Global governments have hit a structural fiscal wall. Advanced economies are carrying debt loads that would have been considered a sovereign crisis scenario twenty years ago. Japan has long since departed the realm of conventional fiscal analysis with its 215% debt-to-GDP ratio. Rather than unwinding this burden in the years following the pandemic, governments doubled down with stimulus packages, energy subsidies, and increased defence spending. Now, with interest rates firmly in the “higher for longer” camp, compounding debt service costs is turning this burden into an active crisis.

To make matters worse, governments are currently facing four compounding pressures with no cyclical release valve. Entitlement obligations from an aging population are accelerating against a shrinking tax base, while geopolitical reality has locked in permanent, irreversible defence spending floors. Furthermore, the massive fiscal overhang of the pandemic remains entirely unresolved. Crucially, the era of zero-interest rates that made this leverage manageable has ended. Today, OECD governments spend more on debt service than on defence. In the United States alone, interest payments consumed nearly $1 trillion in 2025. That is money that does not build a single hospital, repair a single bridge, fix a school, or connect a single household to clean water.

Because sovereign balance sheets are now increasingly captured by these legacy obligations, the resulting fiscal deficit is massive. The global infrastructure funding gap – the difference between what is being spent and what is needed – is projected to reach $15 trillion by 2040. The post-war model in which the sovereign state financed, built, and operated public infrastructure is, in most of the world, functionally over.

Private Capital Enters the Chat

When governments cannot write the cheque, they turn to the private sector. This is not a new phenomenon – infrastructure privatization has been happening in waves since the 1980s – but the scale and urgency of the current moment are genuinely without precedent. The fiscal constraint is no longer a temporary condition to be managed through one or two budget cycles; it is a permanent feature of the sovereign landscape.

Private capital can participate in infrastructure through several distinct models, each with a different logic and a materially different risk-return profile.

The PPP model stands out because it is the model that resolves the core problem most directly. The government needs infrastructure it cannot afford to build – and maintain. The private sector gets a long-term contract backed by a sovereign counterparty. Risk is allocated to whoever can best manage it: construction and operational risk to the developer, demand risk either shared or retained by the state depending on the structure.

After a brief COVID-induced pause, global PPP deal flow has accelerated through its previous 2018 ceiling.

The regional breadth of the recovery is telling: Sub-Saharan Africa posted a 133% increase year-on-year, Europe and Central Asia 91%, and Latin America and the Caribbean 36%. In the United States alone, 36 states now have dedicated P3 enabling legislation, up from fewer than 15 a decade ago. The UK’s National Wealth Fund, launched in 2024, has an explicit PPP co-investment mandate. The G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment targets $600 billion in private infrastructure mobilization by 2027. The trend is structural, it is broad-based, and it is accelerating precisely when government balance sheets are least able to offer an alternative.

Beyond the Toll Booth: The New Face of PPPs

The PPP model has existed in modern form since the late 1980s, when developing countries began reversing decades of nationalization. In its early incarnation, it was almost exclusively about economic infrastructure: telecom licenses, power purchase agreements, and toll road concessions. In the World Bank’s PPI database, transport and telecom together accounted for over 60% of all private infrastructure investment through the 1990s.

In the early 2000s, the introduction of the availability payment (AP) model – where governments pay a fixed fee for the private sector to design, build, finance, and operate social infrastructure – opened the doors for PPPs to manage hospitals, schools, prisons, and courthouses.

Post-2010, low-carbon projects in the World Bank PPI database outnumber conventional ones by more than two to one (1,915 low-carbon vs. 815 conventional).

The sector diversification is now visible even in a single market snapshot. In Europe in 2024, education PPPs doubled in project count year-on-year (15 transactions versus 8 in 2023). Italy completed the first sovereign data centre PPP in European history, with €331 million in EIB financing for digital cloud infrastructure serving Italian public administration. The UK closed a €605 million district heating network PPP. The old caricature of PPPs as a motorway financing mechanism for governments that cannot be bothered to collect tolls themselves has been thoroughly overtaken by events.

The SDG Multiplier Effect

For a sustainability-minded investor, the PPP landscape presents an immediate challenge: not all PPP concessions are created equal through an impact lens. A managed toll lane serving commuters in Texas or Melbourne is, without question, a sound investment. The cash flows are contracted, the regulatory framework is mature, and the inflation linkage is explicit. But it would be a stretch to characterize it as SDG-aligned infrastructure. The user is, in most cases, a private motorist with alternatives. The social additionality is limited.

This matters because the case for infrastructure as a sustainable asset class rests on considerably broader foundations. As we documented in our October 2023 note, Inflation-Proofing and SDG-Boosting, research published in Nature Sustainability (Thacker et al.) found that infrastructure either directly or indirectly influences all 17 SDGs, encompassing 121 of the 169 targets – 72% of the entire SDG framework. More pointedly, for five SDGs – SDG 3 (Good Health), SDG 6 (Clean Water), SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities) – every single target is influenced by infrastructure investment.

Infrastructure, in other words, is more than an inflation hedge or a portfolio diversifier. When properly targeted, it is the most direct mechanism available to listed equity investors for deploying capital toward global sustainability commitments. The question is not whether to invest in infrastructure, but which infrastructure.

Toll roads in advanced economies and airports serving leisure tourism in mature markets are excluded from our focus – not because they are poor investments, but because they do not represent the category of infrastructure where the PPP growth wave is most pronounced, nor where the impact additionality is most compelling. Our attention is concentrated on operators and developers whose PPP concession pipelines are anchored in social infrastructure (healthcare, public transit, sanitation, water access) and environmental infrastructure (clean energy, waste treatment).

First Responders to the Infrastructure Deficit

The five operators and developers we favour share three characteristics that distinguish them from the broader infrastructure universe: their revenues flow predominantly from government counterparties under long-term concession or availability-payment structures; their pipelines are expanding, not managing decline; and their assets serve populations where private capital is genuinely additional – not merely convenient.

Acciona (ANA-ES) is the most diversified single expression of this thesis. Its Pernambuco water and sanitation concession – €2.38 billion, 35 years, seven million people in one of Brazil’s poorest states – is the largest SDG 6 PPP transaction closed by any listed company in 2025, and it sits alongside São Paulo Metro Line 6, renewable energy transmission concessions in Peru and Australia, and an active bid pipeline in US managed lanes. Acciona’s EBITDA from concessions grew 103% in FY2025. The market continues to price it as a construction company. Veolia (VIE-FR) completes the environmental picture on the water side: as the world’s largest operator of municipal water systems under delegated public service contracts, it holds the most geographically diversified portfolio of government-backed water PPP revenues available in listed equity markets, spanning France, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.

Sacyr (SCYR-ES) occupies the social infrastructure end of the spectrum that most sustainable infrastructure portfolios systematically miss. Hospital PPPs – availability-based, long-duration, government-backed – are structurally identical to road concessions in their cash flow profile but carry materially stronger SDG 3 alignment. Sacyr has been winning them consistently across Spain, Chile, and Colombia while simultaneously developing water treatment PPPs and bidding US managed lane concessions. Ten new concession wins in 2024–25 across five countries. It is the most prolific listed PPP developer by contract count, in an investment category that most European fund managers have never analyzed.

In Brazil, Motiva (MOTV3-BR) brings urban mobility into the mix. Beyond its four major highway concession wins in 2024–25, Motiva operates São Paulo’s Metro Line 4, the Salvador metro, and multiple BRT corridors – giving it genuine SDG 11 exposure in Brazil’s most underserved urban centres, in a market where the federal government’s R$1.7 trillion infrastructure programme is generating the deepest PPP deal flow of any emerging economy.

Finally, Mota-Engil (EGL-PT) occupies territory no other listed operator will enter: road concessions in Angola and Mozambique, the Lobito Corridor railway maintenance agreement running to 2054, and the operating contract for Luanda’s new international airport. Africa’s infrastructure deficit is the largest in the world. Mota-Engil is, for now, one of the few listed companies being paid to close it.

The EBITDA margin column deserves careful reading. Motiva at 46% reflects a fully concession-derived business: government-contracted revenues, limited variable costs, predictable cash generation. Sacyr at 27% carries a residual construction division that blends the number down, though 93% of its EBITDA originates from concession assets. Acciona and Veolia, both near 15%, operate larger services and construction platforms alongside their concession portfolios.

The group trades between 5.1x and 8.4x EV/EBITDA, which is modest given the contractual duration and government-backed nature of the revenues. Mota-Engil at 5.1x carries a construction multiple, not a concession one. The Lobito corridor, the Luanda airport, and the Santos-Guarujá tunnel generate no visible premium in the current price. Whether that gap closes as concession EBITDA matures is the core of the investment thesis.

Dividends are a hallmark of infrastructure investing, and two distinct approaches appear in this table. Veolia’s 4.3% yield reflects a mature portfolio of long-term municipal service contracts generating stable, predictable cash flows that management is comfortable distributing. Acciona’s 1.9% reflects a deliberate choice to retain capital: with Pernambuco, Metro Line 6, and a €301bn project pipeline actively consuming investment, the priority is deployment over distribution. Both are rational strategies given where each company sits in its concession development cycle.

Acciona has returned roughly 120% over the two-year period shown, against 40% for the MSCI World and mid-single-digit returns for Veolia and Mota-Engil. Acciona’s re-rating reflects the market finally pricing diversified concession pipelines correctly. Sacyr’s recent upward break suggests this recognition is spreading.

On March 4, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz closed. Within days, Brent crude crossed $120 per barrel. By March 31st, oil prices had registered one of the steepest monthly gains on record. Against this backdrop, energy stocks posted their best-ever quarterly performance in Q1.

What is less appreciated is that the most direct beneficiaries of a sustained Brent around $100 are not the oil majors. Rather, it is the companies that produce liquid fuels that compete, molecule-for-molecule, against petroleum products at the pump – i.e., biofuel producers. As a result, many investors are starting to look again to alternative fuels as a potential way to diversify their portfolios out of fossil fuels in an increasingly unstable world.

After all, the world is already witnessing shortages in diesel and jet fuel – for which biofuel alternatives can be created using vegetable sources. Renewable diesel, biodiesel, Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF), and bioethanol are typically priced as a spread to their petroleum equivalents: Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel (ULSD), jet fuel, and gasoline respectively. Hence, every dollar Brent holds above its pre-war baseline widens that spread, which favors biofuels over their fossil equivalents.

One caveat to the table above is that current geopolitical tensions are also putting pressure on fertilizer prices – especially urea and nitrogen, which are key inputs in ethanol-based biofuels, representing approximately 59 percent of the energy generated from biofuels. One-third of global fertilizer transits through the Strait of Hormuz, and the resulting supply disruption is one reason fertilizer company stocks have surged in the past month.

A second caveat: while biofuels such as ethanol can be seen as a less damaging source of energy compared to fossil fuels, they still put pressure on the food system by consuming both land and fertilizer. The food-fuel trade-off is material double-sided risk: first-generation biofuels divert cropland and fertilizer from food production at precisely the moment food prices are surging, and governments that over-extend biofuel mandates risk a political backlash that could reverse the very policies underpinning these companies’ margins.

Biofuels Are Politically Smart

Subsidizing biofuels remains a politically savvy move even for a pro-fossil-fuel Trump administration, delivering tangible mid-term wins such as locking in farm-state loyalty through sustained demand for corn ethanol and soy biodiesel – key to holding the Midwest in the 2026 midterms and beyond. It positions Trump as delivering on “America First” energy by blending more domestic biofuels to shave a few cents off pump prices, shielding consumers from import shocks while boosting rural jobs. We believe that support for the sector in the U.S. – but also in the EU and Brazil – will increase in the coming months, acting as an additional tailwind.

What makes the U.S. economics particularly compelling is that rising oil prices are layered on top of a policy incentive stack that operates independently of the Brent price. There are three distinct credit streams:

Together, these three layers can add $1.00–2.00 per gallon to margins for best-in-class producers – a structural floor that holds even if crude retreats from its current elevated levels. This is the real economic story behind the sector’s re-rating.

The list of investable (>$1B market cap) companies in the biofuel space remains limited. Neste is one of the largest suppliers of SAF in the world, though it also runs a profitable downstream oil business. Darling Ingredients supplies the waste greases and fats that are refined into fuel by other players. Smaller emerging-market pure plays like Sao Martinho offer direct exposure to the Brazilian biofuel market.

Biofuel names have silently outperformed the broader market by a substantial margin over the past year. That said, recent outperformance should be interpreted in light of the fact that the valuation of the whole sector had collapsed in 2022 alongside much of the broader “ESG complex.”

Higher feedstock costs and regulatory shifts are nonetheless creating a stark divide between more established, diversified players and emerging pure plays.

Neste: Shares remain supported despite leverage concerns, as investors focus on Neste’s SAF refinery expansion in Rotterdam. Recent news flow keeps the narrative centered on future capacity and policy-driven demand, outweighing near-term balance sheet risks.

Darling Ingredients: The stock rally reflects strong momentum driven by tight feedstock supply and robust renewable diesel margins. The key engine here is the Diamond Green Diesel (DGD) joint venture with Valero Energy – one of the world’s largest renewable diesel facilities, with capacity of approximately 1.2 billion gallons per year. Valero’s downstream distribution network and refining infrastructure give DGD a structural advantage in capturing the full RIN and LCFS credit stack, while the JV structure limits Darling’s capital exposure and maximizes its leverage as the feedstock-supply partner.

Verbio SE: Recovery is underway, but price action is capped by execution risks at new U.S. biofuel plants. Markets are reacting to delays and ramp-up costs, keeping sentiment cautious despite improving cash flow and higher biodiesel prices.

Borregaard: Less tied to fuel markets, Borregaard trades as a defensive bio-based chemicals play. Its limited exposure to volatile biofuel margins explains its stable valuation relative to more cyclical peers.

REX American Resources: Outperformance is driven by carbon capture and ethanol-linked tax credits (45Q). News on project progress is shifting the story from ethanol margins to policy-backed, high-margin decarbonization revenue.

Sao Martinho: Benefiting from strong Brazilian ethanol prices and corn ethanol expansion, with supportive domestic policy. The stock remains inexpensive relative to peers despite solid growth, partly reflecting commodity exposure and BRL currency risk.

Green Plains: Still lagging due to weak ethanol margins and declining revenues, but early traction in high-protein feed (a biofuel co-product) is improving sentiment. Best viewed as a turnaround story within the ethanol segment.

Investment Conviction Hierarchy

Not all names in this sector deserve equal treatment at current prices. Our preference ranking, based on risk-adjusted exposure to the thesis:

Highest conviction – Darling Ingredients (DAR-US). The DGD/Valero JV gives Darling the best combination of scale, waste-based feedstock advantage (animal fats, UCO), and U.S. policy credit capture in the peer group. UCO-based feedstocks generate the lowest carbon intensity scores, maximizing 45Z and LCFS credit capture simultaneously.

High conviction – Sao Martinho (SMTO3-BR). The cheapest name in the peer group, with Brazilian ethanol prices at multi-year highs and RenovaBio CBIO credits providing an additional domestic income layer. Less exposed to any single regulatory regime than U.S. or EU peers, with domestic consumption growth providing a demand floor.

Selective – Neste (NESTE-FI). The undisputed global quality compounder in renewable fuels, but the current valuation already prices in much of the upside. The Rotterdam SAF expansion is the critical catalyst to watch; confirmation of an on-schedule ramp-up would resolve the leverage overhang.

Avoid near-term – Green Plains (GPRE-US). Corn ethanol margins remain structurally compressed, and the high-protein feed pivot is not yet sufficient to rerate the stock.

The U.S.-Israel war with Iran has already exacted a massive humanitarian and environmental toll. One can only hope for a swift end to the madness but even if that should occur, the impact on energy markets will be permanent and akin to the aftermath from Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Sustainability investors rarely have direct portfolio exposure to fossil fuels but are always indirectly affected by them. Today’s Macro Meets Sustainability Update addresses key questions on oil markets and what it means for energy transition investments.

1. Fossil Fuels and The Cost of Capital

One of the major differences between fossil fuel and transition energy investments (solar, wind, among others) investments is their sensitivity to the cost of capital: renewable energy projects require large upfront capital and generate stable cash flows over decades, making their economics highly sensitive to interest rates. In contrast, fossil fuel projects have a larger share of costs tied to ongoing fuel expenses and generate more near-term, commodity-driven cash flows, so their value depends less on financing conditions. As a result, changes in the cost of capital have a much bigger impact on renewables than on oil and gas investments.

Why this matters during an oil spike is that depending on central banks’ reaction function, renewable energy prospects will improve or deteriorate.

Historically, central banks view short oil price spikes as a tax on growth, while prolonged rises in oil prices are expected to be inflationary. This means that policy rates, on the margin, go down to “accommodate” the oil price spike when it is a short-term supply shock and go up to dampen in the inflationary effect when prices are expected to be longer lasting.

Recall that during the COVID-19 pandemic, many central bankers initially described the surge in inflation as “transitory”, expecting it to be temporary due to pandemic-related supply chain disruptions. However, many regretted the forecast as inflation persisted – and jumped again- during the early months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Today the Governor of the Bank of Canada described the potential for inflation related to the oil price as transitory, a word we wonder if central bankers will again express regret for choosing. It is unclear how long the current oil price surge will last, but pundits are betting toward a long supply crunch. Earlier this week, the head of the International Energy Agency noted that at least forty energy assets across nine countries in the Middle East have been “severely or very severely” damaged since the Iran war began. In Qatar, the damaged liquefied natural gas processing facilities – considered the world’s largest supplier of seaborne gas cargo – is estimated to take three to five years to repair.

At last week’s meeting the U.S. Fed began backtracking on interest rate cuts; rates were left unchanged at the meeting, as was widely expected, and expectations for future rate cuts have been curtailed. Notably, the FOMC members slightly upgraded U.S. economic growth prospects, albeit not by as much as the upward rating to inflation (expected to stay well above the Fed’s 2% target until 2028).

The reaction in renewable energy stocks’ performance to the news was hardly distinguishable from the broader market; both the Clean Energy ETF (ICLN-US) and S&P 500 both sold off on Powell’s speech that outlined a likely delay in rate accommodation. We chalk this up to low confidence; the rate outlook has been messy for some time and recall that last September, we described how the FOMC members are deviating from the conventional central bank’s playbook by cutting rates and simultaneously upgrading the economic outlook and increasing its expectations for inflation to well over 2%.

Our long-held view (for example, please see August 23, 2023 SAA and Climate Change) is that the global economy is ripe for higher structural inflation and most economies are at or near full-employment; it wouldn’t take much for cyclical inflation pressures to be renewed. In this sense, we believe the risks are tilted to higher inflation – interest rates will, on the margin, be a headwind for renewable energy stocks.

2. Renewables and the Energy Security Tailwind

A somewhat more difficult factor to quantify, albeit equally significant for renewables investments, is whether geopolitics today is destroying demand for fossil fuels longer term and favoring a more aggressive switch to renewables.

Until 2022, the concept of energy security was primarily discussed as a priority for emerging economies. But the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China’s limiting of critical materials in response to Trump tariffs, and the U.S.’ hostile involvement in Venezuela have forced most nations to recalculate their appetite for reliance on foreign energy. Solar, wind, geothermal and even nuclear share an advantage over fossil fuels; once the infrastructure is built, it becomes a long-life domestic asset that is far less dependent on global trading systems.

In the most recent World Energy Outlook (2025), the EIA addressed the uptick in energy security as a priority across nations, but concluded that countries are reaching for very different levers to achieve it: many fuel-importing nations are leaning toward renewables and efficiency as solutions, while other countries are simply focusing more on ensuring ample supplies of traditional fuels.

The IEA notes that tracking the diversification of manufacturing capacity of five key clean energy technologies – batteries, heat pumps, electrolysers, solar PV, wind power and EVs – is an important indicator of energy security. Note in the chart below, we show that the installed manufacturing capacity of these technologies is highly geographically concentrated, notably in China. In 2024, China accounted for over 80% of installed manufacturing capacity in every part of the solar PV value chain, and the majority of global manufacturing capacity for wind power components as well. The position of China in battery manufacturing is even stronger, accounting for at least 85% of global production in all parts of the value chain, and over 95% in the case of battery anodes. Manufacturing capacity is more diversified in the case of heat pumps and electrolysers for hydrogen production.

China stands out not least of all because the country dominates supply of the key materials needed for manufacturing of clean energy technology. In this context, it is logical to expect a doubling down in clean energy efforts from China (a country relatively poor in fossil fuel resources but relatively rich in renewable energy inputs). Conversely, now that climate change objectives are no longer relevant in the U.S., the path of least resistance may be to pursue energy security by further levering domestic fossil fuel resources in that country.

We view China and the U.S. as pursuing two opposite paths to energy independence based on their energy resources (fossil fuel vs renewables). Other countries less endowed will necessarily take some middle road, i.e. diversification both among energy trading partners and energy sources. A case in point is India’s pivot to nuclear energy: last year, the government set a goal to develop 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 from approximately 9 GW today and has allocated $2.3 billion for research and development. Earlier this month, the government signed a signed a $2.6 billion deal with Cameco to ensure sufficient uranium supply for the next nine years.

Overall, renewed pressure to improve domestic energy security means a greater pivot to renewables for some nations and will benefit suppliers of renewable energy equipment, though this is unlikely to be a uniform strategy and significantly depends on domestic energy assets available.

Few moments may feel less “sustainable” than a Trump-led government waging a war in the Middle East. Most people will agree that Trump’s second stint in the White House has been remarkably controversial — though perhaps not for the reasons one might expect. The U.S. president has rolled back major environmental policies, ignited a conflict without clearly communicating the strategic objective, and unleashed AI technologies without giving too much thought to its societal consequences. Yet, in a twist reminiscent of the early 2020s, Trump is now indirectly fueling an uptrend in equity prices of many companies that fit squarely within sustainability portfolios.  

After a strong run in the early 2020s, sustainability had become a fatigued investment theme between 2022 and 2025, with a few exceptions, such as nuclear energy and grid plays. Whereas the pre-2022 wave of enthusiasm centered on EVs strongly participating in the energy transition (witness the run-up in stock prices like Tesla and ChargePoint) and themes such as plant‑based food (Beyond Meat, Oatly), this new cycle is being driven by transition-oriented segments such as solar, grid infrastructure, batteries, and transition materials.

With the exception of food sustainability, most SMS environmental themes have outperformed the MSCI World ACWI since April 2, 2025 — the day Trump announced that his economic agenda would once again unleash the U.S’. “animal spirits”.

A look at the composition of these themes shows that they are mostly tilted toward industrials and transition plays, explaining their resilience in the current environment -whereby a rotation away from AI and tech appears underway.

In this context, our alternative energy theme (top ten equal-weighted companies per SMS theme average) has performed strongly – but certain names appear expensive, especially as grid and AI-related investments have dominated investor attention over the past year. Looking at materials in particular, the AI and Grid themes have pushed multiples of companies producing copper and nickel to record levels.

A Look at SMS’ Resilient ‘Nuggets’

Looking at SMS’ long universe of 500+ investable names out of the MSCI World Index, we find a few interesting plays which have derated perhaps a bit too much considering their fundamentals amid current technological and economic tailwinds. What’s more, these names remain on the margin of the AI trade – i.e. they’ve either somewhat already derated because of the software-to-AI rotation and remain relatively immune from a further markdown in AI-related plays.

LKQ — One of the world’s largest automotive recyclers. LKQ’s industry‑leading car‑part sorting technology should help consumers extend the life of their vehicles, particularly in an environment of elevated fuel and car prices amid persistent inflation. The stock is trading near recent lows, offering attractive upside potential.

Autodesk — Despite suffering from a rotation away from software toward AI, Autodesk remains deeply embedded in engineering workflows. While AI will without a doubt reshape its business, it will more likely be integrated into existing processes than replace them. Autodesk offers a compelling entry point, supported by strong ROE and a growing water‑efficiency business — increasingly valuable in a world where water assets are becoming scarce and pricier.

Kepco Electric — Korea’s main electric utility. The country remains a major industrial hub and stands to benefit from its renewed alignment with the U.S. Like other Korean equities, Kepco trades at a low P/E despite a stable economic backdrop and global momentum behind nuclear power – including from sustainability-minded investors who now consider nuclear as a sustainable power source.

WSP — The world’s largest engineering. As Europe, the U.S., and Canada strengthen their push for a more resilient economic foundation, WSP is well positioned to play a central role.

Alstom — The global leader in rail solutions. Alstom stands to benefit from its sizable backlog and the growing need to refurbish and expand rail infrastructure worldwide.

LG Energy Solutions — A key battery supplier to major automakers. The slowdown in U.S. EV manufacturing appears mostly priced in. Elevated energy prices should support the broader EV ecosystem, where sentiment has turned excessively negative. LG Energy Solutions also benefits from the expansion of its energy‑storage division.

Sustainability shifting toward the “Resiliency Trade”

Finally, a notable feature of Trump’s second term is the shift from the early‑2020s sustainability narrative to one centered on resiliency. Many companies and investors have adjusted their framing accordingly, often without altering their actual strategies. Aside from a few U.S. automakers withdrawing from EV development — at a time when gas prices have reached five‑year highs (see our February 26 note, Detroit Goes Into Full Reverse) — SMS themes have largely stayed true to their underlying objectives despite this new investment regime.

In reality, resiliency is not so different from sustainability. It refers to an organization’s ability to withstand shocks, adapt to structural change, and preserve long‑term value creation. For investors, this spans several dimensions:

Markets are increasingly rewarding companies capable of navigating environmental, regulatory, and economic disruptions while capitalizing on innovation and the transition to a low‑carbon economy. As such, resiliency is not merely a defensive trait — it is becoming a driver of durable returns and downside risk mitigation. This dynamic explains why the Industrials and Materials sectors align well with the sustainability–resilience nexus.

As an example of how this also translates into the political sphere, energy efficiency is being promoted as a nation-building priority in countries like Canada. Many other countries are reviving energy-saving policies that were enacted during the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In Asia, work from home policies are increasingly promoted as one way to save fuel. So it seems that resiliency is the new yet less politically loaded word for sustainability.

2025 proved to be a pivotal transition year for global carbon markets, marked by geopolitical upheaval and sharply diverging regional dynamics. The total global value of carbon markets declined slightly to €791 billion, representing a modest 4% drop from the €825 billion recorded in 2024 and placing the market broadly in line with levels observed in 2021. At first glance, this contraction may appear surprising given the continued expansion of carbon pricing schemes worldwide. In reality, the slowdown reflects a year in which climate policy temporarily lost political momentum across several major jurisdictions.

Europe itself was not immune to this shift. Political support for climate policy in the European Union weakened during 2025, with a watered-down agreement on the bloc’s 2040 climate targets and the partial unravelling of the EU’s flagship 2035 internal combustion engine ban late in the year. Decarbonization policy increasingly had to compete for political oxygen in a tense geopolitical environment dominated by security concerns, trade tensions, and economic uncertainty.

Across the Atlantic, political turbulence in the United States amplified these headwinds. In April 2025, the Trump administration issued an executive order explicitly targeting state-led cap-and-invest programs, triggering fears of federal intervention in sub-national carbon markets. International climate cooperation also faced significant setbacks. The International Maritime Organization’s proposed Net Zero Framework was effectively shelved following aggressive pushback from the United States, while Washington’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement introduced new uncertainty into global climate diplomacy and contributed to turbulence in the CORSIA aviation carbon framework.

Yet while policy uncertainty slowed momentum in some areas, the year also revealed a striking divergence in carbon price performance across major markets. European Union Allowances (EUAs) rallied strongly, while carbon prices within the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) weakened considerably.

In Europe, EUA prices averaged €74.40 per tonne in 2025, up from €66.50 the previous year. The rally was fueled by growing expectations of structural supply tightening, combined with record long positions accumulated by investment funds ahead of a sharply reduced auction calendar in 2026. In North America, however, WCI prices moved in the opposite direction, falling below the $30 per tonne threshold by the end of the year. This regional decoupling reflects two very different policy environments: Europe continued tightening supply and embedding carbon pricing deeper into its industrial framework, while the WCI faced prolonged regulatory uncertainty tied to delayed rulemaking by the California Air Resources Board and the lingering psychological overhang of federal legal challenges.

As the dust settles on this volatile year, however, 2026 may mark the moment when carbon markets move into structural expansion. In Europe, a major review of the EU Emissions Trading System and the operational launch of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will further tighten the link between carbon pricing, trade, and industrial policy. In North America, the potential expansion of the Western Climate Initiative suggests that regional carbon markets may continue to grow even in the absence of federal climate leadership.

 

The EU ETS: 2026 Review and the CBAM Reality

The European Union’s carbon market is about to enter another defining phase as it marks its 21st anniversary. In 2026, the European Commission will undertake a comprehensive review of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), examining key structural features including the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), free allocation mechanisms, and the potential expansion of the system to additional sectors. The review will also integrate several recent political compromises, including the newly negotiated 2040 climate targets and broader adjustments to the EU’s decarbonization strategy.

Investors vividly remember the last major ETS overhaul. The 2021 review fundamentally reshaped the system by tightening the emissions cap and strengthening the Market Stability Reserve – changes that helped drive the price of EU carbon allowances to triple over the following two years. The upcoming 2026 review is unlikely to produce changes of the same magnitude; most analysts view it as a fine-tuning exercise ahead of the next phase of the ETS beginning in 2031. Even so, regulatory clarity matters enormously in carbon markets. When emitters and investors gain visibility into the long-term trajectory of supply, they are far more willing to implement sophisticated carbon management strategies that rely on banking, hedging, and actively trading EUAs to optimize compliance costs.

Overlaying this regulatory review is another structural shift: 2026 marks the first operational year of the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). As we stated in our note “Carbon Protectionism: Winners and Losers under EU’s Carbon Border Plan” (July 25, 2024), the mechanism represents one of the most consequential developments in global carbon pricing, fundamentally altering the incentives facing companies that export carbon-intensive goods into the European market.

Under CBAM, importers of products such as steel, cement, aluminum, fertilizers, hydrogen, and electricity must purchase and surrender CBAM certificates reflecting the carbon content of those imports. The price of these certificates is directly linked to EU ETS allowance prices, effectively extending the influence of the EU carbon market beyond the bloc’s borders.

The CBAM phase-in also triggers an equally important transformation within Europe itself. The policy is designed to gradually eliminate the free allocation of EU ETS allowances for sectors covered by CBAM over a nine-year period from 2026 to 2034. The phase-out begins slowly before accelerating toward the end of the transition period and corresponds directly to the CBAM ramp-up. During the transition phase, CBAM will only apply to the portion of emissions that is no longer covered by free allowances under the EU ETS. 

In other words, the incentives game is changing. European industry will progressively lose the buffer of free permits while foreign producers face a growing carbon price at the border. Early commentary around the system suggests this dynamic may already be creating a new category of market activity sometimes referred to as “CBAM proxy hedging.” Industrial importers and traders are beginning to position themselves in the EUA market to hedge future CBAM liabilities, in some cases securing a significant portion of expected carbon exposure several years in advance.

The combined effect of CBAM implementation and the gradual disappearance of free allocations ensures that an ever-larger share of industrial emissions in Europe will be exposed to the full market price of carbon. For companies operating in carbon-intensive sectors, carbon management is no longer a theoretical policy discussion – it is rapidly becoming a central financial variable.

 

WCI: Sub-National Resilience and North American Expansion

While Europe’s carbon market tightens structurally, North America’s Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is quietly demonstrating that sub-national jurisdictions are not waiting for Washington to resolve the climate debate.

The release of a draft linkage agreement on March 3, 2026 outlining the integration of Washington State’s Cap-and-Invest program into the California–Quebec carbon market marks a potentially historic moment for North American carbon pricing. If implemented, the agreement would harmonize compliance instruments, enable joint auctions, and integrate registry systems across participating jurisdictions – effectively expanding the WCI into a larger regional carbon market spanning multiple economies.

For investors watching the political drama unfold in Washington, the move also sends a clear signal: state-level carbon markets are far more resilient than many feared. Despite the Trump administration’s attempts to challenge state cap-and-trade systems, legal scholars and environmental policy experts widely argue that federal executive actions face significant jurisdictional hurdles when attempting to dismantle state-regulated emissions markets. California’s cap-and-trade system is deeply embedded in state law and supported by an established regulatory framework, making it difficult to unwind through federal intervention alone.

At the same time, the broader economic environment could unexpectedly provide support for carbon prices within the WCI system. A new wave of tariffs and industrial policy aimed at reshoring manufacturing to North America is beginning to reshape supply chains across several sectors. As production capacity shifts back toward domestic markets, a greater share of industrial emissions may fall under the jurisdiction of regional cap-and-trade programs.

In a market where emissions caps tighten year after year, increased industrial activity within participating jurisdictions translates directly into greater demand for compliance allowances. If Washington State successfully joins the Western Climate Initiative – with trading potentially beginning as early as 2027 – the expansion of the market, combined with a resurgence in domestic manufacturing, could create the conditions for stronger carbon prices in North America over the coming decade.

For now, however, the key takeaway is simple: while federal climate policy in the United States remains politically contested, regional carbon markets continue to expand and evolve, quietly reinforcing their role as one of the most durable pillars of North American climate policy.

Recent news that America’s leading automakers have effectively written down the value of their EV divisions to zero signals a significant strategic reset in the U.S. auto industry. This shift coincides with the Trump administration’s announcement of the end of EPA emissions rules—removing regulatory pressure to boost fleet fuel efficiency. Together, these developments mark a notable retreat from the aggressive electrification plans of the past decade.

While EV demand has slowed in the U.S. and Canada, global markets tell a different story. Sales remain robust across Europe and Asia (see Charging Up on Cheap EV Stocks, Nov. 13, 2025). Norway is an extreme case: only seven gas‑powered vehicles were sold in December 2025. Yet American consumers remain unconvinced that EVs meet their needs as well as ICE vehicles have over the past century. High sticker prices (even if total cost of ownership is competitive) and an inconsistent national charging network continue to hold back adoption. Layered on top are waning auto sales overall amid rising living costs and declining consumer confidence.

Bank lending has also tightened. Auto loan growth has slowed as subprime delinquency rates reach 30‑year highs, constraining access to financing at a time when affordability is already stretched.

Despite these pressures, America remains a car‑centric society, and purchase intentions remain resilient. Surveys indicate more Americans plan to buy a vehicle within the next six to twelve months than at any point in the past three years. A recent TransUnion survey finds that 40% of U.S. adults are considering purchasing a vehicle within the next year.

This backdrop helps explain why U.S. automaker stock prices more than doubled over the past year—with the exception of Stellantis, whose sizable European operations and its own EV write‑downs weighed on performance. GM and Ford in particular have rallied sharply: GM trades at a 3‑year high and Ford at a 10‑year high.

Both have benefited from the AI‑driven industrial construction boom and the ongoing demand for work trucks (notably Ford Pro and GM’s truck lineup). Yet the combination of stretched consumers and rising subprime defaults signals that the domestic auto cycle may be nearing a turning point. Moreover, prices of foreign EVs continue to fall much faster than those of U.S.-made EVs or ICE vehicles—raising other concerns about U.S. competitiveness.

By comparison, Korean automakers have soared. Following Hyundai’s robotaxi debut at CES 2026, Hyundai and Kia shares are up 80% and 60% YTD, respectively, and have tripled over the past year (see Back to Basics: Sustainable Alpha for 2026, Jan. 8, 2026).

Financial and operational metrics underline the widening performance gap. Ford continues to trail GM in its transition from a legacy automaker to a more EV‑ready competitor. GM appears better positioned domestically in EVs, while Ford’s debt-to-equity ratio above 4 leaves it more exposed than GM and most foreign peers. With both stocks sitting near multi‑year highs, valuations appear stretched given a slowing economy and rapidly falling EV prices.

Sustainability investors love a good cost-decline chart. Over the past decade, solar delivered the mother of all learning curves: a >90% drop in module prices that transformed photovoltaics from a subsidized niche into the cheapest source of electricity across much of the world.

What rarely makes it into the slide deck is that this cost revolution was quietly enabled by a commodity that traded sideways for years. Silver—the most conductive metal and a critical input in solar cell metallization—remained a stable $20–25/oz for most of the early 2020s. That era has ended.

Silver reached an all-time high of $121/oz on January 29, 2026. Even after speculative liquidation drove a sharp correction, prices remain near ~$75—roughly triple early-2024 levels. The structural backdrop remains intact: five consecutive years of supply deficits, cumulative shortfalls of ~820Moz, and a supply base that is largely unresponsive to price signals because 70–80% of silver production is a byproduct of copper, lead, zinc, and gold mining.

 

Not All That Glitters Is Gold

The distinction between gold and silver is fundamental. Gold functions primarily as a monetary asset: jewelry and central bank reserves account for roughly 70–75% of demand, while industrial uses represent only ~7–8%. When gold rallies, it is typically a macro story—currency hedging, inflation protection, geopolitical stress. Please see our note “Go for the Gold” on this subject, March 13, 2024

Silver is structurally different. While still used as an investment and store of value, industrial applications now represent 59% of global demand, up from 50% a decade ago, driven by solar PV, electronics, EVs, 5G infrastructure, and AI-related hardware. This dual identity—monetary and industrial—amplifies volatility. It attracts safe-haven flows while remaining highly sensitive to economic demand. The “Devil’s Metal” nickname reflects precisely that dynamic.

The implication is straightforward: when gold prices double, jewelers absorb the cost. When silver prices triples, manufacturers’ margins compress. For solar producers, that distinction is existential.

Silver’s Role in Solar: From Rounding Error to Margin Pressure

Silver paste is screen-printed onto silicon solar cells to form conductive grid lines (“fingers” and “busbars”) that collect current. The quantity per cell is small—roughly 10–13 mg/W for mainstream TOPCon technology—but at current prices, those milligrams are economically material.

In 2023, at ~$23/oz silver, paste costs were roughly $0.008/W, or 3–5% of total cell production costs. By late 2025, at $80+/oz, that figure rose to approximately $0.022/W—approaching 30% of module selling prices in certain markets. When industry gross margins hover near $0.01/W, a $0.014/W increase in a single input materially alters profitability.

Manufacturers have aggressively “thrifted” silver—reducing loadings from ~40 mg/W a decade ago to <10 mg/W today through thinner lines and multi-busbar designs. However, incremental efficiency gains are reaching diminishing returns. Further reductions increasingly require architectural change rather than process optimization.

The Great Decoupling: Technologies and Their Silver Dependencies

Silver inflation is accelerating technological bifurcation within solar manufacturing. Architectures capable of copper substitution gain structural leverage; those dependent on high-temperature silver processes face prolonged margin risk.

TOPCon: The 70% Constraint
Tunnel Oxide Passivated Contact (TOPCon) cells command about 70% global market share but face the most complex copper substitution challenge. The high-temperature manufacturing process (~800°C) enables copper atoms to diffuse into the silicon and degrade cell performance. This leaves the technology’s dominant producers — JinkoSolar (JKS-US), Canadian Solar (CSIQ-US), and Hanwha Qcells (009830-KR) — structurally exposed to silver prices for the foreseeable future.

HJT and Back-Contact: Copper-Compatible Alternatives
Two minority cell architectures offer a faster path off silver. Heterojunction (HJT) and Back-Contact (BC) cells represent just 13–15% of global production today, but their low-temperature manufacturing processes make copper substitution far more feasible than in TOPCon. This compatibility advantage, once a technical footnote, has become a commercial selling point as silver prices force the industry to rethink its metallization roadmap. LONGi (601012-CN), the world’s largest solar manufacturer, is betting on this shift: the company is targeting mass production of copper-metallized BC cells by Q2 2026, which would make it the first top-five producer to achieve silver-free output at scale.

CdTe Thin Film: The Structural Outlier
First Solar (FSLR-US), the only American/non-Chinese top-five solar panel manufacturer, relies on cadmium telluride (CdTe) technology that uses no silver. Its cost structure is structurally insulated from precious metal volatility. While CdTe historically trailed crystalline silicon on efficiency, the new Series 7 modules are narrowing the gap. As silver prices rise, CdTe’s technology becomes incrementally more competitive.

 

The Innovators’ Edge: Financial Positioning

Our preferred companies within the solar panel manufacturing industry share a defining characteristic: structural insulation from sustained silver inflation—through technology differentiation (First Solar), architectural pivot (LONGi), or policy-protected manufacturing (Hanwha Qcells).

In the section below, we contrast these companies with Canadian Solar, which remains exposed to conventional TOPCon economics without a visible substitution roadmap.

1. First Solar (FSLR-US): The Silver-Free Fortress

First Solar remains the clearest structural beneficiary of high silver prices. The company delivered 5.3 GW of module sales in Q3 2025 and is adding 3.7 GW of incremental US finishing capacity. Its ~54.5 GW contracted backlog provides multi-year visibility.

Risks center on execution (Series 7 ramp) and contract dynamics, but not commodity exposure. In a sustained silver inflation regime, relative margin stability is a differentiator.

2. LONGi Green Energy (601012-CN): Architectural Pivot

LONGi’s HPBC 2.0 platform, targeting Q2 2026 copper mass production, positions it as an early mover in base-metal metallization. BC modules already represented >25% of shipments by Q3 2025. Execution risk remains elevated given 2025 losses, but a successful copper transition would structurally rebase its cost curve into 2026–27.

3. Hanwha Solutions (009830-KR): Policy + Integration

Hanwha Solutions continue to be exposed to rising silver prices, however the company’s U.S. manufacturing footprint (8.4 GW planned capacity in Georgia) provides tariff protection and 45X tax credit eligibility. Near-term execution remains challenged—shipment guidance reduced from 9 GW to 6 GW and plant delays into 2026—but vertical integration (ingots through modules) directly addresses tightening U.S. trade enforcement.

Overall, although Hanwha’s commodity exposure is intact, policy support will at least partially offset input cost volatility.

4. Canadian Solar (CSIQ-US): Structural Exposure

Canadian Solar operates conventional TOPCon technology without disclosed copper metallization initiatives. The company’s energy storage division (e-STORAGE, $3.1B backlog) has provided a partial buffer, but not enough to offset the damage at the cell level: three consecutive quarters of net losses (~$75M cumulative) illustrate how little insulation conventional TOPCon offers against input cost inflation.

If silver remains above $60/oz through 2027, TOPCon producers without substitution pathways face sustained profitability pressure.

Financial Divergence: Growth and Margin Separation

The divergence in cost structure between these four companies is increasingly visible in reported fundamentals. Over the past three years, First Solar delivered 24% revenue CAGR with 44% gross margins — an outlier versus peers experiencing revenue contraction (–13% to –26%) and single-digit or negative margins. R&D intensity also diverges, with First Solar allocating materially more capital to innovation relative to revenue.

Equity markets have noticed. Since January 2024 (see chart below), First Solar — the only manufacturer with zero silver exposure — has outperformed the MSCI World index, while every silver-dependent manufacturer has underperformed. The gap is striking: First Solar trades roughly 40-50% higher than in 2024, while Hanwha Solutions has been cut in half and Canadian Solar has lost roughly a third of its value. The message is unambiguous: investors are already rewarding silver immunity.

If 2025 taught us anything, it is that the impact of Trump’s political orientations on equity prices is often far from what conventional wisdom would predict. In our final note of last year, we highlighted a plethora of sustainability themes that performed far differently than consensus expectations predicted under a Trump government.

Indeed, last year showed investors, including your SMS editors, the need for critical ignoring in order to truly parse the signal from the noise. Though we doubt that Trump will take less space in the news cycle, our 2026 investment outlook is a return to two fundamental questions of investing:

Our relatively sanguine view on equity markets stems from a cool-headed analysis of policy settings. In the U.S., fiscal policy is projected to be modestly positive in 2026 whereas it was restrictive in 2025. There is likely to be Q1 pop in fiscal thrust – thanks to a resumption in federal spending after the shutdown, as well as OBBBA tax cuts that will boost spending (see chart below).

Meanwhile, as the chart below highlights, overall financial conditions have been favourable for some time, and it is hard to see that changing for the foreseeable future; politics at the Fed suggest a dovish configuration for 2026 and beyond.

To be sure, an economic recession in the U.S., occurring in parallel with major weakness in China would put a damper on our moderately bullish thesis. The American labor market is a sore spot – the majority of jobs created over the past year have been in the hospitality and health care sectors, both of which offer under-average wage compensation. But hiring managers still report unfilled positions and continue to be optimistic about hiring; we are resolved to wait until there are definitive signs of a labor market breakdown or unmistakable evidence of a recession before becoming more bearish on risk assets.

Given the above-described policy settings: which sectors offer an attractive risk/reward backdrop to investors in 2026?  Below we highlight six sustainable equity investment ideas that can benefit from mildly favorable policy settings that we believe are primed to outperform.

 

Idea #1: The Grid Super-Cycle: Expansion vs. Integration

Investing in the grid is hardly a contrarian take in 2026. In fact, it is arguably the most crowded trade on the street – but the “why” matters more than the “what.” Most analysis treats the grid as a monolith, indiscriminately buying utilities and equipment makers. We see it differently. The global grid trade has bifurcated into two distinct markets with opposing drivers: the U.S. is in a frantic race for expansion (more capacity for AI), while Europe is fighting for integration (more stability for renewables).

The U.S. “Expansion” Trade:  As we discussed in our October 16, 2025, note “The Energy Transition Just Switched Time Zones”, the U.S, power grid is in aggressive growth mode for the first time in two decades. The driver is no longer just replacing aging poles; it is raw load growth from data centers requiring massive amounts of firm power.

The Rest of World “Integration” Trade:  Outside of the U.S., the narrative flips. Europe isn’t just fighting for more power; it is fighting to stabilize it. As renewable penetration crosses 50%, national grids are breaking under the volatility.

 

Idea #: 2 Dreading Natural Disasters?  Add Long Positions in Dredgers

Despite the political rhetoric, the cost of natural disasters and the need for climate resilience are not going away. Finding climate adaptation plays that go beyond insurance and engineering services companies is sometimes challenging, but one niche segment that deserves more attention from investors is dredging.

Dredging companies are on the front line of combatting rising sea levels and stronger storms that threaten the reliability of ports, flood control channels, and coastal waterways. And beyond climate considerations, dredging is a necessary economic investment. Ports and inland waterways are the backbone of domestic commerce in many countries and in international trade, yet many are not maintained to their necessary depths. Inadequate dredging leads to shipping delays and higher transportation costs. Strengthening supply chains and supporting domestic manufacturing requires well functioning ports and dredging companies are critical.

Two public dredging companies of interest are Great Lakes Dredge & Dock (GLDD), which operates mostly in the U.S., and DEME Group (DEME) that derives most of its revenues in Europe.  

GLDD:  A large share of U.S. dredging revenue is tied to government contracts, which are influenced by appropriations cycles, regulatory approvals, and political priorities.  Fortunately for GLDD, despite Trump having gutted disaster relief agencies like FEMA, funding tailwinds for coastal resiliency and port deepening remain intact -the company has strong backlog visibility (total backlog is over 1.3 times total 2024 annual revenue). Indeed, the company’s value proposition hinges on pairing the industry’s youngest and largest dredging fleet with complex project execution expertise, allowing it to capture market share and higher margins in capital deepening and coastal resiliency work. Importantly, in the U.S., dredging projects are protected from international competition:  the Jones Act requires U.S.-built, U.S.-crewed vessels for domestic dredging, which provides an important moat around the company’s core revenue base:  there are no real U.S. dredging companies that can compete with GLDD.

DEME:  Similar to GLDD, DEME operates in both port and coastal infrastructure dredging, as well as soil and sediment remediation and the company also has significant revenue associated with Engineering, Procurement, Construction, and Installation of offshore wind (foundations, turbine installation, cables) plus oil & gas decommissioning).  The company’s most important moat is its fleet modernization:  DEME operates cutting-edge vessels that allow it to do work in deeper waters and complex installations that legacy fleets cannot match. Investors should note however that DEME is stock is less liquid, given that two major investors own over 70% of outstanding stock.

Over the past year, GLDD stock performance has kept pace with the S&P500, though DEME has lagged. What is more, while the S&P 500 is reaching ever higher valuations (P/E of 29 for the entire market and 23.7 excluding tech), dredging companies have been consistently getting cheaper over the past three years.  Both companies currently trade at 12 times earnings, compared to historical valuations closer to 16 times. With structural tailwinds in place and large project backlogs, both companies offer good value in a critical climate adaptation sector.

 

Idea #3: Short Peabody Coal – The King of a Shrinking Castle

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and market reports from late 2025, coal consumption by the electric power sector rose by approximately 9% to 11% compared to 2024 in the United States. This was the first year when usage of thermal coal for power generation purposes increased in more than two decades of decline. Stronger power demand coming from data centers and a frigid winter in North America both supported the price of coal pure plays such as Peabody Energy (BTU), which is trading at a five year high.

However, our expectation is that it will be difficult to notch out more coal demand from here. Although it may be true in theory that that the U.S.’ fleet of thermal coal plants has a massive amount of “spare capacity” (roughly half of the fleet sits idle on any given day), most of that capacity is unusable: old  coal plants are hard to restart and are unreliable, and grid capacity near offline plants is insufficient. Overall, we do not expect that the 2025 increase in thermal coal usage is the start of a new trend. In this context, stock investors are currently pricing BTU as if their earnings are far more durable than they are.

Idea #4: Long GLP-1s: The Transition to Essential Medicine

The investment thesis for weight loss drugs is evolving from a consumer discretionary theme to a medical necessity. While 2024 and 2025 were defined by lifestyle adoption, 2026 will likely be driven by clinical indications. Recent data confirms GLP-1 efficacy in treating chronic kidney disease (CKD), heart failure, and addiction disorders. As these drugs secure approval for such indications, insurance reimbursement rates should improve, transitioning the Total Addressable Market (TAM) from a self-pay model to a covered, essential medicine model. Furthermore, the anticipated rollout of oral formulations, led by Novo Nordisk’s oral Wegovy, promises to democratize access by removing the barriers associated with cold-chain storage and injection administration.

A significant investment performance gap emerged in 2025, with Eli Lilly (LLY) appreciating approximately 40% while Novo Nordisk (NVO) corrected by roughly 40%. While Lilly executed well on its pipeline, we believe investors have over-penalized Novo for temporary supply chain constraints. Novo Nordisk remains the global incumbent with the deepest clinical data repository. We view the current valuation disparity as irrational and expect mean reversion in 2026 as Novo resolves supply bottlenecks. For investors seeking diversified exposure to the theme – and protection against single-stock volatility – the Roundhill GLP-1 & Weight Loss ETF (OZEM) offers a balanced basket of approximately 25 companies, capturing both the established duopoly and emerging biotech acquisition targets.

 

Idea #5: Buy a Korean Car – and the Stock

We have outlined in past notes the bullish case for Korea stocks (for example, please see “Seoul Mates: The Case for Korean Sustainability Plays”, May 1, 2025). We especially like Korean EV carmakers.

Korean car makers appear to be much more engaged in electrification compared to their U.S./Japanese counterparts, and the trade deal with the US takes some uncertainty away on the country’s ability to export to the U.S.

To be sure, consensus forecasts for global EV sales in 2026 are not particularly rosy. However, the Korean brands are poised to steal market share from other manufacturers. After all, their build quality is impressive especially given the price. For example, Kia is putting out its K5 EV car at the same price as its ICE sister K4 car. Meanwhile, Hyundai just unveiled it’s robotaxi –a testament to the company’s recent technological catch-up.

We especially like Kia at its current price – the stock is training at very low multiples relative to its peers.

Idea #6: A Word About Oil

Prior to events in Venezuela, short positions in U.S. oil services companies SLB and Halliburton were among our top 2026 investment ideas. The thesis is straightforward: oil services are the part of the supply chain most sensitive to oil prices. With WTI trading at cyclical lows below $60/bbl and a strong consensus for little upside in 2026, drilling activity is likely to remain weak. Historically, after a prolonged period at these prices, oil companies prepare to strand certain fossil fuel assets.

SLB and HAL stock prices traded higher in late 2025 while oil prices traded down—a rare deviation that doesn’t tend to last and often makes for an interesting entry point in short positions.

However, Trump’s intervention in Venezuela and plans for U.S. oil companies to re-enter the country drove a significant pop in U.S. oil companies over the past week. Our editorial team is divided as to whether this price action produces a better opportunity to short or whether to stand aside. Note that oil prices have not rallied since the January 2nd intervention and the world remains well-supplied with heavy crude. The price pop likely reflects optimism that drilling contracts will be awarded to U.S. companies at the expense of other suppliers like Alberta. Trump meets with U.S. oil executives next week to discuss Venezuela; we will wait for more clarity before becoming more bearish on related investments.

Investors looking to gain commodity exposure related to the energy transition theme often look no further than copper. After all, copper is considered the backbone of electrification as wiring, motors, grids, and charging networks require huge amounts of the metal. But other materials are arguably just as important and are somewhat neglected by investors: aluminum, a key material for lightweighting,  has several tailwinds that make aluminum producers – both primary and secondary (scrap) – an interesting investment proposal.

Aluminum: What is it?

Unlike copper or gold, aluminum never appears as a pure metal, it is bound up mostly in bauxite, a rock found on the earth’s surface, primarily in Guinea, Australia and China. To make aluminum, alumina is extracted from the bauxite (rock) using caustic soda. Alumina is then turned into aluminum in liquid form using electrolysis, which is hugely electricity intensive. Indeed, aluminum has often been called electricity in a solid form because it takes a huge amount of electricity to produce it.

Because bauxite and alumina are relatively common, aluminum is an abundant material that is used in a myriad of applications and across economic sectors (see chart below).

Importantly, unlike fossil fuels and some other industrial inputs, aluminum intensity is increasing in the global economy. The charts below show the trajectory of oil and aluminum per unit of GDP. Fossil fuel intensity in the global economy has been dropping for several decades. Conversely, aluminum and copper intensity of GDP stabilized around 2010 and is widely forecast to increase in the years ahead.

The largest increase in aluminum demand – both now and for the next several years- is in the transportation sector, which is already the single largest consumer of aluminum, accounting for almost 30% of global demand.  Lightweight vehicles and aircraft, designed for fuel efficiency and lower emissions, rely heavily on aluminum components. This trend will increase as automakers continue to adopt aluminum for lightweighting, especially in electric vehicles whereby manufacturers look for ways to offset the weight of batteries, and to comply with emissions standards.

Outside of transportation, other tailwinds for aluminum demand include:

On the supply side, bauxite is considered a plentiful resource that is relatively easy to access given that it is found near the earth’s surface. The chart below shows how aluminum compares to other metals – aluminum production is relatively resource efficient in that it takes only 7 kg of rock (bauxite) to produce 1 kg of aluminum. This ratio has held fairly steady over the past several decades.  

Although there are no physical constraints to aluminum supply, most forecasters expect aluminum supply to tighten relative to demand beyond the next three years.

Most notable is that China, currently responsible for about 60% of global aluminum production, has implemented a national ceiling of 45 million tons per year on primary aluminum production. The cap was established in 2017 to address overcapacity and environmental concerns. 2024 was the first year that the cap appeared to be binding (Chinese aluminum output was about 45 mt in 2024) and it is very likely that it is binding again this year.

In March 2025 the Chinese government issued a formal plan: “Aluminum Industry High‑Quality Development Implementation Plan (2025–2027)”, in which supply-side controls on primary aluminum capacity and output were reaffirmed. The implication is that Chinese supply is unlikely to meet rising global aluminum demand.  

The second supply-side risk is electricity constraints. Given the quantity of electricity necessary to produce aluminum, the economics of aluminum are essentially the economics of power. It’s no wonder that smelting capacity is clustered where electricity is relatively cheap (e.g. Norway, Canada and increasingly in the Middle East).

Green Aluminum Plays

Since electricity is such a major input to aluminum production, competitive advantages are available for producers that can either reduce the cost or the volume of the electric input. Enter recycling.

One of the defining features of aluminum is its ability to be recycled infinitely without losing its original properties. Moreover, making recycled aluminum only takes around 5% of the energy needed to make new aluminum. Therefore, there is a strong economic incentive to recycle: about 75%  of all aluminum ever produced is still in use today.

Given the supply risks mentioned above (limited Chinese output of primary aluminum and a potential shortfall of electric power), there are strong incentives to improve aluminum recycling rates. In this context, it should be no surprise that we favor non-Chinese companies with the technology and capacity to produce with high recycled content, especially those with access to low-emissions electricity like hydropower.

In the table below, we show GHG emissions for large cap aluminum producers as a share of revenue.  Note that emissions are particularly important to monitor for aluminum companies, since the vast majority of emissions are related to the source of energy used in producing electricity used smelting. What sets the low-emissions companies apart from their peers is that they all have sizeable recycling operations.

Apart from a comparatively low carbon footprint, aluminum recycling companies have also distinguished themselves from their peers by their stock market performance, both over the past three years and especially in 2025.

As we have written in past notes, since recycling is geographically agnostic, it bypasses many geopolitical and trade issues – one can build a recycling plant anywhere so long as there is access to reliable energy and labor. Importantly, input feed (scrap aluminum) generally trades at a discount to the index price of aluminum, but a significant risk is the availability of scrap. Several countries, but most notably the EU, are set to place export bans on aluminum scrap, precisely because they view it as a national security issue, just like access to copper and rare earth metals. So far in 2025, the price margin between scrap and primary aluminum prices is worth monitoring even if it has remained stable up to now.

Overall, in a world that risks becoming increasingly energy constrained, we expect that aluminum producers most exposed to recycling will outperform and should command a premium over those companies that compete for (higher priced) electricity inputs.

Interestingly, there is currently little valuation discrepancy between the companies in our recycling leaders and laggards baskets (see the chart below).  

Earlier this year, we published a note explaining why only three publicly traded companies were poised to reap the gains of a bull market in rare earth metals in 2025. Since our note (“Critical Minerals, Critical Moves: The Scramble for Rare Earth Metals”, May 7, 2025) an equally weighted basket of MP Materials, Lynas Rare Earths and Neo Performance Materials has gained almost 100%.

Rare earth metals are the lifeblood of most new technologies, both military and civilian (many of which sit squarely within the energy transition theme).

We were compelled to write our previous note due to the geopolitical context of procuring rare earth metals. Recall that in April, China implemented export restrictions on seven rare earths in retaliation to tariffs imposed by the U.S. Trump administration. Then in October, China further restricted supply by adding wide-ranging controls on several rare earths, as well as on battery precursors and superhard materials. At the end of October, U.S. and China leaders reached a trade truce, whereby the most recent restrictions have been temporarily suspended. History suggests, however, that Chinese export restrictions are far from over.

In our last note, we focused on recycling as a possible means to improve rare earth elements (REE) supply. After all, recycling can be geographically agnostic and would lessen the ecological footprint of extremely dirty mining activity. We stand by our previous conclusions: recycling offers a path to increased REE autonomy. However, with recycling rates of REEs currently under 1% and very few operations commercially viable, even an aggressive ramp up in recycling will not be a significant solution to diversify REE supply over the next five years.

In today’s note, we explore whether there are other means to avoid sleepwalking into an REE crisis and how investors should position within this sector.

REE Substitution?

It is not hard to understand that the motivation to find substitutes to REE use is high and rising. After all, companies that use REEs as an input to production are currently held hostage by a tightly controlled supply chain. Moreover, mining and processing REEs creates massive environmental degradation and human health risks. And the costs to procure REEs are forecast to rise sharply as demand swamps available supply.

Unfortunately, however, it seems that REE mining is here to stay for some time. Of the major industries that rely on REEs (defense, renewable energy, consumer electronics), we could only find evidence in the electric vehicle industry for a potential pathway to significantly reduce REE use.

Currently, most electric vehicles run on permanent-magnet motors that are comprised of REEs (Nd, Pr, Dy, Tb). However, alternatives exist. For example, BMW produces electric SUVs with motors that contain no rare earth metals; the development of these motors began in reaction to the 2011 neodymium price spike triggered by Chinese policy. These vehicles will be available for sale in North America in 2026 and may offer a pathway for larger adoption of REE-free electric vehicles.

Conversely, catalytic converters that are used in the exhaust systems of non-EV vehicles are still entirely reliant on REEs such as cerium oxide. While this is not the prime reason, the potential divergence in REE dependence adds more credence to our view that the combination of technological developments and scale are making wider EV adoption the path of least resistance (please see our recent note, “Charging Up on Cheap EV Stocks”, November 13, 2025).

Nonetheless, the likelihood of a widespread conversion across industries away from rare earth metals is unlikely. A “simple” swapping out materials often requires a costly redesign of components, systems, or supply chains. Many substitutions and alternative‐material efforts are still at the research or pilot stage and are far from economically viable.

Follow The Money?

In the absence of private sector capabilities to re-orient away from REEs, governments are increasingly throwing money at the problem. While there are newly announced programs to jumpstart R&D for substitute materials, the bulk of government attention so far has been allocated to building national champions with the aim to re-build global supply chains. The table below highlights various government investments and interventions in 2025 alone:

There are several potential drawbacks for investors when governments intervene in public corporations (reduced operational efficiency, deprioritizing shareholder returns, distorted market signals, etc.) but in the case of rare earth metals, we expect that the advantages outweigh any problems. Since rare earth metal mining is inherently a risky business, governments as stakeholders tend to lower the overall risk for other shareholders and improve financing conditions (i.e. cost and access to capital). Additionally, from a sustainability perspective, there is some evidence that environmental standards tend to be higher when governments take stakes, which is especially significant in the mining sector.

In the U.S., MP Materials has become the government REE “darling”. Earlier this year, the Department of War created a Public Private Partnership (PPA) with the company that established a 10-year price floor of $110 per kg (roughly $40/kg above the current market price) for NdPr. The government will purchase 100% of the magnets produced for defense and commercial use for a decade following commissioning. Needless to say, these actions materially stabilize the near-term earnings outlook and helps support the stock price, irrespective of China’s next moves.

Meanwhile, smaller REE companies (miners) have failed to keep up. With no deal from Uncle Sam, these companies trade similar to junior miners of other commodities (gold, copper, nickel).

Investment Strategy

Given our analysis above, there are three crucial points that investors looking to play the rare earth metals theme need to keep in mind:

Taken this information together, we believe investing in rare earth elements should be framed as such: