Since our last note on Battery, Energy Systems Storage (BESS) in November 2024 (see “What is Store for Energy Storage”) a few trends have accelerated in the industry as the global demand for power continues to grow to supply AI data centers. As such, BESS is now playing a key role in electrification, as evidenced in this week’s news about Spain’s solar power glut and how BESS is changing the economics of renewable power. Although most renewables are now cheaper than gas, the question is how much longer the sector can develop separately from BESS.
Solar is now so cheap that it can undermine its own economics. In sunny regions, it floods the grid at midday, driving prices down just when output peaks. That also makes grid balancing harder and can contribute to outages, as Spain showed last year.
Wind helps because it often produces in the evening, overnight and in winter, when solar output is weak. Together, solar and wind are more valuable than alone. Add batteries, and a hybrid system can deliver firm clean power for $56/MWh today, which is below gas in many markets. With utility-scale storage costs down fourfold since 2016, this advantage should keep improving.
In our last note on batteries (“Beyond Lithium: The Next Battery Boom”, May 21), we discussed how next-generation batteries are moving beyond hard-to-source minerals such as cobalt and lithium. Here we look at the energy mix powering data centers, gas turbines, integrated power developers and BESS pure plays, in a world where the International Energy Agency estimates that two out of every three dollars invested in power now go to renewables.
Gas is Still Winning the Data Center Power Game, but not for long
Natural gas remains the leading power source for U.S. data centers (see chart below). Renewables, already at 24%, are moving up quickly as their LCOE continues to fall.
Current estimates suggest that as much renewable capacity as gas capacity could be added to power U.S. data centers through 2030.
The equation is shifting. Solar+wind+BESS hybrids already beat gas on cost at 95% reliability ($56 vs. $76/MWh), and battery costs are falling faster than any other energy technology. But data centers need power that is always on, instantly responsive, compact and quick to build. On all four counts, gas still wins. Gas turbines can meet 99.9% uptime requirements, handle rapid AI load swings, use far less land and avoid the long interconnection queues that slow solar+storage projects.
But renewables will catch up: by 2030, better interconnection timelines and cheaper storage should narrow the speed and cost gaps. And by 2032–2035, some studies suggest that emerging technologies such as long-duration batteries using technologies such as iron-air and flow systems could close much of the reliability gap. For the remaining edge case – ultra-firm power for the largest AI clusters – is where hyperscalers are placing their bets on Small Modular Reactor (SMR) and have already signed offtake agreements from Amazon, Google, Microsoft and Meta targeting first power from SMRs in the early 2030s.
Until then – and given the probable delay in the large scale deployment of SMRs – several BESS players, clean-power developers and data-center power suppliers remain worth watching as they will remain a key part of the power supply chain for the foreseeable future.
BESS: The Future is Now
BESS is having its “wow” moment as one of the fastest-growing technology segments, scaling at a pace that mirrors AI demand. Four players are gaining share in the U.S. data-center market.
Fluence Energy (FLNC-US): Fluence reported a record contracted backlog of $5.60 billion as of March 31, 2026, helped by its pivot toward AI data centers and MSAs with two major hyperscalers. These deals validate its “Smartstack” platform as a shock absorber for short-duration AI power spikes. Margins are also improving, with adjusted gross margins reaching 11.10% in Q2 2026.
Eos Energy (EOSE-US): Eos is scaling its Z3 zinc-based battery platform. 2025 revenue rose sevenfold to $114.20 million, and Manufacturing Line 2 in Pennsylvania should double annualized capacity to 4 GWh by end-2026. Its Frontier Power USA partnership with Cerberus, backed by a $1.50 billion technology-performance insurance framework, should help address project-finance hurdles for non-lithium systems.
ESS Tech (GWH-US): ESS Tech is commercializing iron-flow technology for 10- to 22-hour storage. Recent milestones include Project New Horizon with Google and Salt River Project, a 50 MWh pilot in Arizona, and a partnership with Alsym Energy to develop sodium-ion solutions. Its iron-flow chemistry was also independently validated by the American Public Power Association after a 21-month utility demonstration.
Merus Power (MERUS-FI) is emerging as a European BESS leader, with 2025 net sales of €54.60 million and a CATL agreement to deliver 3 GWh of storage solutions in Nordic Europe. It is also advancing grid-forming technology, including the first commercial GFM storage facility in the Nordics for Alpiq, alongside recent projects in Finland, Latvia, Poland and Denmark.
Except for Fluence, these companies have mostly underperformed over the past year. As with other emerging technologies, a market-cap-weighted basket may make sense to enter into a position in this fast-moving sector.
Enter Clean Power Suppliers and Integrators
Beyond pure-play BESS companies, several clean-power suppliers are also well positioned to power U.S. data centers. Established names such as NextEra and AES are seeing a growing share of their backlog tied to AI demand.
NextEra Energy (NEE-US) is expanding its “Data Center Hub” strategy, with more than 30 sites representing over 60 GW of potential capacity as of April 2026. It added 4.0 GW to its renewables and storage backlog, now about 33 GW, and was selected by the U.S. Department of Commerce to build 9.5 GW of gas-fired generation in Texas and Pennsylvania for large-scale users such as data centers.
The AES Corp (AES-US) is undergoing a major transition after shareholders approved a $10.7 billion take-private acquisition by a consortium led by Global Infrastructure Partners and EQT. The firm is also pioneering “Powered Land” solutions, including a 20-year PPA with Google for co-located generation in Texas. Its 2025 renewables backlog stood at 12.0 GW.
Clean Max (544717-IN) has grown rapidly in data centers, with contracted capacity for Data and AI customers rising tenfold in two years to 2,380 MW. Key deals include a roughly 900 MW renewable agreement with Meta in India and a 150 MW co-investment with Apple. Its EBITDA run-rate reached ₹1,870 crore in early 2026.
Brookfield Renewable (BEP-US) commissioned over 9 GW of new capacity in the past 12 months and aims for 10 GW per year by 2027. Its Neoen acquisition added 1.5 GW of operating battery storage and a nearly 50 GW development pipeline, making storage its fastest-growing segment.
Most have underperformed the market over the past year, except Clean Max. Given the power-demand outlook, exposure to names such as Clean Max could make sense.
Are we at Peak Gas for Data Centers?
Finally, investors should consider “legacy” data-center power suppliers, especially companies tied to gas turbines. If solar+wind+BESS keeps improving versus gas on LCOE and reliability, the current enthusiasm for turbine makers could fade. This could be especially true if renewables’ ability to close the reliability gap from 95% to 99.9% should improve as battery and solar costs fall and AI-driven load management spreads across utilities.
Unlike BESS and clean-power names, gas turbine makers have sharply outperformed over the past year, though they appear to have lost momentum despite large backlogs. Their recent appreciation could therefore create a short opportunity if renewables+BESS and, later, SMRs begin to displace gas on cost and efficiency. This could be true for companies such as GE Vernova, which is now deriving most of its revenues from selling gas turbines to data centers while still struggling to deliver profits with its wind power division.
Baker Hughes (BKR-US) has repositioned itself from oilfield services toward industrial energy technology. Its NovaLT turbine platform is built for distributed power, allowing data-center operators to bypass grid-connection queues and secure power quickly.
Siemens Energy (ENR-DE) benefits from structural demand in Grid Technologies, driven by the need to connect massive AI loads. Management says gas-turbine pricing remains favorable, with average prices per GW rising by the high teens year-over-year in early 2026 as hyperscalers pay premiums for faster delivery. The company booked nearly €2 billion of data-center-related Grid orders in H1 fiscal 2026.
Transition theme valuations peaked in January 2021 and declined through late 2024, even as the Biden administration enacted the Inflation Reduction Act. That legislation is now effectively defunct. Yet from late 2025, transition themes staged a broad recovery and outperformed most benchmarks despite a White House hostile to the sustainability agenda. The lesson: political headwinds were not the primary risk. Inflation and interest rates were – and they may be again.
Although 5- and 10-year inflation breakeven rates have remained relatively stable, survey-based inflation expectations have been rising. A Federal Reserve potentially more hawkish under Kevin Warsh is now weighing the possibility that its next move is a hike, not a cut. The yield curve confirms the shift: the 2-year Treasury yield has risen nearly 50 basis points over the past six months. For long-duration transition equities, even a modest rise in real yields translates directly into multiple compression, as 2022 demonstrated clearly.
Seven Sub-Themes, Seven Different Rate Exposures
We divide the energy transition into seven sub-themes – Utilities/Regulated Power, Renewables Developers/IPPs, Grid/Power Equipment, Energy Storage, Hydrogen/CCUS/DAC, Clean Transport/EV Supply Chain, and Mining/Critical Minerals – and exclude fossil fuel companies whose revenues remain predominantly hydrocarbon-linked.
While all sectors are typically affected by rising rates, we think that some sectors should demonstrate more resilience than others, given three structural differences from 2022:
- AI-driven electrification has created a durable demand floor for grid equipment and power generators. US data center power demand is projected to reach 35-40 GW by 2030, up from roughly 17 GW in 2022, according to EPRI and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimates. Utilities across PJM, MISO, and ERCOT are already reporting multi-year queues of large-load interconnection requests, translating directly into capital programs for transmission, substation upgrades, and distribution hardening. Unlike 2022, where grid equipment revenues were tied to long-cycle utility planning cycles, the current buildout is being pulled forward by hyperscaler commitments with contracted timelines. This demand signal is largely insensitive to the rate cycle: data center construction does not stop because the 10-year Treasury moves 50 basis points.
- The EV supply chain has matured from a growth story into an operating business. In 2021, EV-related equities were priced on total addressable market projections and adoption curves extending a decade forward – the classic long-duration growth setup that gets punished first in a rising rate environment. By 2026, global EV sales exceed 20 million units annually, and companies across the battery, semiconductor, and drivetrain supply chain are generating meaningful revenue and, in many cases, positive FCF. The valuation anchor has shifted from discounted future optionality to current earnings power, which compresses the effective duration of these names and reduces their mechanical sensitivity to discount rate changes. The risk today is cyclical (volume, pricing pressure, Chinese competition) rather than existential.
- Critical minerals supply deficits are structurally driven and largely rate-insensitive. The copper market faces a supply gap of 4-8 million tonnes by 2030 on most credible forecasts (Wood Mackenzie, BloombergNEF, S&P Global Commodity Insights, see our note “From Transition Play to Arms Race: A Critical Materials Reset”, May 28), driven by mine depletion rates, a decade of underinvestment in new project development, and accelerating demand from grid infrastructure and EV batteries. Unlike demand for renewables equipment, which can be deferred when financing costs rise, the physical copper requirement for a transmission cable or a motor winding does not change with interest rates. New mine supply takes 10-16 years from discovery to production, meaning the structural deficit is largely locked in regardless of the rate environment. Producers with low-cost, long-life assets – Freeport, Glencore, Southern Copper – are therefore in an unusual position where their earnings are supported by supply physics, not by policy or financing conditions.
While investing in these sectors could still make sense at this juncture, we would still avoid investing in the hydrogen and carbon capture themes. These remain subsidy-dependent, commercially unproven, and now face a US policy environment that has removed their primary investment support. Wood Mackenzie’s analysis confirms that nascent energy technologies are disproportionately hurt by higher WACC. Their 2025 rally has made the risk-reward worse, not better.
A Look into Transition-Themed ETFs
The overall transition theme has had a difficult time since 2021. Several transition ETFs saw significant AUM attrition between 2021 and 2024. For sustainability minded investors, looking at their performance since 2021 could make sense for those who would like to see the impact that rising rates may have had on the sustainability complex in 2022-23.
The Recovery Is Real but Unfinished
The past twelve months have produced strong returns across most sub-themes, led by copper miners (COPX) and rare earth metals (REMX). Measured from January 2021, however, most themes have only partially recovered relative to the MSCI World, and hydrogen and EVs remain below their absolute 2021 levels in USD. The derating was deep enough that even a strong rally has not restored the transition complex’s relative standing.
Will the sustainability complex prove more resilient this time?
Comparing FCF yield and P/E ratios for roughly 200 transition stocks (those stocks included in the ETFs listed above) between January 2021 and June 2026 produces a mixed picture. A higher FCF yield today buffers against rate-driven multiple compression; a lower P/E implies less duration sensitivity. Looking at the scatter plot, there is no meaningful cluster in the top-right quadrant – which would have suggested a broad-based improvement on both metrics relative to 2021. Individual names in grid equipment and critical minerals show genuine improvement, but it seems the aggregate transition universe offers little more protection against a rate shock than it did three years ago. In this context, selective positioning, not broad thematic exposure, is the right approach.
Where to Position
Grid and power equipment companies benefit from a structural electrification buildout tied to utility capital programs and data center construction, not to rate-sensitive technology adoption curves. Select critical minerals producers in Western countries (please see last week’s note) are supported by geopolitical supply constraints that are unlikely to be affected by higher interest rates. Furthermore, hydrogen and carbon capture should be avoided, as momentum is likely to fizzle once interest rate risks materialize. Selected renewable utilities with inflation-linked or regulated tariffs offer duration-like income with less WACC exposure than project-finance-dependent IPPs. Our preferred companies are listed in the table below.
Grid/Power Equipment: Atkore (ATKR-US) at 13.8x forward P/E with 5.1% FCF yield and first positive YoY volume growth in several quarters. Emerson Electric (EMR-US) at 19.8x forward with the NI Nigel AI platform entering monetization. Hubbell (HUBB-US), a pure-play T&D name with FY2026 guidance raised to 8-11% sales growth.
Renewable Utilities: Ørsted (ORSTED-DK) is down 36% over the twelve months that ICLN gained 85%, with three offshore wind farms completing in 2026 and EBITDA guided above DKK 28 billion. Acciona Energía (ANE-ES) at roughly 10x EV/EBITDA on 2026 guidance of EUR 1.2 billion, with capacity growing toward 17.6 GW. As both companies have been affected by Trump anti-wind power stance – we think that the trend could revert once Trump’s power starts fading and that the U.S. market restarts building wind power projects. A less risky play could be Verbund (VER-AT), which trades at 14.75x trailing P/E on earnings depressed by a below-average hydro coefficient (0.79 in 2025 vs. a long-run average of 1.00), with normalization expected in 2026.
Energy Transition Minerals: Freeport-McMoRan (FCX-US) with copper at all-time highs near $6.44/lb and Grasberg staged for full production recovery by end-2027. SQM (SQM-US), which is expanding into copper mining in addition to lithium, at 10.3x forward P/E on 2026 consensus revenue growth of 58%, with the Codelco partnership resolving a two-year regulatory overhang which should boost copper production.
Critical minerals have been a core investment theme at Sustainable Market Strategies since our founding in 2018. Throughout this time, our thesis was largely anchored to demand: decarbonizing the global economy would require vast quantities of specific metals and minerals, the supply of which was geographically concentrated and environmentally contentious.
By March 2023 (“Copper in Short Supply“), we added a second demand vector, noting that a 30-50% increase in defense spending over five years would layer additional pressure onto already strained supply chains. By May 2025 (“Critical Minerals, Critical Moves: The Scramble for Rare Earth Metals“), China’s April export restrictions on seven rare earth elements confirmed what the national security framing had long implied: these materials are not just inputs to the energy transition, they are also instruments of statecraft.
Today, the bullish transition material thesis is just as much about major supply constraints as it is about structural demand. In today’s note, we update our investment framework and draw out the implications for what is becoming a critical mineral arms race.
Updating the Demand Thesis
The demand story for critical minerals has bifurcated sharply in recent months, and investors who treat all transition materials as a homogeneous basket are being penalized for it. Five years ago, it was common practice to assign equal weight to copper, nickel, cobalt, lithium and rare earths as beneficiaries of the energy transition. Today, the electrification story, which centers on copper, has strengthened considerably, while the battery chemistry story that underpinned nickel and cobalt has meaningfully weakened. And a third demand pillar, artificial intelligence infrastructure, has emerged as a new and underappreciated source of structural demand for a specific subset of materials.
- Copper: Copper remains the single most durable demand story in the critical minerals universe, and the case has grown stronger since our July 2025 note (“Dig, Squeeze and Recycle: Rewiring the Copper Market“). The IEA’s 2025 Global Critical Minerals Outlook projects copper demand growing 30% by 2040 under a stated-policies scenario, driven by grid expansion, industrial electrification, EV deployment and renewable energy build-out. Each of these vectors is intact. What is new is the AI layer: S&P Global estimates the global call on copper rising from approximately 28 million metric tons per year in 2025 to 42 million metric tons by 2040, with AI data center construction alone projected to account for 2-3% of global copper demand by 2030. We continue to view $5/lb as the long-term floor, but the ceiling is increasingly hard to define.
- Nickel & Cobalt: The nickel and cobalt picture is materially different. As we wrote last week (please see Beyond Lithium: The Next Battery Boom May 21, 2026), new battery technologies require neither nickel nor cobalt. This is not a cyclical headwind but a technology substitution, and it removes a demand vector that the original bull thesis depended on.
- Rare earth elements (REEs): Demand for magnet rare earths is intact thanks to the energy transition (EVs, wind turbines and defense applications). AI infrastructure adds a further dimension: certain REEs, such as indium, are essential for photonic chips used in AI data centers and 6G optical networks.
Supply Moves to Centre Stage
The fundamental supply constraint across critical minerals is not, at its core, a geology problem. Reserves of copper, rare earth elements and most battery metals are not running out in any absolute sense. The problem is a processing problem, and it is one that five years of government rhetoric and twelve months of serious capital deployment have not yet resolved. China’s competitive advantage in critical minerals was built deliberately over three decades, starting with Beijing’s 1990 declaration of rare earths as protected strategic minerals. The result is that China today processes approximately 80-90% of the world’s rare earth elements, handles the bulk of battery-grade graphite and cobalt refining, and is systematically expanding its position in copper processing through negative smelter fees that are squeezing rival operators out of the market.
- Copper: Copper supply faces a distinct set of physical constraints on top of the processing concentration problem. Ore grades have fallen from roughly 3% a century ago to an estimated 0.7% today, meaning that miners must move significantly more rock to produce the same quantity of metal, driving up costs, water use and tailings volumes. New copper mines take on average eighteen years from discovery to production, a timeline too long to close the supply gap. Other solutions, like improving recycling will help but provide only partial solutions.
- Nickel and cobalt: These materials present the inverse of the copper problem; the supply story is not one of scarcity but of concentration in jurisdictions that are either geopolitically challenging or actively managed by state actors. Nickel is in its fourth consecutive year of structural oversupply, driven almost entirely by Indonesia’s rapid expansion of processing capacity (Indonesia now accounts for roughly 60% of global output). Companies like BHP have already taken material write-downs on its nickel assets, underscoring how difficult it is for higher-cost, higher-standard OECD producers to compete with state-subsidized Indonesian expansion. The cobalt picture is closely related; The Democratic Republic of Congo holds the dominant share of global reserves and has been the principal swing producer, but the DRC imposed an eight-month export ban that transitioned into a quota system in 2025.
- REEs: For rare earth elements, the supply story has been defined since April 2025 by Beijing’s export control regime, which has now expanded three times and shows no sign of reverting. According to the IEA, removing China from the global REE supply equation leaves only 42% of non-Chinese demand covered. Processing technology itself is additionally controlled; Beijing guards the separation and metallurgical know-how as closely as the raw material flows, which means that even countries with domestic REE deposits cannot simply build their way out of dependence on a short time frame.
Investment Implications: Updating The Universe
Shifting from an environment whereby demand forecasts largely dominated the investment potential to one where supply becomes a key variable implies significant consequences for investment outcomes. For one, traditional DCF heuristics, such as historical valuations, may no longer be the right tool. For example, the valuation premium accorded to government-backed national champions is not a mispricing; it reflects durable access to floor pricing, equity backstops, and below-market financing.
Within the critical metals universe, copper remains the most straightforward and highest-conviction position and one where the physical case has not changed: mine development lags, declining ore grades, and a projected 30% supply deficit by 2035 create a structural floor under prices that no amount of policy intervention can meaningfully alter within the investment horizon.
The table below highlights our top picks for both copper miners and recyclers.
Meanwhile, the shift away from nickel and cobalt demand related to the energy transition, as well as increasing domination of supply by Indonesia, has likely already been absorbed by the mining majors. At BHP and Glencore, nickel now represents only about 5% of revenues, though the adjustment has not necessarily been smooth. That said, as we saw with battery technology, material inputs to a structural energy transition are not static; prudent strategy requires high conviction and strong analysis to identify which metals – like copper – have staying power.
Finally, our investable universe in rare earth elements is narrow by design. The three names that have defined the non-Chinese REE investment case since our May 2025 note – MP Materials, Lynas Rare Earths and NEO Performance Materials – remain the strongest publicly listed companies with the combination of production scale, government backing and processing capability.
- MP Materials: the U.S. Department of War’s equity stake and the guaranteed ten-year NdPr offtake at $110 per kilogram, roughly $40 above recent spot, effectively de-risks the company (albeit policy risk is elevated – a diplomatic thaw between Washington and Beijing would compress that premium quickly).
- Lynas Rare Earths: offers the most meaningful near-term catalyst. The completion of the Texas heavy rare earth separation facility, built in partnership with the Department of Defense, will for the first time give the Western supply chain a domestic processing node for the elements most critical to defense permanent magnets.
- NEO Performance Materials: carries the cleanest geopolitical profile of the three companies. Its Estonian separation facility sits entirely outside Chinese processing influence, and its smaller scale means that any expansion in the security premium commanded by non-Chinese processors would have an outsized impact on its valuation relative to the market cap base.
That said, there are three more companies in this space worth adding to a watchlist:
- Perpetua Resources (PPTA-US) owns the only significant permitted antimony deposit in the U.S. Antimony – a hardener used in ammunition, a flame retardant in electronics and textiles, and increasingly a component in energy storage – was added to China’s export restriction list at the end of 2024. The U.S. currently has no domestic production, but the DoD signed a non-dilutive funding agreement with Perpetua specifically to accelerate mine development. The company has ESG battles ahead because the proposed mine is located in a pristine Idaho watershed, but is worth monitoring because of its unique potential to supply antimony.
- 5N Plus (VNP-CA) is a Canadian specialty materials producer that refines gallium, germanium, indium, and bismuth – precisely the four materials subject to China’s August 2023 export restrictions on semiconductor manufacturing inputs. The company supplies compound semiconductor manufacturers and is one of very few Western sources of high-purity gallium.
- Energy Fuels (UUUU-US) is best known as a uranium company, but has in parallel developed into the only operating REE processor in the U.S., giving it a unique position as a domestic US REE processing asset at a time when the DoD is spending heavily to onshore this capability. The dual uranium/REE exposure is analytically interesting: the same asset benefits from two separate strategic minerals tailwinds.
The war in Iran has overshadowed some interesting news happening in energy transition: The war’s collateral effect on oil prices has made some recent technological breakthroughs even more relevant than ever. Key winners include players in the global battery sector, as batteries are fast becoming cheaper and more easier to build, which is making grid-level Battery, Energy and Solar Storage (BESS) installations and EVs cheaper by the day.
These technological development are happening mostly in Asia (China, Korea and Japan) – not in the U.S – or in any other Western countries. CATL, the world’s most important battery supplier, announced that it will start mass producing its sodium ion battery in 2026. This will remove several choke points in the battery supply chain – such as the need to source and refine rare materials like lithium, nickel and cobalt, which is not an easy and sometimes not an ethical thing to do (we last wrote about advances in BESS in 2024 “What in store for energy storage“, November 28, 2024). In fact, battery cell prices have seen a fourfold reduction since 2015, which has led to increased adoption in EV and BESS applications.
Furthermore, lower battery prices are making EVs relatively cheaper than ICE-based cars as the growth in EV prices is now lower than that of their ICE equivalents. Reports that EV sales are up massively y/y in North America (see our note “Detroit Goes Into Full Reverse”, Feb 26) and also in the rest of the world due to elevated oil prices should continue to stimulate demand for batteries in the auto sector.
In the BESS space, we also see some demand stimulation coming from data centres. As such, global BESS installed capacity is set to double from 2025 to 2026 – suggesting that batteries are increasingly making their way into grid applications – this should sustain demand for battery cells even further.
A Fast-Moving Technology
The battery technology landscape has moved faster in the past 18 months than in the preceding decade. This rapid evolution is also reflected in the stock prices of pure-play battery manufacturers – which have outperformed the MSCI World this past year by a margin – albeit with much more volatility. After all, this sector is highly levered to tariffs and to geopolitical tensions between China and the U.S., and to Trump’s anti clean energy stance.
While the stock price of most companies in the space outperformed, that of BYD, the vertically-integrated EV and battery producers, has suffered from intensifying competition in China and from compressing prices and profit margins this past year. Looking at technological developments, three of them stand out. First, CATL’s Naxtra sodium-ion battery should enter into production in 2026 at 175 Wh/kg — matching Lithium Iron Phosphate (LFP) on energy density while running on sodium carbonate priced at $0.05/kg versus $15/kg for lithium carbonate, a 300x raw material cost differential – with much less physical and ethical supply chain constraints. Second, Samsung SDI’s SolidStack program has moved from laboratory to automotive qualification samples, with a credible 2027 mass production target for sulfide-based solid-state cells. Third, large-format LFP cells for grid storage have crossed a commercial inflection point: EVE Energy’s 628Ah cell and 6.9 MWh cabinet system are being deployed at utility scale globally, with the company signing over 50 GWh of deals in recent months.
However, like for other emerging technologies – investors would be wise to bet on 2-3 players as opposed to pick and choose a single winner in the space. For this, but also for geopolitical reasons, it would be smart to build a basket comprised of Chinese and Korean pure play battery leaders.
CATL : In our view, CATL’s multi-chemistry platform makes it is the only company in this cohort where technology leadership and earnings momentum are simultaneously present. In that, the stock’s 60% price performance is solid but does not appear too stretched while the HK secondary listing will open the register to a materially wider institutional investor base, which is an incremental demand catalyst. The valuation is not cheap, but it is defensible against earnings.
LG Energy Solutions: Another member of that basket should be LG Energy Solution in Korea, which offers an interesting risk/reward profile. The stock is up +32% over the last year in a context of a strong backlog, a new 46-Series orders in a single quarter, and a clear path from operating loss to profitability as 4695 utilisation ramps.
Samsung SDI : For those wanting to be at the leading edge of tech, then a position into Samsung SDI which is emerging as a key leader in the commercialization of its Solid State battery could make sense. The company 236% 1Y performance is almost entirely sentiment-driven on SolidStack — the company is loss-making, the forward P/E is 175x, and solid-state timelines have slipped industry-wide before.
What Lies Ahead: The Next Wave of Battery Technology
The next five years will be defined by four transitions moving from lab to commercial scale. The nearest-term is LMFP (Lithium Manganese Iron Phosphate) — a modest upgrade to the standard lithium iron phosphate chemistry that boosts energy density ~15–20% with no added cost or supply chain risk, using existing manufacturing lines. Firms like CATL and Gotion are already scaling it; the market is projected to grow from $121M in 2024 to nearly $19B by 2034. After that, silicon anodes — where silicon replaces graphite as the negative electrode, storing significantly more energy per gram — are closer to mainstream electric vehicle adoption than most investors assume. Amprius Technologies (AMPX) already ships commercial cells at >400 Wh/kg, and the cost curve is compressing. Lithium-sulfur is the longer-dated but higher-upside bet – but only private companies operate in that space for now. On the manufacturing side, dry electrode processing —which eliminates the expensive solvent-based steps in cell production — is being commercialised by LG Energy Solutions and Tesla and will structurally reduce per-cell cost across the industry over the next three to four years. Cutting across all of this, artificial intelligence-assisted materials discovery is compressing research and development timelines from years to months, meaning the battery technology roadmap through 2030 will likely include surprises not yet in any analyst’s base case.
The practical implication for investors: favour the platform companies with the manufacturing scale to absorb and commercialise whatever comes next — CATL and LG Energy Solution — while maintaining a small allocation to listed technology bets like Amprius (AMPX) or Samsung SDI where the upside is binary, the prices are high, but the technology is real.
Buildings are responsible for approximately 37% of global energy and process-related CO Of course, heat pumps are an integral solution to reducing building carbon emissions and weaning the global economy off fossil fuels – it shouldn’t be a surprise that European sales jumped in q1 in response to the recent energy price surge. But the opportunity set is broader than just heat pumps.
Investing to solve the 37% carbon challenge in buildings requires dividing the opportunity set into embodied and operational carbon. Embodied carbon refers to the CO₂ emitted during the production of the materials that constitute a building – the cement, the steel, the insulation, the glass – and during construction itself. Operational carbon refers to carbon emissions related to the operation of the building. This includes HVAC (heating and cooling) but also the efficiencies that come from the building envelope itself (windows, insulation, etc). It is this latter category where we see value and the least-crowded positions in sustainable investing.
Operational vs. Embodied Carbon
Buildings emit carbon in two fundamentally distinct ways and on different timescales.
Operational carbon is the CO₂ produced each year by the energy used to run a building – heating, cooling, hot water, lighting, etc. It accounts for approximately 28% of global energy-related emissions. These emissions can be reduced through retrofits – better insulation, more efficient HVAC, smarter controls. In addition, related emissions fall automatically as electricity grids decarbonise: the same heat pump powered by renewables emits a fraction of what it emits on a coal-heavy grid. For the existing building stock – operational carbon is the correct priority, since the retrofit pathway is the only lever available once a building is built.
Embodied carbon is the CO₂ emitted during the production of the materials that constitute a building – the cement, the steel, the insulation, the glass – and during construction itself. It accounts for approximately 9 – 11% of global emissions. Unlike operational carbon, it is locked in at the moment of construction; no subsequent efficiency improvement can undo it.
The key point is that as buildings become more energy-efficient and grids become cleaner, the proportion of a new building’s “lifetime” carbon emissions that comes from embodied carbon rises inexorably. In a code-compliant new build today, embodied carbon already represents 35–40% of lifetime emissions. In a near-zero energy building – the standard that European policy is now mandating for new construction – embodied carbon can represent 40–60% of lifetime climate impact, up from roughly 15–20% in pre-1990 stock. As buildings approach true zero-energy status, that proportion may exceed 60%: the operational problem shrinks as we solve it, but the embodied carbon problem does not.
This creates a two-track investment framework. Track one addresses the existing building stock through retrofit – heat pumps, insulation, glazing, controls, etc., while track two addresses new construction through material innovation – low-carbon cement, green steel, mass timber, specialty construction chemistry. We have addressed the latter in a series of notes and the main public equity players in these industries are well known and have not changed meaningfully (please see for example: ‘Wood’ You ‘Steel’ to Save a Life, May 25, 2022 and
Carbon Protectionism: Winners and Losers under EU’s Carbon Border Plan, July 25, 2024. ). The same can not be said for companies related to operational emissions, where there has been tremendous transformation in the opportunity set.
Not Your Father’s HVAC Company
We have written about HVAC companies extensively over the years, and the core thesis – that companies making buildings more thermally efficient would compound well on both financial and sustainability metrics – has played out favorably.
- Comfort Systems (FIX-US) is the starkest case. We noted in our August 2025 note that FIX had “outsized momentum from its exposure to data centre cooling and modular infrastructure.” That framing was accurate but perhaps understated: by Q1 2026, revenue from technology companies – dominated by data centre mechanical and electrical work – accounted for 56% of FIX’s total revenue, up sharply from previous years. The electrical segment grew 88% year-on-year. The company’s $12.5 billion backlog – more than $5 billion of which was added in the past twelve months – reflects multi-year commitments from tech customers. FIX is now a data centre construction contractor: a mechanical and electrical integrator that benefits from the thermal management demands of AI infrastructure.
- Trane Technologies (TT-US) tells a similar, if more nuanced, story. Bookings in the U.S. – predominantly large commercial chillers and, increasingly, data centre cooling systems – rose 160% year-on-year in Q1 2026. A $10.7 billion record backlog underpins multi-year revenue visibility. Its acquisitions of Stellar Energy (modular data centre chiller plants, targeting $1 billion in revenue within three years from a $350 million base) and LiquidStack (direct-to-chip liquid cooling systems) are explicit bets on the data centre thermal opportunity. Although Trane does retain a meaningful commercial building HVAC exposure (roughly one third of revenue), it’s hardly a pure-play HVAC company.
- Carrier Global (CARR-US) has transformed differently. Rather than following the data centre pull, Carrier has shifted its portfolio by divesting fire, security, and access businesses and acquiring Viessman Climate Solutions to reposition itself as a focused climate solutions company. The 2024 $13 billion purchase of Viessmann made Carrier the most accessible large-cap vehicle for investors seeking European residential heat pump exposure. Along with Viessmann, 13% of Carrier revenues stem from climate solutions in the transport industry (e.g. refrigerated trucking and shipping). That said, Carrier’s data centre cooling revenue has scaled from negligible to over $1 billion, with $1.5 billion guided for 2026 and Q1 orders up more than 500% year-on-year. Carrier today is a bifurcated company with a European residential heat pump operator through Viessmann, an important transportation line, and a growing data centre precision cooling provider.
For investors seeking genuine pure-play heat pump exposure – the most credible listed names are Daikin Industries (6367-JP), whose air conditioning business accounts for approximately 95% of revenue, Ariston Group (ARIS-MI), the Italian residential heating and heat pump specialist whose €2.71 billion revenue is entirely concentrated in thermal comfort products and NIBE Industrier (NIBE.B-SE). NIBE featured strongly in our 2022 and 2023 notes on this theme, and is arguably the purest listed vehicle for European residential heat pump exposure, with its Climate Solutions division accounting for approximately 70% of group revenue.
Pushing The Envelope – The Missing Half of the Retrofit Trade
Perhaps the most persistent gap in the sustainable building investment narrative is the thermal envelope: the walls, roof, floor, and glazing that determine how much energy a building requires to maintain a comfortable temperature. Better insulation means a smaller, cheaper heat pump, lower running costs, and lower emissions. After all, installing a high-performance heat pump in a leaking, poorly insulated building is thermodynamically equivalent to filling a bathtub with the drain open.
The EU’s Energy Performance of Buildings Directive mandates progressive renovation of the worst-performing buildings. The dominant guidance from national retrofit programmes and engineering best practice recommend thermal envelope improvements (insulation, glazing, air-sealing) before mechanical system upgrades (e.g. heat pumps). This ‘fabric first’ principle, makes insulation the logical prerequisite for efficient heat pump installation.
- Rockwool International (ROCK.B-DK) is a leading sustainable insulation company. Stone wool insulation, like that produced by Rockwool is made of basalt rock and recycled industrial slag and is inherently durable, fire-resistant, acoustically effective, and partially circular: it does not degrade, compress, or require replacement over a building’s lifetime. Rockwool revenue reached €3.88 billion in 2025, up 3% organically, with EBIT margins of 14.0% excluding the write-off of its Russian operations in January 2026. The European Commission estimates that over 85% of the EU building stock was built before 2000 and will require significant energy renovation. Rockwool is the direct beneficiary of any policy that mandates thermal envelope improvement before or alongside mechanical system upgrades.
- Owens Corning (OC-US): Since we last wrote about OC, the company has acquired door manufacturer Masonite (in 2024) and repositioned itself as a branded building envelope company spanning roofing, insulation, and doors. S&P Global named it a Top 1% sustainability performer in the building products industry for 2026.
- Saint-Gobain (SGO-FR) is perhaps most comprehensive expression of the thermal envelope theme in a single listed company. Its portfolio encompasses float glass (double and triple glazing), stone wool and glass wool insulation, gypsum board, construction mortars, and SageGlass – the globally leading electrochromic smart glazing technology; the glass dynamically tints to reduce solar heat gain by up to 90%, directly reducing the cooling load on HVAC systems. With approximately €47 billion in annual revenue and exposure to virtually every component of a high-performance building envelope, it can be considered an anchor position that ties the thermal envelope thesis together.
Investors wanting to put capital to work in the sustainable building theme should develop a two-pronged strategy that includes both the thermal envelope and heat pumps since, as described above, these two factors together are what equate to low emissions retrofits. In the chart below, we show the two baskets of the names mentioned above. Equity performance has been disappointing, especially over the past year: these names are tied to the U.S. and European housing cycle, which have both been suppressed by elevated interest rates. Heat pumps sales in particular have been sluggish in the past year after record sales earlier in the decade. However, most recently heat pump sales have once again predictably spiked in reaction to this year’s energy price surge related to the U.S-Israel-Iran war.
Our climate trajectory is now less about what happens if we fail to act and more about how severe are the consequences of the warming already set in motion. Floods, droughts, wildfires, and extreme storms have become present and worsening conditions under which economies, infrastructure, and communities must now operate.
The disconnect between this physical reality and the structure of global capital allocation remains striking: we have noted several times that climate finance has remained overwhelmingly oriented toward mitigation – reducing the emissions that drive further warming – while adaptation, the work of hardening systems against the disruption already underway, continues to attract a fraction of what the scale of the problem demands.
Why is it so difficult to attract capital to climate adaptation solutions? Mainly because it collides with one of the oldest problems in economics: the public goods problem. The benefits of resilient infrastructure – a coastal flood barrier, a drought-resistant water system, an upgraded stormwater network – are largely non-excludable: once built, they protect everyone in the area regardless of whether they contributed to the cost. Private capital cannot capture all of that diffuse value because not all of the beneficiaries will have clean contractual relationships with the investor that built the asset. This is not a market failure that better pricing will fix; it is a structural feature of the asset class that requires public capital to bridge.
A second problem is that climate adaptation investments generate value as avoided costs rather than as positive cash flows. A seawall that prevents hundreds of millions in annual flood damages is enormously valuable but not necessarily as a revenue line for the infrastructure owner. Contrast this with mitigation: a solar farm sells electricity under a long-term power purchase agreement; a carbon capture project generates credits that can be sold on carbon markets. Both produce a monetisable cash flow stream that private capital can underwrite. Adaptation tends to produce the absence of losses that would otherwise have occurred, which is more difficult to price, attribute, and securitise.
Adaption and National Security: Two Sides of the Same Coin
The notion that climate adaptation infrastructure is a public good has strong overlap with national defense. Consider what national security requires: a standing army, a naval fleet, an intelligence apparatus, a cyber defense infrastructure. None of these generate a commercial return and none have a paying customer, and yet no serious observer argues that national defense should therefore go unfunded.
This logic has become more acute in an era of accelerating deglobalization. As we documented in previous notes (for example, please see Shift Happens: From Globalization to Reshoring, August 14 2024), the post-Cold War assumption that global interdependence would provide security through mutual economic dependency is being challenged. As we discussed in A Matter of National Security, November 2, 2022, the war in Ukraine revealed how in Europe, governments that had outsourced their energy security to global markets found themselves exposed in ways that no amount of financial hedging could address. Since then, the national security prerogative has intensified for an ever-expanding list of countries; perhaps most notable is the attention accorded to Mark Carney’s “middle power” speech at Davos earlier this year.
The same lesson now applies to climate resilience; a nation whose water supply is degraded by prolonged drought, whose food production is disrupted by extreme heat, whose coastal infrastructure is periodically overwhelmed by storm surge, or whose power grid fails under unprecedented thermal load is suffering more than just an economic inconvenience, it weakens a nation’s ability to defend itself and to act autonomously.
This is not a new concept: in 2007, the term “threat multiplier” was coined by the U.S. Department of Defense and in 2014, climate change was formally designated as a threat multiplier. The most recent DoD climate adaptation plan covers the 2024 -2027 period (although the current administration dismisses global warming). The Pentagon historically funded these plans because the operational exposure is real and quantifiable. In other words, climate adaptation can now be seen as functionally inseparable from national security – therefore the intellectual case for public capital in adaptation is already settled.
Capital Needs a Counterparty
If climate adaptation – or national security – needs are public goods then it’s no wonder public capital should be involved, just like all previous public goods challenges that have been tackled at scale. The interstate highway system, municipal water and sewage networks, electrical grid buildout, are almost never financed purely by private markets; the return structure of public goods investments requires a counterparty willing to absorb diffuse social benefits.
Earlier this month, we addressed the public-private-partnership (PPP) model Outsourcing the Sovereign: The PPP Bailout, April 23 2026). We argued that PPPs were becoming increasingly necessary because governments around the world simply do not have the fiscal fortitude to undertake major works projects without private participation. The global infrastructure funding gap – the difference between what is being spent and what is needed – is projected to reach $15 trillion by 2040 and simply cannot be closed by the public sector alone.
In the case of climate adaptation infrastructure, the PPP model is especially symbiotic: governments may lack the funds to build the required infrastructure, but the private sector lacks the revenue structure to make the investment viable.
An example where this works well is in Australia. The AquaSure consortium built and operates Victoria’s desalination plant under a formal PPP structure. The plant was designed as a drought-proof water supply for Melbourne and Geelong – a rainfall-independent source that complements reservoir storage during dry periods. Melbourne Water, a government entity, pays AquaSure a fixed fee of A$608 million per year for 27 years regardless of how much water is actually ordered – the government pays for the availability of drought-proof water, not for the water itself. The private sector financed construction, bears operational risk, and maintains the asset; the public sector bears the water demand risk and pays for the public good of water security. The model has been criticized during wet years when the plant sits idle and payments continue but this misses the point; the payment is the insurance premium for drought resilience, not a payment for water delivered.
A second model is to have a dedicated public investment vehicle. The most tempting shortcut for governments facing large public goods funding gaps is to eye the pools of long-term capital already sitting in national pension systems and attempt to redirect it toward national priorities, whether it be climate adaptation, defense, or something else. Several governments have acted on this instinct:
- The UK’s Mansion House Accord (2025) committed 17 major pension providers to allocate a minimum 5% to UK private markets by 2030
- Malaysia’s Prime Minister publicly urged the government-managed retirement savings scheme, known as EPF, to raise domestic holdings to 70% of the portfolio
- Canada eliminated its 30% cap on pension fund investments in Canadian entities (December 2024) and launched a Major Projects Office to fast-track infrastructure approvals for institutional investors
- Australia mandated that its Future Fund explicitly consider energy transition and housing in allocation decisions
- In South Korea, pension funds have been asked to increase their risk exposure by beefing up investments in the country’s junior bourse, KOSDAQ. The problem is that using regulatory or political leverage to steer pension capital toward national priorities conflates two mandates. A pension fund trustee’s legal obligation (fiduciary duty) typically runs exclusively to the beneficiaries – the retirees who depend on the fund. The moment that obligation is diluted by a secondary national interest mandate, beneficiaries who had no say in the political decision bear the risk.
Governments are increasingly building separate, dedicated vehicles with explicitly different mandates, and to invite pension capital into those vehicles as a willing commercial co-investor rather than a conscripted one. For example:
- The UK’s National Wealth Fund explicitly incorporates flood defences and climate-resilient water infrastructure into its investment mandate alongside clean energy.
- Australia’s Clean Energy Finance Corporation has demonstrated over twelve years that this model works at scale, mobilising nearly three dollars of private capital for every public dollar deployed.
- The Canada Growth Fund is fiscally-neutral, managed at arm’s length by PSP Investments, and can use contracts for difference and offtake contracts to absorb certain risks that typically keep private capital on the sidelines.
In each case, pension funds participate as co-investors on commercial terms, attracted by the de-risked deal structures that public anchor capital makes possible.
Global governments have hit a structural fiscal wall. Advanced economies are carrying debt loads that would have been considered a sovereign crisis scenario twenty years ago. Japan has long since departed the realm of conventional fiscal analysis with its 215% debt-to-GDP ratio. Rather than unwinding this burden in the years following the pandemic, governments doubled down with stimulus packages, energy subsidies, and increased defence spending. Now, with interest rates firmly in the “higher for longer” camp, compounding debt service costs is turning this burden into an active crisis.
To make matters worse, governments are currently facing four compounding pressures with no cyclical release valve. Entitlement obligations from an aging population are accelerating against a shrinking tax base, while geopolitical reality has locked in permanent, irreversible defence spending floors. Furthermore, the massive fiscal overhang of the pandemic remains entirely unresolved. Crucially, the era of zero-interest rates that made this leverage manageable has ended. Today, OECD governments spend more on debt service than on defence. In the United States alone, interest payments consumed nearly $1 trillion in 2025. That is money that does not build a single hospital, repair a single bridge, fix a school, or connect a single household to clean water.
Because sovereign balance sheets are now increasingly captured by these legacy obligations, the resulting fiscal deficit is massive. The global infrastructure funding gap – the difference between what is being spent and what is needed – is projected to reach $15 trillion by 2040. The post-war model in which the sovereign state financed, built, and operated public infrastructure is, in most of the world, functionally over.
Private Capital Enters the Chat
When governments cannot write the cheque, they turn to the private sector. This is not a new phenomenon – infrastructure privatization has been happening in waves since the 1980s – but the scale and urgency of the current moment are genuinely without precedent. The fiscal constraint is no longer a temporary condition to be managed through one or two budget cycles; it is a permanent feature of the sovereign landscape.
Private capital can participate in infrastructure through several distinct models, each with a different logic and a materially different risk-return profile.
The PPP model stands out because it is the model that resolves the core problem most directly. The government needs infrastructure it cannot afford to build – and maintain. The private sector gets a long-term contract backed by a sovereign counterparty. Risk is allocated to whoever can best manage it: construction and operational risk to the developer, demand risk either shared or retained by the state depending on the structure.
After a brief COVID-induced pause, global PPP deal flow has accelerated through its previous 2018 ceiling.
The regional breadth of the recovery is telling: Sub-Saharan Africa posted a 133% increase year-on-year, Europe and Central Asia 91%, and Latin America and the Caribbean 36%. In the United States alone, 36 states now have dedicated P3 enabling legislation, up from fewer than 15 a decade ago. The UK’s National Wealth Fund, launched in 2024, has an explicit PPP co-investment mandate. The G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment targets $600 billion in private infrastructure mobilization by 2027. The trend is structural, it is broad-based, and it is accelerating precisely when government balance sheets are least able to offer an alternative.
Beyond the Toll Booth: The New Face of PPPs
The PPP model has existed in modern form since the late 1980s, when developing countries began reversing decades of nationalization. In its early incarnation, it was almost exclusively about economic infrastructure: telecom licenses, power purchase agreements, and toll road concessions. In the World Bank’s PPI database, transport and telecom together accounted for over 60% of all private infrastructure investment through the 1990s.
In the early 2000s, the introduction of the availability payment (AP) model – where governments pay a fixed fee for the private sector to design, build, finance, and operate social infrastructure – opened the doors for PPPs to manage hospitals, schools, prisons, and courthouses.
Post-2010, low-carbon projects in the World Bank PPI database outnumber conventional ones by more than two to one (1,915 low-carbon vs. 815 conventional).
The sector diversification is now visible even in a single market snapshot. In Europe in 2024, education PPPs doubled in project count year-on-year (15 transactions versus 8 in 2023). Italy completed the first sovereign data centre PPP in European history, with €331 million in EIB financing for digital cloud infrastructure serving Italian public administration. The UK closed a €605 million district heating network PPP. The old caricature of PPPs as a motorway financing mechanism for governments that cannot be bothered to collect tolls themselves has been thoroughly overtaken by events.
The SDG Multiplier Effect
For a sustainability-minded investor, the PPP landscape presents an immediate challenge: not all PPP concessions are created equal through an impact lens. A managed toll lane serving commuters in Texas or Melbourne is, without question, a sound investment. The cash flows are contracted, the regulatory framework is mature, and the inflation linkage is explicit. But it would be a stretch to characterize it as SDG-aligned infrastructure. The user is, in most cases, a private motorist with alternatives. The social additionality is limited.
This matters because the case for infrastructure as a sustainable asset class rests on considerably broader foundations. As we documented in our October 2023 note, Inflation-Proofing and SDG-Boosting, research published in Nature Sustainability (Thacker et al.) found that infrastructure either directly or indirectly influences all 17 SDGs, encompassing 121 of the 169 targets – 72% of the entire SDG framework. More pointedly, for five SDGs – SDG 3 (Good Health), SDG 6 (Clean Water), SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities) – every single target is influenced by infrastructure investment.
Infrastructure, in other words, is more than an inflation hedge or a portfolio diversifier. When properly targeted, it is the most direct mechanism available to listed equity investors for deploying capital toward global sustainability commitments. The question is not whether to invest in infrastructure, but which infrastructure.
Toll roads in advanced economies and airports serving leisure tourism in mature markets are excluded from our focus – not because they are poor investments, but because they do not represent the category of infrastructure where the PPP growth wave is most pronounced, nor where the impact additionality is most compelling. Our attention is concentrated on operators and developers whose PPP concession pipelines are anchored in social infrastructure (healthcare, public transit, sanitation, water access) and environmental infrastructure (clean energy, waste treatment).
First Responders to the Infrastructure Deficit
The five operators and developers we favour share three characteristics that distinguish them from the broader infrastructure universe: their revenues flow predominantly from government counterparties under long-term concession or availability-payment structures; their pipelines are expanding, not managing decline; and their assets serve populations where private capital is genuinely additional – not merely convenient.
Acciona (ANA-ES) is the most diversified single expression of this thesis. Its Pernambuco water and sanitation concession – €2.38 billion, 35 years, seven million people in one of Brazil’s poorest states – is the largest SDG 6 PPP transaction closed by any listed company in 2025, and it sits alongside São Paulo Metro Line 6, renewable energy transmission concessions in Peru and Australia, and an active bid pipeline in US managed lanes. Acciona’s EBITDA from concessions grew 103% in FY2025. The market continues to price it as a construction company. Veolia (VIE-FR) completes the environmental picture on the water side: as the world’s largest operator of municipal water systems under delegated public service contracts, it holds the most geographically diversified portfolio of government-backed water PPP revenues available in listed equity markets, spanning France, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.
Sacyr (SCYR-ES) occupies the social infrastructure end of the spectrum that most sustainable infrastructure portfolios systematically miss. Hospital PPPs – availability-based, long-duration, government-backed – are structurally identical to road concessions in their cash flow profile but carry materially stronger SDG 3 alignment. Sacyr has been winning them consistently across Spain, Chile, and Colombia while simultaneously developing water treatment PPPs and bidding US managed lane concessions. Ten new concession wins in 2024–25 across five countries. It is the most prolific listed PPP developer by contract count, in an investment category that most European fund managers have never analyzed.
In Brazil, Motiva (MOTV3-BR) brings urban mobility into the mix. Beyond its four major highway concession wins in 2024–25, Motiva operates São Paulo’s Metro Line 4, the Salvador metro, and multiple BRT corridors – giving it genuine SDG 11 exposure in Brazil’s most underserved urban centres, in a market where the federal government’s R$1.7 trillion infrastructure programme is generating the deepest PPP deal flow of any emerging economy.
Finally, Mota-Engil (EGL-PT) occupies territory no other listed operator will enter: road concessions in Angola and Mozambique, the Lobito Corridor railway maintenance agreement running to 2054, and the operating contract for Luanda’s new international airport. Africa’s infrastructure deficit is the largest in the world. Mota-Engil is, for now, one of the few listed companies being paid to close it.
The EBITDA margin column deserves careful reading. Motiva at 46% reflects a fully concession-derived business: government-contracted revenues, limited variable costs, predictable cash generation. Sacyr at 27% carries a residual construction division that blends the number down, though 93% of its EBITDA originates from concession assets. Acciona and Veolia, both near 15%, operate larger services and construction platforms alongside their concession portfolios.
The group trades between 5.1x and 8.4x EV/EBITDA, which is modest given the contractual duration and government-backed nature of the revenues. Mota-Engil at 5.1x carries a construction multiple, not a concession one. The Lobito corridor, the Luanda airport, and the Santos-Guarujá tunnel generate no visible premium in the current price. Whether that gap closes as concession EBITDA matures is the core of the investment thesis.
Dividends are a hallmark of infrastructure investing, and two distinct approaches appear in this table. Veolia’s 4.3% yield reflects a mature portfolio of long-term municipal service contracts generating stable, predictable cash flows that management is comfortable distributing. Acciona’s 1.9% reflects a deliberate choice to retain capital: with Pernambuco, Metro Line 6, and a €301bn project pipeline actively consuming investment, the priority is deployment over distribution. Both are rational strategies given where each company sits in its concession development cycle.
Acciona has returned roughly 120% over the two-year period shown, against 40% for the MSCI World and mid-single-digit returns for Veolia and Mota-Engil. Acciona’s re-rating reflects the market finally pricing diversified concession pipelines correctly. Sacyr’s recent upward break suggests this recognition is spreading.
On March 4, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz closed. Within days, Brent crude crossed $120 per barrel. By March 31st, oil prices had registered one of the steepest monthly gains on record. Against this backdrop, energy stocks posted their best-ever quarterly performance in Q1.
What is less appreciated is that the most direct beneficiaries of a sustained Brent around $100 are not the oil majors. Rather, it is the companies that produce liquid fuels that compete, molecule-for-molecule, against petroleum products at the pump – i.e., biofuel producers. As a result, many investors are starting to look again to alternative fuels as a potential way to diversify their portfolios out of fossil fuels in an increasingly unstable world.
After all, the world is already witnessing shortages in diesel and jet fuel – for which biofuel alternatives can be created using vegetable sources. Renewable diesel, biodiesel, Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF), and bioethanol are typically priced as a spread to their petroleum equivalents: Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel (ULSD), jet fuel, and gasoline respectively. Hence, every dollar Brent holds above its pre-war baseline widens that spread, which favors biofuels over their fossil equivalents.
One caveat to the table above is that current geopolitical tensions are also putting pressure on fertilizer prices – especially urea and nitrogen, which are key inputs in ethanol-based biofuels, representing approximately 59 percent of the energy generated from biofuels. One-third of global fertilizer transits through the Strait of Hormuz, and the resulting supply disruption is one reason fertilizer company stocks have surged in the past month.
A second caveat: while biofuels such as ethanol can be seen as a less damaging source of energy compared to fossil fuels, they still put pressure on the food system by consuming both land and fertilizer. The food-fuel trade-off is material double-sided risk: first-generation biofuels divert cropland and fertilizer from food production at precisely the moment food prices are surging, and governments that over-extend biofuel mandates risk a political backlash that could reverse the very policies underpinning these companies’ margins.
Biofuels Are Politically Smart
Subsidizing biofuels remains a politically savvy move even for a pro-fossil-fuel Trump administration, delivering tangible mid-term wins such as locking in farm-state loyalty through sustained demand for corn ethanol and soy biodiesel – key to holding the Midwest in the 2026 midterms and beyond. It positions Trump as delivering on “America First” energy by blending more domestic biofuels to shave a few cents off pump prices, shielding consumers from import shocks while boosting rural jobs. We believe that support for the sector in the U.S. – but also in the EU and Brazil – will increase in the coming months, acting as an additional tailwind.
What makes the U.S. economics particularly compelling is that rising oil prices are layered on top of a policy incentive stack that operates independently of the Brent price. There are three distinct credit streams:
- RINs (Renewable Identification Numbers): Under the EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standard, fuel blenders must purchase credits from biofuel producers to meet mandated volumes. D4 RINs – the category covering renewable diesel and biodiesel – currently trade at approximately $1.00–1.60 per credit, adding roughly $0.35–0.55 per gallon to producer margins.
- LCFS (Low Carbon Fuel Standard): California rewards fuels with low carbon intensity with tradeable credits. These currently range from $50–80 per tonne of CO₂ avoided, worth $0.20–0.50 per gallon for the lowest-carbon fuels such as used cooking oil (UCO)-based renewable diesel.
- 45Z Clean Fuel Production Credit (IRA, effective January 2025 through 2027 with potential extensions): This new federal credit provides up to $0.35/gallon for sustainable aviation fuel and $0.20/gallon for ground transportation fuels at base rates – rising to $1.75/gallon for SAF and $1.00/gallon for other fuels for producers meeting prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements. The credit scales with carbon intensity, so the cleanest producers capture the most.
Together, these three layers can add $1.00–2.00 per gallon to margins for best-in-class producers – a structural floor that holds even if crude retreats from its current elevated levels. This is the real economic story behind the sector’s re-rating.
The list of investable (>$1B market cap) companies in the biofuel space remains limited. Neste is one of the largest suppliers of SAF in the world, though it also runs a profitable downstream oil business. Darling Ingredients supplies the waste greases and fats that are refined into fuel by other players. Smaller emerging-market pure plays like Sao Martinho offer direct exposure to the Brazilian biofuel market.
Biofuel names have silently outperformed the broader market by a substantial margin over the past year. That said, recent outperformance should be interpreted in light of the fact that the valuation of the whole sector had collapsed in 2022 alongside much of the broader “ESG complex.”
Higher feedstock costs and regulatory shifts are nonetheless creating a stark divide between more established, diversified players and emerging pure plays.
Neste: Shares remain supported despite leverage concerns, as investors focus on Neste’s SAF refinery expansion in Rotterdam. Recent news flow keeps the narrative centered on future capacity and policy-driven demand, outweighing near-term balance sheet risks.
Darling Ingredients: The stock rally reflects strong momentum driven by tight feedstock supply and robust renewable diesel margins. The key engine here is the Diamond Green Diesel (DGD) joint venture with Valero Energy – one of the world’s largest renewable diesel facilities, with capacity of approximately 1.2 billion gallons per year. Valero’s downstream distribution network and refining infrastructure give DGD a structural advantage in capturing the full RIN and LCFS credit stack, while the JV structure limits Darling’s capital exposure and maximizes its leverage as the feedstock-supply partner.
Verbio SE: Recovery is underway, but price action is capped by execution risks at new U.S. biofuel plants. Markets are reacting to delays and ramp-up costs, keeping sentiment cautious despite improving cash flow and higher biodiesel prices.
Borregaard: Less tied to fuel markets, Borregaard trades as a defensive bio-based chemicals play. Its limited exposure to volatile biofuel margins explains its stable valuation relative to more cyclical peers.
REX American Resources: Outperformance is driven by carbon capture and ethanol-linked tax credits (45Q). News on project progress is shifting the story from ethanol margins to policy-backed, high-margin decarbonization revenue.
Sao Martinho: Benefiting from strong Brazilian ethanol prices and corn ethanol expansion, with supportive domestic policy. The stock remains inexpensive relative to peers despite solid growth, partly reflecting commodity exposure and BRL currency risk.
Green Plains: Still lagging due to weak ethanol margins and declining revenues, but early traction in high-protein feed (a biofuel co-product) is improving sentiment. Best viewed as a turnaround story within the ethanol segment.
Investment Conviction Hierarchy
Not all names in this sector deserve equal treatment at current prices. Our preference ranking, based on risk-adjusted exposure to the thesis:
Highest conviction – Darling Ingredients (DAR-US). The DGD/Valero JV gives Darling the best combination of scale, waste-based feedstock advantage (animal fats, UCO), and U.S. policy credit capture in the peer group. UCO-based feedstocks generate the lowest carbon intensity scores, maximizing 45Z and LCFS credit capture simultaneously.
High conviction – Sao Martinho (SMTO3-BR). The cheapest name in the peer group, with Brazilian ethanol prices at multi-year highs and RenovaBio CBIO credits providing an additional domestic income layer. Less exposed to any single regulatory regime than U.S. or EU peers, with domestic consumption growth providing a demand floor.
Selective – Neste (NESTE-FI). The undisputed global quality compounder in renewable fuels, but the current valuation already prices in much of the upside. The Rotterdam SAF expansion is the critical catalyst to watch; confirmation of an on-schedule ramp-up would resolve the leverage overhang.
Avoid near-term – Green Plains (GPRE-US). Corn ethanol margins remain structurally compressed, and the high-protein feed pivot is not yet sufficient to rerate the stock.
The U.S.-Israel war with Iran has already exacted a massive humanitarian and environmental toll. One can only hope for a swift end to the madness but even if that should occur, the impact on energy markets will be permanent and akin to the aftermath from Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Sustainability investors rarely have direct portfolio exposure to fossil fuels but are always indirectly affected by them. Today’s Macro Meets Sustainability Update addresses key questions on oil markets and what it means for energy transition investments.
1. Fossil Fuels and The Cost of Capital
One of the major differences between fossil fuel and transition energy investments (solar, wind, among others) investments is their sensitivity to the cost of capital: renewable energy projects require large upfront capital and generate stable cash flows over decades, making their economics highly sensitive to interest rates. In contrast, fossil fuel projects have a larger share of costs tied to ongoing fuel expenses and generate more near-term, commodity-driven cash flows, so their value depends less on financing conditions. As a result, changes in the cost of capital have a much bigger impact on renewables than on oil and gas investments.
Why this matters during an oil spike is that depending on central banks’ reaction function, renewable energy prospects will improve or deteriorate.
Historically, central banks view short oil price spikes as a tax on growth, while prolonged rises in oil prices are expected to be inflationary. This means that policy rates, on the margin, go down to “accommodate” the oil price spike when it is a short-term supply shock and go up to dampen in the inflationary effect when prices are expected to be longer lasting.
Recall that during the COVID-19 pandemic, many central bankers initially described the surge in inflation as “transitory”, expecting it to be temporary due to pandemic-related supply chain disruptions. However, many regretted the forecast as inflation persisted – and jumped again- during the early months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Today the Governor of the Bank of Canada described the potential for inflation related to the oil price as transitory, a word we wonder if central bankers will again express regret for choosing. It is unclear how long the current oil price surge will last, but pundits are betting toward a long supply crunch. Earlier this week, the head of the International Energy Agency noted that at least forty energy assets across nine countries in the Middle East have been “severely or very severely” damaged since the Iran war began. In Qatar, the damaged liquefied natural gas processing facilities – considered the world’s largest supplier of seaborne gas cargo – is estimated to take three to five years to repair.
At last week’s meeting the U.S. Fed began backtracking on interest rate cuts; rates were left unchanged at the meeting, as was widely expected, and expectations for future rate cuts have been curtailed. Notably, the FOMC members slightly upgraded U.S. economic growth prospects, albeit not by as much as the upward rating to inflation (expected to stay well above the Fed’s 2% target until 2028).
The reaction in renewable energy stocks’ performance to the news was hardly distinguishable from the broader market; both the Clean Energy ETF (ICLN-US) and S&P 500 both sold off on Powell’s speech that outlined a likely delay in rate accommodation. We chalk this up to low confidence; the rate outlook has been messy for some time and recall that last September, we described how the FOMC members are deviating from the conventional central bank’s playbook by cutting rates and simultaneously upgrading the economic outlook and increasing its expectations for inflation to well over 2%.
Our long-held view (for example, please see August 23, 2023 SAA and Climate Change) is that the global economy is ripe for higher structural inflation and most economies are at or near full-employment; it wouldn’t take much for cyclical inflation pressures to be renewed. In this sense, we believe the risks are tilted to higher inflation – interest rates will, on the margin, be a headwind for renewable energy stocks.
2. Renewables and the Energy Security Tailwind
A somewhat more difficult factor to quantify, albeit equally significant for renewables investments, is whether geopolitics today is destroying demand for fossil fuels longer term and favoring a more aggressive switch to renewables.
Until 2022, the concept of energy security was primarily discussed as a priority for emerging economies. But the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China’s limiting of critical materials in response to Trump tariffs, and the U.S.’ hostile involvement in Venezuela have forced most nations to recalculate their appetite for reliance on foreign energy. Solar, wind, geothermal and even nuclear share an advantage over fossil fuels; once the infrastructure is built, it becomes a long-life domestic asset that is far less dependent on global trading systems.
In the most recent World Energy Outlook (2025), the EIA addressed the uptick in energy security as a priority across nations, but concluded that countries are reaching for very different levers to achieve it: many fuel-importing nations are leaning toward renewables and efficiency as solutions, while other countries are simply focusing more on ensuring ample supplies of traditional fuels.
The IEA notes that tracking the diversification of manufacturing capacity of five key clean energy technologies – batteries, heat pumps, electrolysers, solar PV, wind power and EVs – is an important indicator of energy security. Note in the chart below, we show that the installed manufacturing capacity of these technologies is highly geographically concentrated, notably in China. In 2024, China accounted for over 80% of installed manufacturing capacity in every part of the solar PV value chain, and the majority of global manufacturing capacity for wind power components as well. The position of China in battery manufacturing is even stronger, accounting for at least 85% of global production in all parts of the value chain, and over 95% in the case of battery anodes. Manufacturing capacity is more diversified in the case of heat pumps and electrolysers for hydrogen production.
China stands out not least of all because the country dominates supply of the key materials needed for manufacturing of clean energy technology. In this context, it is logical to expect a doubling down in clean energy efforts from China (a country relatively poor in fossil fuel resources but relatively rich in renewable energy inputs). Conversely, now that climate change objectives are no longer relevant in the U.S., the path of least resistance may be to pursue energy security by further levering domestic fossil fuel resources in that country.
We view China and the U.S. as pursuing two opposite paths to energy independence based on their energy resources (fossil fuel vs renewables). Other countries less endowed will necessarily take some middle road, i.e. diversification both among energy trading partners and energy sources. A case in point is India’s pivot to nuclear energy: last year, the government set a goal to develop 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 from approximately 9 GW today and has allocated $2.3 billion for research and development. Earlier this month, the government signed a signed a $2.6 billion deal with Cameco to ensure sufficient uranium supply for the next nine years.
Overall, renewed pressure to improve domestic energy security means a greater pivot to renewables for some nations and will benefit suppliers of renewable energy equipment, though this is unlikely to be a uniform strategy and significantly depends on domestic energy assets available.
Few moments may feel less “sustainable” than a Trump-led government waging a war in the Middle East. Most people will agree that Trump’s second stint in the White House has been remarkably controversial — though perhaps not for the reasons one might expect. The U.S. president has rolled back major environmental policies, ignited a conflict without clearly communicating the strategic objective, and unleashed AI technologies without giving too much thought to its societal consequences. Yet, in a twist reminiscent of the early 2020s, Trump is now indirectly fueling an uptrend in equity prices of many companies that fit squarely within sustainability portfolios.
After a strong run in the early 2020s, sustainability had become a fatigued investment theme between 2022 and 2025, with a few exceptions, such as nuclear energy and grid plays. Whereas the pre-2022 wave of enthusiasm centered on EVs strongly participating in the energy transition (witness the run-up in stock prices like Tesla and ChargePoint) and themes such as plant‑based food (Beyond Meat, Oatly), this new cycle is being driven by transition-oriented segments such as solar, grid infrastructure, batteries, and transition materials.
With the exception of food sustainability, most SMS environmental themes have outperformed the MSCI World ACWI since April 2, 2025 — the day Trump announced that his economic agenda would once again unleash the U.S’. “animal spirits”.
A look at the composition of these themes shows that they are mostly tilted toward industrials and transition plays, explaining their resilience in the current environment -whereby a rotation away from AI and tech appears underway.
In this context, our alternative energy theme (top ten equal-weighted companies per SMS theme average) has performed strongly – but certain names appear expensive, especially as grid and AI-related investments have dominated investor attention over the past year. Looking at materials in particular, the AI and Grid themes have pushed multiples of companies producing copper and nickel to record levels.
A Look at SMS’ Resilient ‘Nuggets’
Looking at SMS’ long universe of 500+ investable names out of the MSCI World Index, we find a few interesting plays which have derated perhaps a bit too much considering their fundamentals amid current technological and economic tailwinds. What’s more, these names remain on the margin of the AI trade – i.e. they’ve either somewhat already derated because of the software-to-AI rotation and remain relatively immune from a further markdown in AI-related plays.
LKQ — One of the world’s largest automotive recyclers. LKQ’s industry‑leading car‑part sorting technology should help consumers extend the life of their vehicles, particularly in an environment of elevated fuel and car prices amid persistent inflation. The stock is trading near recent lows, offering attractive upside potential.
Autodesk — Despite suffering from a rotation away from software toward AI, Autodesk remains deeply embedded in engineering workflows. While AI will without a doubt reshape its business, it will more likely be integrated into existing processes than replace them. Autodesk offers a compelling entry point, supported by strong ROE and a growing water‑efficiency business — increasingly valuable in a world where water assets are becoming scarce and pricier.
Kepco Electric — Korea’s main electric utility. The country remains a major industrial hub and stands to benefit from its renewed alignment with the U.S. Like other Korean equities, Kepco trades at a low P/E despite a stable economic backdrop and global momentum behind nuclear power – including from sustainability-minded investors who now consider nuclear as a sustainable power source.
WSP — The world’s largest engineering. As Europe, the U.S., and Canada strengthen their push for a more resilient economic foundation, WSP is well positioned to play a central role.
Alstom — The global leader in rail solutions. Alstom stands to benefit from its sizable backlog and the growing need to refurbish and expand rail infrastructure worldwide.
LG Energy Solutions — A key battery supplier to major automakers. The slowdown in U.S. EV manufacturing appears mostly priced in. Elevated energy prices should support the broader EV ecosystem, where sentiment has turned excessively negative. LG Energy Solutions also benefits from the expansion of its energy‑storage division.
Sustainability shifting toward the “Resiliency Trade”
Finally, a notable feature of Trump’s second term is the shift from the early‑2020s sustainability narrative to one centered on resiliency. Many companies and investors have adjusted their framing accordingly, often without altering their actual strategies. Aside from a few U.S. automakers withdrawing from EV development — at a time when gas prices have reached five‑year highs (see our February 26 note, Detroit Goes Into Full Reverse) — SMS themes have largely stayed true to their underlying objectives despite this new investment regime.
In reality, resiliency is not so different from sustainability. It refers to an organization’s ability to withstand shocks, adapt to structural change, and preserve long‑term value creation. For investors, this spans several dimensions:
- Climate resilience (managing physical and transition risks),
- Operational resilience (diversified and robust supply chains),
- Financial resilience (sound balance sheets and stable cash flows),
- Governance and social resilience (strong leadership, stakeholder alignment, and risk oversight).
Markets are increasingly rewarding companies capable of navigating environmental, regulatory, and economic disruptions while capitalizing on innovation and the transition to a low‑carbon economy. As such, resiliency is not merely a defensive trait — it is becoming a driver of durable returns and downside risk mitigation. This dynamic explains why the Industrials and Materials sectors align well with the sustainability–resilience nexus.
As an example of how this also translates into the political sphere, energy efficiency is being promoted as a nation-building priority in countries like Canada. Many other countries are reviving energy-saving policies that were enacted during the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In Asia, work from home policies are increasingly promoted as one way to save fuel. So it seems that resiliency is the new yet less politically loaded word for sustainability.