There is an old market cliché that investors like divided government because politicians cannot do very much. The logic is straightforward: when neither party can pass its agenda unilaterally, the odds of sweeping changes to taxes, regulation and spending fall, and companies can plan around a narrower range of outcomes. The 2026 midterms provide an unusually revealing test of that idea. Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress while President Trump remains in the White House, leaving neither side with the votes required to impose a broad policy reset. The likely result is not stability in the conventional sense, but a narrower range of federal outcomes, more aggressive congressional oversight, and a larger role for states in determining how energy, infrastructure, and healthcare policy evolves over the next two years.
The initial market response was consistent with this interpretation, although it was far from uniform. We track four SMS policy baskets, labeled B1 to B4 in the chart below: Transition Utilities (B1), Grid & AI Enablers (B2), the Solar Value Chain (B3) and Medicaid & ACA-Exposed (B4). The SMS Solar Value Chain and Medicaid & ACA-Exposed baskets rallied sharply around the election, Transition Utilities also advanced, and the Grid & AI Enablers basket sold off. The split looks like a repricing of political downside where it had been concentrated, alongside a reassessment of areas where expectations, valuations and public resistance had already climbed.
The return of the policy floor
For much of the past two years, investors in clean energy and healthcare faced more than ordinary regulatory uncertainty. Unified Republican control created the possibility that executive actions could be reinforced through budget reconciliation, appropriations and durable statutory changes. Democratic control of Congress does not make policy supportive, but it reduces the probability that another large legislative package will deepen the retrenchment already enacted under the Trump administration.
That difference matters for valuation because a sector does not need a new subsidy or entitlement expansion to rerate. When expectations are depressed, a lower probability of the worst outcome can be sufficient. The immediate rallies in solar and healthcare therefore look less like forecasts of a new progressive policy cycle than recognition that the distribution of possible outcomes has narrowed. Investors are pricing a floor, not yet a catalyst.
Basket 1: Transition Utilities
The Transition Utilities basket captures companies positioned to earn regulated or contracted returns from the buildout of cleaner generation, transmission, distribution, and grid resilience. The basket is less dependent on a new federal subsidy package than the solar manufacturers and installers, but it is highly sensitive to state regulation, allowed returns, permitting, and the allocation of infrastructure costs.
States may matter more than Congress
The federal result will dominate headlines, but the state-level shift may have more direct investment consequences. Five governorships moved from Republican to Democratic control, while Democratic gains in attorney-general and regulatory offices change who shapes implementation, enforcement and utility planning. Energy policy in the United States is already highly federalized: states influence utility rate cases, transmission siting, integrated resource plans, renewable procurement, net metering and building standards.
This creates an important asymmetry for Transition Utilities. The basket does not require Washington to pass another national climate package. The companies need permission to deploy capital, recover investments through rates and earn returns on transmission, generation and resilience spending. A supportive governor or public utility commission can therefore influence earnings visibility even when Congress remains deadlocked.
There is, however, a less comfortable side to the state-policy argument. If voters have become more sensitive to electricity affordability, utilities are not automatically beneficiaries simply because regulators shift costs away from data centers or favor clean investment. The same commissions that approve grid spending also determine how quickly utilities recover that spending and what returns shareholders are allowed to earn. A campaign against electricity bills can therefore become a campaign against the pace of capital spending, cost recovery or allowed returns. The investment question is not simply whether infrastructure is necessary, but whether utilities can demonstrate that it lowers system costs and allocate those costs in a way regulators will continue to accept.
Basket 2: Grid & AI Enablers
The Grid & AI Enablers basket represents the physical layer behind electrification and digital growth. These companies benefit from the need for substations, transformers, switchgear, transmission lines, cooling systems and specialized construction. Their exposure is broader than clean energy, which gives the basket a stronger secular demand base but also links it to data-center capital spending and the politics of electricity affordability.
Why Grid & AI Enablers sold off
The decline in Grid & AI Enablers is the most useful counterweight to a simple blue-wave narrative. The basket had already been one of the strongest trades of 2026, supported by data-center construction, manufacturing investment and the expectation of a long grid-capital cycle.
Campaign politics supports part of the sell-off. Many Democrats ran against data centers: campaigns spent more than $380 million on television ads mentioning them, and Democrats outspent Republicans on the topic by more than three to one. Of the 34 governors elected in races AP called, 32 back stronger regulation and 12 back bans or moratoria. Tougher permitting, ratepayer-protection rules and local moratoria are now more likely, and they land on the demand that Grid & AI Enablers had been valued on.
The size of the move may still overstate the damage to this basket. Developers facing multi-year interconnection queues have been turning to behind-the-meter generation, and one tracker counts roughly 90 GW of announced behind-the-meter capacity, more than a quarter of planned US data-center capacity. Projects that supply their own power sidestep much of the ratepayer-cost argument, but they still need switchgear, transformers and electrical construction. Rules that make data centers pay for their own grid upgrades could push more projects on-site instead of cancelling them
In short, the election results do not eliminate the infrastructure opportunity for Eaton [ETN-US], Quanta Services [PWR-US] or EMCOR Group [EME-US], but it can slow the conversion of a powerful long-term theme into near-term revenue and make elevated valuations more sensitive to disappointment.
Basket 3: Solar Value Chain
The Solar Value Chain basket is the most direct policy-duration trade in the group. It spans domestic manufacturing, utility-scale equipment and residential deployment, so the companies respond differently to tariffs, tax credits, interest rates and state-level rules. What unites the basket is that the probability of further policy deterioration can matter almost as much as the probability of new support.
Solar: a repricing of survival, not a return to the IRA
The post-election solar rally should not be mistaken for a restoration of the Biden-era policy architecture. President Trump retains control of the executive branch and the veto, while many of the incentives weakened under unified Republican government cannot be readily restored. Trade policy, federal permitting and agency implementation also remain important sources of risk.
What changed is that the clean-energy industry now has additional institutional defenses. Democratic committee chairs can conduct oversight, slow appropriations language, scrutinize agency implementation and use must-pass legislation to seek targeted concessions. State governments can also sustain renewable portfolio standards, storage programs, distributed-solar rules and procurement mandates. For a basket that remained deeply negative for the year even after the November rally, reducing the probability of another policy shock can have a disproportionate effect.
Basket 4: Medicaid & ACA-Exposed Healthcare
The healthcare basket combines managed-care organizations, hospital operators and a healthcare property company. The common thread is exposure to insured patient volumes and public reimbursement, but the transmission mechanism differs: Centene and Molina are directly affected by enrollment and rate setting, while hospitals are affected through payer mix, uncompensated care and utilization.
Healthcare: gridlock can still protect earnings
The healthcare basket may be the clearest expression of the policy-floor thesis. Democratic control of Congress does not automatically repeal the Medicaid financing changes and ACA provisions enacted under President Trump. The White House can veto a broad reversal, and Senate rules remain an obstacle to standalone legislation. Providers and managed-care companies should therefore not assume that the pre-2025 policy environment will return.
Nevertheless, the election changes the negotiating environment around additional cuts and implementation. Healthcare affordability was a major voting concern, and Democrats now control the committees, hearings and legislative calendar in Congress. Partial mitigation through budget negotiations, implementation delays, targeted ACA support or relief for hospitals is more plausible than it was before the election. Those changes can matter materially at the company level because managed-care enrollment, reimbursement and hospital uncompensated care respond to policy at the margin.
The next two years are about floors, not catalysts
The four baskets point to a differentiated conclusion. Transition Utilities gain from a lower federal downside tail and potentially friendlier state regulation. Solar receives the largest policy rerating because the sector had absorbed the greatest policy damage, although the rally does not by itself establish a new bull market. Medicaid- and ACA-exposed companies benefit from a reduced probability of further retrenchment and a greater chance of targeted mitigation. Grid & AI Enablers retain the strongest secular demand case, but they also face the clearest risk that electricity affordability and local opposition complicate the investment cycle.
The central question after an election is usually what the winners will do. In this case, investors may get more insight by asking what each side can no longer do alone. Democrats cannot rebuild the old policy regime while Trump controls the White House, but Trump can no longer rely on a compliant Congress to deepen it. For sectors carrying significant policy scars, fragmented government can function as downside protection. The 2026 blue wave may matter less because it puts Democrats in control of Congress than because it fragments control of policy across Washington, state capitals and regulatory bodies.
Personalization – the use of machine learning models trained on individual-level data to tailor a product, prediction, or treatment to a specific person rather – is not a single phenomenon that artificial intelligence applies uniformly across the economy. Its success is governed by three measurable variables: 1. the cost of acquiring data, 2. the cost of a wrong prediction, and 3. the speed of the feedback loop between action and outcome.
Health care is simultaneously the sector with the strongest scientific justification for personalization and the sector most prone to expensive overpromising, since the same conditions that make personalization valuable also make it slow, costly, and difficult to validate.
Why Personalization by AI isn’t Fungible Across Sectors
The “personalization of everything” narrative incorrectly suggests that Netflix’s recommendation engine, Amazon’s product suggestions, and an AI-matched cancer therapy as points on the same continuum. Media and retail personalization succeeded quickly and cheaply because the underlying data is abundant and continuously regenerated by user behavior, a wrong recommendation costs the company almost nothing (the user simply scrolls past it), and the feedback loop between a suggestion and its outcome is measured in seconds. An industry like precision agriculture occupies a middle position: sensor and satellite data are becoming cheap, but the feedback loop is a full growing season, and an error costs real yield, which is why adoption has been steady rather than explosive.
Health care sits at the opposite pole: clinical and genomic data are expensive to generate, fragmented, and constrained by privacy regulation that has no analogue in ad-tech: a wrong prediction risks patient fatality rather than simply waste an advertising impression. In addition, the feedback loop connecting a treatment decision to its true outcome, survival, recurrence, or long-term toxicity, can run into years, far too slow to train and correct a model the way a recommendation algorithm corrects itself in real time.
Health care outcomes are surely one of the most impactful use for artificial intelligence, with personalization an important pathway. Earlier this summer, financial participants confirmed this view: in August, Moderna stock surged because its personalized mRNA cancer vaccine – AI helps identify the right targets for each patient – showed success in a pivotal trial. Of course, the story is larger than AI in medicine: investors cheered because it provided clinical validation that mRNA can work in cancer, not just infectious diseases.
Whether the optimism is warranted is yet to be seen, as real-world failures also do exist: between 2025 and 2022, IBM spent roughly $4 billion building Watson Health on the premise that a system trained the way Watson beat Jeopardy! could generalize to oncology. Internal documents later showed the system generating “unsafe and incorrect” treatment recommendations, with failures traced directly to training on a small number of synthetic cases that reflected one hospital’s practice patterns rather than diverse, real-world outcomes data. IBM sold off the unit’s data and analytics assets in 2022 for roughly $1 billion, a fraction of what had been invested.
Nonetheless, it’s becoming clear that artificial intelligence has the potential to personalize treatments and therefore significantly improve outcomes in a high impact sector like health care. Today’s Note identifies the companies and investment opportunities related to this theme.
Health Care Personalization: Who Does What
To evaluate “AI plus health care”, we immediately notice that a lower risk strategy is to own the “picks and shovels” (or infrastructure) of personalized medicine rather than the biotech companies that own the therapies. The table below highlights why this is the case, but put simply, biotech companies own the regulatory and clinical risk and commercial risk whereas the suppliers of the inputs to the final drug treatments, i.e. the picks and shovels, are relatively shielded from these unknowns.
Below, we separate the three layers that must each work for personalized medicine to reach a patient: the data that makes personalization possible, the software and diagnostics that turn that data into a decision, and the manufacturing capacity that actually produces a personalized product at scale.
1. Data Generation
When it comes to personalized medicine, the first step requires data generation companies that produce the raw genomic, single-cell, or spatial biology data, through sequencing instruments and sample-preparation tools, that all downstream personalization applications depend on. The clearest illustration of the importance of this layer occurred in August 2026, when Merck (MRK-US) and Moderna (MRNA-US) reported the first positive Phase 3 result for any individualized neoantigen therapy, in resected melanoma. The therapy is, in effect, one drug per patient: each dose requires that bioinformatics pipeline that selects which specific mutations to encode. This essential manufacturing input enables the therapy to exist and falls outside the category of discretionary diagnostic tests subject to payer discretion. Two companies in this space stand out:
- Illumina (ILMN-US) develops and manufactures life science tools and integrated systems for large-scale analysis of genetic variation and function. It is considered a mature, profitable incumbent whose sequencing platforms generate the raw genomic data every downstream application depends on. Second-quarter 2026 revenue grew 9.5% year-over-year, and the business is comfortably profitable.
- 10x Genomics (TXG-US) provides single-cell and spatial biology tools that capture the kind of granular data bulk sequencing cannot. Its 2026 revenue guidance implies roughly flat to modestly positive growth, but gross margin improved to 70% in the first quarter and net losses narrowed meaningfully. It is a smaller and more cyclical business than Illumina but one sitting directly upstream of the next generation of personalization applications: most of 10x’s workflows are ultimately sequenced on Illumina instruments, but Illumina has also built competing single-cell and spatial product lines.
2. Data-to-Decision
Data-to-decision companies turn raw data into an actionable clinical choice, such as which diagnostic test result, drug, or dose is right for a specific patient. This is the layer generating the most investor attention, partly because of its reliance on AI in specific products and partly because the category has adopted “AI” as a branding convention. The companies doing this work have divergent financial profiles, making for a tricky backdrop for investors:
- Natera (NTRA-US) is a diagnostics company, which engages in the discovery, development, and commercialization of genetic testing services. Second-quarter 2026 revenue grew 37%, management raised full-year revenue guidance and reiterated guidance for positive full-year cash flow, a rare combination of hypergrowth and a credible, near-term path to self-funding.
- Tempus AI (TEM-US) is a precision medicine company, historically centered on oncology, that runs two linked businesses: diagnostics and data. Diagnostics account for about three quarters of revenue, running genomic and molecular test on tumor samples. (about three-quarters of revenue). The data division keeps de-identified clinical and molecular patient records. It licenses that data, and the AI tools built on it, to pharmaceutical companies for drug discovery, trial design, and finding patients for trials. The company grew revenue 22% in the second quarter and posted a small profit, its first,
- Guardant Health (GH-US) is a “precision” oncology company, which provides treatment selection for cancer through the use of proprietary blood-based tests, vast data sets, and advanced analytics. In their most recent earnings results, they reported oncology test volume up 63% year-over-year, although net losses widened over the same period.
- Certara (CERT-US) provides software and technology-enabled services for drug developers including cell and gene therapy, clinical pharmacology, complex biologics, decision analytics and modeling. The company reported roughly flat second-quarter 2026 revenue and reported a small loss (compare to a profit gains in the previous quarters).
3. Manufacturing at Scale
Manufacturers physically produce personalized or small-batch biologic therapies (mRNA vaccines, cell and gene therapies). This is the bottleneck that determines whether personalized medicine can move beyond rare-disease niches into broader clinical use.
Bespoke, per-patient biologic manufactured in small batches is the structural opposite of the blockbuster-drug economics that built the modern pharmaceutical business model.
- Lonza (LONN-CH) is a Swiss company founded in 1897 that is a manufacturing partner for biopharmaceuticals. Historically, the company has “mass produced” popular treatments, but they now have a dedicated line of business develops, de-risk, commercializes, and scales emerging therapies. Sales growth was reported at over 20% in 2025, across mRNA, cell and gene therapy, and biologics manufacturing capacity.
The summary table above shows the large dispersion in the financial performance of the major actors in health care personalization. Revenue growth, gross margin, and profitability vary significantly; owning a basket of companies may be a more appropriate strategy than bearing single name risk.
For six years, Shein, the world’s largest fast fashion retailer, wandered from New York to London to Hong Kong before finally completing its stock market debut on September 1, 2026, an odyssey that ended in a muted trading debut and a valuation of roughly $26 billion – a fraction of the $100 billion it commanded at its 2022 funding peak. ESG scrutiny genuinely contributed to that delay. The company faced scrutiny from U.S. lawmakers over supply chain labor practices and forced-labor allegations tied to Xinjiang cotton. In the U.K., risk-disclosure requirements tied to Shein’s Chinese supply chain killed the London listing option. When Shein finally debuted in Hong Kong, the offering raised $1.7 billion, at a fraction of prior valuations.
It would be a fantasy to believe that Shein’s difficulty to secure a listing as proof that the fast fashion business model is failing. After all, Shein remains the world’s largest fast fashion retailer, and the industry of fast fashion has consistently outgrown the broader apparel market over the past several years.
When consumers spend money at Shein, they are doing so with little concern for environmental and social considerations. The implication is that consumers, voting with their pocketbooks, have not embraced eco-conscious choices on any great scale: the worst fashion polluters with the most environmentally destructive business models continue to gain market share. And if consumer sentiment is not enough to shift the needle in an ESG-indefensible industry, what can? In today’s Note, we argue that fast fashion’s business model IS more vulnerable today: policy, technology, and regulation are three levers that are working in place of consumers’ good intentions.
Trade Policy: A Fast Fashion Faux Pas
For the first time in fast fashion’s two-decade run, the mechanism forcing a cost increase on the sector’s most environmentally reckless business models is not activist pressure or consumer preference. It is trade policy pursued for reasons that have nothing to do with sustainability. First, the U.S. imposed steep Section 301 tariffs on Chinese-origin apparel and footwear, then extended sweeping “reciprocal” tariffs to nearly every other apparel-exporting nation under an April 2025 executive order. Companies operating in China rerouted supply chains through Vietnam, Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia to avoid the steepest China-specific rates. Then, in August 2025, the U.S. ended its de minimis exemption, the rule that let packages under $800 enter duty-free, and which Shein and Temu had built their entire unit economics around: garments now face tariffs as high as 46% depending on country of origin and product classification. The weighted average U.S. tariff on apparel and footwear imports spiked from 13% to 54% in spring 2025 before settling around 36%, still roughly double the broader U.S. import tariff average, in a sector where the U.S. imports 89% of the apparel and leather goods it sells. The European Union is following with its own repeal of the €150 de minimis exemption in 2026, closing the same loophole on the other side of the Atlantic.
Note that tariffs are a blunt instrument with no environmental objective behind them. Tariffs raise the cost of doing business in one jurisdiction; they do nothing to address overproduction, hazardous chemical use, or the underlying twenty-four-season production cycle. Tariffs may be working to stymy the sales of fast fashion brands, and therefore indirectly (and temporarily?) curb related environmental and social woes. However, they are a blunt instrument, easily reversed should the political winds change.
Technology: Making Apparel Circularity Feasible, But Not Inevitable
The single biggest change in the past five years when it comes to environmental impacts in the textile industry is arguably the technology that enables recycling. Fiber-to-fiber recycling has moved from laboratory concept to commercial reality. For example, Econyl is a branded regenerated nylon yarn made by the Italian company Aquafil, which chemically recycles nylon waste (like discarded fishing nets, carpet scraps, and industrial plastic) into new nylon fiber that is chemically identical to virgin nylon and can be reused infinitely without loss of quality; it’s already integrated at commercial volume into products from major fashion and swimwear brands rather than existing only as a pilot or lab-scale demonstration. Meanwhile, chemical recycling platforms like Circulose and Circ are running functioning pilot-to-commercial operations for cellulosic fibers and polyester-cotton blends, the two hardest categories to recycle. McKinsey estimates that with €6 to €7 billion of capital expenditure, fiber-to-fiber recycling could reach 18% to 26% of gross textile waste in Europe by 2030, up from under 1% today.
That said, readiness is not the same as adoption, and the industry’s own recent history is the clearest warning against declaring victory. Renewcell, the most heavily publicized textile-to-textile recycling company in the sector, filed for bankruptcy in February 2024 despite years of branded partnership announcements with major retailers. The brands signed offtake agreements, but they did not buy enough actual volume to keep the Renewcell solvent. That gap between announced ambition and executed procurement is the major bottleneck: industry-wide recycled fiber content remains stuck under 8%, Collection infrastructure, the unglamorous prerequisite for feeding any of this technology, still captures only 30% to 35% of textile waste in Europe, the most advanced market globally. The conclusion for investors is that circularity is now technically possible in a way it was not five years ago, which removes the industry’s best-worn excuse, but the constraint has shifted from engineering to capital allocation and brand purchasing commitment.
EU Regulation: Making Fast Fashion Unprofitable
Where technology has matured and tariffs remain a blunt, environmentally agnostic instrument, the European Union is the first jurisdiction to pair financial penalties directly with design incentives. Extended Producer Responsibility schemes rolling out under the EU’s Sustainable and Circular Textiles Strategy use eco-modulated fees: producers pay more for garments that are less durable, less recyclable, or contain less recycled content.
France has gone furthest and fastest. Coincidentally, its anti-ultra-fast-fashion law took effect on the same day as Shein’s IPO (September 1, 2026), imposing fees of up to 50% of a garment’s pre-tax selling price and banning advertising for platforms explicitly named in the legislative debate, Shein and Temu among them. France’s law targets the business model directly: it is designed around overproduction and environmental damage, not import protectionism or fiscal revenue. The EU’s parallel move to end its €150 de minimis exemption in 2026 closes the same loophole the U.S. closed a year earlier, but layered on top of EPR and the French penalty regime, it represents a more coordinated attempt to make the ultra-fast-fashion model structurally unprofitable in the EU market specifically.
Investment Implications
In the section below, we identify apparel retailers considered the biggest winner and losers from ongoing tariffs, recycling technology and EU regulation.
Losers:
- Structurally exposed to the de minimis/tariff mechanism: PDD Holdings (PDD-US), owner of Temu, and Shein (0625-HK) face the most direct hit, since their entire cost advantage was built on duty-free small-parcel shipping, no longer possible in both the U.S. and EU. Stanford GSB research shows they’re diversifying markets rather than restructuring the underlying model, which caps the damage but doesn’t reverse it.
- Asia-sourcing-concentrated apparel manufacturers with thin margins and limited pricing power: G-III Apparel Group (GIII-US, withdrew guidance entirely), VF Corporation (VFC-US, down roughly 20% since May 2026), Gap Inc. (GAP-US, $200-300 million quantified tariff cost), Columbia Sportswear (COLM-US), and American Eagle Outfitters (AEO-US, down 37% YTD). None of these carry the brand pricing power to fully pass costs to consumers, and their Vietnam and China sourcing concentration puts them squarely in the highest-tariff bracket.
- Companies with pledges but no capital behind them: as we discussed, brands whose recycled-content commitments are percentage targets without disclosed offtake agreements are exposed to reputational and potentially regulatory risk under the EU’s eco-modulated EPR fee structure, which will increasingly reward demonstrable recycled content and durability, not stated ambition. Nike, Inc. (NKE-US) face an active class action lawsuit alleging that up to 90% of items in its own “Sustainability” collection are not actually made with recycled fibers as advertised, and the company overstated recycled content claims. Meanwhile, Shein was fined €1 million by Italy’s Competition Authority in August 2025 specifically for misleading sustainability claims.
Winners:
- Brands with genuine pricing power and premium positioning are passing through tariff costs: Ralph Lauren (RL-US) has pushed through explicit price increases with limited demand destruction, and as a premium brand tariff costs are small as a share of retail price makes the entire tariff regime close to immaterial for them financially. Note that on an operational basis, Ralph Lauren is an industry leader, based on CSRHub score metrics.
- Nearshored or diversified-sourcing manufacturers: Gildan Activewear Inc. (GIL-CA), with manufacturing concentrated in Central and North America, it is a beneficiary of USMCA and CAFTA preferential treatment, and carries structurally lower Asia tariff exposure than peers. Like Ralph Lauren, Gildan is an operational leader, according to CSRHub scores.
- Brands that made real capital commitments to recycling infrastructure early: Inditex (ITX-ES) and H&M (HMB-SE) – once considered the worst fast fashion offenders – are now best positioned to benefit from EU eco-modulated EPR fees specifically because their offtake agreements with recycled textile manufacturers give them defensible, auditable recycled-content claims exactly when regulators start checking. This is a case where genuine capital deployed years before the regulation bites becomes a real competitive moat rather than a marketing line.
Commercially mature recycling technology suppliers: Unifi (UFI-US), through its REPREVE fiber business, and Lenzing AG (LNZ-AT), through Refibra/TENCEL, sit downstream of both the EU regulatory push and brand offtake demand, positioned to capture volume regardless of which individual apparel brand wins market share, a more diversified way to express the circularity thesis than betting on any single retailer.
With AI agents now roaming the virtual corridors of the services industry, it’s fair to ask how far this technology ultimately displaces workers across finance, legal, accounting, and HR functions at larger organizations. Agentic AI platforms let firms create and train agents in a way that effectively builds “digital twins” of entire services’ workforces. Where firms used to add headcount, often through temp staffing agencies, they can now nurture agents natively trained on their own context and workflows. In this not-so-utopian world, now at our doorstep, it’s fair to wonder whether temp staffing companies retain a durable role, and whether the sector’s historically controversial labor model becomes a smaller share of how large employers fill gaps.
The most rigorous data point on employer intent comes from the Adecco Group’s Workforce Trends 2026 Report, a survey of roughly 2,000 C-suite executives and 37,500 workers across 13 countries. Forty-five percent of business leaders expect AI agents to be fully integrated into workflows within twelve months, yet only 36% say their talent strategy clearly communicates that AI will create opportunities for employees rather than displace them, and just 22% are confident they are building the digital capabilities their workforce actually needs.
The gap cuts the other way too: 70% of non-managerial employees say they would be comfortable collaborating with AI agents, compared with only 39% of leaders who believe their staff feel that way. The implication is that AI agent execution risk sits with management confidence and change management, not worker resistance. PwC’s AI agent survey corroborates this pattern: 75% of executives report confidence in their AI agent strategy, but describe the near-term effect as redeploying staff to new tasks rather than eliminating headcount outright. Census Bureau firm-level tracking adds a useful reality check: among companies currently using AI, 87% report it displaces only a small number of tasks, with large-scale task replacement still confined to under 1% of firms.
Taken together, the evidence does not support a clean substitution thesis in which AI agents are displacing temporary or contingent labor at scale today. Instead, it points to a slower, uneven redesign of work in which the binding constraint is organizational trust and skills investment, not the technology’s raw capability to replace tasks currently filled by temp staffing.
Build vs. Buy, and the “Enshittification” Risk
Outsourcing to temp staffing versus building in-house AI agents is a classic build-versus-buy tradeoff, with each option carrying a distinct risk profile rather than one being categorically superior. Temp staffing converts labor into a variable cost, transfer screening, compliance, and turnover risk to the agency, and, critically, carries a network effect: a temp worker arrives having already seen how dozens of other employers solve the same problem, so each placement imports cross-company best practice and gives the employer an external market check on quality. A temp’s output is benchmarked against a market rate and a market skill pool, and underperformance is cheap to terminate.
In-house AI agents have no equivalent mechanism. They are trained and reinforced almost entirely on one company’s own data, KPIs, and management preferences, so they tend to optimize for pleasing the existing hierarchy rather than for ground truth. The upfront cost is largely sunk (data infrastructure, fine-tuning, integration, governance), but the marginal cost of each additional task approaches zero once built, which is the entire investment case for agentic automation. The catch is that there is no natural market discipline, forcing a reset the way a temp worker’s next assignment does. An agent fine-tuned on a company’s own historical decisions and success metrics will tend to reproduce and amplify that company’s existing blind spots and internal politics.
For investors evaluating a company’s AI agent buildout, the diligence question is not simply how much capex is going into it, but whether implementing agents can occur while avoiding enshittification – the idea that your employees start drinking the corporate kool aid a bit too much, i.e., whether the company has built independent evaluation benchmarks, external data grounding, and adversarial red teaming to substitute for the cross-employer network effect that in-house agents structurally lack.
ESG: The Temp Staffing Risks that AI Agents Sidestep
Temp staffing practices typically split legal employment (the agency) from operational control (the client), which creates accountability gaps. For instance, temp staffing companies have been historically accused of precarious pay and hours, wage theft, discrimination, weak safety training for high-risk placements, and even recruitment-fee debt bondage or forced labor among migrant workers, alongside erosion of union bargaining power. These risks translate financially into litigation exposure, joint-employer liability, regulatory fines, higher insurance costs, and lost contracts, especially as supply-chain due-diligence rules tighten globally. By deploying AI agents in lieu of temp workers, a company can sidestep this entire risk category.
How Big is the Temp Market, Really?
Temp employment peaked at 2.5% of total U.S. non-farm employment in 2020 and now stands at roughly 1.5% of the employed workforce. With job openings now back near 2019 levels, the current low level of temp staffing may be explained as much by the temporary sluggishness of the broader job market as by any AI-driven substitution effect.
Looking at the past six months, BLS data offers a more nuanced picture than the popular “AI is gutting white-collar jobs” narrative suggests: temp staffing employment has in fact increased by 34,800 jobs (+1.4%).
That said, there is considerable dispersion across industries. Temp staffing for financial activities and information services show genuine, broadening contraction, down 57,000 (-0.6%) and 35,000 (-1.2%) respectively over six months. This contraction is concentrated in insurance carriers, credit intermediation, and computer systems design, precisely the automatable back-office and technical functions linked to the fastest AI adoption rates. Legal services and accounting, by contrast, show no aggregate displacement at all: legal payrolls are up 11,300 (+0.9%) and accounting is roughly flat over the same window. Healthcare remains the only sector still driving overall job growth (+2.9% YoY through March 2026, across all healthcare employment, not just temp placements), while temp staffing specifically has stabilized after last year’s slide, both supporting the case that clinical staffing demand is more insulated from AI substitution than white-collar temp placement. The Dallas Federal Reserve and Anthropic research suggest the likely explanation is that AI’s labor impact so far shows up as a freeze in entry-level hiring, associates, junior auditors, rather than incumbent layoffs, a dynamic that is invisible in aggregate industry headcount data but very real for the cohort it affects.
Agents Are Priced In
Publicly listed temp staffing companies have derated substantially over the past year and underperformed the broader indices. Thin profit margins, flattening revenue growth, and a slower overall job market have taken the air out of the post-Covid staffing bubble.
Within the group, Robert Half looks most vulnerable to agentic AI, given its strong exposure to back-office financial functions, precisely the roles most likely to be automated within the next five years. AMN Healthcare, by contrast, provides staff that remain far harder to replace given the clinical nature of the work, which should make it more resilient to AI displacement, at least until humanoid robotics make meaningful inroads into care settings.
From an operational standpoint, most staffing firms now have an explicit AI strategy, often centered on using AI tools to streamline their own HR and placement processes. In addition, they will increasingly compete for client budgets with management consultants and IT integrators, which are also pitching “build your agentic workforce” engagements to the same corporate buyers, as the strategies highlighted in the table below suggest.
Equity market participants have reacted quickly to the disruption narrative. Short interest in Robert Half has reached 24%, reflecting a deep-seated conviction that AI will permanently erode demand for white-collar placement services, even as domestic staffing trends are inflecting toward recovery, a combination that could set up a short squeeze as sentiment catches up to improving operational realities. ManpowerGroup carries more moderate short interest of roughly 15%.
Sustainability-oriented equity mandates have spent a decade building around a practical constraint: ESG data for small cap companies is less available and less reliable than its large cap counterparts. Third-party ratings agencies often concentrate their analytical resources on large caps, where disclosure is richer and the revenue-per-company economics make coverage worthwhile. The consequence has been a structural underweight in small caps across ESG portfolios that is a data artifact rather than a deliberate investment judgment.
Over the twelve months ending June 30, 2026, that underweight cost money. The Russell 2000 returned 40% and in the first half of 2026 alone, the Russell 2000 outperformed the S&P 500 by more than 12 percentage points, its best start to a year since 1991.
The deeper issue for sustainability mandates is that low scores and missing scores are treated as equivalent signals of ESG risk, when in most cases they reflect nothing more than the disclosure practices of a company with less staff dedicated to the investor relations function.
We propose a different entry point: rather than relying on ratings coverage that does not exist, we identify small cap companies where observable, verifiable sustainability events have recently occurred or are imminent – first ESG reports, CDP initiation, SBTi validation, board-level governance upgrades, etc. These triggers do not require proprietary data infrastructure. They require reading company filings, sustainability reports, and proxy statements, which is what active small cap managers already do. The re-rating that follows is systematic and documented: research published in 2025 found that MSCI ESG rating changes drive abnormal returns over multiple months after the change, with institutional investor repositioning as the primary transmission mechanism.
The implication is actionable: in small caps, identify the companies that are publishing the required data and own them before the agencies react.
The Investment Thesis
When a company improves its sustainability posture in a material, verifiable way, the re-rating tends to follow a predictable sequence. First, the company appears in sustainability-focused screening databases (MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, ISS) with an upgraded score. This typically takes 12 to 24 months from the triggering event. Second, institutional mandates with ESG minimum screens begin to include the name in their eligible universe, generating incremental demand that is largely independent of traditional fundamental catalysts. Third, coverage by sustainability-focused analysts follows, compounding the effect.
Companies know that improving their sustainability posture is good for their stock price; the survey results showed in the chart below highlight that companies believe the main opportunities related to ESG ratings are acquiring and retaining interest in their stock.
It is logical that the re-rating premium would be amplified in small caps relative to large caps because the starting ownership base is dominated by generalist managers who have not priced sustainability improvement into their valuation. There are some practical signals that investors can track to anticipate a re-rating:
- First publication of a sustainability report (particularly if structured around SASB materiality topics)
- Adoption of science-based emissions targets or commitment to SBTi validation
- Board composition changes (addition of an independent director with sustainability credentials; board-level committee dedicated to ESG oversight)
- First participation in CDP disclosure (Carbon Disclosure Project questionnaire responses carry significant weight in downstream rating models)
- Emissions intensity reduction documented over two consecutive years (a single year is insufficient signal; agencies require a trend)
Where to Look
The most fertile ground for the improvers investment thesis sits in sectors where SASB-defined material sustainability topics are operationally manageable at scale for a small company, but where disclosure has historically been minimal. Industrial services, specialty chemicals, and building products are all areas where energy intensity, waste management, and worker health and safety are financially material (under SASB) and operationally addressable without the capital requirements that make transition difficult. A small industrial company that installs remote energy monitoring across its facilities, reduces its recordable incident rate, and publishes a first SASB-aligned sustainability report is doing all three things at once – and doing them in a way that is both financially rational and likely to trigger a meaningful ESG re-rating within two years.
The Counter-Argument
A skeptic may point to three things that undermine the arguments above:
- The re-rating timeline of 12 to 24 months is long, and the path is uncertain: a company can publish a sustainability report without triggering any rating agency review if the report is judged insufficiently substantive.
- The sustainability reporting landscape is not frictionless: first-time reporters routinely publish reports of uneven quality, and a poorly constructed first report can lock in a low score rather than improve it.
- The liquidity premium embedded in small caps is not always fully compensated: if a sustainability-driven re-rating coincides with a broad risk-off environment, the demand lift from ESG-screened mandates may be insufficient to offset market-wide selling.
These are real risks, but they can be mitigated by concentrating on companies whose underlying operational improvements are genuine and financially material, rather than those pursuing disclosure as a cosmetic exercise. For example, an emissions intensity trend that tracks with capital investment in energy efficiency is credible, while an emissions intensity trend that appears only in the sustainability report – without corresponding capex – is not.
Investment Implications
For small cap equity managers, a systematic scan for the leading indicators listed above (sustainability report publication, CDP participation, SBTi commitment, and board changes) applied across the portfolio universe can generates a watchlist of names likely to re-rate within 24 months.
In the section below, we highlight companies that qualify for a “sustainability re-rating” based on the criteria identified above.
Small Cap Sustainability Improvers Ripe for Re-Rating
- Onterris Inc (ONT-US)
Market cap: $750M | SASB sector: Waste Management / Environmental Services
Onterris, an environmental and engineering consulting firm, had its near-term SBTi target and long-term net-zero target formally validated by the Science Based Targets initiative in early 2025. SBTi validation is arguably the most credible sustainability event a company can execute. Ratings agencies like MSCI operate on annual review cycles, meaning a company that validates SBTi targets today is unlikely to see a formal rating upgrade until the next scheduled assessment, usually annually.
Onterris has published annual SASB-aligned sustainability reports for three consecutive years and participates in CDP. Revenue approached $900M in 2025 and 2026 guidance is above that level. The business is growing into the disclosure infrastructure rather than shrinking, which gives the rating upgrade a durable foundation.
It is also worth noting that until recently, the company operated under the name Montrose Environmental Group, but rebranded as Onterris in April 2026. Corporate identity resets of this kind often precede a broader ESG narrative refresh and tend to attract new analyst attention.
- Dexterra Group (DXT-CA)
Market cap: CAD $880M | SASB sector: Professional & Commercial Services / Industrial Support Services
Dexterra provides supports services for the creation, management and operation of infrastructure. The company published its first-ever comprehensive, GRI-aligned sustainability report in March 2025, including a quantified Scope 1 and Scope 2 baseline following the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard. Prior reports were informal communications without a quantified emissions baseline.. Importantly, the business is financially robust: Q1 2026 revenue grew 15% year on year, and earnings beat estimates by approximately 40%. This removes the risk that sustainability commitments get deprioritized because of financial stress.
- John B. Sanfilippo & Son (JBSS-US)
Market cap: ~$990M | SASB sector: Processed Food
JBSS, a leading American processor of tree nuts and related snacks, has quietly built one of the more comprehensive environmental disclosure programs among U.S. food small caps without having published a formal consolidated sustainability report. The company participates in CDP across all three disclosure streams simultaneously (climate change, water security, and forests), which is rare at this market cap. The company discloses scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. In fiscal year 2025, total emissions intensity declined 8.3%. The company updated its Environmental Policy in May 2024, conducts water risk analysis using WRI’s Aqueduct Atlas across all six production facilities, and holds Energy Star Partner of the Year recognition. It reached 89.5% recyclable packaging by weight. SASB material topics for processed food (energy, water management, packaging waste, food safety) are each being actively addressed. The re-rating catalyst here is specific: MSCI and Sustainalytics currently rate JBSS without a published PDF sustainability report to anchor on, meaning the quantitative data sitting on its website is likely being partially discounted or missed. Publication of a first formal consolidated report would immediately elevate the company’s data quality score.
- Ag Growth International (AFN-CA)
Market cap: CAD $450M | SASB sector: Industrial Machinery & Goods
AGI makes grain handling, aeration, and storage equipment, placing it in a sustainability-adjacent commercial position (food security infrastructure) that creates natural demand for ESG transparency. Their 2024 Sustainability Report, released in June 2025, was the first to include a SASB Index and a standalone TCFD-aligned supplemental disclosure, neither of which appeared in the 2023 report. This is a meaningful escalation from narrative-only sustainability communication to framework-indexed disclosure, which is exactly what most ratings agencies require to move from qualitative to quantitative scoring. The Board operates a Governance and Sustainability Committee. On the quantitative side, AGI set a target in 2023 to reduce Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions intensity by 25% by 2030 against a 2021 baseline; in 2024, it had already achieved a 16% reduction, keeping the trajectory on track. Safety performance improved sharply: lost-time incident rate down 46% and total recordable incident rate down 49% year on year, both SASB material metrics for this sector.
It is important to note that the names highlighted here are cited uniquely based on an expectation that financial market participants will latently give credit to their sustainability efforts; For example, AGI carries a highly leveraged balance sheet and has been under financial stress from agricultural equipment cycle headwinds: the sustainability re-rating is an independent catalyst, but the equity thesis depends on stabilization of the underlying business.
In the table below, we summarize the main sustainability re-rating triggers for the aforementioned companies, plus six more that we believe could benefit from the same dynamic.
The sustainable investment industry has spent two years debating whether defence is a sustainable investment. That is the wrong question. Whether Rheinmetall qualifies for an Article 9 fund misses what actually matters: whether investors have the analytical tools to hold defence companies to account for what they make, who their customers are, and what happens when their products reach the battlefield. Responsibility, rather than sustainability, is the appropriate standard, and it is a more demanding one than any taxonomy classification.
Data published this month records 65 active armed conflicts in 2025, the highest count since records began in 1946, with 244,600 people killed in organised violence, the second deadliest total since the Rwanda genocide in 1994. Eight of those conflicts are interstate wars, the most since World War II.
As a logical consequence, world military expenditure reached $2.8 trillion in 2025, up 41% since 2015, with forecasts pointing to $6.6 trillion by 2035. Europe’s ReArm Europe plan commits €800 billion; the United Kingdom has pledged 5% of GDP in defence spending by 2035. The capital flows are real, growing, and unlikely to reverse whether or not an Article 9 fund knows what to call them.
This note builds on the SMS framework introduced in our March 2025 note “The European Defense Offensive: From Peace Dividend to War Premium”, which identified five screening criteria (Controversial Weapons Exclusions, Allied Revenue Alignment, Government Independence, R&D Investment, and Strategic Defence Orientation) and a cohort of European specialists we termed the second wave.
Between July 2022 and the publication of our March 2025 European Defence Offensive, the SMS European Defence Specialists Basket delivered approximately 550% in total return. That performance continued for some time but has corrected heavily since the February 2026 peak. Over the fifteen months since publication, the basket, the S&P 500, and the American Defence Primes delivered 28%, 27%, and 25% respectively – effectively the same trade. The valuation re-rating of underowned European specialists as defence budgets re-accelerated is complete. The entry point that defined the first and second waves is gone.
The chart above is the investment case for this note: the opportunity that justified the first note has closed, and a new one has opened. What follows is where the next leg of returns will come from.
Red Lines That No Longer Hold
There was a time when a blanket defence exclusion was defensible. The sector consisted predominantly of identifiable end-products: tanks, artillery, fighter jets, submarines. Revenue streams were opaque but outputs were not. An investor that decided it did not want to own defence companies could draw a clean line around the category and walk away without much analytical strain.
That is no longer the case. The reason is dual-use, a property that once described finished technology products but now runs the entire length of the value chain, from raw materials to drones.
Upstream, the rare earth elements that power an EV motor, a wind turbine, or a smartphone are chemically identical to those in a drone motor, a missile guidance system, or an electronic warfare suite. Neodymium is neodymium. MP Materials (MP-US) is the only integrated rare earth mine and mill in the United States, indispensable to the domestic clean energy supply chain AND is simultaneously supplying the Pentagon under a ten-year offtake agreement backed by $400 million in government investment. An exclusionary policy that excludes MP Materials while retaining clean energy exposure would apply different standards to identical atoms depending on who writes the purchase order. Some investors will make that choice deliberately, as an expression of values. The point is that it is a values choice, not an analytical finding, and the clean line it tries to draw no longer maps cleanly onto the physical world.
Downstream, the same logic applies in reverse. The satellite constellation that provides broadband internet provides battlefield targeting. The AI platform that optimises logistics for a retailer optimises resupply for a military base. The same imaging system that monitors agricultural land monitors conflict zones. Revenue segmentation by end-use is rarely disclosed at the granularity a meaningful screen requires, and when it is, it rarely captures what happens to the technology once it leaves the company.
This is why the third wave which we discussed in this week’s note is different in character from the first and second.
The Rare Earth Elements (REE) Megatrend
Permanent magnets made from neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium are the enabling component in precision guidance systems, drone motors, missile actuators, electronic warfare equipment, and submarine propulsion. Demand for magnet rare earths has doubled since 2015, with defence among the structural growth drivers alongside EVs and wind. China processes approximately 85-95% of these materials at the midstream metallization and separation stage – a share the IEA projects will remain at 75% by 2035 even under an optimistic build-out scenario.

We have covered the OECD REE investment case in depth across three prior notes, beginning with “Critical Minerals, Critical Moves” (May 2025) and “Rare Opportunities in Rare Earths” (November 2025), and most recently in “From Transition Play to Arms Race: A Critical Materials Reset” (May 28, 2026) – published days before China’s June escalation. Readers seeking the full company-level analysis of the OECD REE basket should refer to these notes. What follows is specific to the defence demand driver and the regulatory timeline it has introduced.
That pressure reached a new peak just a couple weeks ago, in the week of June 15, 2026. The G7 set a target of no single country supplying more than 60% of each member’s rare-earth imports by 2030; the European Council proposed a formal de-risking mechanism; and China responded on June 22 with targeted export controls on US defence companies and rare-earth mining firms. Washington had already anticipated this: from January 1, 2027, a federal rule (DFARS) bans the Pentagon from procuring any system containing permanent magnets originating from China, a deadline China’s own controls have now made considerably harder to ignore. Active inventory depletion sharpens the timeline: the US has reportedly consumed approximately 45% of its Precision Strike Missile stockpile and 30% of its Tomahawk inventory, and restocking every unit requires REE-dependent components that cannot contain Chinese-origin material after that date.
The bottleneck is not mining but the midstream. A separation facility without downstream magnet makers has no local market, and magnet makers need committed offtake from defence, automotive, wind, and industrial customers simultaneously. The mine-to-magnet loop is only investable when all links close at once. The gap between stated policy ambition and physical processing capacity is precisely where the returns are.
The Investable OECD REE Basket
Most of the names below will be familiar to readers of our prior REE note series. Our conviction on the core positions is unchanged.
The three core positions remain MP Materials (MP-US), Lynas Rare Earths (LYC-AU), and Energy Fuels (UUUU-US). MP Materials is the only integrated US rare earth mine and mill, backed by a $400 million Pentagon investment, with REE separation commissioning at Mountain Pass by mid-2026. Lynas, the largest non-Chinese REE company at $13.5 billion, is completing its Texas REE separation facility with DoD funding. Energy Fuels received a $725 million conditional DoD loan commitment on June 18 and disclosed the $1.9 billion acquisition of Vacuumschmelze (VAC), the German precision magnet manufacturer. VAC holds existing qualification relationships with defence OEMs, bypassing the multi-year approval cycles new entrants face. The combined entity is the only OECD operation with a credible mine-to-magnet platform connecting US processing to European defence manufacturing. At $3.5 billion market cap, it looks underpriced relative to the strategic value of the VAC qualification book.
Two smaller names address specific gaps the core three do not cover. NEO Performance Materials (NEO-CA) is ramping its Estonia magnet factory to 2,000 tpa by end-2026, entirely outside Chinese processing influence. REalloys (ALOY-US) is building the largest REE metallization facility outside China in partnership with the Saskatchewan Research Council, with a 15-year offtake from the Tanbreez project in Greenland. It is important to note that REalloys came to market via reverse merger and is the highest-risk name in the basket. 5N Plus (VNP-CA) rounds out the basket with exposure to gallium, germanium, indium, and bismuth – the four materials subject to China’s August 2023 export controls and directly applied in compound semiconductors, radar, and night vision systems.
The REE basket has delivered; but unlike the European defence name re-rating, which converged to S&P 500 performance after March 2025, we do not believe this trade is over. The structural drivers – China’s escalating export control posture, a federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin magnets effective January 2027, and a supply chain buildout still measured in years rather than quarters – have not been resolved by the price action.
Third Defence Wave: Beyond the Primes
The REE basket addresses the supply side of the thesis. The names below address the demand side: platform specialists, systems integrators, and software-adjacent companies whose growth directly drives REE demand. What distinguishes them from the first and second wave is selectivity, not valuation re-rating – that trade is complete. Defence budgets are accelerating in unmanned systems, electronic warfare, naval domain awareness, and AI-assisted decision-making. The five names below are positioned where the spending is going and have not yet been fully absorbed by institutional capital.
- Hensoldt (HAG-DE) is Germany’s pure-play radar, electronic warfare, and optronics specialist. Its TRML-4D radar and Kalaetron electronic warfare suite are on order across multiple NATO allies. Revenue for FY2025 was approximately €2.1 billion against a backlog exceeding three times that figure.
- Renk Group (RENK-DE) is the sole supplier of tank transmissions for the Leopard 2 and propulsion systems for Germany’s Type 212 submarines, with no direct European competitor in naval propulsion at its scale. Revenue is approximately €1.1 billion with an order book accelerating across European navies and armoured forces. The demand trajectory is the strongest of any name in this section.
- Exail Technologies (EXA-FR) operates in the fastest-growing segment of naval spending: underwater domain awareness. Its DriX unmanned surface vessel and Gaps autonomous underwater vehicle serve both oceanographic and military customers, with NATO’s post-Ukraine emphasis on submarine detection providing a direct demand catalyst. The civilian revenue base diversifies against defence budget cyclicality.
- Kratos Defense (KTOS-US) is the closest pure-play on the affordable autonomous systems thesis: drones cheap enough to deploy in volume and lose in combat. This technology sits in a sub-sector where the US Air Force has no incumbent prime to protect. Revenue for FY2025 was approximately $1.2 billion.
- Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH-US) is the primary beneficiary of AI adoption within the US defence and intelligence establishment, bringing the cleared workforce and contract vehicles that pure technology platforms cannot replicate. Revenue for FY2025 was approximately $11.5 billion. The thesis is durable margin expansion as AI tooling reduces contract delivery costs. Government contractor risk is endemic to the category and priced into the current multiple.
Most of the basket has underperformed the MSCI World in the last year. That underperformance is the entry point, not a reason for caution.
The structural case has not deteriorated. It has strengthened. The Bundeswehr’s €100 billion fund is disbursing. NATO navies are ordering. The federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin rare earth magnets takes effect in seven months. Hensoldt and Renk enter this note’s coverage at a correction that their underlying order books do not justify. Booz Allen has been caught in the crossfire of US government IT spending reviews that are, by design, temporary.
The first and second wave re-rated on valuation. The third wave will re-rate on earnings, driven by a procurement cycle accelerating into the specific sub-sectors where these names face no credible competition from the large primes. The gap between the chart above and the order books behind these companies is where the next leg of returns is.
A new manifesto came out of Silicon Valley last week from Palantir’s founder Alex Karp. It suggests that Tech executives ought to embrace patriotism to preserve the values of the Republic. For many observers, this contrasts with Big Tech’s original mantra of pluralism and openness. This is especially true if one considers that most of Big Tech companies such as Meta, Google and Tesla have now mostly reverted towards more cooperation with the Trump administration.
The growing cooperation between Tech and State is getting especially visible on issues pertaining to data privacy – whereby Silicon Valley firms such as Palantir are directly scraping your visual ID – or firms like Meta, Google and Tesla – that indirectly scrape your data – even if it to use it against you at the government’s request. Against this backdrop, it’s no surprise to see that trust vis-à-vis governments and Big Tech firms’ is waning.
A sign of the times is that Google searches for “Data Privacy” (how ironic!) in the U.S, are at a five-year high. We expect this interest to endure as AI continues to scrape the world.
Despite this growing interest in data privacy, users are typically ignoring the fine print regarding what Big Tech and Governments are doing with their data. As early as 2023, a Pew Research survey suggested that as much as six out of ten Americans skip reading privacy policies when signing up to apps. This means that they basically agree to give away whatever data on them that Big Tech firms are looking for. This is somewhat surprising given that about eight-in-ten of those familiar with AI also say that its use by companies will lead to people’s personal information being used in ways they won’t be comfortable with or that weren’t originally intended. Data privacy issues have resurfaced in the past few months during anti-ICE demonstrations across the U.S.: Homeland Security department was using data found on Facebook and Instagram to track, arrest and deport immigrants and arrest protesters.
This prompts a sharper look at the data privacy policies of Big Tech. We examined the policies of major technology firms regarding the sale of personal data, third-party sharing, disclosure to governments, AI training, and consent – only to realize that Big Tech not only owns your data but could also decide to use it against you if requested.
Big Tech & Data Privacy – Pick Your Poison, Choose Your Pain
It is interesting to compare the U.S.’ Big Tech regulation about data privacy to that of their Chinese and EU counterparts. While the EU is the most protective of personal data, there remains a lot of concern for Chinese companies’ proximity to Beijing. According to Beijing’s Cybersecurity Law, every Chinese company – including companies such as BYD and Huawei – are legally obligated to cooperate with state intelligence services. There is no judicial warrant process, no legal mechanism through which either company could refuse a government data request, and no external party can audit compliance or detect covert cooperation. Furthermore, communist party cells are also embedded inside major Chinese companies, providing informal intelligence conduits beyond the formal legal framework. This means the question is not whether Chinese companies would hand over your data, but whether the technical architecture enables them to do so – and the answer is yes on both counts.
Ineffective Investor Pressure: Is Tech Still Investable?
The lack of government oversight over data privacy – and now over the development of AI – forces investors to take a harder look at their Big Tech holdings data privacy policies. That said, given that Big Tech is such a massive chunk of the market – Mag-7 companies still represent about one-third of the market cap in the U.S. equity market – it remains difficult to divest out of these stocks solely based on their data malpractices.
It’s even harder to divest when the Tech sector outperforms the market like it has been doing these past few years. Furthermore, many of these companies have had tailwinds since Trump’s re-election, especially Palantir (which supplies surveillance software to the government) and Google (which knows everything about everyone) – a precious asset in an increasingly repressive world.
Five years of investor engagement with Palantir, Meta, and Google has produced letters, risk briefings, shareholder proposals, one landmark divestment, and a $190 million legal settlement – and virtually zero durable change in corporate behaviour across any of the three firms. The failure operates on three distinct but mutually reinforcing elements.
The first is structural governance. Palantir’s Class F share architecture grants its founders effective veto power over any shareholder resolution; Meta’s dual-class structure allows Mark Zuckerberg to override supermajorities of independent shareholders – including the 62% who voted for the 2022 surveillance advertising proposal – with his personal voting bloc; Alphabet is similarly insulated. These are not governance oversights; they are deliberate and permanent shields, and activist investors have known this for years.
The second element is the absence of a financial transmission mechanism. At Meta and Google, the theory of engagement is that reputational damage translates into advertiser flight, which translates into revenue pressure, which translates into behavioural change. That chain has never closed at scale: both companies continued to grow revenues through every major data privacy controversy, every EU General Data Protection Regulation fine, and every congressional hearing, because their advertising monopolies absorb the cost of controversy without altering the underlying surveillance business model.
The third and most structurally important failure Is that major institutions appear to be throwing in the towel. For example, Norges Bank suspended its own ethics council earlier this year under geopolitical pressure and actually increased its Palantir position despite obvious governance flaws and data privacy issues while simultaneously backing a human rights proposal at Microsoft. We think this highlights reactive positioning and signals that the responsible investment ecosystem lacks the tools and cohesion to hold surveillance-era technology firms to any consistent standard. Taken in this context, Dutch Pension fund ABP’s €825M Palantir divestment and CalSTRS’s $190M Meta settlement appear as rounding errors against the combined market capitalisation and government revenue streams of these firms.
In the span of 24 hours last week, Meta Platforms was found liable by two separate juries in two separate states for two distinct but related categories of harm: child sexual exploitation and the deliberate addiction of adolescents to its platforms. The combined verdicts – $375 million USD in New Mexico on March 24, followed by a landmark addiction liability finding in Los Angeles on March 25 – represent the most consequential legal week in social media history. The -7% weekly drop that followed tells only part of the story: as the chart below shows, Meta had already begun diverging from its Magnificent Seven peers well before the verdicts, and the rulings accelerated a gap that the market had been quietly opening for months.
And yet, on the very same day as the Los Angeles verdict, the White House appointed Mark Zuckerberg to its most influential science and technology advisory council. The juxtaposition is alarming: while the judicial system has finally begun penalizing the company for severe societal harm, the executive branch is actively elevating its leadership to shape national policy.
For years, Big Tech companies have hidden behind Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and First Amendment protections, claiming they are merely neutral conduits for user-generated content. Last week’s back-to-back rulings pierced that armor: the intentional engineering of infinite scrolling, beauty filters, and hyper-optimized engagement algorithms can now be legally classified as defective and dangerous product design. This marks the precise moment courts begin treating social media platforms as harmful products.
Two Verdicts, Two Theories of Harm. One Week.
The two rulings must be understood together: they address different but compounding aspects of Meta’s impact on children.
On March 24, a New Mexico jury found Meta liable on two counts under state consumer protection law – knowingly engaging in deceptive trade practices, and taking unconscionable advantage of users who did not understand the risks of its platforms. The jury found 75,000 separate violations at $5,000 each, arriving at $375 million USD in civil penalties. The case stemmed from a 2023 undercover operation in which investigators posing as underage users on Facebook and Instagram received sexually explicit material and were solicited by adults – contacts that in several cases led to real-world abuse and human trafficking. It is a deception and facilitation of criminal harm case – a materially more severe legal characterisation than negligence. A second phase in May 2026 will seek additional penalties and court-ordered structural reforms, including mandatory age verification.
The following day in Los Angeles, a jury found Meta (70% at fault) and YouTube (30%) liable for intentionally addicting a young woman to their platforms, causing anxiety, body dysmorphia, and suicidal ideation. Snap and TikTok settled before trial. The dollar amounts – $9 million USD total – are trivial. The significance is systemic: the case is a bellwether for over 1,500 California cases and 2,400+ federal cases consolidated under Multi-District Litigation (MDL), with school district and state Attorney General (AG) trials to follow. The New Mexico AG called his verdict “a historic victory.” The Los Angeles plaintiff’s counsel called theirs “the tip of the spear.”
This Is Not an ESG Controversy – It Is a Product Impact Crisis
ESG ratings measure how a company manages its own sustainability risks – governance, environmental performance, data privacy. Meta scores tolerably on those dimensions, which is precisely why it remains a constituent of iShares, Vanguard, and S&P ESG ETFs. Those screens are doing what they were designed to do. LSEG, for instance, ranks Meta 49th out of 790 tech companies on ESG criteria (94th percentile).
The problem operates on the other axis of the double materiality analysis: how does the company’s activity affect people and the planet? On that dimension, Meta is unambiguous. Two juries found that it knowingly deceived the public about child safety while facilitating criminal predation of minors and deliberately engineering adolescent addiction.
That is not an ESG management failure. It is a product impact crisis – and investors relying on ESG scores alone have been asking the wrong question.
The Evidence Was There
Sustainable Market Strategies has flagged Meta and their product problem in several times over the past eight years. In “Reputation Is Everything” (May 2018), we flagged Facebook’s growing legal exposure following Cambridge Analytica. In “Life in the Shadow of Big Tech” (August 2020), we recommended against the stock, warning that regulatory and advertiser pressure were structural threats to the ad revenue model. In “Thumbs Down: A Socially-Toxic Reputation for Facebook“ (October 2021), we wrote explicitly: “Facebook is increasingly looking like Big Tobacco and/or Big Oil companies – ones which long-refused to recognize the negative impact of their behavior on the environment and society.”
The Tobacco industry spent decades funding friendly science, attacking unfriendly research, lobbying against protective legislation, and settling individual cases quietly to avoid systemic exposure – all while publicly denying causation. Meta has followed every step of that playbook. The difference is that the tobacco industry’s reckoning took 40 years. Meta’s is happening in real time, accelerated by a digital evidence trail its own engineers created.
For seven years, a coalition of institutional investors attempted to force Meta to account for its impact on children through the only mechanism available to them short of litigation – the annual general meeting. Child safety resolutions have been filed at every AGM since 2019. Across multiple votes, independent shareholders supported these proposals at rates consistently between 40% and 63%. None of it mattered. Because Zuckerberg’s Class B shares carry 10 votes each, he routinely controls approximately two-thirds of the total voting power at any AGM, reducing the official support for child safety resolutions to below 20%.
The conduct of the largest passive managers compounded the problem. Vanguard – which holds approximately 9% of Meta’s outstanding shares, making it the company’s second-largest shareholder after Zuckerberg himself – voted in favour of zero out of 400 environmental and social shareholder proposals in both the 2024 and 2025 proxy seasons, including, by definition, Meta’s child safety proposals.
The shift is not confined to courtrooms and academic journals. Among the very users Meta depends on, the perception of harm has crossed a threshold: according to Pew Research, the share of American teenagers who say social media has a “mostly negative” effect on people their age has risen from 32% in 2022 to 48% in 2024 – while those saying it has a “mostly positive” effect has collapsed from 24% to just 11%. Nearly half of all teens now say they spend too much time on these platforms. This is not a fringe view held by regulators or plaintiffs’ attorneys, it is the stated experience of the product’s own users – and it is moving in one direction only.
The Illusion of Federal Oversight: Regulatory Capture in Real-Time
Investors should not expect sweeping federal intervention to mitigate these risks. Meta’s political strategy has been systematic and, until last week, largely invisible to markets.
On the same day the Los Angeles jury delivered its landmark verdict, the White House announced that Zuckerberg had been appointed to the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), alongside Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, Oracle’s Larry Ellison, Google co-founder Sergey Brin, and Marc Andreessen. This advisory role gives Meta a direct line to shape national technology and tech policy from inside the White House. The appointment echoes the most brazen maneuvers of legacy harmful industries – the modern-day equivalent of the UN appointing a state oil company CEO to preside over a climate summit, or a tobacco lobbyist sitting on a government health promotion board.
The political groundwork runs deeper than a single appointment. Meta gave $1 million USD to Trump’s second inauguration – compared to nothing for the first – and is among the 37 corporate donors to the president’s $300 million White House ballroom project. The KIDS Act, the first federal bill in a decade with a realistic path to protecting children online, has been deliberately stripped of its most consequential provision: the duty of care requirement that would have obliged platforms to design their products with children’s safety in mind.
The Administration that placed a defendant in a child safety trial on its senior science advisory council – on the day of that verdict – is not positioned to regulate that company’s products. The legal accountability for Meta will not come from Washington, but it could come from state attorneys general, state legislatures, and juries and hopefully one day, investors. Litigation risk does not respond to lobbying expenditure the way regulatory risk does, and the battleground is now demonstrably in courtrooms in Albuquerque, Los Angeles, and Frankfort, Kentucky – not on Capitol Hill.
Other jurisdictions are less compromised. Australia enacted a social media ban for under-16 years old in December 2025; the UK is tightening age-verification requirements. Meta has mobilized aggressively against both. The opposition is commercially rational: adolescent engagement is intrinsically necessary to its business model, and the company’s own conduct confirms it.
In just the last week, OpenAI (ChatGPT) has come under scrutiny for failing to report the Tumbler Ridge mass killer while Anthropic (Claude) was in a standoff with the U.S. government for refusing to remove restrictions on how the military can use its models; it may seem like the wild west in the AI industry.
To be sure, artificial intelligence capabilities are accelerating far faster than legal frameworks: in the U.S. and Canada, there are no federal regulations outlining any prohibitions on AI or surrounding the safety of the technology. The European Union passed the AI act in 2024, with most high-risk AI obligations only taking effect in 2027.
This leaves the private sector largely in charge of overseeing their own AI activities. While this may seem extremely imprudent, it creates a significant opportunity for the testing, inspection and certification (TIC) industry.
What is TIC?
The TIC sector consists of conformity assessment bodies who provide services ranging from auditing and inspection to testing, verification, quality assurance and certification. Many TIC companies were founded in the 18th and 19th century to provide information to shipping underwriters about the condition of ships and equipment. Today, TIC companies may be most associated with standards like ISO 9001, though their operations are far reaching and span across industries that are at the core of sustainability mandates: environmental protection, food, crop, health science, road safety, etc.
Indeed, we wrote about the sustainability merits of TIC companies in previous research (please see our note “Testing the (TIC) Market”, June 6, 2024). Given that TIC companies are paid to ensure the quality of others, it should not be a surprise that the household names in this industry have impeccable ESG records.
TIC companies – the majors include Bureau Veritas (BVI-FR), SGS (SGSN-CH) and Intertek (ITRK-GB) – are considered to operate in staid business lines; their stock prices tend to be highly correlated and have a beta to the global equity market of well under one. This is no doubt because many of the companies derive significant revenue from the public sector and because it is difficult to reduce expenditure on testing and assurance, even during economic downturns. These companies operate with high moats: relationships and reputation are crucial.
The TIC industry typically grows at a reliable 3 – 4% per year, avoiding major dips, but rarely experiencing excessive growth spurts; most third-party market insight reports forecast 3% CAGR for the 2026 – 2030 period. We believe these underestimate the role of AI, not least through novel new business lines like AI assurance.
TIC and AI: An Underpriced Opportunity
Historically, the TIC industry has thrived by monetizing both regulation complexity and safety requirements. AI is likely to massively increase both of these things as governments will eventually require proof that AI is safe, non-biased, cybersecure, and explainable. This creates a new industry involving the auditing of algorithms: AI assurance.
There are already new standards emerging for AI, such as ISO 42001, which is an ISO standard for AI management systems. Many TIC companies have received accreditation to certify companies under ISO 42001 thus enabling global AI audits.
Since the standard is relatively new – officially launched in December 2023 – no information is yet available on how many companies have implemented the standard. However, there are over 1.3 million companies that use ISO 9001, the global benchmark in quality management systems. The market size for AI management is likely to be equivalent.
TIC companies are just getting started when it comes to capitalizing on AI certification opportunities. SGS acquired AI certification specialist CertX in late 2024 specifically to build digital trust capabilities. They then joined NVIDIA’s Halos AI Systems Inspection Lab ecosystem, which is an inspection framework for physical AI systems (autonomous vehicles, robotics, industrial AI). The lab is intended to integrate functional safety, cybersecurity and AI assurance, provide standardized inspection reports and accelerate certification for AI systems globally,
Since NVIDIA cannot certify every AI system themselves without losing neutrality, independent certification via companies like SGS provides regulatory legitimacy, liability protection, and standardized compliance pathways.
SGS’ role is to verify that AI systems using NVIDIA platforms are safe enough for deployment: NVIDIA builds the AI engine and SGS certifies it is safe to operate in society.
In this sense, the potential role for TIC companies can be viewed as the equivalent of the big four auditors for accounting rules. Just like accountants, AI auditors will be needed across industries and sectors: AI deployment will likely require third-party verification across regulated sectors such as autonomous driving, medical AI, industrial robotics, defense systems, smart infrastructure, data centers, etc.
It is likely that established TIC companies will dominate the third-party verification (auditing) market because they already have accreditation authority, regulator relationships and global audit networks; they already have the credibility and reputation to provide this trust layer.
TIC Upside
Investors currently price TIC companies as slow industrial service providers, reflecting stable dividends and modest growth assumptions. But AI is opening new streams of revenue including recurring AI certification and embedded partnerships with hyperscalers like NVIDIA: TIC entities may just become mandatory infrastructure for AI deployment and regulation.
Indeed, once government regulations inevitably fall into place (e.g. the EU AI Act, automotive AI safety, etc.) demand for AI assurance services is likely to rise exponentially.
In this environment, a re-rating of TIC companies is possible with several possible triggers including:
- EU AI Act enforcement requiring third-party audits.
- Hyperscaler partnerships like the one announced between SGS-NVIDIA
- Segment reporting whereby TIC companies begin breaking out revenue tied to AI trust.
- M&A wave as TIC firms acquire AI governance startups like SGS’ acquisition of CertX
Note that so far, our bullish case for TIC and AI outlined above only hinges on the possibility of new AI revenue streams becoming available. TIC companies present solid use cases for artificial intelligence given that most aspects of testing, certification and inspection involves processing large amounts of data; machine learning and computer vision are already automating high-precision inspections, predictive analytics are catching defects earlier and generative AI can streamline report generation and anomaly detection. In other words, we believe that AI assurance is additive to TIC revenues while traditional business lines will also benefit from productivity improvements.
Our thesis that AI will bring new revenue streams to TIC companies is not currently reflected in stock prices. The table below shows financial details of the three major TIC incumbents: SGS, Bureau Veritas and Intertek. Note that in all three cases, P/Es remain at the low end of their historic range – there has been no re-rating to date.
To be sure, these companies are just beginning to discuss the upside to their businesses. Below are highlights from recent earnings calls:
SGS: The company has a “digital trust” unit where management sees “demand for digital trust services particularly strong in the U.S., with significant requirements around cyber resilience, AI algorithm validation for bias, and compliance testing. SGS is investing in building new service offerings in digital trust through both organic development and strategic acquisitions, with this area representing a key component of the megatrends driving future growth”.
Bureau Veritas: the company achieved 30% organic growth year-on-year in data center activities and continues to benefit from the structural need for data center expansion driven by AI infrastructure buildup. “Bureau Veritas is building AI assurance capabilities to help customers verify and validate that AI models are aligned with their values and policies, compliant with legal frameworks, and responsive to stakeholder expectations, especially as the regulatory landscape around AI assurance evolves”.
Intertek: The company has launched an AI lab to support global teams to develop the right AI solutions for the business. The company believes “there is a significant opportunity to help clients manage risk associated with investment in AI, and has launched AI², an independent end-to-end AI assurance program to help customers operate smarter and safer with the right trust in AI algorithms”.
Note the recent stock performance of TIC companies in the chart below. Over the past two years, the companies that now seem destined to become the auditors of AI have massively lagged the AI producers and first users (tech companies). We expect a catch-up phase is ahead as investors recognize the role TIC companies will play in the AI supply chain. Note that Intertek looks like a particularly interesting buying opportunity; the company announced earnings earlier this week and investors did not like that the strengthening sterling against major currencies significantly impacted results. On a day when the FTSE was down sharply due to geopolitical turmoil (Iran), Intertek stock took an exaggerated dive which we believe makes an alluring buying opportunity.
In 2025, many ESG monikers like “greenwashing” and “net zero” fell by the wayside. However, a fancy term to describe accelerating inequalities has made its way into public discourse: the “K-shaped” economy refers to bifurcated labor, wealth and spending patterns, with the upper arm of the “K” representing wealthy asset owners and high-skilled professionals who are thriving, while the lower arm represents low-to-middle-income earners who are facing stagnant wages and rising costs.
As a result, differentiated spending patterns emerge and creates a stark contrast in prosperity across different groups within the economy.
The bland sobriquet – K-shaped economy – may lull some readers to sleep…but it shouldn’t. It’s just a polite way of saying that U.S. income and wealth inequality is accelerating.
Usually, in a “normal” recovery (V or U-shaped), all boats rise, even if the yachts rise faster than the rowboats. The harsh reality is that U.S. income and wealth inequality is accelerating and bringing it with alarming consequences.
What’s To Blame?
There are three main factors that we highlight that are driving the divergence in income, wealth and spending:
1. To Own or Not to Own?
The single largest driver of the K is the gap between those who own assets and those who rely solely on labor for income.
- Asset Owners (Upper K): Households with significant investments in the stock market (S&P 500) and residential real estate have seen their net worth surge to record highs. As of early 2026, the top 10% of earners account for roughly 50% of all U.S. consumer spending and own over 70% of wealth.
- Wage Earners (Lower K): Wage earners without significant assets are seeing their purchasing power eroded. While wages rose briefly after the pandemic, they have recently struggled to keep pace with the cumulative cost of living, leaving less over to save and accumulate assets.
This is what the hard data tells us, but one can also see it the performance of stock prices.
For example, the media has already made much of the fact that Delta airlines stock have diverged markedly from their peers. This is in large part because the company has focused on higher-tier travel: the majority of their profits are now generated from business and first class tickets. Last year, sales of economy tickets contracted by 7% while premium ticket sales rose by 9%.
Another example is the banking industry, where there have been clear winners from the “K” – those that cater to high-net worth individuals have seen their stock prices blast off in the past year, while lower tiered banks – those catering to a more diversified clientele – have lagged.
2. The AI Divide
Both the anecdotal and data evidence is making clear that the rapid adoption of Artificial Intelligence is creating a skills gap that serves to reinforces the K-shape.
For example, an analysis of how Anthropic’s chatbot Claude is used by businesses and consumers around the world suggests that richer countries are much more likely to adopt AI. Claude usage per capita remains highly uneven and strongly correlated with GDP, with currently no evidence that low-use countries are catching up.
Equally significant is who is using AI within countries. Research from Anthropic suggests that more educated users are reaping greater productivity benefits from AI because they can give AI chatbots more sophisticated prompts and therefore get better responses. According to Anthropic, “While Claude is able to respond in a highly sophisticated manner, it tends to do so only when users input sophisticated prompts.”
In other words, the rewards from AI are going to higher educated workers who tend to be at the higher end of the income scale (there are exceptions: tech jobs, once considered high-paying and high-demand, are leading the layoffs precisely due to the AI pivot).
3. Asymmetric Impact of Inflation
U.S. inflation has been running hotter than the Fed’s 2% target for almost half a decade now, but the extra increases in prices don’t hit everyone equally. Essentials like food and housing take up a much larger percentage of low-income budgets and the prices of these items have been rising faster than other consumer prices.
Indeed, households in the bottom 20% of wage earners allocate approximately 63% of their total expenditures to just three categories: housing, food, and transportation. These categories are considered inelastic spending so any price increase in these areas acts as a direct reduction in a family’s standard of living.
In contrast, the highest 20% of earners spend roughly 30-35% of their income on these same essentials. When the price of these essential items goes up, wealthier households simply reduce non-essential spending, while for the lower arm of the “K”, that money often comes out of an emergency fund or basic nutrition.
How Can Sustainability Investors Navigate the K?
For investors focused on sustainability strategies and outcomes, a K-shaped economy, i.e. the speeding up of income and wealth inequalities, can feel like losing the battle. Indeed, many of the potential winners of inequality are not names one would naturally find on the long side of sustainability themed portfolios (premium banks, private jets, yacht builders, etc.)
Nonetheless, there are many themes that are either orthogonal or even aligned to the realities of a split economy. We highlight three below:
Circular Economy: From an environmental perspective, transforming from a linear to circular economy is widely viewed as necessary because it is considered the only legitimate solution to limiting environmental degradation – the ultimate goal is to decouple resources consumption from economic growth.
From an economic perspective, a decline in purchasing-power for the majority of the population implies more interest and demand for recycling, refurbishing, and “product-as-a-service” (i.e. renting or leasing) models.
Business models based on using less raw inputs, extending the economic life of a product and aiming for substantial improvement in resource performance along the way should be seen as increasingly attractive and a major differentiator. We plan to update our previous work on this subject (Circular Economy: When Going Around in Circles is the Right Thing to Do, April 13, 2022) in the weeks ahead.
Social And Sustainability Bonds: While the interest for green bonds has most likely passed the hype phase of the early 2020s, there appears to be steady interest in other fixed income products tied to sustainability. Social bonds offer a steady yield while directly addressing the “downward” trajectory of the lower-K population.
Earlier this month, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) issued a $2 billion Social Bond The proceeds are specifically earmarked for low-income communities in emerging markets, focusing on healthcare, sanitation, and education. The bond was oversubscribed by an impressive 2.7 times. For investors wanting to make real social impact, financing that is tied to specific project outcomes is a direct way to achieve it.
Sustainable Regenerative Agriculture: With climate-related disasters costing well over 100 billion USD again in 2025, we have argued that climate adaptation (i.e. resilience) will become a necessary investment priority. As we noted above and in previous notes, food prices will continue to outpace generalized inflation due in large part to climate change.
Investing in sustainable farmland and timberland are one of the main ways to combat the impacts of climate change while mitigating risks in our food supply chain (please see, Environmental Assets in Short Supply, October 9, 2025). These assets also provide a hedge against inflation (the lower-K struggle).