There is an old market cliché that investors like divided government because politicians cannot do very much. The logic is straightforward: when neither party can pass its agenda unilaterally, the odds of sweeping changes to taxes, regulation and spending fall, and companies can plan around a narrower range of outcomes. The 2026 midterms provide an unusually revealing test of that idea. Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress while President Trump remains in the White House, leaving neither side with the votes required to impose a broad policy reset. The likely result is not stability in the conventional sense, but a narrower range of federal outcomes, more aggressive congressional oversight, and a larger role for states in determining how energy, infrastructure, and healthcare policy evolves over the next two years.
The initial market response was consistent with this interpretation, although it was far from uniform. We track four SMS policy baskets, labeled B1 to B4 in the chart below: Transition Utilities (B1), Grid & AI Enablers (B2), the Solar Value Chain (B3) and Medicaid & ACA-Exposed (B4). The SMS Solar Value Chain and Medicaid & ACA-Exposed baskets rallied sharply around the election, Transition Utilities also advanced, and the Grid & AI Enablers basket sold off. The split looks like a repricing of political downside where it had been concentrated, alongside a reassessment of areas where expectations, valuations and public resistance had already climbed.
The return of the policy floor
For much of the past two years, investors in clean energy and healthcare faced more than ordinary regulatory uncertainty. Unified Republican control created the possibility that executive actions could be reinforced through budget reconciliation, appropriations and durable statutory changes. Democratic control of Congress does not make policy supportive, but it reduces the probability that another large legislative package will deepen the retrenchment already enacted under the Trump administration.
That difference matters for valuation because a sector does not need a new subsidy or entitlement expansion to rerate. When expectations are depressed, a lower probability of the worst outcome can be sufficient. The immediate rallies in solar and healthcare therefore look less like forecasts of a new progressive policy cycle than recognition that the distribution of possible outcomes has narrowed. Investors are pricing a floor, not yet a catalyst.
Basket 1: Transition Utilities
The Transition Utilities basket captures companies positioned to earn regulated or contracted returns from the buildout of cleaner generation, transmission, distribution, and grid resilience. The basket is less dependent on a new federal subsidy package than the solar manufacturers and installers, but it is highly sensitive to state regulation, allowed returns, permitting, and the allocation of infrastructure costs.
States may matter more than Congress
The federal result will dominate headlines, but the state-level shift may have more direct investment consequences. Five governorships moved from Republican to Democratic control, while Democratic gains in attorney-general and regulatory offices change who shapes implementation, enforcement and utility planning. Energy policy in the United States is already highly federalized: states influence utility rate cases, transmission siting, integrated resource plans, renewable procurement, net metering and building standards.
This creates an important asymmetry for Transition Utilities. The basket does not require Washington to pass another national climate package. The companies need permission to deploy capital, recover investments through rates and earn returns on transmission, generation and resilience spending. A supportive governor or public utility commission can therefore influence earnings visibility even when Congress remains deadlocked.
There is, however, a less comfortable side to the state-policy argument. If voters have become more sensitive to electricity affordability, utilities are not automatically beneficiaries simply because regulators shift costs away from data centers or favor clean investment. The same commissions that approve grid spending also determine how quickly utilities recover that spending and what returns shareholders are allowed to earn. A campaign against electricity bills can therefore become a campaign against the pace of capital spending, cost recovery or allowed returns. The investment question is not simply whether infrastructure is necessary, but whether utilities can demonstrate that it lowers system costs and allocate those costs in a way regulators will continue to accept.
Basket 2: Grid & AI Enablers
The Grid & AI Enablers basket represents the physical layer behind electrification and digital growth. These companies benefit from the need for substations, transformers, switchgear, transmission lines, cooling systems and specialized construction. Their exposure is broader than clean energy, which gives the basket a stronger secular demand base but also links it to data-center capital spending and the politics of electricity affordability.
Why Grid & AI Enablers sold off
The decline in Grid & AI Enablers is the most useful counterweight to a simple blue-wave narrative. The basket had already been one of the strongest trades of 2026, supported by data-center construction, manufacturing investment and the expectation of a long grid-capital cycle.
Campaign politics supports part of the sell-off. Many Democrats ran against data centers: campaigns spent more than $380 million on television ads mentioning them, and Democrats outspent Republicans on the topic by more than three to one. Of the 34 governors elected in races AP called, 32 back stronger regulation and 12 back bans or moratoria. Tougher permitting, ratepayer-protection rules and local moratoria are now more likely, and they land on the demand that Grid & AI Enablers had been valued on.
The size of the move may still overstate the damage to this basket. Developers facing multi-year interconnection queues have been turning to behind-the-meter generation, and one tracker counts roughly 90 GW of announced behind-the-meter capacity, more than a quarter of planned US data-center capacity. Projects that supply their own power sidestep much of the ratepayer-cost argument, but they still need switchgear, transformers and electrical construction. Rules that make data centers pay for their own grid upgrades could push more projects on-site instead of cancelling them
In short, the election results do not eliminate the infrastructure opportunity for Eaton [ETN-US], Quanta Services [PWR-US] or EMCOR Group [EME-US], but it can slow the conversion of a powerful long-term theme into near-term revenue and make elevated valuations more sensitive to disappointment.
Basket 3: Solar Value Chain
The Solar Value Chain basket is the most direct policy-duration trade in the group. It spans domestic manufacturing, utility-scale equipment and residential deployment, so the companies respond differently to tariffs, tax credits, interest rates and state-level rules. What unites the basket is that the probability of further policy deterioration can matter almost as much as the probability of new support.
Solar: a repricing of survival, not a return to the IRA
The post-election solar rally should not be mistaken for a restoration of the Biden-era policy architecture. President Trump retains control of the executive branch and the veto, while many of the incentives weakened under unified Republican government cannot be readily restored. Trade policy, federal permitting and agency implementation also remain important sources of risk.
What changed is that the clean-energy industry now has additional institutional defenses. Democratic committee chairs can conduct oversight, slow appropriations language, scrutinize agency implementation and use must-pass legislation to seek targeted concessions. State governments can also sustain renewable portfolio standards, storage programs, distributed-solar rules and procurement mandates. For a basket that remained deeply negative for the year even after the November rally, reducing the probability of another policy shock can have a disproportionate effect.
Basket 4: Medicaid & ACA-Exposed Healthcare
The healthcare basket combines managed-care organizations, hospital operators and a healthcare property company. The common thread is exposure to insured patient volumes and public reimbursement, but the transmission mechanism differs: Centene and Molina are directly affected by enrollment and rate setting, while hospitals are affected through payer mix, uncompensated care and utilization.
Healthcare: gridlock can still protect earnings
The healthcare basket may be the clearest expression of the policy-floor thesis. Democratic control of Congress does not automatically repeal the Medicaid financing changes and ACA provisions enacted under President Trump. The White House can veto a broad reversal, and Senate rules remain an obstacle to standalone legislation. Providers and managed-care companies should therefore not assume that the pre-2025 policy environment will return.
Nevertheless, the election changes the negotiating environment around additional cuts and implementation. Healthcare affordability was a major voting concern, and Democrats now control the committees, hearings and legislative calendar in Congress. Partial mitigation through budget negotiations, implementation delays, targeted ACA support or relief for hospitals is more plausible than it was before the election. Those changes can matter materially at the company level because managed-care enrollment, reimbursement and hospital uncompensated care respond to policy at the margin.
The next two years are about floors, not catalysts
The four baskets point to a differentiated conclusion. Transition Utilities gain from a lower federal downside tail and potentially friendlier state regulation. Solar receives the largest policy rerating because the sector had absorbed the greatest policy damage, although the rally does not by itself establish a new bull market. Medicaid- and ACA-exposed companies benefit from a reduced probability of further retrenchment and a greater chance of targeted mitigation. Grid & AI Enablers retain the strongest secular demand case, but they also face the clearest risk that electricity affordability and local opposition complicate the investment cycle.
The central question after an election is usually what the winners will do. In this case, investors may get more insight by asking what each side can no longer do alone. Democrats cannot rebuild the old policy regime while Trump controls the White House, but Trump can no longer rely on a compliant Congress to deepen it. For sectors carrying significant policy scars, fragmented government can function as downside protection. The 2026 blue wave may matter less because it puts Democrats in control of Congress than because it fragments control of policy across Washington, state capitals and regulatory bodies.
Most professionals in the energy sector, whether in renewables or conventional sources, know Jevons paradox: when efficiency lowers the cost of using a resource, total consumption tends to rise rather than fall. The pattern is visible today in two places. Cheaper solar and wind have added to global supply without displacing existing sources, and AI and data centers have pushed electricity demand growth to its fastest pace in decades, even as the efficiency of computing improves. But a second paradox sits alongside it: at a time when the politics of climate policy have rarely been more contested, the practical ingredients for meaningful progress are finally almost uniformly available, because the cost, technology and security arguments now point the same way in most countries.
It is easy to be a skeptic. Global energy use since the early 1900s shows new sources layered on top of old ones, with none yet displaced (Chart 1). For all the talk of a transition, the aggregate data show little evidence of one.
Indeed, looking at total global energy use from primary sources (i.e. before turned into electricity), fossil fuels and traditional biomass that are high in carbon emissions still account for about 87% of our energy use (see the chart below). There is no universally accepted threshold of a low-carbon transition, but leveraging the climate scenarios of organizations like the IEA, a net-zero-aligned transition generally means fossil fuels fall to about 20% to 25% of primary energy, while non-fossil sources (renewables, nuclear, hydro) provide roughly 75 to 80%. If we extrapolate the current pace of transition, it will take at least another 100 years to get anywhere close to a low-carbon energy system!
But it’s unlikely that the energy transition will follow the trajectory of the past because many of the pre-conditions that took decades to arrive are now in place.
In today’s note, we give four reasons why the ability to remove carbon from our energy supply has never been higher.
Reason #1: The Economics of Solar and Wind Are Winning
In the spring of 2025 (A Transition Tipping Point, May 29, 2025), we argued that many renewable technologies are entering the exciting phase of the S-curve, i.e. when growth in usage becomes exponential. The uptake of new technologies usually occurs when the cost is sufficiently competitive to make switching from the incumbent economically enticing.
This is now becoming the case for renewables: The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) found that more than 90% of utility-scale renewable capacity commissioned in 2025 delivered power at a lower cost than the cheapest new fossil fuel alternative in its market when measured by the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), i.e. the average cost of producing a megawatt hour (MWh) over a plant’s life, before the cost of integrating it into the grid.
The gap appears widest where capital is cheap and fuel is imported. For example, onshore wind in China averaged US$27/MWh, against gas-fired LCOE of US$50 to 60/MWh where gas is cheap. To be sure, this is the current extreme example of renewable costs that are favorable relative to fossil fuels; in a recent analysis, Thunder Said Energy shows that LCOE by region varies remarkably. In the U.S., gas and coal remain competitive with solar and wind, whereas in Europe, China and Australia, renewables are already the clear winner. The key takeaway is that in most parts of the world, economics now favor the technology that backs an aggressive energy transition.
Reason #2: Energy security aligns with renewables
For most of the world, energy security favors renewables because the vulnerability they replace is a recurring one: a fossil fuel-importing country must buy, ship and receive fuel every year, so its supply, price and routes are exposed continuously. In contrast, a solar farm, wind turbine or geothermal plant becomes a long-life domestic asset once it is built and is far less dependent on global trading systems. Since 2022, the need for domestic energy security has been proven: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s limits on critical materials in response to U.S. tariffs, and U.S. involvement in Venezuela have forced most nations to reconsider their reliance on foreign energy.
This year’s conflict in the Middle East reinforced the point and China is the clearest test of the argument so far. The country imports about 70% of its oil, roughly half of it from the Gulf, yet it has been the least disrupted of the large importers during the Strait of Hormuz crisis. After the strait closed in March, China’s crude imports fell by about a third. About 60% of the unreplaced shortfall was met from storage, but the remainder was absorbed by a real fall in the oil burned. That fall was manageable because of electrification, one of several buffers: electric vehicles accounted for more than 60% of domestic monthly vehicle sales in the first half of 2026, and China added more wind capacity in that period than in any full calendar year before 2025. The crisis has also raised demand for Chinese equipment, with solar exports reaching a new records in March 2026.
Countries will try to increase energy security according to the resources they hold; China is relatively poor in fossil fuels and rich in renewable energy inputs, so it’s easy to understand the ramp up in renewables in this context. The U.S. has relatively abundant domestic fossil resources, so there is far less urgency from a security perspective to transition to renewables. As we wrote earlier this year (please see Macro Meets Sustainability: Outlook for Q2 and Beyond, March 26, 2026), other countries less endowed will necessarily pursue diversification both among energy trading partners and energy sources; this will favor renewables relative to the status quo.
Reason #3: Storage Is Closing the Intermittency Gap
Falling battery costs have turned solar’s main physical weakness – that it produces only when the sun shines – into an economic problem that can be priced and solved. BloombergNEF reported that lithium-ion battery prices fell to a record US$108 per kilowatt hour (kWh) in 2025, 93% below 2010 levels, and that stationary storage (batteries installed at fixed sites such as solar farms and substations to store electricity for later use on the grid) fell 45% in a single year. The drop reflects intense competition in China, where annual stationary cell production capacity is roughly double global demand. In other words, there is a strong likelihood that China can flood the market with cheap batteries that will make the intermittency problem a thing of the past.
In fact, the effect is already visible on grids: Ember estimates that solar plus batteries met more than a quarter of California’s evening peak demand on the average day in the first half of 2026, up from 6.8% in 2023, while Texas batteries supplied a record 20% of evening demand in March.
The investment conclusion is that storage turns the intermittency problem from a question of physics into a question of cost. The cost is falling quickly, making renewables + battery storage competitive with gas in a growing number of markets.
Reason #4: Policy Can Solve The Remaining Hurdle
Policy still shapes the pace of the energy transition, but the problem policy needs to solve is no longer the prohibitive costs of renewables, but rather the administrative process. The IEA reports that more than 2,500 GW of renewable, large-load and storage projects are stalled in grid connection queues worldwide, that grid investment lags far behind generation, and that congestion-related curtailment is already rising. As we previously argued (Power Hungry: The Real Cost of a Digital Future, October 23, 2025), large power projects can take five to ten years to permit and build, against about two years for a data center. Europe is on a similar path, with the European Commission identifying slow permitting as a binding constraint and aiming to adopt the European Grids Package by the end of the year.
If any investor has the scale and resources to build adaptation exposure deliberately, it is Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM). The fund manages about NOK 22,700bn, holds 7,077 companies in 54 countries and owns an average of 1.2% of each. Its returns therefore rise and fall with the global economy and climate rather than with any single company. Like many peers, NBIM has raised climate issues with companies since 2006, and its mandate has treated climate change as an investment risk since 2022. It is also a useful case study because it publishes its holdings, allowing us to measure what it owns rather than estimate its exposure. NBIM’s 2030 Climate Action Plan shows how a leading owner approaches adaptation. One priority is a stronger focus on nature, physical climate risk, adaptation and resilience. The fund stress-tests its equity portfolio against extreme climate scenarios and conducts physical-risk analysis of real assets. It has also added government bonds to its analysis and created a climate focus list that includes physically vulnerable companies while bringing adaptation more explicitly into engagement meetings. Even so, many of these actions remain geared toward climate risk management and mitigation, with limited detail on capital allocated directly to adaptation. Many institutional climate strategies have the same limitation because they were built around decarbonisation targets and stewardship rather than adaptation.
In past notes, ‘Climate Change and Strategic Asset Allocation‘ (August 24, 2022), we argued that climate belongs in long-term capital market assumptions, with inflation, especially food inflation, the main channel and a case for more inflation-protected and natural-resource assets. Moreover, our ‘Weatherproofing Portfolios: Resilience as the New Alpha‘ (September 11, 2025) and ‘Adaptation Investing: Survival of the Funded‘ (May 7, 2026) notes showed private adaptation finance at only about 0.5% of climate finance, kept low because adaptation pays in avoided losses, not cash flows. Today’s note looks at how to take climate adaptation into SAA a step further.
How we measure exposure: the SMS Climate Adaptation Index
To measure exposure to climate adaptation, we use the SMS Climate Adaptation Index, a rules-based thematic index built in four steps. We first define five drivers that frame the theme: water and flood resilience, urban and built environment resilience, grid and energy resilience, agriculture adaptation, and climate risk intelligence and insurance. We then screen a developed-market all-cap universe for companies whose reported revenues align with products and services tied to those drivers, using revenue data classified into granular business activities rather than broad sector codes. Our research team adds a bottom-up review where disclosure is thin, and the final portfolio applies controversy and other responsible-investment screens, then weights companies by free-float market cap with a 5% cap per name. The index holds 72 companies, 71 of which are priced: 15 in water and flood, 18 in urban and built environment, 14 in grid and energy, 12 in agriculture and 13 in climate risk intelligence and insurance. The index measures what a company sells, not how it describes itself, which gives peers a transparent yardstick.
NBIM’s 1.3% of NAV is low only against a deliberate allocation, not against the market. For its part, the SMS index covers about 1.6% of the free-float value of the MSCI ACWI IMI, and NBIM holds it at 1.8% of its equities, at or slightly above market weight and more than twice its unlisted renewable infrastructure (0.5% of NAV). The gap is therefore one of intent: a benchmark-hugging fund owns the theme in proportion to its small market size, so only an explicit mandate can raise it. Looking at recent performance, the SMS Climate Adaptation Index has tracked the MSCI World (URTH) closely in recent months.
Against the SMS index, NBIM holds 62 of the 71 priced names, worth about NOK 290bn, or 1.3% of the fund, so the companies are in the portfolio and the exposure is incidental. Market-cap weights put about 40% of that exposure into four industrial giants and 46% into grid and energy, against 31% in the SMS index, while water and flood account for 4% against 10%. A peer with a global market-cap equity book should expect a similar tilt.
What peers stand to gain: a better-diversified equity book, not a storm shelter
Measured against a replica of NBIM’s equity mix, the SMS index adds breadth, inflation sensitivity and a small-cap tilt, while giving up low volatility and commodity exposure (see figure below). Those loadings come mostly from the companies rather than the weighting. For a pension plan with inflation-linked liabilities, allocating to an index such as the SMS Climate Adaptation Index could broaden and diversify the fund’s equity exposure. In 2022, when equities and bonds fell together, the index lost far less than global equities, although that year sits within a hindsight-biased sample.
The table shows what a move toward higher targets would have produced over ten years. The result hinges on how much of the index’s excess return persists, and the record is a flattering, hindsight-biased sample led by Quanta Services (PWR-US), which gained more than 2,000%. At 5% of assets, the added return ranges from 0.16 pp a year if none of the SMS Climate Adaptation Index’s excess return persists in the future to 0.27 pp at full persistence, or roughly USD 160m to 270m a year per USD 100bn before costs. The benefit shrinks toward zero if the excess return vanishes.
The climate adaptation index will not shelter a portfolio from a potential financial storm. Its downside beta is above 1, and it has no significant loading on agriculture, duration or commodities, the channels used in NBIM’s extreme-weather scenario. A larger allocation would therefore lose slightly more than equities in that shock. What it offers is diversification and a modest return improvement, paid for in tracking error, which for a fund on a tight risk budget is the binding constraint.
Copper hit an intraday record of US$14,875 per tonne on September 10th, as planned U.S. tariff increases prompted hoarding across the global supply chain. In real terms, prices remain close to a 25-year high. Although recent demand has benefited from data centres riding the AI boom, AI still accounts for less than 5% of global copper consumption. Prices could therefore climb further: U.S. growth remains strong – the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow estimate stands at 3.7% year on year – and demand from EVs, construction and defence shows little sign of easing.
Furthermore, military rearmament has emerged as a genuine, additive driver of copper demand, layering on top of the electrification and AI-driven grid buildout already straining supply. Industry estimates put the current incremental demand from rising military spending at roughly 500,000 tonnes per year, about 1.5% of global consumption.
Global copper inventories have nevertheless risen recently, even as declining ore grades and production difficulties constrain mine supply and deepen bottlenecks. Pressure on prices are therefore likely to persist.
Meanwhile, global copper demand is forecast to grow at roughly twice the pace of supply over the next decade. That imbalance underscores the market’s strength, even with prices already elevated by historical standards.
Can copper be replaced?
Substitution is a genuine but limited risk. Aluminum is the only viable alternative, yet its conductivity is roughly 61% that of copper. It is also only one-third as dense, making it attractive where weight matters. That is why aluminum already dominates high-voltage transmission and is gaining share in EV wiring harnesses, particularly with copper trading at about 4.2 times its price.
Industry estimates put aluminum substitution at approximately 2% of global copper demand in 2026, rising to about 6% by 2030 and concentrated almost entirely in low-voltage automotive circuits. EV battery busbars, where current density and thermal reliability are critical, remain roughly 85% copper. Traction-motor windings have seen almost no substitution because bulkier aluminum windings would sacrifice the power density manufacturers are working to preserve.
More importantly, the largest incremental source of demand – AI-driven data centre and grid construction – is largely immune to substitution. Copper represents less than 0.5% of total data centre project costs, leaving hyperscale developers relatively indifferent to its price when specifying grid connections. Other alternatives, including silver, graphene and superconducting materials, are either too expensive at scale or commercially immature. Copper will remain difficult to displace for the foreseeable future.
Copper: the case for a bull market
First, both copper and copper miners have outperformed the S&P 500 so far this year.
Second, market participants have remained net long copper for the past two years, and current positioning points to an increasingly bullish stance. This suggests that asset managers and speculators are still invested in the market and expect prices to remain elevated for some time.
Against this backdrop, diversified miners have outperformed pure-play copper producers year to date even if enthusiasm around AI has cooled, leading by nearly ten percentage points. In our May 26, 2026, note, “From Transition Play to Arms Race: A Critical Materials Reset”, we argued for pure-play copper companies over diversified groups within the broader critical-materials universe.
That call has yet to pay off. Much of the AI enthusiasm was already embedded in leading copper miners, and investors are now questioning whether valuations across AI – and the associated data centre build-out – can be sustained, even for indirect beneficiaries such as the copper “complex”. Even so, copper stocks still look relatively inexpensive: their average price-to-earnings ratio remains below that of the S&P 500, which trades at 26 times earnings.
Copper recyclers such as Aurubis, however, retain solid fundamentals and trade at attractive valuations within the “Copper Kings” universe. They have lagged diversified miners, some of which have risen by 1.5 to 2 times over the past year. Higher copper prices also bring more scrap to market, giving recyclers easier access to feedstock than miners confronting steadily declining ore grades. We therefore continue to prefer recyclers to diversified copper miners.
Four years ago, we argued that nuclear was coming back (please see Back to the Future: A Nuclear Revival, 9 June 2022). The thesis was, and still is, that nuclear is a necessary source of firm, low-carbon electricity in a system trying to exit coal and gas. The investments we recommended were uranium miners in geopolitically safer jurisdictions, above all Canada (CCO-CA), and small modular reactor vendors such as NuScale Power SMR-US, GE (now GEV-US), Hitachi 6501-JP and Rolls Royce (RR-GB).
The mining leg has played out as expected. The SMR contribution to the electricity grid has not. Stock-market performance reflects that split: CCO-CA and CEG-US have rerated sharply over four years, while NuScale, the listed name most levered to an SMR buildout, has not. Without that buildout, nuclear’s share of global electricity has declined from about 10% in 2022 to under 9% today. Today’s note examines what has changed in the outlook and where we would (and would not) put money between now and 2030.
The scorecard
Nuclear remains the principal widely deployed, low-carbon source of firm power that is not constrained by river geography or weather. That was true in 2022, and it is true now. Our 2022 expectation was that by the second half of this decade, high fossil-fuel prices, regulation and national-security concerns would make new reactors financeable relative to other sources, and that SMRs would be near ready for operation.
Oil prices were not uniformly high. However, the other supports (policy, security of supply, and now AI-driven electricity demand) have largely been in place; the long-run case for nuclear is intact. What did not happen is the SMR buildout. The most closely watched projects in North America were cancelled or delayed:
- NuScale’s Carbon Free Power Project with UAMPS was cancelled in November 2023 after estimated project cost rose from about $5 billion to about $9 billion on inflation and higher rates.
- The first North American grid-scale SMR actually under construction, GE Vernova Hitachi’s BWRX-300 at Ontario Power Generation’s Darlington site, is now aimed at commercial operation around 2030, later than first discussed.
Factory fabrication and modular add-on capacity remain the theoretical attractions. In practice, most of the 80-plus SMR designs are still at conceptual or detailed design. Only two SMR plants are in operation: Russia’s Akademik Lomonosov (floating) and China’s HTR-PM, which entered commercial operation in December 2023. A handful more are under construction in Argentina, China and Russia. The technology is still largely untested at commercial scale in North America.
So what happened?
Global electricity demand rose on the order of 3% in 2025, faster than total energy demand, with AI and data centres a visible incremental driver. Hyperscalers are demanding power as fast as it can be added to the grid. Earlier this summer we wrote why natural gas plus renewables (solar and batteries) is the current go-to for new U.S. data-centre load (please see July 2026, Data Centers: After the Gas Rush). SMRs are a long-term firm-power option but can’t address the needs today.
The four largest U.S. hyperscalers (GOOGL-US, AMZN-US, META-US, MSFT-US) have signed nuclear offtake. According to a recent Carnegie report, hyperscalers generally prefer buying needed energy through power purchase agreements (PPAs), which has resulted in restarts, life extensions, and uprates of existing plants. Thus far, their interest has not translated into the financial backing that would be required to generate an “order book” to build a fleet of new reactors.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ July 2026 accounting is blunter: nuclear has played no meaningful role in meeting the AI load already on the grid, and many SMR announcements are feasibility funding and options, not engineering, procurement and construction cheques. Amazon’s plan with Energy Northwest in Washington is a case in point. Amazon has funded the initial feasibility phase and secured the right to purchase power from the first project (four modules), with no obligation to take that power if it is too expensive. Delivery is “some time in the 2030s”; no construction permit has been filed.
Google’s partnership with privately held Kairos Power in Tennessee is likely to be the first of these advanced-reactor data-centre deals to produce power, aimed at 2030. The project broke ground in April 2026. It is a 50 MW demonstration plant selling into the TVA system, not the 500 MW fleet originally advertised.
SMRs are therefore unlikely to fill hyperscaler demand this decade. The nuclear equity story through 2030 is primarily restarts, uprates and life extensions of existing plants, plus the fuel those plants burn (large new reactors continue to be built in Asia, which supports uranium demand even if Western SMRs slip). With that backdrop, we update the listed opportunities.
Investing in Nuclear: Today To 2030
Despite a slower timeline for small modular reactors, nuclear will remain part of the energy mix. In the section below we walk through the listed names in the nuclear chain, from the mine to the electricity that comes out of the plant, and where we would (and would not) put money between now and 2030.
The physical chain is simple. Uranium starts as ore, is milled to yellowcake, converted to UF6 so U-235 can be concentrated, then returned to ceramic pellets in fuel assemblies. Most listed stocks sit at the two ends, the mine and the power1. Mining and milling steps matter but are hard to buy as public equities.
Mining and milling. Our preferred uranium miner since 2022 has been CCO-CA, because most of its uranium is sold under long-term contracts and because the mines are in Canada. KAP-GB is the larger competitor, but Kazakhstan is a harder jurisdiction for an ESG-constrained book.
Alongside these established companies, there are four developers with potential to supply more uranium in the future: NexGen (NXE-CA), Denison (DML-CA), Uranium Energy (UEC-US) and Paladin (PDN-AU). The first two are not yet producing uranium, while UEC is in early production in the U.S. and PDN is producing in Namibia and developing assets in Canada.
Conversion. Only a handful of plants can convert yellowcake to UF6. Cameco operates one of them, while the other large Western converter, France’s Orano, is unlisted.
Enrichment. About 95% of world capacity sits with private companies. Centrus Energy (LEU-US) is the listed US exception.
Fuel fabrication. Utilities do not switch suppliers lightly, so this is a stable business. Incumbents are mostly private or inside larger groups. Westinghouse (Cameco and Brookfield) makes fuel for the common US reactor type. GE Vernova (GEV-US) and Hitachi (6501-JP) make fuel for boiling-water reactors. BWX Technologies (BWXT-US) makes fuel for the U.S. Navy and some advanced designs.
Designing and building new reactors. This layer is paid when a plant is actually built. GE Vernova and Hitachi are building the BWRX-300 at Darlington, aimed at 2030. Mitsubishi (7011-JP) and Doosan Enerbility (034020-KR) are large-reactor hardware in Asia. BWX Technologies (BWXT-US) and Curtiss-Wright (CW-US) sell into plants that already run. NuScale (SMR-US), Oklo (OKLO-US) and Rolls Royce (RR-GB) are the main listed SMR expressions.
Construction contractors. Once a reactor is financed: Jacobs (J-US), Fluor (FLR-US), Atkins Realis (ATRL-CA), Aecon (ARE-CA) and Samsung (028260-KR). Bechtel, often the lead, is private.
Generating electricity. In North America, since new plants are not being built, the main activity is restarting previously decommissioned plants, improving output from current plants and licence extensions.
The specialist is Constellation Energy (CEG-US). Microsoft is paying for the restart of Three Mile Island Unit 1; Meta’s contract keeps Clinton in Illinois running. Vistra (VST-US) is in the same business and is also a gas generator. Talen Energy (TLN-US) has a PPA with Amazon for Pennsylvania data centres.
Outside the US, longer operation of existing fleets is the same idea: KEPCO (015760-KR), Kansai Electric (9503-JP), CEZ (CEZ-CZ Fortum (FORTUM-FI). CGN Power (1816-H) is the China large-fleet name, with the usual ESG-jurisdiction caveat.
Waste and decommissioning. Used fuel is stored, usually on site; reactors are eventually taken apart. There is no satisfactory listed way to own the waste step. The liability stays with the generator. Cloud companies that enter power purchase agreements do not take the long-term environmental or community risk, nor the nuclear-safety residual.
Given the value chain and our view that SMRs will not be a material 2026–30 solution, the best listed exposure is at steps 1 (mining) and 7 (generating). Cameco is the only listed name that reaches from the mine through conversion and, via Westinghouse, into fuel and plant services. Centrus and BWXT are small ways to own the scarce middle. Constellation, and to a lesser extent Vistra, have customers for any extra megawatt-hour they can extract from plants that already exist.
A core principle of economics is that scarcity drives price. But several environmental assets are currently running counter to this principle. As we wrote in Environmental Assets in Short Supply (October 9, 2025), “many environmental assets have not re-priced in times of scarcity or are simply not priced at all.” We have tracked environmental scarcity across seven distinct resources since 2018:
- Critical minerals: What began in 2018 as a governance and supply chain concern about cobalt sourcing from the Democratic Republic of Congo has evolved into a geopolitical flashpoint across several materials that are essential for national defense, artificial intelligence and green technology. In our most recent note on the topic, we outline why inputs that were thought to be in relative abundance are now turning into an outright materials arms race (From Transition Play to Arms Race, May 28, 2026).
- Water: Water scarcity arises when reliable supplies of clean freshwater are insufficient to meet the needs of people, ecosystems, agriculture, and industry. It is driven not only by limited physical availability, but also by overuse, pollution, uneven distribution, and climate change. In recent months, investor attention has zeroed in on water needs derived from AI data centers (an issue we view as solvable and highly investable) especially in times of drought. See Water Woes: Ag, Not AI, April 16, 2026.
- Marine protein: Fish is the dominant protein source for many parts of the world and oceans have finite productive capacity; fish stocks are being depleted faster than ecosystems can replenish them. A 2025 FAO assessment of 2,570 marine fish stocks found that over one third are overfished, i.e. are harvested beyond biologically sustainable levels.
- Phosphorus: Investor attention to fertilizer scarcity was prompted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting sanctions on Belarusian potash, though underlying vulnerabilities have been present for over a decade. Indeed, phosphorus is a non-renewable, non-substitutable material with no synthetic alternative. Although the world has over 300 years of reserves, China is currently the largest producer, but Morocco and Western Sahara hold roughly 70% of global reserves, meaning long-run supply security rests on a single-country dependency rather than absolute physical scarcity.
- Soil: We have been tracking soil as an undervalued ecosystem since 2022 whose productive capacity is being eroded by short-term farming economics. Erosion, salinization, compaction, nutrient depletion, and land conversion all degrade soil far faster than it can be naturally replenished, making fertile soil a finite environmental asset. There is evidence that the premium paid for land with more productive soil is growing, suggesting that scarcity is beginning to be factored into price (please see our note Environmental Assets in Short Supply, October 9, 2025).
- Sand: Sand is a resource that is assumed to be infinite. However, in its usable construction-grade form, it is being depleted faster than natural replenishment. Prices are beginning to reflect this reality: in geographies that rely on natural sand for construction, prices reflect structural shortages, with inflation for construction-grade sand running far hotter than general price inflation.
- Timber: Primary forest loss runs at about 10 million hectares per year, mostly due to agricultural conversion. Old-growth carbon stocks and hydrological function cannot be replicated by plantation forestry on any relevant timescale. Of course, wildfires like this summer only serve to amplify the problem.
Three Investment Strategy Pillars
For each of the resources described above, our research has implicitly relied on the same three pillars to find investable equity opportunities within environmental assets in short supply.
- Beneficiaries are the owners of the scarce asset or the infrastructure controlling access to it: water utilities, phosphate miners, timber REITs, aquaculture operators, etc. are all beneficiaries of natural resources that are in short supply since they benefit directly from any increase in supply-constrained pricing of the underlying good. Companies in this category are most often materials, utilities and REITs sectors.
- Solvers are companies that reduce consumption, improve efficiency, or substitute away from the constrained input: desalination technology, manufactured sand, precision agriculture, battery chemistry that eliminates cobalt and nickel demand entirely are examples of industries that are solving for constrained natural resources. Companies in this category tend to be heavily weighted to the industrials and technology sectors.
- Protectors are companies that enable monitoring, certification, or active restoration of the resource base itself. When resources are constrained, these companies often benefit from regulation that is meant to ensure a more sustainable usage of resources in short supply.
We mapped our equity coverage against this framework of beneficiary, solver and protector. The table below highlights sample companies with high revenue alignment to each of the scarce environmental assets and pillars.
The result is a diversified universe, albeit one that is weighted toward Beneficiaries. This is not a surprise: investors can easily buy a phosphate miner or a timber REIT when they expect the price of the underlying commodity to increase. However, it is more difficult to buy exposure to wetland restoration, aquifer recharge, or pollinator habitat protection, since financial vehicles to do so are not prevalent. Indeed, the Protector role has the lightest coverage of our three pillars: where restoration and conservation activity exists, it is overwhelmingly private, philanthropic or embedded as a minor revenue line inside diversified conglomerates (certification bodies, testing labs, satellite monitoring firms) rather than expressed through dedicated public companies.
Why This Matters Now
We believe that two developments in the past eighteen months – the buildout of AI infrastructure and the increase in global trade barriers – have made it more relevant for investors to consider the supply-side of physical inputs within equity portfolio construction.
Regarding artificial intelligence, AI data center buildout is simultaneously accelerating demand for water (cooling load), copper (grid and data center wiring) and critical material (rare earths used in photonic chips for AI data centers and 6G networks). The AI buildout comes on top of what were already separate scarcity stories with independent underlying drivers. Take water. Agriculture usage and more frequent droughts had already been pushing pressure on utilities and industrial companies to improve water efficiency as articulated clearly by executives at Schneider Electric. Water cooling demands from AI act to accentuate these forces and it’s happening across other environmental inputs like rare earths, copper, etc.
Meanwhile, supply side constraints are also occurring due to geopolitics. A less friendly global trade backdrop means that both raw inputs and finished goods flow less freely at a time when greater raw materials are needed to build domestic capacity (reshore). China’s April 2025 rare earth export restrictions provided a glimpse of the potential for supply chain disruption in strategic sectors like defense and technological infrastructure.
The Paradox at the Heart of the Grid
AI is both a source of the problem and the most credible solution to it. Global data center electricity consumption reached approximately 415 TWh in 2024, growing at 12% per year since 2017, and the IEA projects this figure could reach up to 1,200 TWh by 2030. A single AI-focused data center today consumes as much electricity as 100,000 households. At the same time, the electricity grid is increasingly unreliable: the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) flagged rising shortfall risk under both extreme and normal conditions in its latest Long-Term Reliability Assessment, and grid outages already cost U.S. businesses roughly $150 billion annually.
The irony is that the same computing paradigm generating this demand surge is also the most capable tool available to manage it. The question for investors is not whether AI will change how electricity is produced, distributed, and consumed. It will. The question is which companies in the stack are positioned to capture durable, recurring revenue from that shift.
Two Domains, Two Mechanisms
Grid Optimization
AI’s most direct contribution to grid efficiency operates at the level of real-time sensing, forecasting, and control. Smart meters and IoT sensors generate continuous operational data; AI algorithms process that data to build a live picture of grid state and issue control signals in milliseconds, far faster than human operators can respond.
The IEA’s 2025 “Energy and AI” report identifies AI-based fault detection as one of the highest-impact near-term applications, with documented reductions in outage durations of 30-50%. Given the $150 billion annual cost of outages, a 30% improvement represents tens of billions in recoverable economic value, even before accounting for carbon savings from avoided backup generation.
Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) represent the next frontier. These systems aggregate small-scale distributed resources, including behind-the-meter solar, batteries, demand-response loads, and EV chargers, and coordinate them through AI to respond to grid signals in real time. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that tripling VPP scale in America alone could reduce grid costs by $10 billion per year, primarily by deferring expensive peak capacity additions. As the share of intermittent renewables grows, the economic case for AI-driven aggregation and dispatch becomes progressively stronger.
Industrial Process Optimization
Industry and commercial buildings together account for roughly 64% of U.S. electricity demand, making them the largest addressable market for AI efficiency tools. Here, the applications are more granular but no less material. We see 4 key industrial sectors where AI could markedly optimize production and reduce energy costs:
Steel: Steel is an instructive case. ArcelorMittal (MT-US) partnered with energy AI specialist Energiency to deploy machine learning models that predict and control energy consumption continuously across its smelting operations, achieving 2-5% annual energy savings on an energy bill that represents roughly one quarter of total production costs. A separate deployment using C3.ai’s energy management platform at a different major steel producer generated $14 million in annual energy cost savings at a single hot roll mill, alongside a 40 MW reduction in monthly utility demand charges.
Cement : Cement, which another thermodynamically constrained industry, can also achieve more efficiency using AI. A 2026 peer-reviewed analysis found 3-9% net energy and CO2 reductions from AI-optimized kiln controls, after explicitly subtracting the energy cost of running the AI itself. For an industry running near thermodynamic limits, 5% is financially significant and competes favorably with far more expensive physical decarbonization options.
Cooling : For cooling and facility management, the IEA independently cites a 23% cooling energy saving from AI-optimized controls as a representative industrial deployment benchmark. Across optimizable industrial subsystems more broadly, documented savings commonly reach 20-30% of the targeted system’s energy consumption, though total plant-level savings are typically 5-15% given that no single subsystem represents the entire load.
Chemicals: Chemical production offers one of the highest AI optimization ceilings in heavy industry. Energy costs represent 40-60% of variable production costs at specialty chemical and petrochemical facilities, and process complexity (multi-variable reactor management, distillation train sequencing, heat integration across unit operations) creates exactly the conditions where narrow ML models identify non-obvious savings that rule-based controls miss. AI-optimized process control at chemical plants has demonstrated sustained energy reductions of 3-8% on targeted units, with the strongest results on distillation columns where temperature and pressure gradients interact in ways that respond well to continuous model retraining. At industrial scale, a 5% energy reduction at a large petrochemical complex running 200-400 GWh annually translates to $3-8 million per year at current industrial power prices, with no capital expenditure on physical equipment.
A useful way to frame AI’s efficiency contribution is to ask what energy is consumed by the AI relative to what it saves. The answer varies dramatically depending on the type of AI deployed, and investors who treat all AI as equivalent in energy intensity will systematically misread this opportunity.
Industrial process optimization does not rely on large language models. It uses narrow, purpose-built machine learning models, often small enough to run on edge hardware or modest on-premise servers. A factory consuming 100 GWh per year that deploys a continuous ML optimization model on local hardware might consume 0.01-0.1 GWh annually on inference. If that model saves 5% of plant energy, or 5 GWh, the implied leverage ratio is 50:1 to 500:1 in energy saved per unit of AI energy consumed. This is not marginal: it is strongly net positive, and it is precisely why the IEA’s analysis of well-scoped industrial applications concludes that AI is energy-additive rather than energy-neutral.
The energy paradox narrative applies to large language models and generative AI, where a single query consumes 3-30 times the energy of a typical web search, and training runs consume electricity equivalent to small towns. But these architectures are not what drives a cement kiln or optimizes a steel furnace. The AI that matters most for industrial efficiency is lean, specialized, and deployed close to the process. The companies building and selling that software are not competing against data center scale-up; they are competing against the baseline of unoptimized industrial operations, and winning.
Where the Investment Opportunity Sits
The most defensible long-term positions across this theme sit with the large-cap infrastructure companies in the coverage universe. Their combination of certified field service networks, multi-decade customer relationships, and systems integration depth creates a moat that pure software entrants cannot replicate quickly.
Schneider Electric (SU-FR) is the most fully integrated play in the coverage universe. Its EcoStruxure platform spans building management, grid automation, and industrial control as a unified software stack, and recurring software and services revenue is growing as a share of EBITA. The company’s dominant position in data center power distribution gives it direct exposure to the AI infrastructure build-out, independent of any efficiency software thesis.
GE Vernova (GEV-US) sells grid software through a customer base it already serves with physical grid hardware and services contracts, which substantially lowers sales friction. GridOS, GEV’s advanced distribution management system, addresses dispatch optimization, fault detection, and VPP orchestration directly, covering the three highest-value AI grid applications identified by the IEA.
Eaton (ETN-US) is the most hardware-proximate name in the group, but its power management franchise is increasingly software-defined. Its fastest-growing segments (data center and industrial power quality) are exactly where AI-driven efficiency generates the clearest and most measurable ROI for end customers.
ABB (ABBN-CH) brings the deepest industrial automation capability in the group. Its ABB Ability digital suite is most concentrated in process industries (chemicals, mining, pulp and paper) where energy optimization ROI is highest and willingness to pay for proven software is well established. ABB’s multi-year portfolio restructuring has improved capital returns without eroding its technical position.
C3.ai (AI-US) is the primary enterprise software plays with revenue concentrated in industrial energy management. C3.ai’s documented results in steel energy forecasting are among the most quantified in the public domain.
Itron (ITRI-US) and Landis+Gyr (LAND-CH) offer small-cap exposure to the smart metering and grid sensing layer, which is foundational infrastructure without which AI optimization algorithms have no data to work with. Landis+Gyr is exclusively a smart grid company; Itron earns approximately 67% of revenues from smart grid products. Both carry higher execution risk than the large-cap names, but provide concentrated exposure to grid digitization spending.
Vertiv (VRT-US) manufactures the thermal management systems and power distribution infrastructure that sit inside data centers and determine how efficiently electricity is converted into compute. As AI chips generate five to ten times more heat per rack than conventional servers, the hardware required to cool them becomes more complex and more expensive, expanding Vertiv’s addressable market with every GPU cluster installed.
The YTD performance dispersion within the coverage universe is instructive. Vertiv’s 75% gain reflects the market’s pricing of several years of AI cooling demand; the thesis is sound but execution risk is now fully reflected in the price. The large-cap infrastructure names (Schneider, GE Vernova, Eaton, and ABB) have been relative laggards and offer better risk-adjusted entry given backlog-supported earnings visibility and growing recurring revenue. The pure software layer (AI-US, AZPN-US) requires higher conviction on near-term revenue inflection; C3.ai in particular has not yet demonstrated a durable path to profitability despite strong individual customer case studies.
Sustainability-oriented equity mandates have spent a decade building around a practical constraint: ESG data for small cap companies is less available and less reliable than its large cap counterparts. Third-party ratings agencies often concentrate their analytical resources on large caps, where disclosure is richer and the revenue-per-company economics make coverage worthwhile. The consequence has been a structural underweight in small caps across ESG portfolios that is a data artifact rather than a deliberate investment judgment.
Over the twelve months ending June 30, 2026, that underweight cost money. The Russell 2000 returned 40% and in the first half of 2026 alone, the Russell 2000 outperformed the S&P 500 by more than 12 percentage points, its best start to a year since 1991.
The deeper issue for sustainability mandates is that low scores and missing scores are treated as equivalent signals of ESG risk, when in most cases they reflect nothing more than the disclosure practices of a company with less staff dedicated to the investor relations function.
We propose a different entry point: rather than relying on ratings coverage that does not exist, we identify small cap companies where observable, verifiable sustainability events have recently occurred or are imminent – first ESG reports, CDP initiation, SBTi validation, board-level governance upgrades, etc. These triggers do not require proprietary data infrastructure. They require reading company filings, sustainability reports, and proxy statements, which is what active small cap managers already do. The re-rating that follows is systematic and documented: research published in 2025 found that MSCI ESG rating changes drive abnormal returns over multiple months after the change, with institutional investor repositioning as the primary transmission mechanism.
The implication is actionable: in small caps, identify the companies that are publishing the required data and own them before the agencies react.
The Investment Thesis
When a company improves its sustainability posture in a material, verifiable way, the re-rating tends to follow a predictable sequence. First, the company appears in sustainability-focused screening databases (MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, ISS) with an upgraded score. This typically takes 12 to 24 months from the triggering event. Second, institutional mandates with ESG minimum screens begin to include the name in their eligible universe, generating incremental demand that is largely independent of traditional fundamental catalysts. Third, coverage by sustainability-focused analysts follows, compounding the effect.
Companies know that improving their sustainability posture is good for their stock price; the survey results showed in the chart below highlight that companies believe the main opportunities related to ESG ratings are acquiring and retaining interest in their stock.
It is logical that the re-rating premium would be amplified in small caps relative to large caps because the starting ownership base is dominated by generalist managers who have not priced sustainability improvement into their valuation. There are some practical signals that investors can track to anticipate a re-rating:
- First publication of a sustainability report (particularly if structured around SASB materiality topics)
- Adoption of science-based emissions targets or commitment to SBTi validation
- Board composition changes (addition of an independent director with sustainability credentials; board-level committee dedicated to ESG oversight)
- First participation in CDP disclosure (Carbon Disclosure Project questionnaire responses carry significant weight in downstream rating models)
- Emissions intensity reduction documented over two consecutive years (a single year is insufficient signal; agencies require a trend)
Where to Look
The most fertile ground for the improvers investment thesis sits in sectors where SASB-defined material sustainability topics are operationally manageable at scale for a small company, but where disclosure has historically been minimal. Industrial services, specialty chemicals, and building products are all areas where energy intensity, waste management, and worker health and safety are financially material (under SASB) and operationally addressable without the capital requirements that make transition difficult. A small industrial company that installs remote energy monitoring across its facilities, reduces its recordable incident rate, and publishes a first SASB-aligned sustainability report is doing all three things at once – and doing them in a way that is both financially rational and likely to trigger a meaningful ESG re-rating within two years.
The Counter-Argument
A skeptic may point to three things that undermine the arguments above:
- The re-rating timeline of 12 to 24 months is long, and the path is uncertain: a company can publish a sustainability report without triggering any rating agency review if the report is judged insufficiently substantive.
- The sustainability reporting landscape is not frictionless: first-time reporters routinely publish reports of uneven quality, and a poorly constructed first report can lock in a low score rather than improve it.
- The liquidity premium embedded in small caps is not always fully compensated: if a sustainability-driven re-rating coincides with a broad risk-off environment, the demand lift from ESG-screened mandates may be insufficient to offset market-wide selling.
These are real risks, but they can be mitigated by concentrating on companies whose underlying operational improvements are genuine and financially material, rather than those pursuing disclosure as a cosmetic exercise. For example, an emissions intensity trend that tracks with capital investment in energy efficiency is credible, while an emissions intensity trend that appears only in the sustainability report – without corresponding capex – is not.
Investment Implications
For small cap equity managers, a systematic scan for the leading indicators listed above (sustainability report publication, CDP participation, SBTi commitment, and board changes) applied across the portfolio universe can generates a watchlist of names likely to re-rate within 24 months.
In the section below, we highlight companies that qualify for a “sustainability re-rating” based on the criteria identified above.
Small Cap Sustainability Improvers Ripe for Re-Rating
- Onterris Inc (ONT-US)
Market cap: $750M | SASB sector: Waste Management / Environmental Services
Onterris, an environmental and engineering consulting firm, had its near-term SBTi target and long-term net-zero target formally validated by the Science Based Targets initiative in early 2025. SBTi validation is arguably the most credible sustainability event a company can execute. Ratings agencies like MSCI operate on annual review cycles, meaning a company that validates SBTi targets today is unlikely to see a formal rating upgrade until the next scheduled assessment, usually annually.
Onterris has published annual SASB-aligned sustainability reports for three consecutive years and participates in CDP. Revenue approached $900M in 2025 and 2026 guidance is above that level. The business is growing into the disclosure infrastructure rather than shrinking, which gives the rating upgrade a durable foundation.
It is also worth noting that until recently, the company operated under the name Montrose Environmental Group, but rebranded as Onterris in April 2026. Corporate identity resets of this kind often precede a broader ESG narrative refresh and tend to attract new analyst attention.
- Dexterra Group (DXT-CA)
Market cap: CAD $880M | SASB sector: Professional & Commercial Services / Industrial Support Services
Dexterra provides supports services for the creation, management and operation of infrastructure. The company published its first-ever comprehensive, GRI-aligned sustainability report in March 2025, including a quantified Scope 1 and Scope 2 baseline following the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard. Prior reports were informal communications without a quantified emissions baseline.. Importantly, the business is financially robust: Q1 2026 revenue grew 15% year on year, and earnings beat estimates by approximately 40%. This removes the risk that sustainability commitments get deprioritized because of financial stress.
- John B. Sanfilippo & Son (JBSS-US)
Market cap: ~$990M | SASB sector: Processed Food
JBSS, a leading American processor of tree nuts and related snacks, has quietly built one of the more comprehensive environmental disclosure programs among U.S. food small caps without having published a formal consolidated sustainability report. The company participates in CDP across all three disclosure streams simultaneously (climate change, water security, and forests), which is rare at this market cap. The company discloses scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. In fiscal year 2025, total emissions intensity declined 8.3%. The company updated its Environmental Policy in May 2024, conducts water risk analysis using WRI’s Aqueduct Atlas across all six production facilities, and holds Energy Star Partner of the Year recognition. It reached 89.5% recyclable packaging by weight. SASB material topics for processed food (energy, water management, packaging waste, food safety) are each being actively addressed. The re-rating catalyst here is specific: MSCI and Sustainalytics currently rate JBSS without a published PDF sustainability report to anchor on, meaning the quantitative data sitting on its website is likely being partially discounted or missed. Publication of a first formal consolidated report would immediately elevate the company’s data quality score.
- Ag Growth International (AFN-CA)
Market cap: CAD $450M | SASB sector: Industrial Machinery & Goods
AGI makes grain handling, aeration, and storage equipment, placing it in a sustainability-adjacent commercial position (food security infrastructure) that creates natural demand for ESG transparency. Their 2024 Sustainability Report, released in June 2025, was the first to include a SASB Index and a standalone TCFD-aligned supplemental disclosure, neither of which appeared in the 2023 report. This is a meaningful escalation from narrative-only sustainability communication to framework-indexed disclosure, which is exactly what most ratings agencies require to move from qualitative to quantitative scoring. The Board operates a Governance and Sustainability Committee. On the quantitative side, AGI set a target in 2023 to reduce Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions intensity by 25% by 2030 against a 2021 baseline; in 2024, it had already achieved a 16% reduction, keeping the trajectory on track. Safety performance improved sharply: lost-time incident rate down 46% and total recordable incident rate down 49% year on year, both SASB material metrics for this sector.
It is important to note that the names highlighted here are cited uniquely based on an expectation that financial market participants will latently give credit to their sustainability efforts; For example, AGI carries a highly leveraged balance sheet and has been under financial stress from agricultural equipment cycle headwinds: the sustainability re-rating is an independent catalyst, but the equity thesis depends on stabilization of the underlying business.
In the table below, we summarize the main sustainability re-rating triggers for the aforementioned companies, plus six more that we believe could benefit from the same dynamic.
Since our last Macro Meets Sustainability update on March 26th, oil prices have crashed back to the levels recorded before the U.S. and Israel invaded Iran. Meanwhile, AI-related stocks are at new all-time highs and have taken many of our preferred electric grid buildout companies with them.
In light of these two macro developments, in today’s Note, we update our views on two key sustainable investment themes: the outlook for renewables and the likelihood of further upside in electrification plays.
Renewables vs. Fossil Fuels: Who is Intermittent Now?
The oil market has produced one of the most dramatic round trips in recent memory. From its pre-conflict level of roughly $80/bbl, Brent crude surged to nearly $120/bbl through mid-March as Strait of Hormuz traffic was severely disrupted, but has since collapsed to under $75/bbl, with WTI down roughly 25% in a single month. Although the situation appears very fragile, the Strait of Hormuz has largely normalized for now and Saudi export capacity has reportedly recovered toward pre-war levels.
The last three months have provided a live stress test by way of China for what the energy transition could look like for nations that pursue electrification and renewable energy production. China’s EV fleet now displaces over 1 million barrels per day of oil demand, equivalent to Oman’s entire output. Its ultra-high-voltage grid delivers domestically generated solar and wind power across the country. Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025. In March 2026, China exported a record $21.9 billion in solar panels, batteries, and EVs in a single month. All of this means that the Chinese economy was virtually unscathed by the closing of the Strait – according to Goldman Sachs, oil from this region represents less than 6% of China’s energy needs and economists expect that the global oil price spike reduced Chinese GDP by less than 0.2% (compared with 0.5 to 1% for other Asian nations).
Indeed, renewable energy has brought insulation from the oil price shock to the Chinese economy while other nations scramble (governments across four continents enacted various forms of fossil fuel subsidies during the spike). This is because solar, wind, geothermal and even nuclear share an advantage over fossil fuels; once the infrastructure is built, it becomes a long-life domestic asset that is far less dependent on global trading systems.
Ember analyst Kingsmill Bond put it bluntly: “fossil fuels are now intermittent and uncertain, which was the argument levelled against renewables.” The Chinese example indeed suggests that the intermittency risk in energy portfolios has migrated; it now sits in the extraction and logistics infrastructure of fossil fuels, not in the production profile of wind and solar. We stand by our previous conclusion: the path to increased national energy security will be bifurcated. Many nations that have been historically dependent on fuel imports will look to the Chinese example and lean-in to renewables and efficiency, while nations like the U.S. and Canada that are endowed with fossil fuels may double down on extraction of traditional fuels.
For equity portfolios, oil companies’ stock performance mirrors the oil price round trip, with many companies having already given back the gains made since the war began. As the table below highlights, the companies most exposed are those whose long-term oil price assumptions, typically disclosed in annual reports, are sitting above the current forward curve. That said, geopolitical uncertainty argues against attempting to short oil companies at the current juncture.
On the renewable energy side, a more hawkish Fed and sticky inflation means that the rate picture argues for standing aside rather than adding exposure. Renewable energy producers carry significant sensitivity to the discount rate environment since project economics depend on long-dated contracted cash flows financed at capital costs that move directly with yields. We flagged this sensitivity in Q2 as the primary macro risk to the renewable operator thesis, and it has not resolved. A clear Fed pivot signal or durable cooling of core inflation are conditions for revisiting the stand-aside stance.
The rate environment thus argues for patience on renewable energy producers. It has not, however, tempered the market’s appetite for the grid equipment and power management companies that sit upstream of them, where a different set of valuation questions now applies.
Are The Power Plays Overdone?
Last week’s note (“Data Centers: After the Gas Rush,” July 3, 2026) made the case for BESS pure-plays and clean-power developers as a way to capture the AI data center energy buildout from an undervalued entry point.
The flip side of the infrastructure story is grid equipment and power management companies that have made substantial equity price gains alongside AI-related stocks that continue to appreciate despite growing valuation concerns. Indeed, companies like Vertiv have seen eye-watering performance alongside their hyperscale data centre clients. The risk is not that the AI build-out stops, but that it slows or shifts timeline, and at 65-70x trailing earnings there is no valuation cushion for either outcome.
Hyperscaler orders are not irrevocable: Microsoft froze approximately 1.5 gigawatts of self-build data centre projects in April 2025, revising associated equipment orders mid-cycle. The market appears to be drawing its own conclusions: Eaton, a more diversified name in the sector, beat earnings estimates in each of the last two quarters and its stock sold off on both releases; when a company delivers accelerating order growth and raised guidance and the stock declines, expectations have simply become too high to satisfy.
In our last October 23, 2025 Note, Power Hungry: The Real Cost of a Digital Future, we argued that early-cycle beneficiaries in power infrastructure had already re-rated sharply, and the better risk-reward was shifting toward later-cycle optimization and maintenance players. Among the six major infrastructure names tracked since that note, the pattern is unambiguous: the more concentrated the exposure to AI and data centre build-out, the more aggressively the stock has re-rated. In the table below, we show that Vertiv (VRT-US) is up approximately 65% since October 2025, Siemens Energy (ENR-DE) roughly 52%, and ABB (ABBN-CH) around 42%, all while their trailing P/E multiples expanded further into territory that prices execution without error.
For more diversified names, the picture is more nuanced. Eaton (ETN-US) and Schneider Electric (SU-FR) are up 9% and 11% respectively over the same period, from starting points that were already full. Both retain genuine multi-driver revenue bases across grid modernization, industrial electrification, and energy security that are independent of AI capex specifically. The thesis for holding them remains intact. However, at roughly 40x and 35x trailing earnings respectively, both sit at meaningful premiums to their 10-year averages with limited margin for error on execution. Investors should let earnings grow into the multiple rather than add to positions at current levels.
A final group of companies are those that have concentrated exposure to grid optimization, monitoring, and efficiency whose revenues arrive later in the electrification cycle. Emerson Electric (EMR-US), Carrier Global (CAR-US), Honeywell (HON-US), and Daikin Industries (6367-JP) have solid sustainability credentials and most have not yet participated in the recent AI hype swing. As the grid expansion phase matures and attention shifts to maintaining and optimizing an expanded electrical ecosystem, these names offer exposure to the same structural demand with a more comfortable valuation cushion.
Since our last note on Battery, Energy Systems Storage (BESS) in November 2024 (see “What is Store for Energy Storage”) a few trends have accelerated in the industry as the global demand for power continues to grow to supply AI data centers. As such, BESS is now playing a key role in electrification, as evidenced in this week’s news about Spain’s solar power glut and how BESS is changing the economics of renewable power. Although most renewables are now cheaper than gas, the question is how much longer the sector can develop separately from BESS.
Solar is now so cheap that it can undermine its own economics. In sunny regions, it floods the grid at midday, driving prices down just when output peaks. That also makes grid balancing harder and can contribute to outages, as Spain showed last year.
Wind helps because it often produces in the evening, overnight and in winter, when solar output is weak. Together, solar and wind are more valuable than alone. Add batteries, and a hybrid system can deliver firm clean power for $56/MWh today, which is below gas in many markets. With utility-scale storage costs down fourfold since 2016, this advantage should keep improving.
In our last note on batteries (“Beyond Lithium: The Next Battery Boom”, May 21), we discussed how next-generation batteries are moving beyond hard-to-source minerals such as cobalt and lithium. Here we look at the energy mix powering data centers, gas turbines, integrated power developers and BESS pure plays, in a world where the International Energy Agency estimates that two out of every three dollars invested in power now go to renewables.
Gas is Still Winning the Data Center Power Game, but not for long
Natural gas remains the leading power source for U.S. data centers (see chart below). Renewables, already at 24%, are moving up quickly as their LCOE continues to fall.
Current estimates suggest that as much renewable capacity as gas capacity could be added to power U.S. data centers through 2030.
The equation is shifting. Solar+wind+BESS hybrids already beat gas on cost at 95% reliability ($56 vs. $76/MWh), and battery costs are falling faster than any other energy technology. But data centers need power that is always on, instantly responsive, compact and quick to build. On all four counts, gas still wins. Gas turbines can meet 99.9% uptime requirements, handle rapid AI load swings, use far less land and avoid the long interconnection queues that slow solar+storage projects.
But renewables will catch up: by 2030, better interconnection timelines and cheaper storage should narrow the speed and cost gaps. And by 2032–2035, some studies suggest that emerging technologies such as long-duration batteries using technologies such as iron-air and flow systems could close much of the reliability gap. For the remaining edge case – ultra-firm power for the largest AI clusters – is where hyperscalers are placing their bets on Small Modular Reactor (SMR) and have already signed offtake agreements from Amazon, Google, Microsoft and Meta targeting first power from SMRs in the early 2030s.
Until then – and given the probable delay in the large scale deployment of SMRs – several BESS players, clean-power developers and data-center power suppliers remain worth watching as they will remain a key part of the power supply chain for the foreseeable future.
BESS: The Future is Now
BESS is having its “wow” moment as one of the fastest-growing technology segments, scaling at a pace that mirrors AI demand. Four players are gaining share in the U.S. data-center market.
Fluence Energy (FLNC-US): Fluence reported a record contracted backlog of $5.60 billion as of March 31, 2026, helped by its pivot toward AI data centers and MSAs with two major hyperscalers. These deals validate its “Smartstack” platform as a shock absorber for short-duration AI power spikes. Margins are also improving, with adjusted gross margins reaching 11.10% in Q2 2026.
Eos Energy (EOSE-US): Eos is scaling its Z3 zinc-based battery platform. 2025 revenue rose sevenfold to $114.20 million, and Manufacturing Line 2 in Pennsylvania should double annualized capacity to 4 GWh by end-2026. Its Frontier Power USA partnership with Cerberus, backed by a $1.50 billion technology-performance insurance framework, should help address project-finance hurdles for non-lithium systems.
ESS Tech (GWH-US): ESS Tech is commercializing iron-flow technology for 10- to 22-hour storage. Recent milestones include Project New Horizon with Google and Salt River Project, a 50 MWh pilot in Arizona, and a partnership with Alsym Energy to develop sodium-ion solutions. Its iron-flow chemistry was also independently validated by the American Public Power Association after a 21-month utility demonstration.
Merus Power (MERUS-FI) is emerging as a European BESS leader, with 2025 net sales of €54.60 million and a CATL agreement to deliver 3 GWh of storage solutions in Nordic Europe. It is also advancing grid-forming technology, including the first commercial GFM storage facility in the Nordics for Alpiq, alongside recent projects in Finland, Latvia, Poland and Denmark.
Except for Fluence, these companies have mostly underperformed over the past year. As with other emerging technologies, a market-cap-weighted basket may make sense to enter into a position in this fast-moving sector.
Enter Clean Power Suppliers and Integrators
Beyond pure-play BESS companies, several clean-power suppliers are also well positioned to power U.S. data centers. Established names such as NextEra and AES are seeing a growing share of their backlog tied to AI demand.
NextEra Energy (NEE-US) is expanding its “Data Center Hub” strategy, with more than 30 sites representing over 60 GW of potential capacity as of April 2026. It added 4.0 GW to its renewables and storage backlog, now about 33 GW, and was selected by the U.S. Department of Commerce to build 9.5 GW of gas-fired generation in Texas and Pennsylvania for large-scale users such as data centers.
The AES Corp (AES-US) is undergoing a major transition after shareholders approved a $10.7 billion take-private acquisition by a consortium led by Global Infrastructure Partners and EQT. The firm is also pioneering “Powered Land” solutions, including a 20-year PPA with Google for co-located generation in Texas. Its 2025 renewables backlog stood at 12.0 GW.
Clean Max (544717-IN) has grown rapidly in data centers, with contracted capacity for Data and AI customers rising tenfold in two years to 2,380 MW. Key deals include a roughly 900 MW renewable agreement with Meta in India and a 150 MW co-investment with Apple. Its EBITDA run-rate reached ₹1,870 crore in early 2026.
Brookfield Renewable (BEP-US) commissioned over 9 GW of new capacity in the past 12 months and aims for 10 GW per year by 2027. Its Neoen acquisition added 1.5 GW of operating battery storage and a nearly 50 GW development pipeline, making storage its fastest-growing segment.
Most have underperformed the market over the past year, except Clean Max. Given the power-demand outlook, exposure to names such as Clean Max could make sense.
Are we at Peak Gas for Data Centers?
Finally, investors should consider “legacy” data-center power suppliers, especially companies tied to gas turbines. If solar+wind+BESS keeps improving versus gas on LCOE and reliability, the current enthusiasm for turbine makers could fade. This could be especially true if renewables’ ability to close the reliability gap from 95% to 99.9% should improve as battery and solar costs fall and AI-driven load management spreads across utilities.
Unlike BESS and clean-power names, gas turbine makers have sharply outperformed over the past year, though they appear to have lost momentum despite large backlogs. Their recent appreciation could therefore create a short opportunity if renewables+BESS and, later, SMRs begin to displace gas on cost and efficiency. This could be true for companies such as GE Vernova, which is now deriving most of its revenues from selling gas turbines to data centers while still struggling to deliver profits with its wind power division.
Baker Hughes (BKR-US) has repositioned itself from oilfield services toward industrial energy technology. Its NovaLT turbine platform is built for distributed power, allowing data-center operators to bypass grid-connection queues and secure power quickly.
Siemens Energy (ENR-DE) benefits from structural demand in Grid Technologies, driven by the need to connect massive AI loads. Management says gas-turbine pricing remains favorable, with average prices per GW rising by the high teens year-over-year in early 2026 as hyperscalers pay premiums for faster delivery. The company booked nearly €2 billion of data-center-related Grid orders in H1 fiscal 2026.