Sustainability-oriented equity mandates have spent a decade building around a practical constraint: ESG data for small cap companies is less available and less reliable than its large cap counterparts. Third-party ratings agencies often concentrate their analytical resources on large caps, where disclosure is richer and the revenue-per-company economics make coverage worthwhile. The consequence has been a structural underweight in small caps across ESG portfolios that is a data artifact rather than a deliberate investment judgment.

Over the twelve months ending June 30, 2026, that underweight cost money. The Russell 2000 returned 40% and in the first half of 2026 alone, the Russell 2000 outperformed the S&P 500 by more than 12 percentage points, its best start to a year since 1991.

The deeper issue for sustainability mandates is that low scores and missing scores are treated as equivalent signals of ESG risk, when in most cases they reflect nothing more than the disclosure practices of a company with less staff dedicated to the investor relations function.

We propose a different entry point: rather than relying on ratings coverage that does not exist, we identify small cap companies where observable, verifiable sustainability events have recently occurred or are imminent – first ESG reports, CDP initiation, SBTi validation, board-level governance upgrades, etc. These triggers do not require proprietary data infrastructure. They require reading company filings, sustainability reports, and proxy statements, which is what active small cap managers already do. The re-rating that follows is systematic and documented: research published in 2025 found that MSCI ESG rating changes drive abnormal returns over multiple months after the change, with institutional investor repositioning as the primary transmission mechanism.

The implication is actionable: in small caps, identify the companies that are publishing the required data and own them before the agencies react.

 

The Investment Thesis

When a company improves its sustainability posture in a material, verifiable way, the re-rating tends to follow a predictable sequence. First, the company appears in sustainability-focused screening databases (MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, ISS) with an upgraded score. This typically takes 12 to 24 months from the triggering event. Second, institutional mandates with ESG minimum screens begin to include the name in their eligible universe, generating incremental demand that is largely independent of traditional fundamental catalysts. Third, coverage by sustainability-focused analysts follows, compounding the effect.

Companies know that improving their sustainability posture is good for their stock price; the survey results showed in the chart below highlight that companies believe the main opportunities related to ESG ratings are acquiring and retaining interest in their stock.

It is logical that the re-rating premium would be amplified in small caps relative to large caps because the starting ownership base is dominated by generalist managers who have not priced sustainability improvement into their valuation. There are some practical signals that investors can track to anticipate a re-rating:

Where to Look

The most fertile ground for the improvers investment thesis sits in sectors where SASB-defined material sustainability topics are operationally manageable at scale for a small company, but where disclosure has historically been minimal. Industrial services, specialty chemicals, and building products are all areas where energy intensity, waste management, and worker health and safety are financially material (under SASB) and operationally addressable without the capital requirements that make transition difficult. A small industrial company that installs remote energy monitoring across its facilities, reduces its recordable incident rate, and publishes a first SASB-aligned sustainability report is doing all three things at once – and doing them in a way that is both financially rational and likely to trigger a meaningful ESG re-rating within two years.

The Counter-Argument

A skeptic may point to three things that undermine the arguments above:

These are real risks, but they can be mitigated by concentrating on companies whose underlying operational improvements are genuine and financially material, rather than those pursuing disclosure as a cosmetic exercise. For example, an emissions intensity trend that tracks with capital investment in energy efficiency is credible, while an emissions intensity trend that appears only in the sustainability report – without corresponding capex – is not.

Investment Implications

For small cap equity managers, a systematic scan for the leading indicators listed above (sustainability report publication, CDP participation, SBTi commitment, and board changes) applied across the portfolio universe can generates a watchlist of names likely to re-rate within 24 months.

In the section below, we highlight companies that qualify for a “sustainability re-rating” based on the criteria identified above.

 

Small Cap Sustainability Improvers Ripe for Re-Rating

  1. Onterris Inc (ONT-US)

Market cap: $750M | SASB sector: Waste Management / Environmental Services

Onterris, an environmental and engineering consulting firm, had its near-term SBTi target and long-term net-zero target formally validated by the Science Based Targets initiative in early 2025. SBTi validation is arguably the most credible sustainability event a company can execute. Ratings agencies like MSCI operate on annual review cycles, meaning a company that validates SBTi targets today is unlikely to see a formal rating upgrade until the next scheduled assessment, usually annually.

Onterris has published annual SASB-aligned sustainability reports for three consecutive years and participates in CDP. Revenue approached $900M in 2025 and 2026 guidance is above that level. The business is growing into the disclosure infrastructure rather than shrinking, which gives the rating upgrade a durable foundation.

It is also worth noting that until recently, the company operated under the name Montrose Environmental Group, but rebranded as Onterris in April 2026. Corporate identity resets of this kind often precede a broader ESG narrative refresh and tend to attract new analyst attention. 

  1. Dexterra Group (DXT-CA)

Market cap: CAD $880M | SASB sector: Professional & Commercial Services / Industrial Support Services

Dexterra provides supports services for the creation, management and operation of infrastructure. The company published its first-ever comprehensive, GRI-aligned sustainability report in March 2025, including a quantified Scope 1 and Scope 2 baseline following the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard. Prior reports were informal communications without a quantified emissions baseline.. Importantly, the business is financially robust: Q1 2026 revenue grew 15% year on year, and earnings beat estimates by approximately 40%. This removes the risk that sustainability commitments get deprioritized because of financial stress.

  1. John B. Sanfilippo & Son (JBSS-US)

Market cap: ~$990M | SASB sector: Processed Food

JBSS, a leading American processor of tree nuts and related snacks, has quietly built one of the more comprehensive environmental disclosure programs among U.S. food small caps without having published a formal consolidated sustainability report. The company participates in CDP across all three disclosure streams simultaneously (climate change, water security, and forests), which is rare at this market cap. The company discloses scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. In fiscal year 2025, total emissions intensity declined 8.3%. The company updated its Environmental Policy in May 2024, conducts water risk analysis using WRI’s Aqueduct Atlas across all six production facilities, and holds Energy Star Partner of the Year recognition. It reached 89.5% recyclable packaging by weight. SASB material topics for processed food (energy, water management, packaging waste, food safety) are each being actively addressed. The re-rating catalyst here is specific: MSCI and Sustainalytics currently rate JBSS without a published PDF sustainability report to anchor on, meaning the quantitative data sitting on its website is likely being partially discounted or missed. Publication of a first formal consolidated report would immediately elevate the company’s data quality score.

  1. Ag Growth International (AFN-CA)

Market cap: CAD $450M | SASB sector: Industrial Machinery & Goods

AGI makes grain handling, aeration, and storage equipment, placing it in a sustainability-adjacent commercial position (food security infrastructure) that creates natural demand for ESG transparency. Their 2024 Sustainability Report, released in June 2025, was the first to include a SASB Index and a standalone TCFD-aligned supplemental disclosure, neither of which appeared in the 2023 report. This is a meaningful escalation from narrative-only sustainability communication to framework-indexed disclosure, which is exactly what most ratings agencies require to move from qualitative to quantitative scoring. The Board operates a Governance and Sustainability Committee. On the quantitative side, AGI set a target in 2023 to reduce Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions intensity by 25% by 2030 against a 2021 baseline; in 2024, it had already achieved a 16% reduction, keeping the trajectory on track. Safety performance improved sharply: lost-time incident rate down 46% and total recordable incident rate down 49% year on year, both SASB material metrics for this sector.

It is important to note that the names highlighted here are cited uniquely based on an expectation that financial market participants will latently give credit to their sustainability efforts; For example, AGI carries a highly leveraged balance sheet and has been under financial stress from agricultural equipment cycle headwinds: the sustainability re-rating is an independent catalyst, but the equity thesis depends on stabilization of the underlying business.

In the table below, we summarize the main sustainability re-rating triggers for the aforementioned companies, plus six more that we believe could benefit from the same dynamic.

The sustainable investment industry has spent two years debating whether defence is a sustainable investment. That is the wrong question. Whether Rheinmetall qualifies for an Article 9 fund misses what actually matters: whether investors have the analytical tools to hold defence companies to account for what they make, who their customers are, and what happens when their products reach the battlefield. Responsibility, rather than sustainability, is the appropriate standard, and it is a more demanding one than any taxonomy classification.

Data published this month records 65 active armed conflicts in 2025, the highest count since records began in 1946, with 244,600 people killed in organised violence, the second deadliest total since the Rwanda genocide in 1994. Eight of those conflicts are interstate wars, the most since World War II.  

As a logical consequence, world military expenditure reached $2.8 trillion in 2025, up 41% since 2015, with forecasts pointing to $6.6 trillion by 2035. Europe’s ReArm Europe plan commits €800 billion; the United Kingdom has pledged 5% of GDP in defence spending by 2035. The capital flows are real, growing, and unlikely to reverse whether or not an Article 9 fund knows what to call them.

This note builds on the SMS framework introduced in our March 2025 note “The European Defense Offensive: From Peace Dividend to War Premium”, which identified five screening criteria (Controversial Weapons Exclusions, Allied Revenue Alignment, Government Independence, R&D Investment, and Strategic Defence Orientation) and a cohort of European specialists we termed the second wave.

Between July 2022 and the publication of our March 2025 European Defence Offensive, the SMS European Defence Specialists Basket delivered approximately 550% in total return. That performance continued for some time but has corrected heavily since the February 2026 peak. Over the fifteen months since publication, the basket, the S&P 500, and the American Defence Primes delivered 28%, 27%, and 25% respectively – effectively the same trade. The valuation re-rating of underowned European specialists as defence budgets re-accelerated is complete. The entry point that defined the first and second waves is gone.

The chart above is the investment case for this note: the opportunity that justified the first note has closed, and a new one has opened. What follows is where the next leg of returns will come from.

 

Red Lines That No Longer Hold

There was a time when a blanket defence exclusion was defensible. The sector consisted predominantly of identifiable end-products: tanks, artillery, fighter jets, submarines. Revenue streams were opaque but outputs were not. An investor that decided it did not want to own defence companies could draw a clean line around the category and walk away without much analytical strain.

That is no longer the case. The reason is dual-use, a property that once described finished technology products but now runs the entire length of the value chain, from raw materials to drones.

Upstream, the rare earth elements that power an EV motor, a wind turbine, or a smartphone are chemically identical to those in a drone motor, a missile guidance system, or an electronic warfare suite. Neodymium is neodymium. MP Materials (MP-US) is the only integrated rare earth mine and mill in the United States, indispensable to the domestic clean energy supply chain AND is simultaneously supplying the Pentagon under a ten-year offtake agreement backed by $400 million in government investment. An exclusionary policy that excludes MP Materials while retaining clean energy exposure would apply different standards to identical atoms depending on who writes the purchase order. Some investors will make that choice deliberately, as an expression of values. The point is that it is a values choice, not an analytical finding, and the clean line it tries to draw no longer maps cleanly onto the physical world.

Downstream, the same logic applies in reverse. The satellite constellation that provides broadband internet provides battlefield targeting. The AI platform that optimises logistics for a retailer optimises resupply for a military base. The same imaging system that monitors agricultural land monitors conflict zones. Revenue segmentation by end-use is rarely disclosed at the granularity a meaningful screen requires, and when it is, it rarely captures what happens to the technology once it leaves the company.

This is why the third wave which we discussed in this week’s note is different in character from the first and second.

The Rare Earth Elements (REE) Megatrend

Permanent magnets made from neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium are the enabling component in precision guidance systems, drone motors, missile actuators, electronic warfare equipment, and submarine propulsion. Demand for magnet rare earths has doubled since 2015, with defence among the structural growth drivers alongside EVs and wind. China processes approximately 85-95% of these materials at the midstream metallization and separation stage – a share the IEA projects will remain at 75% by 2035 even under an optimistic build-out scenario.

We have covered the OECD REE investment case in depth across three prior notes, beginning with “Critical Minerals, Critical Moves” (May 2025) and “Rare Opportunities in Rare Earths” (November 2025), and most recently in “From Transition Play to Arms Race: A Critical Materials Reset” (May 28, 2026) – published days before China’s June escalation. Readers seeking the full company-level analysis of the OECD REE basket should refer to these notes. What follows is specific to the defence demand driver and the regulatory timeline it has introduced.

That pressure reached a new peak just a couple weeks ago, in the week of June 15, 2026. The G7 set a target of no single country supplying more than 60% of each member’s rare-earth imports by 2030; the European Council proposed a formal de-risking mechanism; and China responded on June 22 with targeted export controls on US defence companies and rare-earth mining firms. Washington had already anticipated this: from January 1, 2027, a federal rule (DFARS) bans the Pentagon from procuring any system containing permanent magnets originating from China, a deadline China’s own controls have now made considerably harder to ignore. Active inventory depletion sharpens the timeline: the US has reportedly consumed approximately 45% of its Precision Strike Missile stockpile and 30% of its Tomahawk inventory, and restocking every unit requires REE-dependent components that cannot contain Chinese-origin material after that date.

The bottleneck is not mining but the midstream. A separation facility without downstream magnet makers has no local market, and magnet makers need committed offtake from defence, automotive, wind, and industrial customers simultaneously. The mine-to-magnet loop is only investable when all links close at once. The gap between stated policy ambition and physical processing capacity is precisely where the returns are.

The Investable OECD REE Basket

Most of the names below will be familiar to readers of our prior REE note series. Our conviction on the core positions is unchanged.

The three core positions remain MP Materials (MP-US), Lynas Rare Earths (LYC-AU), and Energy Fuels (UUUU-US). MP Materials is the only integrated US rare earth mine and mill, backed by a $400 million Pentagon investment, with REE separation commissioning at Mountain Pass by mid-2026. Lynas, the largest non-Chinese REE company at $13.5 billion, is completing its Texas REE separation facility with DoD funding. Energy Fuels received a $725 million conditional DoD loan commitment on June 18 and disclosed the $1.9 billion acquisition of Vacuumschmelze (VAC), the German precision magnet manufacturer. VAC holds existing qualification relationships with defence OEMs, bypassing the multi-year approval cycles new entrants face. The combined entity is the only OECD operation with a credible mine-to-magnet platform connecting US processing to European defence manufacturing. At $3.5 billion market cap, it looks underpriced relative to the strategic value of the VAC qualification book.

Two smaller names address specific gaps the core three do not cover. NEO Performance Materials (NEO-CA) is ramping its Estonia magnet factory to 2,000 tpa by end-2026, entirely outside Chinese processing influence. REalloys (ALOY-US) is building the largest REE metallization facility outside China in partnership with the Saskatchewan Research Council, with a 15-year offtake from the Tanbreez project in Greenland. It is important to note that REalloys came to market via reverse merger and is the highest-risk name in the basket. 5N Plus (VNP-CA) rounds out the basket with exposure to gallium, germanium, indium, and bismuth – the four materials subject to China’s August 2023 export controls and directly applied in compound semiconductors, radar, and night vision systems.

The REE basket has delivered; but unlike the European defence name re-rating, which converged to S&P 500 performance after March 2025, we do not believe this trade is over. The structural drivers – China’s escalating export control posture, a federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin magnets effective January 2027, and a supply chain buildout still measured in years rather than quarters – have not been resolved by the price action.

Third Defence Wave: Beyond the Primes

The REE basket addresses the supply side of the thesis. The names below address the demand side: platform specialists, systems integrators, and software-adjacent companies whose growth directly drives REE demand. What distinguishes them from the first and second wave is selectivity, not valuation re-rating – that trade is complete. Defence budgets are accelerating in unmanned systems, electronic warfare, naval domain awareness, and AI-assisted decision-making. The five names below are positioned where the spending is going and have not yet been fully absorbed by institutional capital.

 

Most of the basket has underperformed the MSCI World in the last year. That underperformance is the entry point, not a reason for caution.

The structural case has not deteriorated. It has strengthened. The Bundeswehr’s €100 billion fund is disbursing. NATO navies are ordering. The federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin rare earth magnets takes effect in seven months. Hensoldt and Renk enter this note’s coverage at a correction that their underlying order books do not justify. Booz Allen has been caught in the crossfire of US government IT spending reviews that are, by design, temporary.

The first and second wave re-rated on valuation. The third wave will re-rate on earnings, driven by a procurement cycle accelerating into the specific sub-sectors where these names face no credible competition from the large primes. The gap between the chart above and the order books behind these companies is where the next leg of returns is.

A new manifesto came out of Silicon Valley last week from Palantir’s founder Alex Karp. It suggests that Tech executives ought to embrace patriotism to preserve the values of the Republic. For many observers, this contrasts with Big Tech’s original mantra of pluralism and openness. This is especially true if one considers that most of Big Tech companies such as Meta, Google and Tesla have now mostly reverted towards more cooperation with the Trump administration.  

The growing cooperation between Tech and State is getting especially visible on issues pertaining to data privacy – whereby Silicon Valley firms such as Palantir are directly scraping your visual ID – or firms like Meta, Google and Tesla – that indirectly scrape your data – even if it to use it against you at the government’s request. Against this backdrop, it’s no surprise to see that trust vis-à-vis governments and Big Tech firms’ is waning.

A sign of the times is that Google searches for “Data Privacy” (how ironic!) in the U.S, are at a five-year high. We expect this interest to endure as AI continues to scrape the world.

Despite this growing interest in data privacy, users are typically ignoring the fine print regarding what Big Tech and Governments are doing with their data. As early as 2023, a Pew Research survey suggested that as much as six out of ten Americans skip reading privacy policies when signing up to apps. This means that they basically agree to give away whatever data on them that Big Tech firms are looking for. This is somewhat surprising given that about eight-in-ten of those familiar with AI also say that its use by companies will lead to people’s personal information being used in ways they won’t be comfortable with or that weren’t originally intended. Data privacy issues have resurfaced in the past few months during anti-ICE demonstrations across the U.S.: Homeland Security department was using data found on Facebook and Instagram to track, arrest and deport immigrants and arrest protesters.

This prompts a sharper look at the data privacy policies of Big Tech. We examined the policies of major technology firms regarding the sale of personal data, third-party sharing, disclosure to governments, AI training, and consent – only to realize that Big Tech not only owns your data but could also decide to use it against you if requested.

Big Tech & Data Privacy – Pick Your Poison, Choose Your Pain

It is interesting to compare the U.S.’ Big Tech regulation about data privacy to that of their Chinese and EU counterparts. While the EU is the most protective of personal data, there remains a lot of concern for Chinese companies’ proximity to Beijing. According to Beijing’s Cybersecurity Law, every Chinese company – including companies such as BYD and Huawei – are legally obligated to cooperate with state intelligence services. There is no judicial warrant process, no legal mechanism through which either company could refuse a government data request, and no external party can audit compliance or detect covert cooperation. Furthermore, communist party cells are also embedded inside major Chinese companies, providing informal intelligence conduits beyond the formal legal framework. This means the question is not whether Chinese companies would hand over your data, but whether the technical architecture enables them to do so – and the answer is yes on both counts.

Ineffective Investor Pressure: Is Tech Still Investable?

The lack of government oversight over data privacy – and now over the development of AI – forces investors to take a harder look at their Big Tech holdings data privacy policies. That said, given that Big Tech is such a massive chunk of the market – Mag-7 companies still represent about one-third of the market cap in the U.S. equity market – it remains difficult to divest out of these stocks solely based on their data malpractices.

It’s even harder to divest when the Tech sector outperforms the market like it has been doing these past few years. Furthermore, many of these companies have had tailwinds since Trump’s re-election, especially Palantir (which supplies surveillance software to the government) and Google (which knows everything about everyone) – a precious asset in an increasingly repressive world.

Five years of investor engagement with Palantir, Meta, and Google has produced letters, risk briefings, shareholder proposals, one landmark divestment, and a $190 million legal settlement – and virtually zero durable change in corporate behaviour across any of the three firms. The failure operates on three distinct but mutually reinforcing elements.

The first is structural governance. Palantir’s Class F share architecture grants its founders effective veto power over any shareholder resolution; Meta’s dual-class structure allows Mark Zuckerberg to override supermajorities of independent shareholders – including the 62% who voted for the 2022 surveillance advertising proposal – with his personal voting bloc; Alphabet is similarly insulated. These are not governance oversights; they are deliberate and permanent shields, and activist investors have known this for years.

The second element is the absence of a financial transmission mechanism. At Meta and Google, the theory of engagement is that reputational damage translates into advertiser flight, which translates into revenue pressure, which translates into behavioural change. That chain has never closed at scale: both companies continued to grow revenues through every major data privacy controversy, every EU General Data Protection Regulation fine, and every congressional hearing, because their advertising monopolies absorb the cost of controversy without altering the underlying surveillance business model.

The third and most structurally important failure Is that major institutions appear to be throwing in the towel. For example, Norges Bank suspended its own ethics council earlier this year under geopolitical pressure and actually increased its Palantir position despite obvious governance flaws and data privacy issues while simultaneously backing a human rights proposal at Microsoft. We think this highlights reactive positioning and signals that the responsible investment ecosystem lacks the tools and cohesion to hold surveillance-era technology firms to any consistent standard. Taken in this context, Dutch Pension fund ABP’s €825M Palantir divestment and CalSTRS’s $190M Meta settlement appear as rounding errors against the combined market capitalisation and government revenue streams of these firms.

In the span of 24 hours last week, Meta Platforms was found liable by two separate juries in two separate states for two distinct but related categories of harm: child sexual exploitation and the deliberate addiction of adolescents to its platforms. The combined verdicts – $375 million USD in New Mexico on March 24, followed by a landmark addiction liability finding in Los Angeles on March 25 – represent the most consequential legal week in social media history. The -7% weekly drop that followed tells only part of the story: as the chart below shows, Meta had already begun diverging from its Magnificent Seven peers well before the verdicts, and the rulings accelerated a gap that the market had been quietly opening for months.

And yet, on the very same day as the Los Angeles verdict, the White House appointed Mark Zuckerberg to its most influential science and technology advisory council. The juxtaposition is alarming: while the judicial system has finally begun penalizing the company for severe societal harm, the executive branch is actively elevating its leadership to shape national policy.

For years, Big Tech companies have hidden behind Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and First Amendment protections, claiming they are merely neutral conduits for user-generated content. Last week’s back-to-back rulings pierced that armor: the intentional engineering of infinite scrolling, beauty filters, and hyper-optimized engagement algorithms can now be legally classified as defective and dangerous product design. This marks the precise moment courts begin treating social media platforms as harmful products.

 

Two Verdicts,  Two Theories of Harm. One Week.

The two rulings must be understood together: they address different but compounding aspects of Meta’s impact on children.

On March 24, a New Mexico jury found Meta liable on two counts under state consumer protection law – knowingly engaging in deceptive trade practices, and taking unconscionable advantage of users who did not understand the risks of its platforms. The jury found 75,000 separate violations at $5,000 each, arriving at $375 million USD in civil penalties. The case stemmed from a 2023 undercover operation in which investigators posing as underage users on Facebook and Instagram received sexually explicit material and were solicited by adults – contacts that in several cases led to real-world abuse and human trafficking. It is a deception and facilitation of criminal harm case – a materially more severe legal characterisation than negligence. A second phase in May 2026 will seek additional penalties and court-ordered structural reforms, including mandatory age verification.

The following day in Los Angeles, a jury found Meta (70% at fault) and YouTube (30%) liable for intentionally addicting a young woman to their platforms, causing anxiety, body dysmorphia, and suicidal ideation. Snap and TikTok settled before trial. The dollar amounts – $9 million USD total – are trivial. The significance is systemic: the case is a bellwether for over 1,500 California cases and 2,400+ federal cases consolidated under Multi-District Litigation (MDL), with school district and state Attorney General (AG) trials to follow. The New Mexico AG called his verdict “a historic victory.” The Los Angeles plaintiff’s counsel called theirs “the tip of the spear.”

This Is Not an ESG Controversy – It Is a Product Impact Crisis

ESG ratings measure how a company manages its own sustainability risks – governance, environmental performance, data privacy. Meta scores tolerably on those dimensions, which is precisely why it remains a constituent of iShares, Vanguard, and S&P ESG ETFs. Those screens are doing what they were designed to do. LSEG, for instance, ranks Meta 49th out of 790 tech companies on ESG criteria (94th percentile).

The problem operates on the other axis of the double materiality analysis: how does the company’s activity affect people and the planet? On that dimension, Meta is unambiguous. Two juries found that it knowingly deceived the public about child safety while facilitating criminal predation of minors and deliberately engineering adolescent addiction.

That is not an ESG management failure. It is a product impact crisis – and investors relying on ESG scores alone have been asking the wrong question.

The Evidence Was There

Sustainable Market Strategies has flagged Meta and their product problem in several times over the past eight years. In “Reputation Is Everything” (May 2018), we flagged Facebook’s growing legal exposure following Cambridge Analytica. In “Life in the Shadow of Big Tech” (August 2020), we recommended against the stock, warning that regulatory and advertiser pressure were structural threats to the ad revenue model. In “Thumbs Down: A Socially-Toxic Reputation for Facebook“ (October 2021), we wrote explicitly: “Facebook is increasingly looking like Big Tobacco and/or Big Oil companies – ones which long-refused to recognize the negative impact of their behavior on the environment and society.”

The Tobacco industry spent decades funding friendly science, attacking unfriendly research, lobbying against protective legislation, and settling individual cases quietly to avoid systemic exposure – all while publicly denying causation. Meta has followed every step of that playbook. The difference is that the tobacco industry’s reckoning took 40 years. Meta’s is happening in real time, accelerated by a digital evidence trail its own engineers created.

For seven years, a coalition of institutional investors attempted to force Meta to account for its impact on children through the only mechanism available to them short of litigation – the annual general meeting. Child safety resolutions have been filed at every AGM since 2019. Across multiple votes, independent shareholders supported these proposals at rates consistently between 40% and 63%. None of it mattered. Because Zuckerberg’s Class B shares carry 10 votes each, he routinely controls approximately two-thirds of the total voting power at any AGM, reducing the official support for child safety resolutions to below 20%.

The conduct of the largest passive managers compounded the problem. Vanguard – which holds approximately 9% of Meta’s outstanding shares, making it the company’s second-largest shareholder after Zuckerberg himself – voted in favour of zero out of 400 environmental and social shareholder proposals in both the 2024 and 2025 proxy seasons, including, by definition, Meta’s child safety proposals.

The shift is not confined to courtrooms and academic journals. Among the very users Meta depends on, the perception of harm has crossed a threshold: according to Pew Research, the share of American teenagers who say social media has a “mostly negative” effect on people their age has risen from 32% in 2022 to 48% in 2024 – while those saying it has a “mostly positive” effect has collapsed from 24% to just 11%. Nearly half of all teens now say they spend too much time on these platforms. This is not a fringe view held by regulators or plaintiffs’ attorneys, it is the stated experience of the product’s own users – and it is moving in one direction only.

The Illusion of Federal Oversight: Regulatory Capture in Real-Time

Investors should not expect sweeping federal intervention to mitigate these risks. Meta’s political strategy has been systematic and, until last week, largely invisible to markets.

On the same day the Los Angeles jury delivered its landmark verdict, the White House announced that Zuckerberg had been appointed to the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), alongside Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, Oracle’s Larry Ellison, Google co-founder Sergey Brin, and Marc Andreessen. This advisory role gives Meta a direct line to shape national technology and tech policy from inside the White House. The appointment echoes the most brazen maneuvers of legacy harmful industries – the modern-day equivalent of the UN appointing a state oil company CEO to preside over a climate summit, or a tobacco lobbyist sitting on a government health promotion board.

The political groundwork runs deeper than a single appointment. Meta gave $1 million USD to Trump’s second inauguration – compared to nothing for the first – and is among the 37 corporate donors to the president’s $300 million White House ballroom project. The KIDS Act, the first federal bill in a decade with a realistic path to protecting children online, has been deliberately stripped of its most consequential provision: the duty of care requirement that would have obliged platforms to design their products with children’s safety in mind.

The Administration that placed a defendant in a child safety trial on its senior science advisory council – on the day of that verdict – is not positioned to regulate that company’s products. The legal accountability for Meta will not come from Washington, but it could come from state attorneys general, state legislatures, and juries and hopefully one day, investors. Litigation risk does not respond to lobbying expenditure the way regulatory risk does, and the battleground is now demonstrably in courtrooms in Albuquerque, Los Angeles, and Frankfort, Kentucky – not on Capitol Hill.

Other jurisdictions are less compromised. Australia enacted a social media ban for under-16 years old in December 2025; the UK is tightening age-verification requirements. Meta has mobilized aggressively against both. The opposition is commercially rational: adolescent engagement is intrinsically necessary to its business model, and the company’s own conduct confirms it.

Last week’s analysis focused on Greenland and Greenbacks and examined how escalating geopolitical tensions could influence peripherally developed bond markets. This week, we shift our focus to the global green bond market. Note that your Editors at Sustainable Market Strategies have historically viewed green bonds as primarily a labeling exercise—more beneficial to asset owners than as genuine instruments of environmental change. Though the market continues to grow, our stance remains largely unchanged; we remain sceptical that green bond products offer much in terms of positive environmental outcomes.

The pricing of green debt now generally aligns with that of non-green bonds, with the exception of emerging market (EM) debt, which still carries a slight double-digit spread. Additionally, developed market green sovereign bonds tend to have a 1-2 basis point spread due to their relative illiquidity compared to conventional bonds. We see two main reasons why green bonds now trade more like conventional bonds. First, countries like Germany have pioneered the development of comprehensive green benchmark curves across all maturities, facilitating more accurate pricing of green debt relative to risk-free rates.

 

Second, the ECB now integrates a “Climate Factor” into its collateral framework. As such, as the ECB confirmed that assets with high carbon footprints would face larger “haircuts” (reductions in value) when pledged as collateral, which prompted banks to immediately increase their demand for green bonds to ensure they had high-quality, “climate-safe” collateral to pledge for ECB liquidity. This creates a structural bid for green paper that has driven up interest and secondary market activity.

Green vs. Conventional Bonds: Similar Pricing but Different Impact?

Recent research from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicates that issuing green bonds can lead to measurable environmental benefits, countering the notion that they are merely marketing tools. A key study found that, on average, issuers’ carbon emissions decreased by approximately 10% to 13% within 2 to 4 years following issuance. The reduction in emission intensity—emissions per unit of revenue—was even more significant, dropping by as much as 20% to 30%. These findings suggest that companies are becoming considerably more carbon-efficient, even amid business growth.

Interestingly, the most substantial post-issuance emission reductions are often observed in carbon-intensive sectors such as utilities, energy, and manufacturing. For these industries, green bonds typically finance specific transition projects—like retrofitting power plants or upgrading manufacturing technology—that lead to significant, measurable decreases in carbon output. For these heavy emitters, green bonds serve as a credible signal to investors of their commitment to long-term environmental goals, a trend supported by the data.

Despite a challenging history, interest in green debt remains resilient even after the 2022 ESG market collapse. Indeed, the table below shows that issuance of green, sustainability, sustainability-linked and step-up bonds have been stable to rising in the past five years. Whether this trend continues depends on whether the market can withstand the rise of anti-ESG policies under Trump 2.0 and the global backlash against sustainability initiatives. With governments, corporations, and investors rapidly reversing their sustainability commitments, policy shifts could further weaken this sector’s growth prospects.

 

Green debt instruments vary significantly in their structure and impact. While green bonds and sustainability-linked bonds typically allocate proceeds for specific environmental or social goals, step-up bonds offer a different incentive. They provide issuers with a bonus, such as a reduced interest rate, if they meet predetermined sustainability targets, potentially encouraging more sustainable practices. However, recent research, including a report by IFC/World Bank (2023), questions the effectiveness of sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs). The study highlights a ‘structural design flaw’ related to their optionality and notes that these bonds often fail to drive meaningful behavior change due to weak financial incentives, limiting their overall impact on sustainability goals.

The rapidly expanding segment of the green debt market is Sustainability-Linked Loans (SLLs). Questions arise about whether Treasurers of leading SLL issuers can genuinely lower financing costs by linking sustainability targets to each issuance. Additionally, it is worth considering if these goals had been achieved regardless of issuing an SLL, assuming the company would have continued its existing sustainability path. This raises concerns about the actual impact and motivation behind SLLs.

Looking at the sovereign space, European countries – and Chile – have led the pack in cumulative sovereign green bond issuance over the past five years. With many issuing governments now moving to the right, one can wonder for how long the global sovereign green bond will survive.

The global green bond market has expanded over the past five years, yet its added value in addressing sustainability challenges remains uncertain. After all, if investors face no additional risks when investing in green paper, it’s difficult to argue that their impact surpasses that of non-green debt investments. Consequently, green bonds may offer more financial flexibility or indulgences rather than genuine environmental impact to allocators looking to shade their portfolio in green. This raises questions about their true effectiveness in promoting sustainability, emphasizing the need for clearer metrics and accountability in green bond investments.

In 2025, many ESG monikers like “greenwashing” and “net zero” fell by the wayside. However, a fancy term to describe accelerating inequalities has made its way into public discourse: the “K-shaped” economy refers to bifurcated labor, wealth and spending patterns, with the upper arm of the “K” representing wealthy asset owners and high-skilled professionals who are thriving, while the lower arm represents low-to-middle-income earners who are facing stagnant wages and rising costs.

As a result, differentiated spending patterns emerge and creates a stark contrast in prosperity across different groups within the economy.

The bland sobriquet – K-shaped economy – may lull some readers to sleep…but it shouldn’t. It’s just a polite way of saying that U.S. income and wealth inequality is accelerating.

Usually, in a “normal” recovery (V or U-shaped), all boats rise, even if the yachts rise faster than the rowboats. The harsh reality is that U.S. income and wealth inequality is accelerating and bringing it with alarming consequences.

What’s To Blame?

 There are three main factors that we highlight that are driving the divergence in income, wealth and spending:

 
1.
To Own or Not to Own?

The single largest driver of the K is the gap between those who own assets and those who rely solely on labor for income.

 

This is what the hard data tells us, but one can also see it the performance of stock prices.

For example, the media has already made much of the fact that Delta airlines stock have diverged markedly from their peers. This is in large part because the company has focused on higher-tier travel: the majority of their profits are now generated from business and first class tickets. Last year, sales of economy tickets contracted by 7% while premium ticket sales rose by 9%.  

Another example is the banking industry, where there have been clear winners from the “K” – those that cater to high-net worth individuals have seen their stock prices blast off in the past year, while lower tiered banks – those catering to a more diversified clientele – have lagged.

2. The AI Divide

Both the anecdotal and data evidence is making clear that the rapid adoption of Artificial Intelligence is creating a skills gap that serves to reinforces the K-shape.

For example, an analysis of how Anthropic’s chatbot Claude is used by businesses and consumers around the world suggests that richer countries are much more likely to adopt AI. Claude usage per capita remains highly uneven and strongly correlated with GDP, with currently no evidence that low-use countries are catching up.

Equally significant is who is using AI within countries. Research from Anthropic suggests that more educated users are reaping greater productivity benefits from AI because they can give AI chatbots more sophisticated prompts and therefore get better responses. According to Anthropic, “While Claude is able to respond in a highly sophisticated manner, it tends to do so only when users input sophisticated prompts.”

In other words, the rewards from AI are going to higher educated workers who tend to be at the higher end of the income scale (there are exceptions: tech jobs, once considered high-paying and high-demand, are leading the layoffs precisely due to the AI pivot).


3. Asymmetric Impact of Inflation

 U.S. inflation has been running hotter than the Fed’s 2% target for almost half a decade now, but the extra increases in prices don’t hit everyone equally. Essentials like food and housing take up a much larger percentage of low-income budgets and the prices of these items have been rising faster than other consumer prices.

Indeed, households in the bottom 20% of wage earners allocate approximately 63% of their total expenditures to just three categories: housing, food, and transportation. These categories are considered inelastic spending so any price increase in these areas acts as a direct reduction in a family’s standard of living.

 

In contrast, the highest 20% of earners spend roughly 30-35% of their income on these same essentials. When the price of these essential items goes up, wealthier households simply reduce non-essential spending, while for the lower arm of the “K”, that money often comes out of an emergency fund or basic nutrition.

 

How Can Sustainability Investors Navigate the K?

For investors focused on sustainability strategies and outcomes, a K-shaped economy, i.e. the speeding up of income and wealth inequalities, can feel like losing the battle. Indeed, many of the potential winners of inequality are not names one would naturally find on the long side of sustainability themed portfolios (premium banks, private jets, yacht builders, etc.)

Nonetheless, there are many themes that are either orthogonal or even aligned to the realities of a split economy. We highlight three below:

Circular Economy: From an environmental perspective, transforming from a linear to circular economy is widely viewed as necessary because it is considered the only legitimate solution to limiting environmental degradation – the ultimate goal is to decouple resources consumption from economic growth.

From an economic perspective, a decline in purchasing-power for the majority of the population implies more interest and demand for recycling, refurbishing, and “product-as-a-service” (i.e. renting or leasing) models.

Business models based on using less raw inputs, extending the economic life of a product and aiming for substantial improvement in resource performance along the way should be seen as increasingly attractive and a major differentiator. We plan to update our previous work on this subject (Circular Economy: When Going Around in Circles is the Right Thing to Do, April 13, 2022) in the weeks ahead.

Social And Sustainability Bonds: While the interest for green bonds has most likely passed the hype phase of the early 2020s, there appears to be steady interest in other fixed income products tied to sustainability. Social bonds offer a steady yield while directly addressing the “downward” trajectory of the lower-K population.

Earlier this month, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) issued a $2 billion Social Bond The proceeds are specifically earmarked for low-income communities in emerging markets, focusing on healthcare, sanitation, and education. The bond was oversubscribed by an impressive 2.7 times. For investors wanting to make real social impact, financing that is tied to specific project outcomes is a direct way to achieve it.

Sustainable Regenerative Agriculture: With climate-related disasters costing well over 100 billion USD again in 2025, we have argued that climate adaptation (i.e. resilience) will become a necessary investment priority. As we noted above and in previous notes, food prices will continue to outpace generalized inflation due in large part to climate change.

Investing in sustainable farmland and timberland are one of the main ways to combat the impacts of climate change while mitigating risks in our food supply chain (please see, Environmental Assets in Short Supply, October 9, 2025). These assets also provide a hedge against inflation (the lower-K struggle).

Over the last month, political and security turbulence has escalated on multiple fronts. The shooting of conservative commentator Charlie Kirk dominated headlines, amplifying the discourse around political violence. Donald Trump made waves by renaming the Department of Defense to the Department of War. Against this backdrop, Pete Hegseth has convened a special meeting of Department of War leaders this week. Across the Atlantic, a series of Russian drone incursions into allied airspace highlighted the fragility of European security.

In our previous note, “The European Defense Offensive: From Peace Dividend to War Premium”, March 6, 2025, we discussed how guns and drones can help to achieve security and how drones are reshaping entire civilian sectors. The central task for policymakers and investors is to channel these tools toward stability, innovation, and resilience.

 

Back to the Battlefield: The Resurgence of Geopolitics

Since 1980, we experienced a relative period of geopolitical calm, shaped by the end of the Cold War, expanding globalization, and the absence of direct large-scale conflict between major powers. However, this environment has been progressively shifting toward conflicts, with renewed great-power rivalries, regional wars, trade tensions, and escalating competition over resources and technology.

The table below shows the most important conflicts since the beginning of the century. The same conflicts are repeated as they generally remain unresolved as more are added to the list. The projected increases in defense spending for most countries in the world tend to confirm our assessment that tensions are accelerating globally.

The Drone Disruption: From Battlefields to Boardrooms

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought the extensive use of drone for reconnaissance and direct attacks into focus and shows how innovation changes the nature of wars. Twenty-five years ago, in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgents relied on classic guerilla tactics of ambushes and mobility to counter Western military strength. In Ukraine however, drones now serve a similar role. Cheap, nimble, and precise, they harass supply lines and equipment much like guerilla fighters once did.

The chart below shows the exponential rise in demand for drones over the past five years as well as the  continued exponential growth expected to occur in future years. As described above, military use is growing due to larger defense budgets and the transformation of armed forces towards more drone usage. In the civilian sector there are increasing commercial and societal uses.

From an investment perspective, the combination of military and non-military uses is appealing since it amounts to a certain diversification in demand; military spending does not tend to follow the economic cycle, whereas drone demand from non-military sources tends to more cyclical.

Indeed, for sustainable investors, drones are increasingly being deployed in ways that deliver tangible benefits for society:

Importantly, this civilian transformation of drone technology echoes a broader historical pattern: many advances that originated in military research such as GPS, the internet, and satellite imaging eventually delivered immense benefits for public use. In the same way, drones are now transitioning from instruments of conflict to powerful tools for society where demand is growing.

 

The Gun Market’s Surprising Stall

Surprisingly even with greater polarization, gun demand in the U.S. has plateaued following the post-COVID surge. Several forces explain this: many households already own multiple guns, crisis fatigue has diminished the urgency to arm, and inflation has constrained discretionary spending.

The chart below shows two indicators highlighting the COVID peak in gun demand and the recent plateauing in the United States; the largest market in the world. Background checks from the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NCIS) are a good leading indicator of new gun demand in the United States whereas firearms manufacturing from the Annual Firearms Manufacturing and Export Report (AFMER) is a coincident to lagging indicator because manufacturers respond to current demand.

Despite persistently high homicide rates in the U.S., the political landscape leaves little room for meaningful gun legislation, and this affects the firearms market. Paradoxically, in the past, fears of tighter regulation have triggered surges in gun sales, i.e. people purchase guns in anticipation of not being able to in the future. However, with a Supreme Court broadly supportive of expansive Second Amendment rights, the likelihood of new restrictions is low, which removes the urgency to purchase additional firearms.

The map below shows that the U.S., Mexico and Brazil have among the highest firearms homicide rates and yet stronger gun control legislation is unlikely in the near future. In the United States, the current administration does not favor stricter rules. In Mexico, civilian ownership is tightly regulated but illicit firearms traficking is a powerful source of demand. In Brazil, Bolsanaro loosened gun laws when he was president while Lula has issued executive orders to tighten gun control because the Brazilian Congress is ambivalent to enact stronger regulation.

The Promise of Drones (Go Long) vs. the Limits of Guns (Be Short)

Unlike drones, which have evolved from military origins to offer wide-ranging civilian and environmental benefits, guns and munitions lack such positive spillover potential for society. Firearms are designed with a single purpose: to wound or kill, and their civilian proliferation is more often linked to rising homicide rates, accidents, and social costs rather than broad social gains.

The table below shows drone and drone-adjacent companies that offer societal benefits and positive financial attributes and gun companies to avoid from a sustainable investment standpoint.

The chart below shows market capitalization, sustainability scores, growth in sales and price to sales for companies in our targeted long and short sectors There are not yet many large companies considered to be specializing in drones; the larger companies like Nokia, Honeywell and Leonardo manufacture components used in drones as part of their much larger organization. The same can be said for gun manufacturers as they remain small capitalization. As expected from our sectoral analysis above, drone companies are experiencing strong growth: for example, Red Cat has had exceptional growth in the last five years (78% growth in sales), it is also expected to continue as its price-to-sales of 128 highlights. On the other hand, gun companies have had close to zero growth in sales and trade at depressed price-to-sales. We expect this trend to continue: high valuation in the growth segment of drones and low valuation in the stagnating gun segment.

The opening months of 2025 have seen market swings, volatility spikes and ripening conditions for a bear market. Politics and geopolitics have taken central stage and will drive investment outcomes for sustainability portfolios for the remainder of the year and beyond. In this installment of our quarterly update on Macro Meets Sustainability, we argue that despite the noise emanating from Washington, in terms of concrete policy action, the euro area’s recent (fiscal) policy moves are the more significant market driver. We also underscore our view, outlined in several recent notes, that global inflation risks are rising while economic growth momentum is slowing, creating a stagflationary environment. The implication is that the rotation to defensive sectors and to euro area stocks has further to go.  

U.S. Noise and Euro Area Action

Contrary to mainstream media and financial pundits, our observation is that U.S. policy changes have underwhelmed so far in 2025; the biggest surprises and significant policy action have occurred in the euro area:

In the U.S., the daily headlines of federal firings, deportations, and tariff threats means the Trump’s administration occupies most of the space. However, what has actually been accomplished on any of these fronts?

In terms of DOGE, it’s difficult to know exactly how many layoffs have taken place but estimates of federal job separations in February were about 60 000, an insignificant number in an economy that employs over 160 million people. To be sure, the immeasurable loss of experience in federal institutions is lamentable and sows the seeds for challenges in the future. However, the impact on economic activity in the near term is likely to be very low.

Meanwhile, although much has been threatened, tariffs imposed on trading partners are so far only slightly more punitive than what occurred during Trump’s first term, which had little impact on overall global activity. The range of possibilities on what comes next is extremely wide, but a pattern has emerged whereby U.S. tariff barks have been worse than the bites.

Finally, while we continue to believe that over time, the level of illegal (and legal) immigration to the U.S. will be aggressively curbed, ICE is operating with the same budget that it had on Jan. 19. This suggests that it is highly unlikely that the government’s targets of over 1000 arrests per day are even close to being met; only the most migrant worker-dependent sectors like agriculture will feel the near-term impacts of current U.S. immigration policy.

In contrast, the threats and proclamations of the Trump administration have been sufficient to shake European policymakers out of their torpor as they seem to be working with renewed vigor. On Tuesday, the German parliament approved Chancellor Merz’s plan to spend up to €1 trillion in coming years on infrastructure and defense. EUR500B is earmarked for infrastructure and green initiatives. This massive spending deal means that just the infrastructure fund alone adds over 1% to GDP over the next decade, even without applying a fiscal multiplier (i.e. positive knock-on effect). Added on to this is the announcement in early March by Ursula von der Leyen that the new “ReArm Europe” investment plan will unlock a €150 billion loan scheme to help Member States invest in key military capabilities.

Our key takeaway is that while investors must stay attuned to possible impacts on global growth and financial markets stemming from the U.S., so far in 2025, realized policy activity has been more significant in Europe than in North America. This provides at least a partial foundation for why we expect the outperformance of euro area equities to continue for the next few quarters.

It’s Still The Economy, Stupid

Although it is well known that financial markets respond poorly to economic and policy uncertainty, the current instability in risk assets can not be solely attributed to uncertainty arising from Trump’s leadership style (described as “flooding the zone”). Indeed, U.S. economic growth was losing momentum well before Trump moved into the White House, and earnings expectations were also ratcheting down prior to Trump’s inauguration.

One very well-known and favored indicator is the economic surprise index, which tracks the strength of incoming data relative to expectations. In the U.S., the economic surprise index peaked in November and is now in negative territory, meaning that data is weaker than forecasted. In the euro area the indicator displays the opposite trend (data is surprising to the upside). The chart below shows the surprise indicator for the U.S.  

Of course, the above analysis is only useful in that it helps explain what has already happened. However, in the U.S. there is likely to be more months of negative surprises before an inflection point is reached because economic surprise indices tend to be mean-reverting and swing in regular patterns – it takes time for expectations adjust to economic reality.  

Beyond this, there are three reasons we expect that the environment for euro area stocks will support continued performance for the next few quarters:

1. More room for fiscal and monetary support outside of the U.S.: though it’s unknown to what extent Trump’s ambitions will translate into action, the direction of travel on virtually all of his stated plans translates to: more inflation and less growth in the near-term. We have written about the inflationary impulse in previous notes (for example, see “Food Fight: Policy’s Effect on Food Producers & Inflation”, February 13, 2025 and “Playing the Trump Card”, November 21, 2024) and the Fed’s updated FOMC projections yesterday are very much in line with our view. In plain language, Federal Reserve Chair Jay Powell acknowledged that further progress on inflation was likely to be “delayed for the time being”. The corollary is that the U.S. Federal Reserve may not have the leeway to loosen monetary policy given its 2% inflation target. Indeed, the OECD recently updated its inflation forecasts. With assumptions about future tariffs, the inflationary impact is strongest in North America.  

As discussed above, Germany is already forging a new path for fiscal policy and we expect other countries with the fiscal space will follow suit, whether it be in the form of relief to businesses to offset the tariff shock (as announced in Canada) or to raise defense spending.

2. Euro area sustainability stocks still trade at a discount relative to their U.S. counterparts. Euro area stocks have been comparatively cheap for years, but the recent divergence in price performance has done little to correct this gap. This is also true for the Sustainable Market Strategies’ sustainability universe. The average forward P/E for euro area stocks in our universe is 18 compared to 29 for the U.S.

3. The U.S. has Mag 7, but the euro area has defense stocks. The U.S. equity outperformance streak in 2023-2024 was without a doubt characterized by a strong tailwind emanating from the Magnificent 7 stocks and a bubble for everything artificial intelligence. China’s Deepseek helped to burst the bubble earlier this year. In contrast, we believe the prime candidate for a future “bubble” sector in the euro area is still in full swing. As we wrote in a recent note, “The European Defense Offensive: From Peace Dividend to War Premium”, the European Commission has recently unveiled an ambitious plan to mobilize approximately $840 billion to bolster the EU’s collective defense capabilities. There is a clear bias for European countries to invest in European defense companies, and despite the near parabolic rise in the biggest defense names, there are still several companies with moderate valuations that satisfy our strict sustainability criteria. But even for investors that do not wish to be long defense companies, the “euphoria” surrounding this sector will likely lift related stocks, especially euro area industrials. On this basis, just as the U.S. tech sector is becoming a drag on broad U.S. equity indices, the bull market in the euro area defense sector could boost European indices.

In sum, despite the fact that geopolitical tensions are emanating from the U.S. and onto the rest of the world, we expect that euro area stocks will continue to outperform.

Defensive Rotation Is Justified  

Stocks in defensive sectors like health care, consumer staples and utilities outperform when uncertainty is high and/or when recession risks are elevated because it is difficult to cut back on essential spending.

From a sustainability standpoint these sectors are often appealing because underlying products and services can create positive impact on individual lives. In recent weeks, we have written notes on two of these critical sectors – health care and food staples – and how sustainability investors should maintain a postive bias in this space despite needing to navigate the ongoing policy crosscurrents. Developments over the past few weeks only serve to strengthen our conviction. Interestingly, euro area stock markets tend to have a greater exposure to defensive sectors (healthcare is about 16% in the Eurostoxx 600 index versus 10% in the S&P 500), which also helps to explain some of the European outperformance in recent weeks.  

Almost two years ago, we wrote what was then a controversial note about the role of defense companies in sustainable investing (see Defending the indefensible? An ESG perspective, May 11, 2023). Fast-forward to today, and this topic has become much more accepted, though still not quite mainstream.

In our previous note, we argued that a subset of the defense sector—specifically what we called the “European Defense Specialists” as opposed to the “American Defense Primes“—should be considered by sustainability-minded investors. Our thesis was based on two key factors: European defense companies demonstrate significantly stronger governance than their American counterparts, and European defense expenditures were poised for massive increases. This strategy has performed exceptionally well, with the SMS European Defense Specialists Basket dramatically outperforming both American Defense Primes and the S&P 500 since our May 2023 publication.

The End of Pax Americana

Recent geopolitical developments, including the Oval Office showdown between Zelenskyy, Trump, and Vance that led to the immediate freezing of all U.S. military support to Ukraine, only strengthen our thesis. What we're witnessing is essentially the end of the post-Cold War "peace dividend" era. For decades, European nations comfortably operated under the Pax Americana security umbrella, maintaining modest defense budgets while focusing on social spending and economic integration. This convenient arrangement—Europeans handling "soft power" (diplomatic influence, cultural appeal, economic incentives, and humanitarian aid) while America provided "hard power" (military might and security guarantees)—is now being fundamentally reconsidered.

Prior to 2022, only the UK, Poland, and France among major European powers were approaching or exceeding NATO's 2% target. Faced with the stark realization of their strategic vulnerability, European nations have been forced to step up.

The ReArm Europe Initiative

Earlier this week, the European Commission unveiled an ambitious plan to mobilize approximately $840 billion to bolster the EU's collective defense capabilities. This plan, dubbed "ReArm Europe," aims to provide European countries with the financial resources to modernize their armies, enhance their collective defense systems, and increase support for Ukraine.

The initiative includes a new fund worth more than $150 billion to support EU members' defense investments, while simultaneously relaxing the bloc's debt rules (effectively the "debt brake" to allow for higher defense spending). Additionally, the EU plans to leverage profits from sanctioned Russian assets (approximately $200 billion held in Europe) to help finance military assistance to Ukraine. While some, like President Zelenskyy, have floated the idea to seize and redirect these $200 billion towards security, France's finance minister has expressed opposition to this mechanism as these are Russian central bank assets and are protected by international banking agreements.

 

The Global Defense Spending Shift

The chart below illustrates the dramatic shift in the global balance of defense spending from 2011 to 2023. The United States has experienced a steady decline in its proportion of global defense spending, dropping from over 50% in 2011 to just 37.7% by 2023. Even in absolute terms (using constant 2022 USD), U.S. spending fell from nearly $1 trillion in 2010 to approximately $880 billion in 2023—a reduction of 12%.

Conversely, Europe (including the UK) has demonstrated remarkable growth, particularly in recent years. From 2011 to 2021, European defense spending as a percentage of the global total increased modestly from 17.9% to 19.8%. However, 2022-2023 showed dramatic acceleration, with Europe's share jumping to 24.4% by 2023—a clear response to the radically altered security environment following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. With the implementation of the ReArm Europe initiative, Europe's defense expenditures could represent over one-third of global defense spending within the next few years.

 

A More Sophisticated Screening Approach

These developments reinforce our conviction to focus on European Defense Specialists rather than American Defense Primes. We've expanded our analysis to include several additional critical factors:

  1. Allied Revenue Alignment: We assess the proportion of revenue derived from NATO and other allied nations, aiming to minimize exposure to companies with significant revenues from potentially misaligned or authoritarian regimes.
  2. Government Independence: We evaluate the percentage of each company owned by governments. Generally, we favor greater independence from government control to maximize innovation potential and governance quality.
  3. R&D Investment: We analyze R&D expenditure as a percentage of revenue. Modern warfare demands constant technological advancement—companies that fail to innovate today will be irrelevant tomorrow.
  4. Strategic Defense Orientation: We focus on companies specializing in technologies and systems designed primarily for defensive purposes—such as air defense systems, cybersecurity solutions, and intelligence platforms—rather than offensive-oriented activities like armored assault vehicles, strike missiles, and tactical combat systems.

Based on this multi-factor approach, six companies stand out as meeting most of our criteria (highlighted in green in the table above).

Unsurprisingly, all six companies have performed exceptionally well since Russia's invasion of Ukraine three years ago. Even the weakest performer in our selection managed to outperform the S&P 500 by a factor of three. However, the performance disparities within the group are notable and raise a critical question: Can this level of outperformance be sustained?

To assess whether these companies can maintain their momentum or if “laggards” might catch up, we look at forward valuations using 12-month price-to-earnings ratios.

While Saab and Leonardo predictably command higher valuations given their remarkable performance runs, what's truly surprising is that despite their extraordinary performance, their P/E ratios remain below 35x—relatively reasonable for companies experiencing such dramatic growth.

Nevertheless, considering the parabolic trajectories of Leonardo and Saab, a prudent alternative strategy would be to shift focus toward the "second wave" of European Defense Specialists. These companies—Thales SA (HO-FR), BAE Systems plc (BA-GB), Indra Sistemas SA (IDR-ES), and QinetiQ Group plc (QQ-GB)—stand to benefit substantially from the recently announced ReArm Europe program and have yet to experience a dramatic valuation expansion.

The seismic shift in the White House has already provoked another one: in the corporate world, many firms are letting go of their climate and Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) objectives. Blackrock is the latest of several U.S. financial institutions to drop out of net zero commitment groups. This contrasts starkly with their stance in 2020 when Larry Fink gained notoriety for his statement that “climate risk is financial risk” in his annual letter to CEOs.

Net zero and other climate commitments were already putting some firms under the spotlights of the anti-ESG movement this past year. That said, the current corporate back off from “all things ESG” is now triggering sustainability-minded investors and other activists in asking for greater accountability over greenwashing claims and past corporate statements about sustainability.

Time to hit the courts?

As the environment for corporate shareholder engagement becomes more challenging, we think that increased focus on litigation could offer another way to hold corporations accountable for their misrepresentation of practices about sustainability and/or their insufficient action on social and environmental issues. With the growing impact of climate change, pollution, and other harmful practices, impacted communities are increasingly likely to seek legal recourse for damages, driving an uptick in lawsuits. This should be good news for the legal crowd – for whom a Trumpian White House is already proving a boon. As such, we think that litigation cases on ESG issues are set to grow substantially over the next few years.

In our view, there are two main areas where we think litigation is set to grow: Consumer and Environmental law. Greenwashing – i.e. the use of misleading environmental claims – is one prominent example which could fall under consumer laws. Conversely, environmental impact, such as pollution, would fall under environmental laws. Here’s how corporate malpractice could fall under one of those categories:

Litigators Unite!

One thing we can be certain of is that litigation has a promising future—especially in the U.S., with climate change cases leading the charge. To this end, a database from Columbia University’s Sabin Center for Climate Change Law contained 2,796 climate litigation case (as of September 2024): 1,850 (66%) were filed in the US and 946 (34%) in the rest of the world. According to the Center, one of the most rapidly growing forms of climate litigation is “climate-washing,” the practice of using misleading or false claims to cover a company’s true climate impact – and mislead consumers into believing its products and services are sustainable. More than 140 such cases have already been filed to date, with 47 filed in 2023 alone.

While it is challenging to determine a precise success rate for climate change litigation due to the variety of cases and jurisdictions involved, the Sabin Center’s studies suggest that over 50% of climate cases have resulted in judicial outcomes favorable to climate action. These favorable outcomes include court rulings that have led to changes in government policy, corporate behavior, and public awareness.

Interestingly, cases challenging “climate-washing” have been particularly successful, with over 70% of finalized cases decided in favor of the claimants. This high success rate highlights the growing scrutiny of corporate environmental claims, and the increasing legal risks associated with greenwashing. The good news is that it seems that the increasing success of climate-washing litigation suggests a growing trend of corporate accountability for environmental claims.

Furthermore, jurisdictions across the U.S. are taking legal action against climate offenders, seeking compensation for environmental damages. A comprehensive map of these cases, created by the Climate Integrity Project, highlights the growing efforts to hold the oil industry accountable for the harm it causes to communities. This trend indicates that sustainability-focused litigators now have a wider range of jurisdictions to consider when pursuing justice in court.

Finally, some research suggests that the global litigation funding investment market was valued at USD 18.2 Billion in 2022 and is anticipated to generate robust growth through 2028, with a CAGR of 13.2%. For those looking to capitalize on the expanding litigation market, it’s worth noting that while a few publicly listed companies specialize in litigation finance, firms exclusively focused on environmental or greenwashing cases remain rare. Consequently, the opportunity in sustainability litigation is more readily accessible through private equity investments.