlog is proof that while AI moves at the speed of light, power still moves at the speed of construction.
The Rest of World “Integration” Trade: Outside of the U.S., the narrative flips. Europe isn’t just fighting for more power; it is fighting to stabilize it. As renewable penetration crosses 50%, national grids are breaking under the volatility.
- The Signal: As discussed in our May 22, 2025, note “From Solar Panels to Control Panels: Why It’s Time to Focus on the Grid”, the April 2025 Iberian Blackout was a wake-up call as it proved that without massive interconnection upgrades, renewable surges can crash the system. Thus, the priority has shifted from building solar farms to building the “interconnectors” that move power across borders.
- The Play: Buy the “Integrators.”
- Nexans (NEX-PA): While Prysmian (PRY-MIL) is the safe beta, Nexans is the alpha “catch-up” trade. Prysmian trades at a premium (~20x P/E) due to its scale. Nexans, however, has transformed into a pure-play electrification proxy but still trades at a discount (~13-15x P/E). As the market digests their divestment of non-core assets and refocus on high-margin subsea cables, we expect this valuation gap to close, offering significant upside in 2026.
- Schneider Electric (Paris: SU): While Nexans and Prysmian provide the cables, Schneider provides the digital “brain.” Their software and automated switchgear manage the complex flows of renewable energy. They are essential for preventing the kind of “voltage instability” that triggered the Spanish blackout.
Idea #: 2 Dreading Natural Disasters? Add Long Positions in Dredgers
Despite the political rhetoric, the cost of natural disasters and the need for climate resilience are not going away. Finding climate adaptation plays that go beyond insurance and engineering services companies is sometimes challenging, but one niche segment that deserves more attention from investors is dredging.
Dredging companies are on the front line of combatting rising sea levels and stronger storms that threaten the reliability of ports, flood control channels, and coastal waterways. And beyond climate considerations, dredging is a necessary economic investment. Ports and inland waterways are the backbone of domestic commerce in many countries and in international trade, yet many are not maintained to their necessary depths. Inadequate dredging leads to shipping delays and higher transportation costs. Strengthening supply chains and supporting domestic manufacturing requires well functioning ports and dredging companies are critical.
Two public dredging companies of interest are Great Lakes Dredge & Dock (GLDD), which operates mostly in the U.S., and DEME Group (DEME) that derives most of its revenues in Europe.
GLDD: A large share of U.S. dredging revenue is tied to government contracts, which are influenced by appropriations cycles, regulatory approvals, and political priorities. Fortunately for GLDD, despite Trump having gutted disaster relief agencies like FEMA, funding tailwinds for coastal resiliency and port deepening remain intact -the company has strong backlog visibility (total backlog is over 1.3 times total 2024 annual revenue). Indeed, the company’s value proposition hinges on pairing the industry’s youngest and largest dredging fleet with complex project execution expertise, allowing it to capture market share and higher margins in capital deepening and coastal resiliency work. Importantly, in the U.S., dredging projects are protected from international competition: the Jones Act requires U.S.-built, U.S.-crewed vessels for domestic dredging, which provides an important moat around the company’s core revenue base: there are no real U.S. dredging companies that can compete with GLDD.
DEME: Similar to GLDD, DEME operates in both port and coastal infrastructure dredging, as well as soil and sediment remediation and the company also has significant revenue associated with Engineering, Procurement, Construction, and Installation of offshore wind (foundations, turbine installation, cables) plus oil & gas decommissioning). The company’s most important moat is its fleet modernization: DEME operates cutting-edge vessels that allow it to do work in deeper waters and complex installations that legacy fleets cannot match. Investors should note however that DEME is stock is less liquid, given that two major investors own over 70% of outstanding stock.
Over the past year, GLDD stock performance has kept pace with the S&P500, though DEME has lagged. What is more, while the S&P 500 is reaching ever higher valuations (P/E of 29 for the entire market and 23.7 excluding tech), dredging companies have been consistently getting cheaper over the past three years. Both companies currently trade at 12 times earnings, compared to historical valuations closer to 16 times. With structural tailwinds in place and large project backlogs, both companies offer good value in a critical climate adaptation sector.
Idea #3: Short Peabody Coal – The King of a Shrinking Castle
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and market reports from late 2025, coal consumption by the electric power sector rose by approximately 9% to 11% compared to 2024 in the United States. This was the first year when usage of thermal coal for power generation purposes increased in more than two decades of decline. Stronger power demand coming from data centers and a frigid winter in North America both supported the price of coal pure plays such as Peabody Energy (BTU), which is trading at a five year high.
However, our expectation is that it will be difficult to notch out more coal demand from here. Although it may be true in theory that that the U.S.’ fleet of thermal coal plants has a massive amount of “spare capacity” (roughly half of the fleet sits idle on any given day), most of that capacity is unusable: old coal plants are hard to restart and are unreliable, and grid capacity near offline plants is insufficient. Overall, we do not expect that the 2025 increase in thermal coal usage is the start of a new trend. In this context, stock investors are currently pricing BTU as if their earnings are far more durable than they are.
Idea #4: Long GLP-1s: The Transition to Essential Medicine
The investment thesis for weight loss drugs is evolving from a consumer discretionary theme to a medical necessity. While 2024 and 2025 were defined by lifestyle adoption, 2026 will likely be driven by clinical indications. Recent data confirms GLP-1 efficacy in treating chronic kidney disease (CKD), heart failure, and addiction disorders. As these drugs secure approval for such indications, insurance reimbursement rates should improve, transitioning the Total Addressable Market (TAM) from a self-pay model to a covered, essential medicine model. Furthermore, the anticipated rollout of oral formulations, led by Novo Nordisk’s oral Wegovy, promises to democratize access by removing the barriers associated with cold-chain storage and injection administration.
A significant investment performance gap emerged in 2025, with Eli Lilly (LLY) appreciating approximately 40% while Novo Nordisk (NVO) corrected by roughly 40%. While Lilly executed well on its pipeline, we believe investors have over-penalized Novo for temporary supply chain constraints. Novo Nordisk remains the global incumbent with the deepest clinical data repository. We view the current valuation disparity as irrational and expect mean reversion in 2026 as Novo resolves supply bottlenecks. For investors seeking diversified exposure to the theme – and protection against single-stock volatility – the Roundhill GLP-1 & Weight Loss ETF (OZEM) offers a balanced basket of approximately 25 companies, capturing both the established duopoly and emerging biotech acquisition targets.
Idea #5: Buy a Korean Car – and the Stock
We have outlined in past notes the bullish case for Korea stocks (for example, please see “Seoul Mates: The Case for Korean Sustainability Plays”, May 1, 2025). We especially like Korean EV carmakers.
Korean car makers appear to be much more engaged in electrification compared to their U.S./Japanese counterparts, and the trade deal with the US takes some uncertainty away on the country’s ability to export to the U.S.
To be sure, consensus forecasts for global EV sales in 2026 are not particularly rosy. However, the Korean brands are poised to steal market share from other manufacturers. After all, their build quality is impressive especially given the price. For example, Kia is putting out its K5 EV car at the same price as its ICE sister K4 car. Meanwhile, Hyundai just unveiled it’s robotaxi –a testament to the company’s recent technological catch-up.
We especially like Kia at its current price – the stock is training at very low multiples relative to its peers.
Idea #6: A Word About Oil
Prior to events in Venezuela, short positions in U.S. oil services companies SLB and Halliburton were among our top 2026 investment ideas. The thesis is straightforward: oil services are the part of the supply chain most sensitive to oil prices. With WTI trading at cyclical lows below $60/bbl and a strong consensus for little upside in 2026, drilling activity is likely to remain weak. Historically, after a prolonged period at these prices, oil companies prepare to strand certain fossil fuel assets.
SLB and HAL stock prices traded higher in late 2025 while oil prices traded down—a rare deviation that doesn’t tend to last and often makes for an interesting entry point in short positions.
However, Trump’s intervention in Venezuela and plans for U.S. oil companies to re-enter the country drove a significant pop in U.S. oil companies over the past week. Our editorial team is divided as to whether this price action produces a better opportunity to short or whether to stand aside. Note that oil prices have not rallied since the January 2nd intervention and the world remains well-supplied with heavy crude. The price pop likely reflects optimism that drilling contracts will be awarded to U.S. companies at the expense of other suppliers like Alberta. Trump meets with U.S. oil executives next week to discuss Venezuela; we will wait for more clarity before becoming more bearish on related investments.
Investors looking to gain commodity exposure related to the energy transition theme often look no further than copper. After all, copper is considered the backbone of electrification as wiring, motors, grids, and charging networks require huge amounts of the metal. But other materials are arguably just as important and are somewhat neglected by investors: aluminum, a key material for lightweighting, has several tailwinds that make aluminum producers – both primary and secondary (scrap) – an interesting investment proposal.
Aluminum: What is it?
Unlike copper or gold, aluminum never appears as a pure metal, it is bound up mostly in bauxite, a rock found on the earth’s surface, primarily in Guinea, Australia and China. To make aluminum, alumina is extracted from the bauxite (rock) using caustic soda. Alumina is then turned into aluminum in liquid form using electrolysis, which is hugely electricity intensive. Indeed, aluminum has often been called electricity in a solid form because it takes a huge amount of electricity to produce it.
Because bauxite and alumina are relatively common, aluminum is an abundant material that is used in a myriad of applications and across economic sectors (see chart below).
Importantly, unlike fossil fuels and some other industrial inputs, aluminum intensity is increasing in the global economy. The charts below show the trajectory of oil and aluminum per unit of GDP. Fossil fuel intensity in the global economy has been dropping for several decades. Conversely, aluminum and copper intensity of GDP stabilized around 2010 and is widely forecast to increase in the years ahead.
The largest increase in aluminum demand – both now and for the next several years- is in the transportation sector, which is already the single largest consumer of aluminum, accounting for almost 30% of global demand. Lightweight vehicles and aircraft, designed for fuel efficiency and lower emissions, rely heavily on aluminum components. This trend will increase as automakers continue to adopt aluminum for lightweighting, especially in electric vehicles whereby manufacturers look for ways to offset the weight of batteries, and to comply with emissions standards.
Outside of transportation, other tailwinds for aluminum demand include:
- a sustainable packaging shift away from plastic to infinitely recyclable aluminum cans
- grid modernization (Aluminum is the dominant material for most overhead power lines worldwide)
- adoption of solar energy (aluminum content in panels is high)
- ongoing defense and infrastructure spending in both developed and developing countries
- substitution away from higher-priced copper for some applications.
On the supply side, bauxite is considered a plentiful resource that is relatively easy to access given that it is found near the earth’s surface. The chart below shows how aluminum compares to other metals – aluminum production is relatively resource efficient in that it takes only 7 kg of rock (bauxite) to produce 1 kg of aluminum. This ratio has held fairly steady over the past several decades.
Although there are no physical constraints to aluminum supply, most forecasters expect aluminum supply to tighten relative to demand beyond the next three years.
Most notable is that China, currently responsible for about 60% of global aluminum production, has implemented a national ceiling of 45 million tons per year on primary aluminum production. The cap was established in 2017 to address overcapacity and environmental concerns. 2024 was the first year that the cap appeared to be binding (Chinese aluminum output was about 45 mt in 2024) and it is very likely that it is binding again this year.
In March 2025 the Chinese government issued a formal plan: “Aluminum Industry High‑Quality Development Implementation Plan (2025–2027)”, in which supply-side controls on primary aluminum capacity and output were reaffirmed. The implication is that Chinese supply is unlikely to meet rising global aluminum demand.
The second supply-side risk is electricity constraints. Given the quantity of electricity necessary to produce aluminum, the economics of aluminum are essentially the economics of power. It’s no wonder that smelting capacity is clustered where electricity is relatively cheap (e.g. Norway, Canada and increasingly in the Middle East).
Green Aluminum Plays
Since electricity is such a major input to aluminum production, competitive advantages are available for producers that can either reduce the cost or the volume of the electric input. Enter recycling.
One of the defining features of aluminum is its ability to be recycled infinitely without losing its original properties. Moreover, making recycled aluminum only takes around 5% of the energy needed to make new aluminum. Therefore, there is a strong economic incentive to recycle: about 75% of all aluminum ever produced is still in use today.
Given the supply risks mentioned above (limited Chinese output of primary aluminum and a potential shortfall of electric power), there are strong incentives to improve aluminum recycling rates. In this context, it should be no surprise that we favor non-Chinese companies with the technology and capacity to produce with high recycled content, especially those with access to low-emissions electricity like hydropower.
In the table below, we show GHG emissions for large cap aluminum producers as a share of revenue. Note that emissions are particularly important to monitor for aluminum companies, since the vast majority of emissions are related to the source of energy used in producing electricity used smelting. What sets the low-emissions companies apart from their peers is that they all have sizeable recycling operations.
Apart from a comparatively low carbon footprint, aluminum recycling companies have also distinguished themselves from their peers by their stock market performance, both over the past three years and especially in 2025.
As we have written in past notes, since recycling is geographically agnostic, it bypasses many geopolitical and trade issues – one can build a recycling plant anywhere so long as there is access to reliable energy and labor. Importantly, input feed (scrap aluminum) generally trades at a discount to the index price of aluminum, but a significant risk is the availability of scrap. Several countries, but most notably the EU, are set to place export bans on aluminum scrap, precisely because they view it as a national security issue, just like access to copper and rare earth metals. So far in 2025, the price margin between scrap and primary aluminum prices is worth monitoring even if it has remained stable up to now.
Overall, in a world that risks becoming increasingly energy constrained, we expect that aluminum producers most exposed to recycling will outperform and should command a premium over those companies that compete for (higher priced) electricity inputs.
Interestingly, there is currently little valuation discrepancy between the companies in our recycling leaders and laggards baskets (see the chart below).
Earlier this year, we published a note explaining why only three publicly traded companies were poised to reap the gains of a bull market in rare earth metals in 2025. Since our note (“Critical Minerals, Critical Moves: The Scramble for Rare Earth Metals”, May 7, 2025) an equally weighted basket of MP Materials, Lynas Rare Earths and Neo Performance Materials has gained almost 100%.
Rare earth metals are the lifeblood of most new technologies, both military and civilian (many of which sit squarely within the energy transition theme).
We were compelled to write our previous note due to the geopolitical context of procuring rare earth metals. Recall that in April, China implemented export restrictions on seven rare earths in retaliation to tariffs imposed by the U.S. Trump administration. Then in October, China further restricted supply by adding wide-ranging controls on several rare earths, as well as on battery precursors and superhard materials. At the end of October, U.S. and China leaders reached a trade truce, whereby the most recent restrictions have been temporarily suspended. History suggests, however, that Chinese export restrictions are far from over.
In our last note, we focused on recycling as a possible means to improve rare earth elements (REE) supply. After all, recycling can be geographically agnostic and would lessen the ecological footprint of extremely dirty mining activity. We stand by our previous conclusions: recycling offers a path to increased REE autonomy. However, with recycling rates of REEs currently under 1% and very few operations commercially viable, even an aggressive ramp up in recycling will not be a significant solution to diversify REE supply over the next five years.
In today’s note, we explore whether there are other means to avoid sleepwalking into an REE crisis and how investors should position within this sector.
REE Substitution?
It is not hard to understand that the motivation to find substitutes to REE use is high and rising. After all, companies that use REEs as an input to production are currently held hostage by a tightly controlled supply chain. Moreover, mining and processing REEs creates massive environmental degradation and human health risks. And the costs to procure REEs are forecast to rise sharply as demand swamps available supply.
Unfortunately, however, it seems that REE mining is here to stay for some time. Of the major industries that rely on REEs (defense, renewable energy, consumer electronics), we could only find evidence in the electric vehicle industry for a potential pathway to significantly reduce REE use.
Currently, most electric vehicles run on permanent-magnet motors that are comprised of REEs (Nd, Pr, Dy, Tb). However, alternatives exist. For example, BMW produces electric SUVs with motors that contain no rare earth metals; the development of these motors began in reaction to the 2011 neodymium price spike triggered by Chinese policy. These vehicles will be available for sale in North America in 2026 and may offer a pathway for larger adoption of REE-free electric vehicles.
Conversely, catalytic converters that are used in the exhaust systems of non-EV vehicles are still entirely reliant on REEs such as cerium oxide. While this is not the prime reason, the potential divergence in REE dependence adds more credence to our view that the combination of technological developments and scale are making wider EV adoption the path of least resistance (please see our recent note, “Charging Up on Cheap EV Stocks”, November 13, 2025).
Nonetheless, the likelihood of a widespread conversion across industries away from rare earth metals is unlikely. A “simple” swapping out materials often requires a costly redesign of components, systems, or supply chains. Many substitutions and alternative‐material efforts are still at the research or pilot stage and are far from economically viable.
Follow The Money?
In the absence of private sector capabilities to re-orient away from REEs, governments are increasingly throwing money at the problem. While there are newly announced programs to jumpstart R&D for substitute materials, the bulk of government attention so far has been allocated to building national champions with the aim to re-build global supply chains. The table below highlights various government investments and interventions in 2025 alone:
There are several potential drawbacks for investors when governments intervene in public corporations (reduced operational efficiency, deprioritizing shareholder returns, distorted market signals, etc.) but in the case of rare earth metals, we expect that the advantages outweigh any problems. Since rare earth metal mining is inherently a risky business, governments as stakeholders tend to lower the overall risk for other shareholders and improve financing conditions (i.e. cost and access to capital). Additionally, from a sustainability perspective, there is some evidence that environmental standards tend to be higher when governments take stakes, which is especially significant in the mining sector.
In the U.S., MP Materials has become the government REE “darling”. Earlier this year, the Department of War created a Public Private Partnership (PPA) with the company that established a 10-year price floor of $110 per kg (roughly $40/kg above the current market price) for NdPr. The government will purchase 100% of the magnets produced for defense and commercial use for a decade following commissioning. Needless to say, these actions materially stabilize the near-term earnings outlook and helps support the stock price, irrespective of China’s next moves.
Meanwhile, smaller REE companies (miners) have failed to keep up. With no deal from Uncle Sam, these companies trade similar to junior miners of other commodities (gold, copper, nickel).
Investment Strategy
Given our analysis above, there are three crucial points that investors looking to play the rare earth metals theme need to keep in mind:
- Bullish demand trends are robust: Odds are low that growth rates of mining and processing of “virgin” rare earth metals will be significantly stymied by a demand side shock as improved recycling rates or viable technological substitutes, at least for the next five years.
- Supply is beholden to periodic jolts: Restricting access to REEs has shown to be an effective policy tool as China’s REE export bans have yielded trade policy wins from the U.S.; investors should expect Chinese policymakers to repeat this strategy in future standoffs.
- Government intervention will create winners and losers among non-Chinese REE producers.
Taken this information together, we believe investing in rare earth elements should be framed as such:
- It is a worthwhile endeavor to maintain core long-term positive exposure to REEs given the criticality of this resource in the energy transition.
- The widening valuation gap between integrated rare-earth companies and early-stage developers is here to stay: the former benefit from “national champion status” while the latter face uncertain financing pathways.
- Entry/exit points in long REE producing companies will be determined by the geopolitical rather than economics.
For decades, logistics was the invisible infrastructure of globalization – cheap, frictionless, and engineered for cost minimization rather than resiliency. COVID exposed those assumptions, and the system never fully recovered. As manufacturing re-shores to North America and Europe, trade policy becomes more protectionist, and corporates confront the limits of net-zero commitments, logistics has shifted from a background function to a material sustainability and financial risk factor.
When production sat in low-cost geographies, moving goods thousands of miles was still cheaper than manufacturing locally – making inefficiencies tolerable. Re-shoring changes the equation. The two charts below make the re-shoring trend unmistakable: manufacturing construction spending and re-shoring job announcements have both accelerated dramatically since COVID. If one assumes that the proposed Trump-era tariff regime materializes (a big IF), the next few years could see further re-shoring as firms hedge against heightened trade friction.
More volume must now be processed closer to end markets, last-mile and returns networks must tighten, and transportation costs re-enter the foreground. This is not “sustainability as virtue signaling”: for many companies, improving logistics efficiency is simply good business.
From a regulatory perspective, Europe’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is reshaping cross-border cost structures by attaching carbon pricing to imports. At the same time, mandatory disclosure frameworks – most notably the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) – require companies to measure and report Scope 3 emissions across their full value chain, placing scrutiny on the largest share of their footprint. With most corporates having already captured the low-hanging Scope 1 and 2 reductions, the decarbonization frontier has shifted upstream and downstream to suppliers.
The chart below shows how sharply the emissions profile has tilted. Operational emissions (Scopes 1 and 2) have fallen by roughly 15% from their 2019 peak, but this progress has driven Scope 3 to more than 90% of total emissions among the world’s 500 largest companies – up from about 75% in 2014.
The final catalyst is that logistics networks built for 2010 demand patterns are misaligned with 2025 realities. E-commerce growth, SKU proliferation, labor shortages, congested ports, and high empties (nearly 33% of U.S. truck miles still run unloaded) are pushing the system to its limits. At the same time, cutting-edge technologies like automation, robotics, AI-driven routing, and end-to-end visibility platforms are finally mature enough to produce step-change efficiency gains. The timing is consequential: structural stress is colliding with tools capable of materially reducing it.
Three Pillars of the Sustainable Logistics Investment Theme
The structural pressures reshaping global supply chains create an investment landscape that echoes past infrastructure transitions: a system operating at its physical limits, a new cohort of technologies capable of relieving those constraints, and a geopolitical alignment where countries are focusing more on themselves. But the logistics transformation is fundamentally distributed. It unfolds simultaneously in buildings, transport networks, and the digital orchestration layer that stitches everything together.
Sustainable logistics is therefore best understood as a multi-sector theme with heterogeneous business models and risk profiles. On one end sit the Logistics Real Estate Companies, providing the physical backbone where goods are stored, sorted, and processed. In the middle are the Transportation & Logistics Operators, the firms that actually move products across increasingly complex global and regional networks. Layered above both is the fast-growing class of Software & System Optimizers, the digital infrastructure orchestrating flows, improving asset utilization, and maximizing emissions efficiency across the entire “supply chain of supply chains.”
This week’s note will highlight the leading companies in each subsector for investors seeking exposure to the ongoing transformation of sustainable logistics.
I. Logistics Real Estate: Warehousing as Critical Infrastructure
Warehousing has become one of the most structurally constrained components of the global economy. Despite intermittent recession fears, U.S. industrial vacancy remains near 4%, well below historical averages. European markets are even tighter, with modern logistics space in the Netherlands and Germany at sub-3% vacancy. When space is available, much of the global stock is outdated – not designed for automation, electrification, or high-velocity returns. The result: lower storage density, inefficient material flows, and higher energy use per pallet.
As throughput requirements surge and tenants electrify fleets, grid capacity, rooftop solar, EV-charging yards, and digital backbones have become mission-critical. This is pushing logistics real estate owners into the role of modernization utilities – enabling tenants to meet operational, emissions, and resilience requirements that legacy warehouses simply cannot support.
Within the subsector, Prologis stands out as the most advanced on sustainability investment, supported by green-financing programs, integrated climate governance, and large-scale infrastructure upgrades across its portfolio. Segro plc is a close second followed by Goodman Group with credible long-term decarbonization strategies and capex commitments.
II. The Transportation & Logistics Operators: Fixing the Network Itself
If logistics real estate companies control the physical nodes, transportation and logistics operators manage the edges – the links that move goods between every point in the system. Those links remain structurally inefficient. U.S. trucking networks still operate with about a third of empty miles, and global road-freight emissions reached a record 2.2 Gt CO₂ in 2023. Inefficiency is both a cost burden and an emissions problem.
Operators such as C.H. Robinson, DSV, SG Holdings, and Brambles are increasingly closing these gaps with software-driven, data-coordinated transport networks. Freight brokerage has become algorithmic; consolidation and routing decisions are automated; and real-time emissions data is shaping modal-shift decisions. Asset-sharing systems – most notably Brambles’ CHEP pallet-pooling model – reduce waste, improve reuse rates, and drive circularity at global scale.
Within this subsector, Brambles stands out as the sustainability benchmark due to the inherent circularity of its CHEP model and its progress against science-based targets. DSV ranks as the strongest of the global Third-Party Logistics companies (3PLs), supported by robust absolute emissions-reduction commitments and leading disclosure. SG Holdings has quietly built a high-quality sustainability profile. C.H. Robinson is making credible improvements and launching customer-facing tools, but its transitions appear more incremental relative to the leaders.
III. Software & System Optimizers: The Intelligence Layer
The third pillar – and the highest-growth, highest-margin segment – is the software and data infrastructure that orchestrates modern logistics. This includes warehouse management systems (WMS), transportation management systems (TMS), real-time visibility platforms, RFID ecosystems, and automation-control engines. As regulatory scrutiny tightens and operational complexity scales, the digital layer offers the fastest, most capital-efficient path to emissions reductions and productivity gains.
Several technology vectors are now converging. RFID adoption has finally passed its inflection point: global shipments exceeded 30 billion tags in 2023, up 25% year-over-year. Persistent labour shortages are accelerating warehouse automation capex, which is expanding 10–12% annually. And visibility tools that were niche pre-COVID are now mainstream, with 70% of Fortune 500 shippers deploying real-time tracking, exception management, and digital documentation.
Companies such as Zebra Technologies, Descartes, and WiseTech Global increasingly run the critical logic of logistics. Their platforms determine pallet routing, slotting optimization, picking sequences, carrier selection, and customs compliance. The impact is measurable: shrinkage reductions of up to 30%, stockout improvements of 10–20%, and materially higher asset-utilization rates across fleets, containers, and warehouse equipment.
Within this subsector, Zebra Technologies and WiseTech Global emerge as the clearest sustainability leaders, integrating emissions-aware tools and efficiency metrics directly into their solutions. Descartes remains an essential enabler of efficient logistics flows with solid ESG reporting, though it communicates its sustainability positioning more quietly than peers.
Sustainability x Financial Analysis
Building on the investment theses for each subsector, we evaluate the selected companies through a dual lens of sustainability and financial performance. The names highlighted in yellow represent our top picks, offering the most compelling intersection of ESG impact and valuation.
- Logistics Real Estate: While Prologis is the sector benchmark, its current valuation is prohibitive. We prefer SEGRO plc, which offers a comparable sustainability profile at roughly half the multiple, albeit with a heavier UK/EU geographic exposure.
- Logistics Services: Both Brambles and DSV A/S stand out for offering a robust balance of sustainability leadership and strong financial fundamentals.
- Technology: Zebra Technologies is our sole selection in this category, driven by its attractive valuation and accelerating focus on sustainability initiatives.
Ultimately, this theme offers a distinct advantage for portfolio construction: it provides natural diversification across asset classes and business models. Logistics Real Estate Companies provide defensive ballast through real-asset duration, inflation-linked income, and structurally tight markets. Transportation & Logistics Operators add cyclical torque, outperforming when global trade accelerates and capacity tightens. Software & System Optimizers supply the long-duration growth engine, driven by automation, digitization, and the rising value of real-time data. Combined, these segments create a tunable mix of quality, growth, and cyclicality depending on an investor’s risk posture.
Taken together, these three pillars form an ecosystem undergoing simultaneous modernization. Buildings are being retrofitted, networks are being re-optimized, and software is finally coordinating the whole system with real-time data. It is rare to find a theme where physical infrastructure, operational networks, and digital layers are all experiencing multi-year investment cycles in parallel – and rarer still when the economics and decarbonization objectives align this cleanly.
The rumours of the death of the EV have been greatly exaggerated. While Donald Trump applied the brakes on the whole EV industry – except for a brief “Broment” with Elon Musk when he turned the White House into a “pop-up” Tesla dealership, it seems that he is doing his best to prolong the life of the internal combustion engine (ICE) – at least in America. It is true that the President is setting back the overall energy transition a few years back, but the transition is still happening fast in the automotive sector.
Moreover, while the political crowd is busy rolling back environmental legislation in many countries– it seems that technological developments are still accelerating to a point where, according to the American Automobile Association (AAA), EVs are now cheaper to buy, own and operate than their equivalent ICE cars. Additionally, the price of traditional gas-powered cars are rising more quickly than EV prices. This suggests that despite the politics, the combination of technological developments and scale are making EVs the path of least resistance.
While global EV sales growth is decelerating, some sources suggest that sales are still expanding at a robust pace 3As a result, EVs are rapidly becoming the default mode of transportation in many parts of the world – even across emerging markets, where electrification and grid infrastructure still lag developed economies.
China is leading the way in building the next generation of EVs and batteries. Conversely, one could think that the stance of the current U.S. administration will likely decrease the odds of the U.S. automobile industry ability to catch up with China’s dominance in the sector. To this end, some recent comments from Ford’s CEO Jim Earley suggesting that Chinese cars have “far superior technology, lower costs and great quality” compared to their U.S. counterparts should be worrisome for U.S. automakers. In fact, the very idea that the U.S. auto industry may become obsolete vis-à-vis its competitors is an increasingly plausible scenario. While China is “stepping on the gas” and propping EV factories, most U.S. makers are slowing down their EV roll-out – and in some cases even considering to cease production.
In this context, the global tariff standoff is also acting as an artificial protection for U.S. automakers and delaying their adaption to an EV world led by Chinese automakers.
Did Trump Really Boost the Global EV Industry?
Like many other transition-focused investment themes (see our note “Contrarians in the Green”, September 18, 2025), EVs and batteries have been a hot topic this year. That also true on a 2-year basis – a period during which the equity price of companies such as Tesla and BYD have almost doubled and solidly outperformed global indices. Interestingly, GM outperformed EV automakers despite being still mostly focused on ICE vehicles as its performance of late was supported by Trump tariffs and, more recently, some positive analyst revisions. Looking three to five years ahead, we would prefer to be long EV makers (BYD, TSLA) and short legacy U.S. automakers (F, GM).
Furthermore, for those looking to capture the up-and-coming EV automakers with some exposure to ICE technology, Korean automakers are interesting (and cheap).
An EV Corollary: The Battery Play
Despite all the negative press over EVs and overcapacity in the industry, it seems that battery makers are still well-liked by the market. After hitting a floor in 2024, their price has rebounded recently.
Finally, while batteries are mostly made in China, they remain an expensive play compared to EVs (especially Korean ones). However, if one were to take a longer view on the theme considering that the future to the global automotive industry is still one which is closely tied to electrification, it could still make sense to re-enter the play at this stage. Furthermore, if tariffs on China EVs exports to the EU, U.S. and Canada were to abate amid a possible rapprochement between China and G7 economies (ex-U.S.), then we could expect the rebound in EV and battery prices to be prolonged.
Even if artificial intelligence and hyperscale data centers fail to expand as aggressively as expected, global electricity demand is set to rise steeply over the coming decade. This acceleration will be driven by industrial revitalization, transportation electrification, manufacturing expansion in emerging economies, and population growth.
Across major regions, the new appetite for power stems from still-strong electric vehicle (EV) adoption, battery and semiconductor manufacturing, and a wave of industrial reconfiguration aimed at energy security and supply chain resilience. Electrification of heating, logistics, and public transport has rapidly replaced fossil fuel demand for electricity.
The chart below highlights two periods of high electricity demand compared to average growth of 3.3% since 1980. The first is the late 1980’s whereby Southeast Asia industrialized quickly, and electrification accelerated after the oil shock. The second is the current period, beginning in 2020 for all the reasons mentioned above.
Electricity demand is having its comeback moment in the United States; the chart looks like a voltage spike. Indeed, after years of grid complacency, power demand is set to post its fastest sustained growth in a generation. Blame (or thank) data centers, electrified factories, and all the stuff we promised that would be “digital”. The cleaner, smarter, more efficient future turns out to be wildly power-hungry.
Identifying Bottlenecks: Paperwork Not Construction
Under most circumstances (except this time with the rapid data center build-out), electricity consumption growth has been relatively predictable, but the infrastructure build out to meet demand tends to lag far behind. Currently, the greatest bottleneck lies not in generation but in permitting and transmission capacity. Across all continents, thousands of gigawatts of renewable and storage projects are stuck in interconnection queues or awaiting regulatory approval. In many markets, large-scale power projects can take five to ten years to permit and build, compared with only two years for new industrial or data center construction. The table below shows the typical timeframe to add power to the grid; from planning to commissioning. The bolded rows highlight when significant expenses (revenues for the companies delivering the product or service) start to materialize.
This regulatory friction is a big clash with the technology sector, which thrives on “moving fast and breaking things,” while electricity generation is governed by the opposite imperative: “move carefully, ensure nothing breaks.” With data centers seen as a chokepoint for artificial intelligence (AI), developers accustomed to timelines measured in months now confront energy timelines measured in multiple years.
Even under conservative assumptions, the world’s electricity infrastructure will require massive capital mobilization over the next decade to accommodate industrial electrification and digitalization. The central challenge is not how to produce enough electrons, but how to deliver them swiftly, safely, and economically within a system that is unaccustomed to “move fast and break things.”
Investment Opportunities
From an investment standpoint, the demand for electricity infrastructure equipment and services across the entire supply chain is expected to remain robust. This ongoing build-out will likely face periods of scarcity because suppliers operate in a capital-intensive industry accustomed to the traditionally slow pace of the electricity sector. However, this sector is now under pressure to accelerate, driven by deep-pocketed, power-hungry companies like Alphabet, Meta, and Microsoft, who want to move fast and scale quickly.
The table below highlights 20 sustainable companies and illustrates how their products and services fit within the electrification ecosystem. We divided this ecosystem into eight segments that generate revenue across the post approval project lifecycle, from engineering and procurement to construction, commissioning, maintenance, and grid optimization.
The chart below highlights the stock performance of the same companies over the last five years. From the company that has performed best, Vertiv, which concentrates its efforts in critical digital infrastructure and has benefitted from the data center build-out and hype, to the company that has performed worst, Daikin Industries, which is the world’s largest Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) manufacturer with a growing portion in smart, grid-responsive HVAC.
One noticeable aspect of the performance charts is that companies strictly involved in automation and monitoring and cooling are at the bottom of the list. This makes sense considering that optimization and maintenance happen after the build-out phase, therefore those companies have not yet seen strong and rising demand for their services, like the ones at the top of the schedule Note that all of these companies have strong sustainability credentials, as the chart below highlights.
However, from a financial perspective, these companies have not yet caught the attention of investors. Sales growth has been generally weak because their grid-related revenues will come later in the electrification cycle, among other things. They will gain more revenues in the maintenance and optimization phase of the electric grid expansion. The aggressive expansion of the electric grid is an early part of a long-term trend toward electrification; these companies offer good risk vs. reward at current valuations.
“The future is already here — it’s just not evenly distributed.”
William Gibson’s line, coined in the early days of the internet, feels oddly apt for the energy transition in 2025. The future, as it turns out, isn’t being built in the places that talk about it the most.
If you judged progress by headlines, you’d assume the transition is stalling. In Washington, “ESG” has become a three-letter insult. In parts of Europe, net-zero policies are being watered down under the pressure of populism, high energy bills, and the pivot to defense. Although it may look like the green dream is fading, the data quietly says otherwise — and it’s pointing in a surprising direction.
According to the IEA’s World Energy Investment 2025 report, total global energy investment will hit a record US$3.3 trillion this year. Of that, US$2.2 trillion will flow to clean energy technologies — twice the US$1.1 trillion still going to fossil fuels. In other words: the energy transition isn’t slowing down; it’s just changing lanes.
The new fast lane isn’t in Berlin, London, or Washington. It’s in Shenzhen, São Paulo, Mumbai, Nairobi, and Jakarta.
While developed markets are bogged down in ideological trench warfare — arguing over what counts as “green,” “just,” or “sustainable” — emerging markets are quietly building the physical infrastructure of the next energy system. They’re not doing it to virtue-signal; they’re doing it because it makes economic sense. Solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles have simply become the cheapest and most practical options available in the Global South.
The transition that was supposed to start in the West and trickle down to the rest of the world has flipped upside down. It’s a delicious historical irony. The Industrial Revolution, the automobile age, and the internet boom all began in the West and radiated outward, leaving developing countries scrambling to catch up. Now, in the clean energy revolution, it’s the emerging economies setting the pace while the incumbents debate the rules.
The Emerging Market Acceleration
According to BloombergNEF, emerging economies now attract two-thirds of global renewable investment, and their clean-energy capacity additions have outpaced developed markets every year since 2021. The IEA estimates that in 2025, over 80% of new solar and wind capacity will be built outside North America and Europe.
The scale is staggering. Pakistan imported 17 GW of solar modules in 2024 — nearly half its grid-connected capacity. Across Africa, solar imports jumped 60% year-on-year, lighting up villages long ignored by traditional utilities.
As this momentum builds, new solar superpowers are emerging. In 2022, India overtook Japan to become the world’s third-largest solar generator. In 2024, Brazil overtook Germany, climbing to fifth place. Alongside China, this means that BRICS nations now account for three of the world’s top five solar producers.
The Great Pivot – From Policy to Pragmatism
The original script for the energy transition was that Europe and the United States would lead — because they had the wealth, the policy frameworks, and the moral resolve to do so. Emerging markets would follow adopting cleaner technologies once costs came down. Net zero by 2050 for the West, 2060 for China, 2070 for India — a moral hierarchy neatly aligned with GDP per capita.
This mirrors the rhythm of UN climate negotiations, where developed countries are expected to lead while developing ones shoulder few formal obligations.
But 2025 has torn up that playbook.
In the United States, politics beat pragmatism. A number of solid renewable energy projects were canceled for no better reason than being “too green.” In Europe, climate ambition collided with voter fatigue: the Netherlands suspended farm-emission targets, Germany scaled back its heat pump subsidies, and France quietly scaled back its EV subsidies. The result is what the IEA now calls “a policy slowdown phase” — lots of speeches, little concrete action.
Politics alone doesn’t explain the stall; two deeper forces are at play. First, the West erroneously bet big on technologies that were either uneconomic or premature (green hydrogen, solar thermal, carbon capture). That gave skeptics all the ammunition they needed to kill ALL green projects. By trying to be too clever, the West tripped over its own ambition.
Second, the explosive rise in energy demand from data centers, industrial reshoring, and AI has scrambled energy planning. Even the greenest server farms need power 24/7 — and that reliability still comes from peaker plants, which, for the most part, run on natural gas.
Meanwhile, emerging markets appear to have taken a far more pragmatic approach to ensuring energy supply. China, India, Brazil, and others did the math. When solar modules, lithium batteries, and wind turbines became cheaper than coal or gas, they bought them.
The contrast couldn’t be clearer. Renewable power growth in developed markets has plateaued, adding only modest capacity through the rest of the decade despite lofty policy targets. Meanwhile, emerging markets are projected to install nearly four times as much renewable capacity as the developed world by 2030, led by solar and wind.
The old centers of global leadership are bogged down in taxonomy debates, while emerging markets are scaling factories, grids, and EV fleets. Capital, as usual, is doing what politics couldn’t: move forward.
Once clean technology stopped being a policy project and became an economic one, the world’s fastest-growing economies were destined to lead. They had no legacy infrastructure to defend, no sunk political capital in oil and gas. They just had growing energy demand and cheap solutions.
Implications for Global Sustainability-Minded Investors
For investors, the map of opportunity has quietly flipped. Most “sustainable” and “energy transition” portfolios remain overweight developed markets — the same markets now mired in politics, planning delays, and policy fatigue. Meanwhile, the real build-out is happening elsewhere, driven by balance sheets that care less about ideology and more about kilowatts.
The numbers are blunt. Emerging markets already account for nearly 60 % of global clean-energy revenues. Yet in most global equity benchmarks, they still represent barely 12 % of portfolio exposure.
That disconnect creates both risk and alpha. Portfolios anchored to Western policy cycles remain exposed to subsidy rollbacks, voter mood swings, and bureaucratic inertia — while emerging-market clean-tech firms are growing revenues at roughly twice the global sector average. Their surge in clean-energy revenues has gone hand in hand with stronger equity performance.
The turning point came in early 2024, when emerging-market clean-energy equities began to pull ahead decisively. This aligns with IEA data showing that emerging economies started deploying significantly more renewable capacity than developed markets, led by solar, wind, and grid infrastructure.
Yet, as the valuation chart shows, these same companies continue to trade at historically lower price-to-earnings multiples, with the gap now widening again after briefly narrowing in 2023. In short, investors are still paying a premium for slower-growing, policy-dependent clean-tech names in the West — while faster-scaling, economically driven leaders in emerging markets deliver better performance at a discount.