“The biggest danger is not inaction. The real danger is when politicians and CEOs are making it look like real action is happening when in fact almost nothing is being done, apart from clever accounting and creative PR.” Greta Thunberg, COP25 2019.
As we all now know, 2020 was a blowout year for attracting capital to ESG investing and 2021 is also off to a great start: according to Morningstar, sustainable fund assets climbed by almost 20% again in Q1 2021, meaning that “ESG” assets under management stand at just under USD $2 trillion. This represents a doubling since 2019!
The rising trend toward ESG investing means that management at publicly traded companies understand the allure of appearing “green”: as more investors choose ESG over traditional stock picks, companies will be overlooked and/or left out of more popular ESG-inspired indices. The latter risks damaging their stock price performance. Moreover, according to a recent MSCI study, companies with high ESG scores experience lower costs of capital compared to companies with poor ESG scores. This is true across developed countries and across sectors.
The implication is that there is a rising incentive for companies to pursue implementing ESG business strategies. Or at the very least, there is a rising incentive to pursue an image of implementing ESG strategies.
The latter - paying lip-service to causes with little impact - affect all of ESG; blue washing refers to pretending to be socially conscious, pink washing refers to falsely promoting fair gender, and of course, greenwashing refers to environmental cover up. All three are important (and could be committed by the same offenders!) but in this week’s note we shine a light specifically on greenwashing.
Corporate greenwashing has implications for multiple economic actors and the planet. In terms of investing, greenwashing misdirects capital away from the goals and preferences of underlying investors.
The principal tool for companies to communicate to investors about their environmental credibility is via sustainability reporting. Therefore, for investors that are looking to marry superior returns and positive ESG outcomes, it is crucial to be able to determine which companies are truly making improvements in environmental performance (either through efficiencies, new technology or innovative business models) and those companies that are merely improving their ability to communicate on ESG factors via glossy reporting.
The matrix below highlights the possible outcomes between being green and reporting green (note that environmental “duds” should be entirely ignored among modern investors).

Although there is a plethora of reporting metrics, indices, standards and practices, all with varying degrees of reliability, we have developed a simple filter to help decipher which companies are likely to fall into each quadrant. Starting with the S&P Global 1200 (covering roughly 70% of total equity market capitalization) as the investment universe, we follow these steps to decode where companies fall in the matrix:
- First, we use SASB’s materiality map’s environmental dimension to evaluate which industries are most affected by environmental issues. We do this to ensure that we only include industries whereby greenwashing is a material investment risk. We then translate the SASB industries to MSCI sectors. This limits our investment universe to MSCI companies within the energy, materials, industrials, and consumer staples sectors.
- Next, we rank these companies using both Eikon Refinitiv and CSR Hub data. Since we are focused only on greenwashing, we use only the Environment Scores (i.e. we ignore the overall ESG, as well as the Social and Government scores). We then compare the overall environment score with two critical sub-components of the environmental dimension: environmental innovation and product. We consider these two sub-categories as an indicator for “potential positive environmental impact” because high scores in these categories suggest that the company is more likely to be focused on environmental technology and/or innovative environmental business models that should lead to productivity in the future. In other words, the overall E score is likely to most closely represent a company’s E communication score, while the E innovation/product score should represent the company’s ability to deliver on green performance in the future.
- We then compare the gap in ranking between a company’s overall E score and its E innovation/product score. Companies that have high overall E, but low E innovation are flagged as having a higher potential for greenwashing (bottom right quadrant of the matrix), while companies with high innovation but low overall scores are more likely to be potential environmental underdogs (top left quadrant of the matrix). Importantly, we only include companies whose scores are consistent in both the Refinitiv and CSR Hub data bases; given the ongoing wide discrepancies in reporting standards and methodologies, this criterion helps increase the accuracy of our filter.
The results of our “greenwash” filter are shown in the tables below by sector.
There are a few key observations and caveats from this exercise:
- Although we applied our filter across the four sectors whereby environmental factors are most material according to SASB, a qualitative check on the individual names that were flagged by the filter suggest that this methodology is less effective for the energy space. We agree that Baker Hughes should be on investors’ watchlist for greenwashing, however we are unconvinced about the names that were flagged as “green underdogs” or “truly green”. These companies were in part flagged by our filter because many do indeed develop innovative technology, but they continue to operate in dirtier aspects of fossil fuel businesses. A case in point is Cenovus, which continues to extract heavy oil from the Canadian tar sands, albeit with technology that improves its water efficiency.
- Within the consumer staples sector, our filter “caught” almost exclusively companies in the tobacco, food products and food retailing industries. This is largely because scores in these industries were more extreme relative to the other industries within this sector (beverages, personal and household products).
According to our filter, the potential for greenwashing is greater among companies with larger market capitalization: the average market cap of companies in our potential greenwasher bucket is 13% greater than those companies in the green underdog category. The correlation between ESG reporting and company size has been widely reported in recent years; the results from the filter suggest that not only are larger companies more likely to report on ESG issues, they are also more likely to exaggerate their green performance.
Finally, we caution readers that this filter is not intended to act as a standalone screen for investors to track down greenwashers. The companies highlighted in the tables should not be viewed conclusively as partaking in greenwashing; even when using several sources of ESG reporting, errors and omissions occur. Rather, our Greenwashing Screen can be used as one tool among many and alongside thorough qualitative company analysis.
Perhaps the most surprising element of the U.S. administration’s call for a global minimum corporate tax is that it took so long to happen. Despite its bad reputation with the general public, tax avoidance has long been tolerated – if not even encouraged – by some OECD countries (e.g., Ireland). Others, such as France and the U.K. – who benefit from the proximity of complacent tax jurisdictions (Monaco and the Channel Islands, respectively) still support their high-earning companies (and individuals) in the fiercely competitive global economic game through such tax avoidance schemes.
It also seems that the IMF and other organizations are now all out about tax collection to finance monster COVID-related deficits – and they are now championing global cooperation on the issue. The good news is that similar to the fiscal and monetary response given to the COVID crisis, we see a high chance that governments will cooperate more seriously on the issue of tax evasion and tax avoidance to fund ever-growing government deficits.
In a note last year (see “ESG investors vs. the taxman”, January 9, 2020), we foresaw such an increase in America’s corporate tax rates following Trump’s fiscally unsustainable cuts of December 2017. The increase in corporate taxes is also on the radar as corporate America expects a solid earnings’ year from the COVID boost to several industries (Construction, Materials, Tech, etc.).
While many welcomed the previous White House’s reduction of the U.S.’ corporate tax rate to 21% – in-line with other developed countries – it seems that the new world in which we are living is asking for much stronger action, i.e. a substantial increase in corporate “tax effort”. In our note of last week (see “Working-class hero”, April 8, 2021), we underlined the decreasing tax effort of American corporations since 1950 as a share of GDP. It seems that governments are giving in to the “populist” impression that Big Business is not paying its fair share – and they are right.
In our note of January 2019, we had also suggested ESG-minded investors to engage with their investee companies on the issue – albeit a very delicate one for the asset management industry. Indeed, financials are often pointed as serial tax avoiders and important users of tax heavens to preserve profit margins. We also underlined that sectors most exposed to a change-of-tack in U.S. corporate tax policy were chemicals, hospitality, casinos, and tech sectors.
That said, investors – which are typically much more avid of tax cuts than they are about tax hikes – benefitted largely from Trump’s tax policies. In fact, the S&P 500 increased by about 7% in late 2017 following the enactment of Trump’s corporate tax plan.
Interestingly, the P/E ratio of the S&P 500 decreased following the tax cut announcement in a context of strong growth and a tight labor market.
While Biden’s tax plan will first target a 15% minimum tax rate on profits for companies in “high tax avoidance” industries with a minimum of USD 100 million of revenue, some sectors and industries will suffer more than others. In our view, sectors with high earnings’ yield and low effective tax rates could suffer some level of reputational risk as the Biden administration looks to re-tax corporate America.
One other way to look at where the IRS will find its “fiscal nuggets” is to look at corporate America’s “fiscal space” – i.e. its tax “effort” as a percentage of EBIT. Here, and perhaps surprisingly, one sees that cash paid in taxes as a percent of EBIT can represent a substantial portion of EBIT in industries such as apparel, hospitality, and systems software.
Conversely, the IRS could look for some corporate fiscal space in industries such as semiconductors, steel and passthrough structures such as REITs which display a much higher potential of being re-taxed.
Finally, Biden’s re-tax plan also sheds light on the current level of corporate welfare – which will likely come under greater scrutiny in the coming months. Here, the rather interventionist Biden administration will likely give back some of the money it will take through taxes to corporations that are in harmony with the agenda of the government.
According to the GoodJobsFirst NGO, subsidies to America’s 20 biggest “corporate welfare queens” amounted to more than USD 80 billion last year. This is something that certainly will be looked at by policymakers as they re-tax corporations in the months to come and unwind the unprecedented level of public support provided to corporates this past year.
One of the high-growth areas of sustainable finance and ESG these days are financial instruments – in this case bonds and loans – with embedded triggers tied to issuers’ sustainability outcomes – many of which compatible with ESG performance frameworks such as the GRI, SASB, SBTi, etc. As a result, many see sustainability-linked instruments as one of the future drivers of sustainability in the corporate world.
According to Bloomberg data, more than USD 30 billion of sustainability-linked loans and bonds have been issued globally by corporates and governments since 2019, and we expect this number to grow at an even faster pace in the coming years. While European corporate and government issuers continue to lead the pack, the U.S. has caught up substantially and is poised to see an increase in its issuance given the recent change of tack in DC and the growing appetite from lenders, corporates and investors for all-things sustainable.
The issuance of sustainability-linked instruments is also becoming more widespread across U.S. and European BICS sectors, with Utilities and Materials leading the group in terms of total amount issued since 2019. Here, three sectors are of interest: Utilities, Financials and Energy.
One can understand some of the reasons pushing Utilities to embark on the sustainability path – with renewables (notably wind and solar) now cheaper than thermal sources (natural gas and coal), companies in this sector can easily attach sustainability strings to their loans knowing that their future most likely will be one with less carbon intensity. In that, we expect Utilities – especially those embracing the transition to a lower carbon future at a faster pace – to benefit from lower financing costs that will likely come with sustainability-linked financing instruments.
Conversely, Financials find themselves in a position where they will have to commit to a change in their books and source of profits (think of Canadian banks’ exposure to oil sands financing) which will take longer than other sectors to achieve – hence the relatively smaller amount of outstanding sustainability-linked instruments in the financial sector.
Surprisingly, sustainability-linked instruments remain a marginal source of finance in the Energy sector – perhaps the area where they could have the greatest impact.
That being said, assessing the effectiveness of sustainability-linked instruments in addressing real-world problems forces us to measure the relative contribution of financial incentives vs. those aiming at other business vectors such as 1) management (i.e. pay) and 2) the contribution of technological change to the improvement of corporate-level sustainability outcomes.
While many are calling for regulatory standards regarding ESG in markets (the latest being Mark Carney in his new book), there remains a fair amount of noise as to the standards to which issuers should adhere when tying their financing costs to sustainability outcomes. One of the leading standards comes from ICMA’s Sustainability-linked bond principles.
While most frequently used metrics include internal KPIs such as energy efficiency performance and improvement of ESG scores (the latter doesn’t make much sense in our view considering the discrepancies in ESG scores across third-party ESG data providers), we much prefer issuers’ adherence to “’hard” objectives such as the Science-Based Targets initiative, commitments to increase gender equality at all levels of the organization, executive pay incentives (one of the most effective ESG incentive when done right), and any other measurable “absolute” sustainability-related targets.
While several studies suggested a disappearing greenium (lower yields for green instruments vs. plain vanilla comparables) in the green bond space, we note that sustainability-linked instruments still offer a lower financing cost compared to the average yield asked for by market participants in several sectors (we don’t know the extent to which sustainability clauses were triggered in Bloomberg, in fact very few details on the covenants themselves).
Looking at about 100 such instruments in the U.S. and Europe issued since 2019, one sees that sustainability-linked instruments yields (BICS sector average) remain lower than the sectoral averages of their plain vanilla equivalents. Like for the early days of green bonds, we are seeing some yield compression happening given the high demand for such products at this point.
Moreover, looking at the G-spread average per sector, we also see that sustainability-linked loans display lower spreads vs. their plain-vanilla equivalents.
Furthermore, we think that sustainability-linked instruments will prove to have their greatest impact in highly leveraged sectors such as Real Estate and Utilities. It also happens that along with Energy, these sectors probably have the biggest “transition” potential of all.
The assault of the Reddit r/WallStreetBets crowd on excessively shorted companies like GameStop and AMC Entertainment shows a disenchantment with the current financial structure, an ingenious understanding of the weak links in the system and a strong desire to protest. Some of the participants in this assault are saying that financial markets are rigged, and that the establishment always has a significant advantage over the “main street” crowd. Sticking it to them is worth the risk of losing. In financial theory, we typically talk about risk aversion where losses have a greater emotional impact than gains. In this case, gains have a much greater emotional impact than losses. GameStop’s branding uses “Power to the Players”. Game players have to be resilient and generally face unfavorable odds – this describes the situation well. The lesson we should learn is that this is a call to improve fairness in markets. It could have more staying potential than the “Occupy Wall Street” movement.
In our view, the growth in popularity of Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) is yet another example of an unfair financial system.
Let’s look at how they are structured with a typical example. A SPAC issues stocks at 10$ and put the proceeds in a trust with the sponsor generally supporting the initial underwriting cost and other fees in case no transaction takes place during the investment period. In essentially all cases, a transaction takes place and the balance sheet before the transaction typically has an underlying value of the shares at 80-90% of the original price.
Since a De-SPAC transaction must typically represent 80% of the sum raised and investors can decide to accept or reject the transaction, the sponsor will typically find additional financing to make sure there is enough capital for the transaction to go through. The most common approach is to use a private investment in public equity or PIPE where a group of investors which like the transaction contemplated agree to provide additional financing at the original 10$ issue price.
At the time of the transaction, the underwriter gets the postponed underwriting fee and an investment banker or consultant gets the review fees for the transaction. Ultimately, if every equity holder approves the deal and the PIPE is fully utilized, we get to the maximum value that can be paid for the target acquisition. From that analysis, we see that in order for the SPAC transaction to be worth the original 10$ invested, the acquisition has to be done at a discount of at least 20% since the money available divided by the shares is sued amount to 80% of the issue price.
Moreover, the sponsors and the original SPAC investors get awarded warrants which further reduces the upside with potential dilution.
The following table describes the required undervaluation of the target in order for the investment to be a success under purchase price scenarios of (12$, 15$ and 20$).
The last 10 years of success and the feeling of invincibility with markets is propelling the demand for opportunities of large gains. Stars have joined the fray with aggressive marketing campaign to promote SPACs.
As can be seen in the table below, the financial industry has most of the incentives. The underwriter, banker, target company, sponsor and even the original investor which is typically an institutional investor all have incentives for hype and higher prices. Ironically, SPACs are a growing point of interest of the retail crowd.