For all investors, staying on top of the regulatory framework, best practices and political landscape is necessary to generate positive returns. But for investors focused on sustainability, the challenge is even greater; definitions and approaches to sustainability investing in many jurisdictions remain nebulous.   

In Today’s note, we address our readers’ top questions regarding the regulatory and political landscape, to clarify and anticipate how the sustainability rules of the game may affect participants.

Question 1: Let’s start in Europe. What is going on with SFDRs? Why are so many funds being downgraded from Article 9 to Article 8?

There has been a lot of media attention about recent downgrades of European funds from “Article 9 to Article 8”. Recall that under European financial regulation, all investment funds must now be classified as either Article 6, 8 or 9; the higher the number, the more sustainable: for example, an Article 8 fund is defined as promoting environmental or social characteristics (light green funds) while an Article 9 must have a sustainable investment objective (dark green funds).

Asset managers have been required to classify their funds since March 2021, but earlier this month, tighter compliance around the classification has been applied. In anticipation of this, many asset managers downgraded their funds from Article 9 to Article 8 late last year; under the realization that their funds would not qualify for Article 9.

To be sure, this is causing frustration among investors who believed they were purchasing an investment product with a particular goal in mind. It could also shake the credibility of Europe’s approach to sustainability via the SFDR.

However, recent data suggests the opposite. Despite these high-profile downgrades, there is heightened demand for the greenest of investment products: according to Morningstar data, while non-sustainable (Article 6) funds saw marked outflows in the latter part of 2022, there were net inflows into Article 9 funds as well as far less outflows from Article 8 funds. This underscores that there is a strong and growing market for high-grade sustainable investment products.

In our view, the downgrading of certain funds suggests that EU taxonomy is “working”; asset managers believe the consequences from mislabelling their products are high enough that they are taking corrective action.

Question 2: What does all this mean for the next leg of EU disclosure rules, is “social” still on the table?

At the outset, the European commission had set a goal of sustainability taxonomy and disclosures for both environmental and social issues. The goal of the social taxonomy is to classify economic activities that contribute to the EU’s social goals and provide guidelines for investors, businesses and regulators. In early 2002, a social taxonomy proposal was published by the EU, but since then, work has stalled. Unlike for the environmental taxonomy, there is no formal timeline set out for social taxonomy and according to some sources, there is little likelihood of progress until 2024 or beyond.  

Question 3: What about in the U.S.? It seems like there are forever delays in improving financial disclosure around climate.

There are two positive developments in the U.S. that we view of interest for investors concerned with climate change risks and opportunities.

First, the U.S. SEC is getting closer to instituting a new rule will require audited emissions data to be included in corporate financial reports. After a notable rise in greenwashing lawsuits (see chart below), the SEC plans to enact the new regulation before May 2023. Companies will need to describe in their annual 10-Ks (i.e. detailed financial report) their strategy toward climate risk, data on Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions and obtain independent attestation of the data.

Second, the three main U.S. banking regulators (Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp) released draft guidance on how they want large U.S. banks to manage exposure to climate change; final guidance is expected later this year. In addition, beginning in 2023, the Federal Reserve, now requires the country’s six largest banks to undergo “pilot” climate scenario analysis, aimed at providing clarity on how lenders are thinking about climate risks.

Together, the SEC proposal and the monitoring of systemically important banks regarding climate change will help investors have a clearer view of the risks and opportunities in their portfolio.

Question 4: What about other countries? Is there anything we need to know?

Investors in the U.K. have also started grappling with new regulation in regard to sustainability. The U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has issued its proposal for sustainability disclosure requirements (SDRs), which is largely the U.K. equivalent of Europe’s SFDRs. The consultation period ends this week and according to the preliminary timeline, the final rules will be published this June and enforced starting in June 2024.

The main difference between the EU’s SFDR and the U.K.’s SDR proposal is that the latter is a labelling regime, not a disclosure regime. If products do not meet the qualifying criteria under the FCA's proposals, they will not be able to use any of the regulator's sustainable investment labels, which are: “sustainable focus”, “sustainable transitioning” and “sustainable impact”. The flow chart below highlights how the UK labels correspond to the EU’s Articles 6, 8 and 9.

Ultimately, we continue to believe that disclosure and regulation around labelling will help investors and market participants avoid greenwashing. The main challenge is for investors and industry participants that sell products in multiple markets: complying to multiple national frameworks is complex and burdensome. There are various initiatives at work to harmonize various standards, such as the Global Reporting Initiative and International Sustainability Standards Board collaboration, but it is unlikely that concrete steps will be taken in 2023.  

Question 5: What about voluntary carbon offsets? Isn’t it high time these are standardized and regulated?

Voluntary carbon offset programs have been around for close to twenty years but have recently grown exponentially, given the number of institutions that will need to use offsets to reach their net zero goals.

The voluntary offset market includes a wide range of programs, entities, standards, and protocols. However, the lack of standardized quality criteria, has generated plenty of concern that voluntary offsets are, at best, unproductive and at worst, fraudulent. A case in points: a recent article in The Guardian uncovered that Verra, one of the most commonly used carbon offset providers in the world uses projects whereby more than 90% of their rainforest offset credits are likely to be “phantom credits” and do not represent genuine carbon reductions. 

Clearly, efforts to regulate the voluntary offset market have been wholly insufficient so far, but there are two international groups trying to address the issue by establishing new guardrails for offsets. The Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM) and the Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative (VCMI) — were created in 2021, and include representatives from governments, businesses, non-profits, etc. ICVCM focuses on the characteristics that would render a particular carbon offset project legitimate, while VCMI is attempting to establish how companies should be permitted to use offsets. The supposition is that once international guidelines are in place, offsets that adhere to the guidelines will be more credible and therefore help institutions make better quality offset choices. ICVCM’s current plan is to release a first set of requirements in March.  

Question 6: What else is on your radar?

We expect that the top two issues that could change the investment landscape specific to sustainability are the political sentiment surrounding ESG in the U.S. and the “climate incentive war” between the U.S. and Europe. We view both as positive developments for sustainability.

As is now well known, in 2022, “ESG” backlash resulted in some U.S. states enacting legislation preventing them from contracting with banks and asset managers with ESG policies, removed state funding from these firms, or reinvested state pension policies. But as Larry Fink (CEO, Blackrock) adroitly pointed out, the $4B withdrawn by Republican states was more than offset by $230B in US inflows last year. This underscores the notion that the global demand for sustainability investment products is growing much faster than the support for Republican “anti-ESG” ideas.

Nonetheless, Republicans are continuing their work from last year, and Republican state-attorneys general have begun 2023 by accusing ISS and Glass Lewis – the two companies that control about 97% of the market share for voting advice – of running afoul of laws and contractual obligations for state investments by prioritizing environmental and social concerns. Our base case is that these actions coming from Republican states will have little consequence over the next two years, i.e. while Joe Biden remains U.S. president, but this could change thereafter. We view all of this media attention as positive and contributing toward the legitimization of sustainability as a conventional and worthy investment approach.

A second issue is the current green stimulus battle between the U.S. and Europe, which could end up as the most beneficial “trade war” of our lifetime! 

The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, which includes significant tax breaks and subsidies amounting to a boost for US production of electric vehicles, solar panels, batteries, etc. has been widely lauded as a significant win for slowing climate change. However, the EU regards these subsidies as contrary to fair competition.

European policymakers, it appears, will be forced to initiate their own subsidy packages for climate investment to level the playing field. Europe’s response could take shape as early as next month at the extraordinary summit of the leaders of the EU (where the main topics will be migration and the EU’s global competitiveness). 

All in all, the major likely developments in 2023 are pointing in the same direction: increasing legitimacy and clarity around sustainability investing.

2022 was a challenging year for investors in general, and for sustainability-minded investors in particular.

First, an unprecedented war following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine jolted global energy markets – especially oil, gas and coal sectors – which are often excluded from sustainability-themed strategies given their direct connection to fossil fuels. Second, a war of ideas broke out, affecting sustainable investors as U.S. politics hit the “ESG fan”, forcing the investment industry to “choose camps”. Furthermore, European financial regulators prompted several asset managers to “rebrand” their strategies in an effort to quell greenwashing. With all of this, one could conclude that sustainable investing is going through some sort of a midlife crisis. Finally, Central Banks’ lateness in recognizing the “inflation issue” provoked an abrupt turnaround in markets in mid-2022 (see our note “Beware Drunken Sailors, the Tide is Turning”, January 20th), which further crushed ESG investment strategies which are typically long Tech and short Energy. In this context, the outperformance of the global Energy sector combined with the rout in Tech stocks formed a “perfect storm” for many ESG investors.

Despite this adverse environment, SMS researchers have several investable themes to draw from and continued to produce investment ideas to 1) provoke real word change through financial markets solutions and 2) generate value for their stakeholders by moving capital away from destructive themes and companies and into more constructive ones.

Though SMS lagged in recognizing the turnaround in oil prices, we were able to benefit from rising commodity prices under our transition materials subtheme and identify opportunities that would benefit from the new macro backdrop. To this end, our top-down, macro/sustainability theme-based research process managed to yield quite a few long/short investment ideas which, on an average basis since our notes were published, returned -1.5%, compared to -20% for the S&P 500 (our sister company Nordis Capital L/S Global equity strategy returned about +3% YTD in USD). In all, our governance theme “Building Better Markets” was the top-performing theme as it included some recommendations to short tech and crypto-based business models – mostly on governance grounds. Conversely, our “Supply Chains” theme was the worst performing one as we suggested short-selling dollar-store business models which had a strong exposure to supply chain bottlenecks. In retrospect, these companies actually profited from the rising cost of living during the year and the valuation followed suit.

With this in mind, today’s note looks at some of our big investment calls of 2022 (see our note “Investment Trends in 2022: Don’t Put Your ESG All in One Basket” January 12th for our initial calls) and explores what we got right and wrong during the year.

Idea #1: Transition Metals: Long Recyclers and Strong ESG-minded Miners

Elevated commodity prices – those of transition metals in particular – amid a shortage of chips and battery materials led us to favor companies with the ability to “mine” those metals in the most sustainable fashion, i.e. from recycled sources (to the extent possible). To this end, we wrote a note (see “Circular Economy When Going Around in Circles is the Right Thing to Do”, April 14th) suggesting long opportunities in companies that are active in the circular economy theme. To this end, our circular economy theme has performed “on par” with the market so far this year.

Idea #2: A Mighty Link in the Supply Chain: Long distribution warehouses

We were bullish on logistics at the outset of the year in the context of still-present shortages, reshoring and growing political tensions around the world - and now de-globalization. That being said, our Supply Chains theme under performed the S&P 500 and even the overall REIT sector these past few months. In fact, this sector even suffered a “double blow” from rising rates (especially REITs) and cyclical recessionary headwinds, which made it one of our worst investment calls of the year.

Idea #3: Seeing the Forest and the Trees

Given the mostly defensive nature of our 2022 calls, it is not surprising to see that we were bullish on forestry and timber companies under our “Natural Capital” theme. This has proven quite valid given the outperformance of the sector these past few months - even if lumber prices currently are pricing in a recession after being jolted during the pandemic months.

Idea #4: Emerging Asset Class and Diversifier: Long Carbon

One interesting turnaround this year can be found in the price of carbon. While we were initially bullish on the carbon market in the EU in particular - which was one of our best-performing investment ideas of the past two years - we turned bearish following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting burst in EU energy prices. We perceived risk that these higher energy prices could in fact provoke a recession in Europe, and with it the fall in carbon prices.

Moreover, we had originally thought that EU authorities would relax some of the constraints in the domestic carbon trading market – such as temporarily increasing emission allowances for 2022 and 2023 in industries covered under the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). Not only were we wrong on this aspect, but we also underestimated the impact that the restarting of coal reactors could have on the demand for carbon emissions. This helps explain the resilience and as well as recent increase in prices of carbon allowances in the EU market.

Idea #5: Spotting Charlatans

We were short Tech for most of the year on governance and macro grounds under our “Building Better Markets” theme. Now that the crypto world faces its first “reckoning moment” with the indictment of SBF, we expect more news of this kind to surface in the coming months and also that companies like MicroStrategy – which part of the business model is a levered play over cryptos - to commence their own “race to zero”. META, another favorite short of the team throughout the year, continued its downfall with dubious data practices and anti-trust enquiries out of Europe. Another team favorite in the shorts department was Robin Hood, a business model which is currently suffering from the current “trust crisis” in the market coming from the demise of crypto and meme stock trading. Finally, we continue to anticipate that companies with poor governance structures such as Softbank - and which took undue risks on tech/crypto plays during the past year - will suffer from the current “return to sanity” of investors.

Biodiversity is increasingly becoming a hot topic for investors as COP 15, dedicated to biodiversity (COP 27 is on climate change), gathers in Montréal next month (Montréal being our hometown, please come and meet with our team either in situ at the COP 15 convention center or at our neighboring office!). As with other environmental issues, financial market participants have been quick to jump on the bandwagon and associate themselves to the preservation of biodiversity – often in doubtful ways, alas –  and many asset managers now promise “protection of biodiversity” as a key objective of some of their impact/ESG portfolios.

Given the complexity in measuring what biodiversity means and what indicators should be used by those who wish to preserve it, we felt it important to circle out what investors can expect to achieve by trading companies who have a positive/negative impact on our natural world. Today’s note builds on our last notes covering biodiversity (“Valuing the Invaluable”, March 31, 2022) and nature-based solutions (“Nature Always Wins”, June 16, 2022).

Three Issues with Investing in Biodiversity

There are three main issues in grappling with the concept of biodiversity as investors. First, the capitalistic nature of investing – itself predicated on the use of natural and human resources to produce goods and services – makes it hard to claim that investors can protect biodiversity through their portfolios. After all, the notion that investors invest in anticipation of future growth appears in contradiction with the preservation of biodiversity and natural capital.

This is probably why many investors look at biodiversity from the private assets side – some of them even use blended finance vehicles to compensate for the insufficient financial return associated with many investments under the “biodiversity” theme. Indeed, it remains unclear how an investor who would want to protect a tract of land and/or reforest it could one day recoup her investment, let alone make a profit out of it. That said, investors can perhaps have a greater impact by investing in nature-related markets that create incentives to protect nature, such as the still nascent – and messy – voluntary and/or regulated carbon market.

Second, in the absence of a “market” for biodiversity, the current economic framework can hardly reward investors seeking commercial returns by investing in the protection of natural capital. In our view, those who look to preserve biodiversity could find some inspiration by looking at the regulatory framework which was put in place in global carbon markets. These regulations have enabled some significant investments in climate finance related projects and explain why the global market for climate finance has been expanding rapidly while the market for biodiversity still remains in its infancy.

The third issue is that biodiversity-related disclosures from companies remain extremely difficult to assess (and audit) to see if the former are actually delivering on their promise to protect the ambient world. Like with many other ESG data points, these policies are mostly unaudited and hardly comparable between listed companies. It remains even more difficult harder to assess which KPIs have been met against the set of biodiversity KPIs that are disclosed to investors - when applicable at all. However, while we all strive for perfect data disclosed in a timely manner - and that most importantly could move markets in a way that protects nature - we don’t see the upcoming TFND (Taskforce on Nature-related Disclosures) disclosures starting to move markets before the end of this decade, at the very least. In the meantime, investors promising to save biodiversity with their portfolios could rely on (and even fund) third-party NGOs to follow the sectors and companies in which they are invested from a biodiversity protection perspective.

Engagement Ideas: You Can’t Value What You Can’t Price

In the absence of clear and perfect data on biodiversity, investors and/or stock exchanges could survey listed companies and proactively ask if they put an internal price on ecosystem services such as water, air, carbon, solar, biomass, etc. After all, as with many social issues, economists view that putting a price on free resources is the first step in addressing the management of them: you can’t manage what you can’t measure, and you can’t value what you don’t price.

We reviewed a selection of databases which list and attempt to put an economic value on ecosystem services (such as this one). That said, to see where companies could “put a price” on nature, one could look at the various categories of ecosystem services and ask their investee company how they value each of them. Many firms already do this by putting an internal price on carbon, water and other services they currently receive for free as to optimize their management processes and future capex patterns. For our part, we looked at the Ecosystem Services Partnership, an NGO mostly backed by universities, and how they categorized Ecosystem Services. 

Some Good News on Biodiversity for Investors: Growing Adoption & Carbon Markets

The good news is that about half of the companies listed on global stock exchanges already have a biodiversity policy. Unsurprisingly, companies listed on the Eurostoxx 50 are leading the way in the adoption of such policies; while companies listed on the S&P 500 lag their peers. Exchanges should lead the charge in asking for more biodiversity disclosures as regulators will likely take a decade before reaching a consensus on how biodiversity disclosures should be reported.

The second piece of good news is that carbon pricing works. The growing interest for carbon markets makes it increasingly interesting for investors. Indeed, as challenges around pricing the concepts of natural capital and biodiversity are likely to remain for the foreseeable future, the best bet for investors is to rely on these voluntary markets. The voluntary carbon market is growing in a profitable way while at the same putting the right incentives in place to preserve natural capital. To this end, a recent study by Ecosystem Marketplace, which is part of the Forest Trends initiative NGO, looked at the trading volume in global voluntary carbon markets and found that, with the exception of agriculture, all subsectors have seen both their volume of transaction and price increase between 2020 and 2021. Some attempts have been made to value ecosystem services by the global economic sector, but their methodologies remain choppy and can hardly be used to inform any investment decision at this point.

The Value of Nature – the Case of NYC's Catskills/Delaware Watershed

Finally, one of the first - and finest - examples of the “value” of ecosystem services comes from New York city’s decision to preserve the Catskill watershed in the early 20th century. A system of naturally filtered reservoirs about 100 miles north of the city, the Catskill watershed supplies 9 million New Yorkers with some of the best water in the United States. Studies have estimated that this “free” water system saves about USD 10 billion (about 0.3% of GDP of NYC) a year for taxpayers and encourages NYC officials to invest in ecosystem preservation. Here again, NYC taxpayers are protecting their watershed because there is a market for the ecosystem services they receive – in this case clean water.

In our last Insight Note on supply chains on March 3rd (Global Supply and Its Chains: From Efficient Bounty to Complex Scarcity?), we laid out our view as to why we forecast that industries, companies and countries will attempt to build less complex, more diverse and regionalized supply chains. Since we wrote that Note, there has been accumulating evidence that our forecast is playing out, both in terms of government initiatives and corporate actions. Most recently, in mid-September, U.S. President Joe Biden signed an executive order that targets foreign investments in US biotech, artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors and other sensitive technologies. Not long after, in China, Xi Jinping consolidated his power, underscoring the country’s “Made in China” policy.   

Today we identify the four industries that we expect to be most disrupted based on U.S. and Chinese national security concerns (we exclude energy from our analysis since we have discussed this topic frequently in prior notes). What these sectors have in common, beyond being stated priority sectors for one more of these governments, is that they are also industries with major environmental challenges. There are significant and varied investment implications of “re-shoring” and “friend-shoring”, but one important opportunity (or risk) is the potential for improving (or deteriorating) environmental outcomes at a global level, as polluting and/or environmentally intensive industries shift from regions with lax standards to stricter ones (or vice versa). We address these issues below.

Batteries: The China Advantage

China dominates almost every aspect of battery manufacturing, starting with the materials sourcing all the way through battery production and EV manufacturing (see chart below).

At the extraction stage, it is noteworthy that current mining production compared to mineral reserves shows that diversification of extraction is possible in the longer term. But whether or not this occurs highly depends on environmental regulation; in many instances, strict environmental regulation makes it uncompetitive to extract resources in particular jurisdictions.

As for the rest of the battery supply chain, the IEA forecasts that most of the supply chain is likely to remain in China until 2030. After all, 70% of battery production capacity announced to date for the period to 2030 is in China.

Nonetheless, the U.S. has bold public sector initiatives to develop domestic battery supply chains.

In March 2022, the United States invoked the Defence Production Act to rapidly boost US production of critical minerals for EV and storage batteries. In addition, in February 2022, the US departments of Energy, Defense and State signed a Memorandum of Agreement to support stockpiling of critical minerals that would facilitate the transition to clean energy, in particular for batteries and wind turbines, and to meet national security needs. Note that China has been stockpiling industrial metals for years; quantities are unknown, but various reports confirm that copper, nickel, zinc and molybdenum are held in substantial volumes.

Takeaway: in the race for battery and EV production, China has a substantial lead. Significant investments at every step of the American supply chain need to be made. Environmental regulation is a major determinant of country dominance at the extraction link of the supply chain.

Semiconductors: U.S. Needs to Produce, China Needs to Design

Experts believe China still remains about a decade behind the United States and its allies in key aspects of semiconductor design (the latter requires talent but significantly less initial capital outlays compared to manufacturing). Manufacturing of chips is another story however: recently it has generally been far cheaper to produce chips in Asia, mainly because tax incentives in those countries have been dramatically more generous and environmental regulations are far looser (semi-conductor manufacturing requires huge amounts of water and anywhere between 10 to 80 percent of the fluorinated greenhouse gases (GHG) pass through semiconductor manufacturing unreacted and are released in the air). Thus, in China the challenge is access to design, while in the U.S., the challenge is manufacturing at a competitive price.

Since September, China’s challenge just got a lot harder: Biden’s executive order prohibits certain entities from investing in US organizations and prohibits U.S. companies from selling certain products to Chinese organizations; this will strongly impede China’s ability to catch up from a design basis.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has rectified the tax incentive situation for semiconductor manufacturing and various states are in a rush to attract new production sites. This leaves environmental challenges. With much of the west coast in a multi-year drought and many aquifers throughout the country going dry, it is an open question whether there is a long-term future for chip manufacturing to re-shore to the U.S. or perhaps more likely, friend-shore to water-rich allies.

Takeaway: both China and the U.S. face important constraints regarding de-linking their semiconductor supply chain.

Seeds: The ‘Computer Chips’ of Agriculture

China is now the world’s largest agricultural importer and grain security remains a top government priority. Unlike in the U.S., food security has been listed as equally important as national energy security in China.

Paralleling the semiconductor industry, China has used both illegal and legal channels to set the foundations for food security. The most well-known case of agricultural property theft occurred last decade and involves Chinese nationals sending Iowa corn seeds to China in suitcases among popcorn bags and Subway napkins. Another important data point is that in 2017, China – through China Chem - also acquired Syngenta (a provider of agricultural science and technology) in what remains the largest takeover of a foreign company. Note that five years later, China Chem is preparing for the re-sale of Syngenta (through an IPO) and plans to use the proceeds to acquire more of the US$100 billion worldwide market for seeds and agrichemicals.

Satisfying China’s food demand without harming the environment is a massive sustainability challenge for the coming decades. China’s agricultural sector is a huge producer of GHG emissions, and the expansion of imports in recent years is also contributing to environmental pressure in exporting countries (for example, almost half of deforestation emissions due to soybean cultivation in Brazil can be attributed to China’s soybean imports).   

Therefore, China’s next steps on food security will, whether it be through ongoing agricultural trade or a stepping up of domestic production, have global reaching implications for environmental trends.  

Takeaway: China has set targets to reduce dependency on foreign food, but whether it is achievable – and whether it brings positive or negative environmental change – remains an open question.

Pharmaceuticals: China Wants to Design, U.S. Wants to Manufacture

Until the mid-1990s, the U.S., Europe and Japan produced 90% of the world’s active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs). Today, China has over 40% of worldwide API market share, and the U.S. relies on China and India for 75%–80% of its supply of APIs. Factory shutdowns in China under that government’s zero-covid policy have meant that in recent months there have been scarce supplies of acetaminophen, antibiotics and chemotherapy drugs; although the manufacturers of these medicines may not be located in China, the active ingredients are sourced there.  

Why did the offshoring occur in the first place? Much like other manufacturing businesses, pharma production plants moved to Asia because labor, regulatory and environmental and tax costs are lower. The remedy to entice pharma production back to America is clear; increase incentives to operate in the U.S.

Although it is early days, but there are signs that companies are beginning to invest in domestic and “neighbourly” production sites.  

Takeaway: Early evidence suggests that the U.S. will achieve greater independence from China with regards to the pharmaceutical supply chain. The barriers to bring back pharma manufacturing to the U.S. is lower than other critical supply sectors. We do not have sufficient information to decipher the extent to which China can develop new medicines independently from U.S. expertise.

The pickup in global inflation that began in 2021 has coincided with a period of structural labor shortages in most developed economies. This backdrop has the potential to unleash a significant surge in wage inflation. Whether that occurs is a crucial question for investors since, for the past several decades, the muted cost of labor has been a key factor in the structural trend higher in corporate profit margins.

Indeed, this long-term decline in labor’s share of profits, along with rising income inequality, are significant driving forces behind one of our six top-down sustainability themes: “Leave No Person Behind”.

Today’s note provides a graphical snapshot of the U.S. labor market to ascertain whether labor is beginning to gain the upper hand. It tells the story of an employment market that is behaving remarkably similar to previous economic cycles: there is no evidence from the macro data that the situation for U.S. workers is improving on a structural basis, i.e. that rising real wages are leading to improved purchasing power or reduced inequality.

 

The U.S. Labor Market in Pictures

  1. The Labor Market Is Cyclically & Structurally Tight

  1. Nominal Wage Growth Is Uniformly Strong

  1. Real Wages Are Not Keeping Up to Inflation

  1. The Share of Workers with Negative Real Wage Growth Is Rising Sharply

  1. High Paying Jobs Have Faster Rising Wages Than Low Ones

  1. Beyond the Cycle, Long-term Bargaining Power Is Not Improving

  1. The Regulatory Backdrop for Labor Has Not Meaningfully Changed

“ESG” has gotten a bad rap especially over the last year as many media outlets have focused on everything that isn’t working in the ESG industry. At SMS, we pride ourselves on taking a pragmatic approach to investment and research: in today’s note, we uphold the view that ESG has been an excellent tool for risk management; how the ESG and investor movement has effected real change on concrete, measurable corporate operations; and why ESG is ripe to become a popular (and potentially successful) “active” investment strategy. “ESG” is not a cure-all, but when done properly, it can influence and amplify social and environmental trends that are important to the broader world, as well as generate superior returns.

ESG: A Proven, Successful Investment Risk Management Tool

Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) – the term used to identify matters associated with corporate responsibility beyond generating financial profit (extra-financial items) – has been an excellent tool for businesses (and investors who take ownership stakes in them) to safeguard themselves from future risks. The clearest demonstration of this is through the lower cost of financing that is accorded to businesses with strong ESG records. Study after study concludes that the cost of financing is cheaper for firms with strong ESG records (see chart below). To be sure, a size bias sometimes overstates this impact (large companies tend to access cheaper funding and also tend to have strong ESG records) but it is not hard to understand why lenders view ESG leaders in a better light: businesses that demonstrate they are at lower risk from controversies, whether it be environmental accidents, or fraudulent financial activity are viewed as more creditworthy by lenders than those that don’t. For investors, the corollary is simple: businesses that have access to cheaper capital, all else equal, offer better risk/reward than investments with higher funding costs.

The overwhelming number of publicly-traded companies that publish sustainability reports is testament to this fact; it is no doubt cheaper to dedicate financial resources to showing transparency about ESG topics than to pay higher borrowing costs.  

ESG naysayers will rightly point out: there is a monumental difference between reporting on sustainability and being sustainable and that ESG data can be of poor quality and is fallible. These critiques are true. Few ratings of any kind are ever perfect - one only needs to look back to the rating agencies’ view of U.S. residential mortgage debt in 2008 for a reminder – but imperfect scores have nonetheless yielded results. As the section below demonstrates, the act of reporting on sustainability - and the imperfect ESG ranking of companies has led to corporate change.

ESG: Real World Results 

Plenty of corporate behaviours and practices have shifted in recent years. It is impossible to prove causality, but the link between increased, quality sustainability reporting and several changes in corporate behavior is nonetheless present. Although it has been over a decade now that the majority of large and mega-cap (i.e. the world’s 250 largest companies by revenue) produce sustainability reports, it is only very recent that the quality of reporting has improved. What is quality reporting? It is materiality reporting. Materiality refers to an organization's significant economic, environmental and social impacts and risks.

SASB is the gold standard on materiality reporting and as the chart below shows, despite a flourishing ESG reporting trade for the past decade, SASB reporting has only accelerated in the past three years.

This has corresponded to change in several issues that are widely considered to be urgent (i.e. material) environmental and societal issues.

A first example is the role of women in decision-making roles. The increased attention attributed to issues like #Metoo, working conditions in “pink collar” jobs during the pandemic, and the repeal of U.S. abortion laws mean that companies and investors are increasingly exposed to reputational risk if they cannot show improvement on gender issues. Although women continue to make up a paltry minority of senior corporate roles, the rate of change has accelerated markedly in the past three years, which has coincided with the number of businesses reporting gender diversity – or the lack of thereof - as a “material” risk.

A second example is the use of voluntary carbon offsets. As the chart below shows, the voluntary carbon offset market has exploded higher in the past two years, at exactly the same time that businesses are feeling pressure to react to the very material risk that climate change has on their operations. While the voluntary market is extremely imperfect and there is most certainly some greenwashing at play, the development of voluntary carbon offsets is an important step toward internalizing the costs of greenhouse gas emissions, especially for industries where emission regulation is weak or absent. 

Similarly, net zero pledges have existed for quite some time and by some estimates, now cover 80% of world GDP. However, it has been far too easy to commit to a vague plan about something far in the future, such as what was done by several countries and oil companies in the past years. Fortunately, along with the materiality of climate change on corporations, the number of independently verified, science-backed targets, has had unprecedented growth in the past two years (see chart below). 

The bottom line is that investors who may have initially been keen to see companies publish ESG reports to better analyze, gauge and quantify risks, have no doubt participated in spurring companies to take steps on materially important ESG issues!

From ESG to ESG Investing: A “Passive” Fail but a Massive “Active” Opportunity

In as much as the track record for ESG as a risk management tool and as a force for corporate behavior change has been a success, the same case cannot be made for ESG investing (yet). There is burgeoning evidence that although overall ESG scoring does not correlate consistently with stock performance, firms with good ratings on material sustainability issues do significantly outperform companies with poor ratings on material issues. And in contrast, firms with good ratings on immaterial sustainability issues do not significantly outperform firms with poor ratings on the same issues.

Still, we stand by our conclusions from our February report (“Authentic ESG Funds: Looking for the (Tracking) Error”, February 10, 2022): the bulk of ESG funds are passively managed, and more often reflect growth funds masquerading as low-carbon.

Indeed, the chart below shows the performance of ESG-aware passive investments. In rising oil price environments, ESG-aware ETFs underperform their benchmarks and in declining oil price environments, they outperform. Over long periods of time, net of management fees, ESG ETFs have generally underperformed, or in the best of cases, tied the broader benchmarks.

To us, this makes sense and we agree with others that point out that ESG investors that pursue a strategy of divestment (or passive investment with exclusions) should not be surprised by potentially lower financial returns because they’re constraining their universe. In other words, if diversification is good for portfolios over the long run, then by excluding certain types of stocks with particular properties, a passive ESG investor is reducing the ability to diversify, and therefore, should expect lower returns.

But let us be clear, it is not because passive investing in ESG has under-delivered that ESG investing can not be successful. We believe that active investing in select ESG themes will be successful for precisely the same reason that materiality reporting has affected corporate change: financial markets are a reflection of (and sometimes influence on) societal themes that unfold.

Share prices assist in the efficient allocation of capital, helping to steer savings toward the most promising investments; when investors allocate to a particular theme, they are taking an active stance on an anticipated change in the world.

One of the major critiques of ESG investing is that it lacks precise goals and it is difficult to measure since the number of objectives is almost infinite and varies from one company to the next. But active ESG investors, i.e. those that do not simply subtract the companies they don’t like, are in fact actively pursuing particular themes that align with - or reside within - broad ESG goals.

A Tale of Three Sustainability-Minded Investors

Take three different investors. The first - The Divestor - purchases an ESG-aware fund that reports low carbon emissions. The second - Passive Clean Investor - has more conviction in the energy transition theme and therefore invests in a (passive) clean energy ETF. The third - Active Transition Investor - recognizing the importance of the energy transition thematic, but also cognitive of the broader macro landscape, devises an active energy transition strategy.

The Divestor does particularly well when energy prices are in a bear market but underperforms when oil prices rise. This is because there are not enough “green” energy transition companies in the broad index to compensate for outsized positive contribution of dirty fossil fuel producers when oil prices rise. The Divestor may post returns in some macroeconomic environments but is unlikely to do well over an entire business/financial cycle.

Similarly, Passive Clean Investor has an even more constrained universe to choose from (companies with low carbon footprints and that produce energy) and is even more beholden to the economic and financial cycle: non-fossil fuel energy companies typically have similar characteristics in that they tend to be technology-centric and therefore extremely long duration assets with high P/Es. Under the right conditions, such as low interest rates and strong economic growth, the Passive Clean Investor’s high conviction views of the energy transition will be rewarded, but under other macro backdrops the strategy will struggle to outperform. 

Finally, the Active Transition Investor understands that the energy transition will occur, albeit its trajectory will be highly dependent on the macroeconomic and geopolitical backdrop. The Active Transition Investor overweights her portfolio to cleantech companies when rates are low, but dials back this exposure in favor of “boring”, lower P/E names that are early in the energy supply chain (like cable providers to the electricity grid industry) when recession fears strike. The Active Transition Investor may also dabble in renewable natural gas stocks or nuclear solutions when necessary, knowing that intermediate solutions are urgently needed to fill the gap left from coal and tar sands before renewable solutions can entirely take over. Active Transition Investor, in fact, may sometimes look indistinguishable from a macro hedge fund investor in that she seeks to deliver returns based on market developments caused by political or economic events.

Water risks are increasingly discussed among the investment community amidst warming weather patterns and the growing frequency of droughts and water shortages. Most of these risks are directly material to almost any investment’s bottom line.

These risks are the usual suspects of climate change: increased severity of droughts, floods, wildfires, storms, sea-level rise and loss of freshwater reserves. They all imply either an excess or lack of water in any given place, affecting the water supply in local economies. Moreover, while carbon emissions are only material through regulatory and reputational mechanisms, water risks are physically material to the bottom line of almost all industries. The following materiality matrix from the World Resources Institute shows precisely how the 13 water risks it measures are relevant to all sectors of the economy in one way or another (on scale of 0 to 4, see the table below).

This is not difficult to grasp once one realises that all industries are using water as one of their main factors of production; most of them not even knowing it. Indeed, one needs water to grow food, produce cement, clothes, medicine, mining metals and to produce any kind of energy. All of these industries have developed business models that implicitly rely on a steady, secure and free supply of water.

The abundant supply of water is now being challenged by climate change and is creating various financial risks for businesses and their supply chains that investors need to understand:

Operational Risks: The most straightforward type of climate/water risk is simply if a business no longer has the necessary water to generate its own production. This is for example the case for a hydropower plant in California serving 750,000 homes that had to be shut down because there was no longer enough water in the river to run its turbines, following the aridification of the Californian landscape. The same applies this year to the Hoover Dam and Lake Mead with its historically low water levels.

Profitability Risks: Another straightforward risk businesses face from climate change are the increasing costs for adapting to abrupt changes in local water supply. This was, for example, the case for Taiwan Semi-Conductor Manufacturers whose water allowance was reduced by 15% by the government following an historic drought in the island. The company had to resort to shipping water by trucks every day from the other side of the island, a very costly solution. The change in the water supply and its costs inevitably affect business models and their economics through their margins and profitability.

Competitive or Transition Risks: Indirect but consequent types of risk due to climate change are Competitive or Transition Risks. These are the risks derived from failing to make the investments necessary to adapt. For example, businesses that have invested in resilient infrastructure to face increasing natural risks will be better prepared than those that did not. The same logic goes for companies that have invested in circular water management solutions for their factories and will therefore be less sensitive to change in the local water supply; as well as having reduced operational costs and improved margins. These companies will have a strong competitive edge, which will also be reinforced by market mechanisms and increasing green regulations. Financial markets participants will create the same discriminatory effect by screening between the companies that are fit enough to survive climate change.

Systemic Risks: A good example to illustrate systemic risk is the collapse of the energy and water systems in Texas during the last deep freeze in February 2021. Because of an ailing jet stream that could no longer contain arctic weather in the arctic, the state of Texas faced some polar weather for a month which froze most of its gas and water infrastructure. This left some parts of the state without running water and electricity for weeks and cost the Texan economy between $80-130 billion in direct and indirect economic losses. This included damage to homes and businesses, cleaning costs for contaminated water and foregone economic activity. This example shows how modern economies are dependent on a secured supply of water, and when threatened, creates systemic risks across the economy.

Inflation Risks: Little discussed is the inflation risk water scarcity is likely to bring. Water scarcity in many regions of the world will inevitably lead to an increase in its price. This has the potential to spread throughout supply chains and to consumers, and lead to sustained inflation throughout the economy. This is also valid for the other side of the water quantity spectrum, where too much water in the forms of floods, storms and intense rainfalls will increase asset erosion and repair costs. These are likely to be new structural pricing effects in the economy that will become new long-term risks for investors.

As the examples above show, many of these risks have already started to materialise in the economy and the probability is rising that water problems become greater over time. That said, hedging portfolios against the growing water risks remains a difficult task. While several ETFs and water “indices” have been created, we feel that they still poorly capture the true “water risk” embedded in the corporate world. To this end, we see three ways to measure water risks for investors.

The first way to evaluate this risk is to look at water usage per million dollars of revenue for companies in each sector, which points us to some of the companies with the highest “water hazard” embedded in their business models.

Second, the WWF Water Risk Filter gives a comprehensive water risks assessment of any global asset that is entered into its database. This tool can then be used as part of an engagement strategy whereby investors can request water-vulnerable companies to take a water-risk assessment, monitor their water vulnerability and eventually incentivize companies to invest in new water innovations to hedge against these risks.

Third, CDP is also emerging as one of the leading data providers for water metrics. It has designed an extensive questionnaire for 10 years on water awareness, exposure, management and stewardship of companies. This effectively evaluates the level of water responsibility for all companies globally and their readiness to face new climate risks. CDP Water ratings (A-F) can therefore be used to screen water risks across portfolios, for example, by only retaining water leaders that have scored an “A”. This water screen can be added to a carbon screening methodology to add adaptation risks to an existing sustainable investment strategy or risk management strategy.

The 1% has the potential to change from being the greatest climate change offenders to the leaders; these wealthy individuals have disproportionate climate influence via their roles as consumers, investors and by leveraging their social networks. It is promising that younger members of the 1% are beginning to act in favor of improved environmental outcomes.

Much of the attention about inequality is focused on income and wealth. However, inextricably tied to wealth and income disparity is carbon emissions, both in terms of those who emit (the wealthy) and those who suffer (the poor).  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the UN group responsible for evaluating climate change related matters, has issued a series of science-based reports documenting the impact of climate change on the planet and its inhabitants. Its analysis of how GHG emissions have and will disproportionately hurt the poor is a reminder of inequality in the world, and the responsibility that the richest have for the living conditions of the poorest. 

In this note, we provide an overview of the current situation, what systemic approaches can be utilized to improve outcomes and perhaps, most importantly, what investment tools are at the disposal of wealthy individuals to rectify their current carbon footprint.

State of the World Today: In the Eye of the Storm

Just as the top 1% captured 38% of all additional wealth accumulated since the mid-1990s, the production of GHG emissions is also extremely concentrated among a small share of the population: the charts below show that the top 10 per cent of income earners is responsible for close to half of all emissions, whereas the lowest 50 per cent of income earners account for around 7–15 per cent of all emissions. In terms of volume, each member of the 1% on average is responsible for 110 tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions, compared to only 6.6 tonnes for the median wage earner.

Perhaps even more dramatic, in many rich countries, per capita emissions among the bottom half of emitters have declined since 1990: their current emission levels are close to the 2030 per capita climate targets set by the US, the UK, Germany and France. In contrast, highest emitters continue to do so at ever increasing rates.

Looking forward, if the world is to comply with the Paris agreement to limit warming to 1. 5°C, the wealthiest 1% will need to reduce their current emissions by 97% by 2030. In other words, all emission reductions efforts “should” be made by citizens in the top half of wealth distribution. The climate crisis shows how rich people blow through their “fair share” of carbon emissions.

These statistics underscore that it is overwhelmingly a wealthy minority that is fuelling the climate crisis. But what is it precisely about wealthy individuals that makes their carbon footprint so drastically different? The main culprit is their choices regarding transportation and leisure, and to a lesser extent, their choice of residence(s). The chart below shows the environmental footprint of several high-profile billionaires: although transportation in private jets, helicopters and luxury cars are a well known high-emitting pleasure of the super-rich, yachts are actually the biggest contribution to their mammoth carbon footprint.

 

Toward a more equal outcome: Policy, People, and Portfolio Impacts

Policy makers are traditionally focused on reducing income inequality, yet for the future of the Earth to be secured, they must shift the focus to addressing carbon inequality.

Carbon inequality differs from income and wealth inequality in that in the case of the latter, the aim of policymakers is generally to increase the income and wealth outcomes of those in the bottom half, without negatively impacting the level of income and wealth of those that are better off. In other words, the goal is to “increase the pie,” and improve the quality of life – as measured in financial terms – for everyone. 

Unfortunately, unless consumer preferences change naturally, or unless policymakers devise an improved set of policy tools to impact consumer preferences, increasing the pie for everyone would tragically mean increasing GHG emissions per capita. 

Since the bottom half of the population is responsible for only a very small share of carbon emissions, it follows then that in order to be successful, policies must focus on the largest emitters, i.e., wealthier nations and wealthier individuals. Possible solutions include: 

Carbon wealth tax: A carbon wealth tax involves applying a supplemental tax to high earners and spending the proceeds on green energy investments and/or other tools that redistribute in favor of lower carbon emitters.

Policy and Consumer Preferences:  COVID-19 has shown how rapid lifestyle changes can be brought about by governments, through lockdown periods establishing new routines.  While lockdowns are draconian, they highlight that spending patterns can shift meaningfully in the near term when there is a strong government action, or exogenous shock (COVID). Consumer preferences can be shifted by government policies, and this shift is a critical part of addressing the climate crisis. One approach, called Choice Editing, refers to the active process of controlling or limiting the choices available to consumers end goal, specifically by banning or imposing punitive taxation on certain products and services. In the case of forcing habit changes of the super-rich, authorities can restrict carbon-intensive products (like private jets or mega yachts) from coming to the market in the first place, or by taxing specific products so that lower-carbon options are favored.  Tax incentives for modifying consumer behavior are a long established part of the policy took kit.  For example, in the U.S., there are significant tax incentives for individuals to purchase municipals bonds to help finance local and state governments - these incentives largely help the wealthy and encourage them to direct their wealth to public infrastructure projects and financing the activities of municipalities. It would be reasonable to provide both taxes and tax incentives to shift the consumer preferences of the richest to save the planet.

In theory, both of the above approaches are straightforward. But in practice, both can be difficult to implement and in the case of taxation, difficult to assess the impact. Wealthy individuals not only have outsized financial resources but they also tend to have substantial social resources, meaning that their ability to lobby and influence regulatory incomes is high relative to other socioeconomic groups. Therefore, the likelihood that choice editing would occur in a way that would crimp the lifestyles of the rich and famous is lowered. In any case, there are currently few such restrictive measures in place. A lone exception is the UK labour party’s proposal to ban private jets from airports beginning in 2025. Meanwhile, carbon taxes have, historically, had little impact on the consumption of high-income households since demand inelasticity is greatest among this group.

A third approach in curbing carbon emissions by wealthier households is by targeting non-financial factors of decision-making. Much of consumer behaviour is influenced not only by rational choice regarding prices, but also by other factors including routines, normative influences, and heuristics and biases. Nudge theory is a concept in behavioral economics that proposes positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions as ways to influence the behavior and decision-making of groups or individuals. In other words, it attempts to alter people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.

Nudging has been recognised as an effective policy tool to align intention and action in facilitating behavioural change with regard to environmental outcomes, especially in the areas of waste management, energy conservation and sustainable travel. Since high-income individuals are often viewed as role models (influencers) and set the tone to which others aspire, they could play an important positive role in changing consumer behavior at large in favor of “greener lifestyles”.

Generational Shifts: All Hands on Deck

An expected $68 trillion will change hands over the next two decades as part of the “Great Wealth Transfer” from the baby boomer generation (born 1946 - 1964) to millennials (born 1981 - 1996) and Gen Z (born 1997-2012). As the survey data in the Chart below highlights, the latter generations place a stronger importance on environmental issues, suggesting that as this wealth transfer occurs, the likelihood that behavior is more aligned with sustainable consumption will increase.

Moreover, a Deloitte survey shows that millennials and Gen Zs are willing to align their spending with their values: 90% of millennials and Gen Zs are taking action to limit environmental impact and are willing to pay a premium for more sustainable products.

This finding is especially true for the wealthiest of these generations. A 2020 report by Wealth-X exploring global luxury highlights that younger members of the ultra wealthy (defined as those having wealth over $30 M) do not have the same affinity for luxury items as those over 50 years old. They are less likely to own a yacht, private jet, art collection or other asset collection (real estate, cars, watches and jewelry, sports team, etc.) of significant value.

Further impact can be achieved through philanthropic activity. There is approximately US$1.5 trillion dedicated to all philanthropic assets and endowments around the world, but less than 1% was spent on curbing climate change in 2020. Philanthropic spending tends to be centred on health, public safety, community development and education, but since millennials tend to prioritize environmental projects, one can expect that giving to environmental causes will skew favourably in the future.

Finally, millennials are likely to invest in portfolios that are different than their parents and grandparents, by placing greater emphasis on environmental impact relative to financial metrics. This is good news since investments in stocks, bonds, businesses and real estate are disproportionately made by those in the top 1% of income and wealth. Through shifting investments to low-emissions companies and mutual funds, the 1% can push companies to lower GHG emissions and thereby drive structural change. By contrast, investments that favour continuing fossil fuel use will delay emissions reductions.

How favorable is the current sentiment towards green equities in the U.S.? The matter is crucial to ESG investors who, on top of anticipating corporate performance, must pay attention to fast-moving sentiment shifts towards green and ESG investments in general. In this note we build simple and intuitive indicators of green preference using U.S. ETF data. These show a green sentiment “boom” between 2017 and 2020 but have started to abate in December 2021, for the first time in two years. In this context, investors should favor individual, high-conviction stocks that are able to decouple from the broader green sentiment and move their green exposure towards defensive sectors.

Many approaches have been used to assess the shifting interest of investors for “green” companies. Great advances are being made in the realm of textual sentiment analysis, and the finance literature is now sprawling with ESG sentiment indicators extracted from news articles. A recent 2021 research piece from Apel, Betzer, and Sherer measures climate transition risk from 15 major news publications, including both financial and generalist newspapers. The authors manually labelled thousands of pieces of news, identifying specific climate change topics, to train a state-of-the-art natural language processing model based on the BERT framework developed by Google. The resulting Transition Risk Indicator (TRI) is then tested to determine whether it significantly explains the returns of the main green indices (see below) on the market. The test is performed controlling for standard equity characteristics such as exposure to the broad market, size, valuation, profitability, quality, and momentum.

Among the six green indices tested, five had their returns significantly explained by transition risk, at a 95% level of confidence. The chart below shows the statistical significance (t-stat) of this text-based climate indicator to explain green index returns. Half of the indices also saw a marked increase in the explanatory power of the Transition Risk Indicator from 2017 to 2020, suggesting climate transition concerns are here to stay.

However, this type of textual sentiment analysis has limits for investors, especially from a tactical perspective. Text-based indicators ultimately remain an indirect measure of investor preferences. Although they can explain a share of “green returns”, they can often miss important turning points in sentiment. In this context, to guide investors, we decided to build more direct, and simpler, measures of green “preference”. These indicators are based on two key ideas, which were inspired by a Brière and Ramelli 2021 paper:

  1. ETF trading is more influenced by sentiment than mutual funds or individual stocks trading due to a higher share of activity coming from retail investors. On the other hand, professional and institutional investors should give more weight to company fundamentals than sentiment in their trading decisions.
  2. The relative returns of green ETFs can be a proxy for sentiment, since investor demand pushes prices up, but a better approximation of green “preference” can be found in the evolution of the number of shares outstanding of these ETFs. Shares outstanding are net the number of shares of the ETF that have been issued, after daily creations and redemptions. If the prices of equities held by an ETF are stable or falling but investor demand for that ETF rises, shares outstanding will grow but this demand trend will not necessarily appear in returns.

We can therefore compare the evolution in total shares outstanding of a basket of green U.S. equity ETFs to the total shares outstanding of a basket of broader U.S. equity ETFs. This ratio gives us a clear proxy for the retail market’s interest towards green ETFs relative to plain vanilla ETFs.

We can also compare that metric to the relative evolution of total assets (instead of shares outstanding) using the same ETF baskets, to identify whether green stock performance overreacts or underreacts compared to investor green sentiment. These two concepts (total assets and shares outstanding) are the key inputs in determining the Net Asset Value (NAV) of ETFs, from ETF 101 math:

The selection of green ETFs is key to the relevance of our green preference metric. As we have argued many times, there are far more closet index strategies in climate ETFs than ETFs that actually make a difference for the planet – such as those picking companies that contribute to protecting or developing natural ecosystems. To perform this selection, we follow Brière and Ramelli in their choice of green ETFs, which have a clear green focus and are all classified by Morningstar as “sustainable”. This leaves us with the following 20 ETFs:

To avoid survivorship bias, we simply sum the number of shares outstanding across these 20 ETFs since 2015, without adjustments for addition or removal of single ETFs. The launch or liquidation of green ETFs are relevant events to our green preference indicator and should not be neutralized by, for instance, using an average number of shares outstanding per ETF in activity. To build a reference universe we perform the same calculation, adding the number of shares outstanding, but over the 20 largest U.S. equity ETFs[1] as of April 2022. Choosing the largest U.S. equity ETF as of today should result in a conservative green sentiment measure, since we compare the evolution of green ETFs to the most successful U.S. equity ETFs today.

The resulting U.S. Green “preference” indicator is shown below in light blue and has been through several distinct phases. The first one is indifference: between 2015 and mid-2017 the creation of new shares for green ETFs was in line with the broader U.S. equity market. A bumpy acceleration then followed up to mid-2020: the U.S. was catching up on global ESG trends, and green sentiment increased by 50%. Then came 2020: COVID and the Biden presidency generated an unprecedented surge in green interest. The relative evolution of green ETF assets to broader U.S. equity ETFs caught up to the trend suggested by relative share outstanding, and even overshot at the end of the year. In 2021 a new divergence occurs, the performance of our green ESG ETFs start to lag that of broader U.S. equity ETFs (dark blue line below), but the green investor sentiment, proxied by shares outstanding, is more resilient and continues to slowly go up until the end of November 2021. Then comes the breaking point. Our shares outstanding indicator started to fall last December, with a small rebound since early March. A reversal would require a pro-ESG catalyst, such as new incentives to improve energy efficiency amid already-high energy prices.

This shares outstanding indicator focused on the volume of green ETF shares that investors created or redeemed over time, relative to the market. Another equally useful piece of information can be obtained from ETF price action. More precisely, we can look at the difference between the closing price of an ETF, the price at which the ETF was bought and sold on exchanges, and its closing NAV, reflecting the value of its holdings. This measure, the NAV premium (or discount if it is negative), has the advantage or being quantifiable in total dollar terms if we simply multiply it by the number of shares outstanding. We calculated the daily dollar NAV premium of each green ETF in our basket, before summing its total amount across ETFs. We then simply computed the cumulative sum of that total green NAV premium since 2015 to obtain another indicator of green preference among U.S. equity investors. This green NAV premium suggests a faster increase in green ETF interest pre-2020, but its recent evolution is close to the shares outstanding indicator: both peaked in July 2021, have started to fall in December 2021, with only small rises since.

Combining these two indicators and assuming that the green premium favored higher growth companies, conclusions are clear: for the first time in years, green-minded investors in U.S. equities have been facing some sentiment headwind, since December 2021. This headwind was compounded by the recent increased volatility in rates and equities. Measuring sentiment shifts in real time, a task we modestly tried to achieve in this note, is key in timely adapting green portfolios to market conditions. Currently, that means moving to a more defensive stance, favoring green utilities and stocks with valuations that are not stretched. Our two green sentiment indicators are showing no signs of sustained rebound at the time of writing: green investors should keep a defensive bias for the time being.

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[1] The largest US equity ETF by assets have the following tickers: SPY, IVV, VTI, VOO, QQQ, VTV, VUG, IJR, IWF, IJH, VIG, IWM, IWD, XLF, VGT, VB, XLK, VNQ, ITOT, VYM.

Canada issued its first sovereign green bond last week; following many other countries who now look to take advantage of the market’s strong demand for green sovereign paper. The issue, which was two times oversubscribed by the market, was also accompanied by the government’s reviewed climate plan for 2030 along with its green bond framework.

As most countries are now looking to develop sovereign “green curves” – de facto creating some additional infrastructure to make green bonds go mainstream – investors and citizens are still waiting for the kind of policies that will actually reduce GHG emissions in line with a 1.5 degree warming by 2100. When green bonds made their debut in the mid 2010s, the market was trading them at a premium, a feature which has stuck for a while given the buy-and-hold nature of their owners. Now, the market has become more equilibrated and the “greenium” of the early days has all but vanished in most markets.

At SMS, we view the green bond market – or green loan market in the corporate world – as being one which essentially “gives comfort” to investors; providing a narrative that they are investing in green initiatives. However, bond or loan investors essentially finance the treasury of governments and companies, not specific projects. Because of the fungibility of funds, companies or governments can ultimately do what they want with the capital received. In the case of Canadian sovereign green bonds, the government only promises to invest 50% of the proceeds directly into climate-friendly initiatives, with the remainder going to the treasury’ central account for future climate-targeted spending. Yet, at the same time, the Canadian government could well authorize the development of Bay du Nord oil field in Newfoundland (Equinor), which would go directly against many ESG-minded investors’ values; some of whom perhaps already invested in the Canadian green bond.

Moreover, there’s the case of shale oil companies issuing green paper to fund their carbon capture operations; the latter accounting for a tiny fraction of their operations. In that, we find it more impactful to look at a country’s or company’s overall operation and direction of change, including the associated incentives to do so.

To this end, NGOs such as the Climate Action Tracker still suggest that Canada’s overall policy framework – to be updated with last week’s iteration – remains highly insufficient. So there remains some confusion around the efficacy and additionality of green bond investors in promoting adherence to a clear climate policy anchor.

Furthermore, even the financials of sovereign green bonds suggest some level of greenwashing. First, sovereign green bond investors – who invest first and foremost in the country’s treasury for a given amount of default risk – will likely be disappointed by the government’s future performance on its sustainability goals and climate policies. Second, considering the minimal greenium between Canada’s green bond and equivalent 7-Yr issues, one can conclude: if the tracking error between two different securities is the same, then the market considers both issues to be equivalent in terms of risk and return profiles and also bets that they likely have the same ultimate use of funds. In that, green or not green, ESG-minded investors are still investing into Canada’s overall budgetary and policy framework.

The rise of sustainability-linked loans

The tepid relation between sovereign green bonds and impact contrasts somewhat with the potential of sustainability-linked bonds (or loans in the corporate sector); especially those which have embedded options tied to sustainability indicators. Provided that 1) the covenants included in the loans or bonds are environmentally meaningful – i.e., that the policy effort from the government/company will exceed what can realistically be achieved from market or technological forces over the duration of the bond – and that associated KPIs remain anchored on strong policy frameworks (SBTi or Paris 2015) and that 2) the financial penalty or coupon bonus (for governments and investors, respectively) can be sufficiently meaningful to the country’s (company’s) reputation and finances. If both conditions were to be met, then we think that sustainability-linked loans could find their place in an ESG-minded investor’s portfolio.

Here, the case of Chile, which issued a 2042 sustainability-linked international USD bond last month is interesting. This bond promises to pay between 12.5 and 25 bps more to the holder if the Chilean government does not meet its overall emissions’ ceiling (KPI 1) and (KPI 2) share of renewable energy as percent of total energy produced in the next 8 years. Considering the USD 2 billion offering, the “embedded” performance kicker could represent a USD 2.5 to USD 5 million potential liability or bonus for the government or investors, respectively.

With more than 350 issues in 2021 using sustainability-linked covenants (corporate and sovereign), the good news is that the issuance of sustainability-linked loans is poised to increase substantially these coming years.

That said, smarter ESG-minded investors ought to look for those which will include “step-up” or “step-down” clauses tied to sustainability outcomes as in Chile most recent issue shown below. A quick search on Bloomberg suggests that there are about 250 active issues with such step-up clauses – and only one in the sovereign space in the case of Chile. The rest remain in the corporate sector.

While step-up (or step-down) coupon clauses could also apply in the corporate bond world, looking at performance-based incentives of execs and board members of companies probably makes even more sense than loan covenants themselves, especially as these may be hard to value for investors.

Looking at companies included in the S&P 1200 index, one sees that about one quarter of companies now have sustainability targets embedded in executive and board pay packages. That said, the number of firms with such targets has increased by about 25 percent since 2015; certainly not enough to foster systemic change in the corporate world just yet.