Today’s note looks at four leading nature markets – or environmental markets – i.e. markets where the underlying asset or commodity has positive environmental benefits or attributes. We look at recent advances, setbacks, leaders and the implications for the investability of environmental markets.

COPped out

Neither Conference of Parties (COP) meetings of the past few weeks changes where the four environmental markets (water, compliance and voluntary carbon, biodiversity) are heading. Below is a summary of the main developments in each market:

Compliance carbon markets: COP31 closes on November 20 and policymakers have not yet produced a final text. So far, the draft proposes a global effort to lift electricity to 35% of final energy by 2035, which supports demand for grids, storage and electrified end uses, while the fossil-fuel language is still contested and may be dropped. Interestingly, the fossil-fuel roadmap is being built outside the formal process by a voluntary coalition of 57 countries. This in itself tells a lot about the usefulness of the COP process). The case for grids and storage therefore rests on economics and national policy, not on a COP mandate.
Voluntary carbon markets: A coalition of governments has published a playbook to build demand for high-integrity credits. That should support quality credits but not a broad rebound in voluntary prices, because no COP decision sets a price.
Biodiversity: COP17 on Biodiversity closed on October 31 and changed disclosure and process with little if any implication for markets. It produced nearly USD 2bn of new funding – against USD 7.3 trillion of nature-negative flows.
Water : Water has no COP of its own, and its nearest catalyst is the UN Water Conference on December 8 to 10. The link to the climate COPs runs through adaptation finance, where the COP31 draft proposes that the Belém pledge to triple it by 2035 should reach at least USD 120bn, against estimated needs of about USD 305bn a year.

1. Energy Transition: Clean Power Outruns Demand

Clean power covered all of the growth in global electricity demand in 2025. Ember’s Global Electricity Review 2026 reports that solar rose by a record 636 TWh, that wind and solar together met 99% of the increase in demand, and that fossil generation fell 0.2%, the first decline since 2020. Renewables (33.8%) also overtook coal (33.0%) for the first time in the modern power system. Carbon Brief’s summary of the review adds that the global electric vehicle fleet now displaces 1.8 million barrels of oil a day.

Capital continues to move towards energy transition complex – but its mix is changing. The IEA’s World Energy Investment 2026 puts energy investment at USD 3.4 trillion in 2026, with about USD 2 trillion going to grids, power supply and electrification and USD 940bn going to China alone. Renewables investment has flattened after several years of rapid growth, partly because equipment got cheaper, so the growth in spending came from grids, storage and gas. Gas plant orders reached 130 GW in 2025, driven by US data centres. Energy security now ranks alongside cost in many import-dependent economies, which has also revived interest in coal in some of them.

Leadership sits with a handful of countries. China supplied 336 TWh of solar growth, and India cut fossil generation by 3.3% as record additions of solar and wind outran demand. For investors, generation is becoming a commodity, so the margin goes to the owners of the scarce pieces around it, such as interconnection, transformers, storage and dispatchable capacity. Equity markets have drawn a similar line. In the year to November 17, the grid infrastructure ETF (GRID-US) returned 5.1% while the broad clean energy ETF (ICLN-US) lost 9.6%, and both trailed the 12.2% return of the S&P 500.

2. Carbon Markets: Still on the Way Up

Carbon pricing has spread further than most investors assume. The World Bank’s State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026 counts 87 pricing instruments covering 29% of global emissions, with India and Viet Nam the newest to join, and finds that carbon pricing raised more than USD 107bn for public budgets in 2025. The EU adopted its 90% target for 2040 but delayed ETS2 (European Trading Scheme) to 2028, and in July the Commission proposed an Industrial Decarbonisation Bank and a route for permanent removals inside the ETS. California extended Cap-and-Invest to 2045, and CARB’s May update lets the emissions ceiling fall 11% a year this decade.

Compliance prices have firmed up while voluntary prices have slipped. The latest California-Québec joint auction, held on August 19, settled at USD 32.48 (CAD 45.11), up from USD 28.81 in May and USD 4.54 above the USD 27.94 floor. All 49.0 million current-vintage allowances sold for the fifth consecutive time, at a cover ratio of 1.31. Compliance entities took 77.8% of the allowances against 81.3% in May, which points to more participants coming from the financial sector. It was also the first auction since CARB finalised its May update, and California, Washington and Québec signed a linkage agreement in the interval. Carbon ETFs have recovered from spring lows but still trail equities: in the year to November 17, the California allowance ETF (KCCA-US) returned 7.9% and the global carbon ETF (KRBN-US) 3.4%, against 12.2% for the S&P 500.

In the voluntary market, MSCI reports that the average price index slipped to USD 3.5 per tonne in 2025 from USD 4.3, even though credits rated BBB and above rose by more than 20% to USD 6.8. The market for renewable energy credits shrank by a quarter, and the market as a whole has held near USD 1.4bn for four years. Dependence on a single buyer is a further weakness, as Microsoft’s April pause in removal purchases showed.

3. Biodiversity: All Talk, and Some Reporting

A recent UN report suggests that 22 of 23 targets biodiversity targets were missed by national entities, Furthermore, the USD 20bn international finance pledge for 2025 was missed, and 84% of countries missed the subsidy-identification deadline. Still, the agreed TNFD framework now counts 830 adopters, and Ceres notes that more than 680 investors now integrate nature into their processes.

The gap between ambition and allocation of capital is clearest if one looks at financial flows towards nature. UNEP’s State of Finance for Nature 2026 shows USD 7.3 trillion of nature-negative flows in 2023 – i.e. an economic activity or financial flow that contributes to the degradation of nature, rather than its protection or restoration – against USD 220bn for nature-based solutions, of which only USD 23bn was private. That works out to roughly thirty dollars for activities that degrade nature for every dollar that protects it.

4. Water: Infrastructure and Treatment, Not a Price

Water remains stressed in many regions of the world. UNU-INWEH reports that about 70% of major aquifers are declining and that drought costs USD 307bn a year. Investment of about USD 380bn a year compares with a need of more than USD 1 trillion, and UN DESA and Goldman Sachs Asset Management put the public share of that at 85% to 90%. In Canada, the gap is local as well as global. IISD cites a C$270bn municipal infrastructure deficit, which shows that water is constrained as much by governance and municipal capacity as by capital.

Listed water stocks have not consistently beaten global equities over ten years. It’s true that Goldman Sachs Asset Management reports outperformance against the MSCI ACWI IMI over the ten years to mid-2025 on a broad definition of water providers, and sector capex is rising. However, on investable water indices, the lead of the global funds has gone. To November 17, 2026, the S&P Global Water and Nasdaq Global Water funds returned 10.2% and 9.3% a year in US dollars against 12.2% for the MSCI ACWI proxy, having led it until April 2025 and May 2024 respectively, while the two US water funds returned 12.3% and 12.6% a year, slightly ahead of it.

Except for a few occurrences in the U.S. and Australia (mostly water rights in the Ag sector), water remains a non-tradable commodity. For their part, costs associated to delivering water, i.e.  municipal infrastructure, have lagged overall inflation through the 2022 shock but have outpaced it since mid-2024. Over the five years to October 2026, US consumer prices for water, sewer and trash collection rose 27.7% against 22.0% for all items, and EU water supply prices rose 31.9% against 26.0%. That supports the revenue case for regulated utilities, although bills that outrun household inflation also raise the risk of affordability caps. Overall, it seems that anything related to water theme has been gaining in value these past few years.

Most professionals in the energy sector, whether in renewables or conventional sources, know Jevons paradox: when efficiency lowers the cost of using a resource, total consumption tends to rise rather than fall. The pattern is visible today in two places. Cheaper solar and wind have added to global supply without displacing existing sources, and AI and data centers have pushed electricity demand growth to its fastest pace in decades, even as the efficiency of computing improves. But a second paradox sits alongside it: at a time when the politics of climate policy have rarely been more contested, the practical ingredients for meaningful progress are finally almost uniformly available, because the cost, technology and security arguments now point the same way in most countries.

It is easy to be a skeptic. Global energy use since the early 1900s shows new sources layered on top of old ones, with none yet displaced (Chart 1). For all the talk of a transition, the aggregate data show little evidence of one.

Indeed, looking at total global energy use from primary sources (i.e. before turned into electricity), fossil fuels and traditional biomass that are high in carbon emissions still account for about 87% of our energy use (see the chart below). There is no universally accepted threshold of a low-carbon transition, but leveraging the climate scenarios of organizations like the IEA, a net-zero-aligned transition generally means fossil fuels fall to about 20% to 25% of primary energy, while non-fossil sources (renewables, nuclear, hydro) provide roughly 75 to 80%. If we extrapolate the current pace of transition, it will take at least another 100 years to get anywhere close to a low-carbon energy system!

But it’s unlikely that the energy transition will follow the trajectory of the past because many of the pre-conditions that took decades to arrive are now in place.

In today’s note, we give four reasons why the ability to remove carbon from our energy supply has never been higher.

 

Reason #1: The Economics of Solar and Wind Are Winning

In the spring of 2025 (A Transition Tipping Point, May 29, 2025), we argued that many renewable technologies are entering the exciting phase of the S-curve, i.e. when growth in usage becomes exponential. The uptake of new technologies usually occurs when the cost is sufficiently competitive to make switching from the incumbent economically enticing.

This is now becoming the case for renewables: The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) found that more than 90% of utility-scale renewable capacity commissioned in 2025 delivered power at a lower cost than the cheapest new fossil fuel alternative in its market when measured by the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), i.e. the average cost of producing a megawatt hour (MWh) over a plant’s life, before the cost of integrating it into the grid.

The gap appears widest where capital is cheap and fuel is imported. For example, onshore wind in China averaged US$27/MWh, against gas-fired LCOE of US$50 to 60/MWh where gas is cheap. To be sure, this is the current extreme example of renewable costs that are favorable relative to fossil fuels; in a recent analysis, Thunder Said Energy shows that LCOE by region varies remarkably. In the U.S., gas and coal remain competitive with solar and wind, whereas in Europe, China and Australia, renewables are already the clear winner. The key takeaway is that in most parts of the world, economics now favor the technology that backs an aggressive energy transition.

 

Reason #2: Energy security aligns with renewables

For most of the world, energy security favors renewables because the vulnerability they replace is a recurring one: a fossil fuel-importing country must buy, ship and receive fuel every year, so its supply, price and routes are exposed continuously. In contrast, a solar farm, wind turbine or geothermal plant becomes a long-life domestic asset once it is built and is far less dependent on global trading systems. Since 2022, the need for domestic energy security has been proven: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s limits on critical materials in response to U.S. tariffs, and U.S. involvement in Venezuela have forced most nations to reconsider their reliance on foreign energy.

This year’s conflict in the Middle East reinforced the point and China is the clearest test of the argument so far. The country imports about 70% of its oil, roughly half of it from the Gulf, yet it has been the least disrupted of the large importers during the Strait of Hormuz crisis. After the strait closed in March, China’s crude imports fell by about a third. About 60% of the unreplaced shortfall was met from storage, but the remainder was absorbed by a real fall in the oil burned. That fall was manageable because of electrification, one of several buffers: electric vehicles accounted for more than 60% of domestic monthly vehicle sales in the first half of 2026, and China added more wind capacity in that period than in any full calendar year before 2025. The crisis has also raised demand for Chinese equipment, with solar exports reaching a new records in March 2026.

Countries will try to increase energy security according to the resources they hold; China is relatively poor in fossil fuels and rich in renewable energy inputs, so it’s easy to understand the ramp up in renewables in this context. The U.S. has relatively abundant domestic fossil resources, so there is far less urgency from a security perspective to transition to renewables. As we wrote earlier this year (please see Macro Meets Sustainability: Outlook for Q2 and Beyond, March 26, 2026), other countries less endowed will necessarily pursue diversification both among energy trading partners and energy sources; this will favor renewables relative to the status quo.

 

Reason #3: Storage Is Closing the Intermittency Gap

Falling battery costs have turned solar’s main physical weakness – that it produces only when the sun shines – into an economic problem that can be priced and solved. BloombergNEF reported that lithium-ion battery prices fell to a record US$108 per kilowatt hour (kWh) in 2025, 93% below 2010 levels, and that stationary storage (batteries installed at fixed sites such as solar farms and substations to store electricity for later use on the grid) fell 45% in a single year. The drop reflects intense competition in China, where annual stationary cell production capacity is roughly double global demand. In other words, there is a strong likelihood that China can flood the market with cheap batteries that will make the intermittency problem a thing of the past.

In fact, the effect is already visible on grids: Ember estimates that solar plus batteries met more than a quarter of California’s evening peak demand on the average day in the first half of 2026, up from 6.8% in 2023, while Texas batteries supplied a record 20% of evening demand in March.

The investment conclusion is that storage turns the intermittency problem from a question of physics into a question of cost. The cost is falling quickly, making renewables + battery storage competitive with gas in a growing number of markets.

 

 

Reason #4: Policy Can Solve The Remaining Hurdle

Policy still shapes the pace of the energy transition, but the problem policy needs to solve is no longer the prohibitive costs of renewables, but rather the administrative process. The IEA reports that more than 2,500 GW of renewable, large-load and storage projects are stalled in grid connection queues worldwide, that grid investment lags far behind generation, and that congestion-related curtailment is already rising. As we previously argued (Power Hungry: The Real Cost of a Digital Future, October 23, 2025), large power projects can take five to ten years to permit and build, against about two years for a data center. Europe is on a similar path, with the European Commission identifying slow permitting as a binding constraint and aiming to adopt the European Grids Package by the end of the year.

 

If any investor has the scale and resources to build adaptation exposure deliberately, it is Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM). The fund manages about NOK 22,700bn, holds 7,077 companies in 54 countries and owns an average of 1.2% of each. Its returns therefore rise and fall with the global economy and climate rather than with any single company. Like many peers, NBIM has raised climate issues with companies since 2006, and its mandate has treated climate change as an investment risk since 2022. It is also a useful case study because it publishes its holdings, allowing us to measure what it owns rather than estimate its exposure. NBIM’s 2030 Climate Action Plan shows how a leading owner approaches adaptation. One priority is a stronger focus on nature, physical climate risk, adaptation and resilience. The fund stress-tests its equity portfolio against extreme climate scenarios and conducts physical-risk analysis of real assets. It has also added government bonds to its analysis and created a climate focus list that includes physically vulnerable companies while bringing adaptation more explicitly into engagement meetings. Even so, many of these actions remain geared toward climate risk management and mitigation, with limited detail on capital allocated directly to adaptation. Many institutional climate strategies have the same limitation because they were built around decarbonisation targets and stewardship rather than adaptation.

In past notes, ‘Climate Change and Strategic Asset Allocation‘ (August 24, 2022), we argued that climate belongs in long-term capital market assumptions, with inflation, especially food inflation, the main channel and a case for more inflation-protected and natural-resource assets. Moreover, our ‘Weatherproofing Portfolios: Resilience as the New Alpha‘ (September 11, 2025) and ‘Adaptation Investing: Survival of the Funded‘ (May 7, 2026) notes showed private adaptation finance at only about 0.5% of climate finance, kept low because adaptation pays in avoided losses, not cash flows. Today’s note looks at how to take climate adaptation into SAA a step further.

How we measure exposure: the SMS Climate Adaptation Index

To measure exposure to climate adaptation, we use the SMS Climate Adaptation Index, a rules-based thematic index built in four steps. We first define five drivers that frame the theme: water and flood resilience, urban and built environment resilience, grid and energy resilience, agriculture adaptation, and climate risk intelligence and insurance. We then screen a developed-market all-cap universe for companies whose reported revenues align with products and services tied to those drivers, using revenue data classified into granular business activities rather than broad sector codes. Our research team adds a bottom-up review where disclosure is thin, and the final portfolio applies controversy and other responsible-investment screens, then weights companies by free-float market cap with a 5% cap per name. The index holds 72 companies, 71 of which are priced: 15 in water and flood, 18 in urban and built environment, 14 in grid and energy, 12 in agriculture and 13 in climate risk intelligence and insurance. The index measures what a company sells, not how it describes itself, which gives peers a transparent yardstick.

NBIM’s 1.3% of NAV is low only against a deliberate allocation, not against the market. For its part, the SMS index covers about 1.6% of the free-float value of the MSCI ACWI IMI, and NBIM holds it at 1.8% of its equities, at or slightly above market weight and more than twice its unlisted renewable infrastructure (0.5% of NAV). The gap is therefore one of intent: a benchmark-hugging fund owns the theme in proportion to its small market size, so only an explicit mandate can raise it. Looking at recent performance, the SMS Climate Adaptation Index has tracked the MSCI World (URTH) closely in recent months.

Against the SMS index, NBIM holds 62 of the 71 priced names, worth about NOK 290bn, or 1.3% of the fund, so the companies are in the portfolio and the exposure is incidental. Market-cap weights put about 40% of that exposure into four industrial giants and 46% into grid and energy, against 31% in the SMS index, while water and flood account for 4% against 10%. A peer with a global market-cap equity book should expect a similar tilt.

What peers stand to gain: a better-diversified equity book, not a storm shelter

Measured against a replica of NBIM’s equity mix, the SMS index adds breadth, inflation sensitivity and a small-cap tilt, while giving up low volatility and commodity exposure (see figure below). Those loadings come mostly from the companies rather than the weighting. For a pension plan with inflation-linked liabilities, allocating to an index such as the SMS Climate Adaptation Index could broaden and diversify the fund’s equity exposure. In 2022, when equities and bonds fell together, the index lost far less than global equities, although that year sits within a hindsight-biased sample.

The table shows what a move toward higher targets would have produced over ten years. The result hinges on how much of the index’s excess return persists, and the record is a flattering, hindsight-biased sample led by Quanta Services (PWR-US), which gained more than 2,000%. At 5% of assets, the added return ranges from 0.16 pp a year if none of the SMS Climate Adaptation Index’s excess return persists in the future to 0.27 pp at full persistence, or roughly USD 160m to 270m a year per USD 100bn before costs. The benefit shrinks toward zero if the excess return vanishes.

The climate adaptation index will not shelter a portfolio from a potential financial storm. Its downside beta is above 1, and it has no significant loading on agriculture, duration or commodities, the channels used in NBIM’s extreme-weather scenario. A larger allocation would therefore lose slightly more than equities in that shock. What it offers is diversification and a modest return improvement, paid for in tracking error, which for a fund on a tight risk budget is the binding constraint.

 

 

 

Sustainable Market Strategies has a long-standing, high-conviction structural view that climate-linked supply disruptions in key agricultural inputs are a structural, not transitory, phenomenon and that food inflation will chronically outpace other inflation categories. Indeed, we view the effects of climate change – including eroding soil fertility, water constraints, pest outbreaks and volatile weather patterns – as the main drivers of a sustained increase in food costs globally.

However, in recent months, risks around the cost of food have been focused on the impacts of politics and geopolitics. For instance, much has been made about fertilizer supply constraints due to the shutting of the Strait of Hormuz as well as global diesel shortages that make food transport far more costly.  In today’s Note, we answer top questions about what truly matters for the outlook for global food supply and related investments.

Question 1: What Is the Impact of the Iran War on Food Prices?

 The closing of the Strait of Hormuz has created supply chain agony for many of the world’s largest industries, not least of which is diesel. Diesel prices surged due to constrained refining capacity in the middle East, and the food sector is highly exposed: in the U.S., transportation costs in the food supply chain accounts for 9 % of retail food cost (over 70 % of food relies on trucks to transport from farms, wholesalers, retailers, and eventually to consumers).  Historically, a 10% rise in diesel price has been associated with about a 0.15% rise in U.S. food prices six to twelve months out, but diesel is up more than 100% this year, which points to a further 0.5 percentage point still to come.

Along with diesel disruptions, the Iran War has also affected fertilizer supply. Farmers rely on three primary nutrients: nitrogen (in the form of urea and ammonia), phosphorus (phosphate) and potassium (potash).

In 2023, imports from the Gulf accounted for about 17% of U.S. phosphate supply and 12% of urea supply. Fertilizer shipments through the strait are currently near zero. The table below shows that prices for phosphate still reflect this, while urea has returned to January levels.

Sulphur, a secondary macronutrient along with calcium and magnesium, has become a fourth point of concern this year. Gulf producers supply roughly half of seaborne sulphur, global elemental sulphur exports fell by about a third in the first half of 2026, and sulphur is the feedstock for the sulphuric acid used to make phosphate.

Fertilizer accounts for between 15% and 35% of total farm expenses and a spike in these input costs can significantly harm profitability. However, fertilizer is a relatively minor expense by the time our food gets to the grocery store. The U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Dollar Report measures costs of food by attributing the shares of value to different sources the food supply chain. The table below shows where one dollar of spending on food “goes”, whether it be at grocery stores or restaurants. Fertilizers are listed as part of “agribusiness” which accounts for only 3 cents of every dollar we spend at the grocery store. 

Fertilizers are listed as part of “agribusiness” which accounts for only 3 cents of every dollar we spend at the grocery store.  

Note that other fertilizer prices have been stable over the past year. About 25% of all fertilizer used is potash, virtually all of it imported from Canada. Canadian potash is exempted from tariffs and despite Trump’s desire to import more from Belarus, geopolitics are unlikely to change the pricing markedly in the near future. Overall, rising fertilizer and diesel prices do exert upward pressure on food bills, but most of the pain is felt far earlier in the supply chain.

 

Question 2: What Do Rising Fertilizer and Fuel Costs Mean for Sustainability?

When input prices rise, the normal economic reaction is to explore efficiency gains or substitutions. Witness the rise in heat pump sales (energy efficiency) and solar panel installation (substitutes) as a reaction to the 2022 fossil fuel price spike during the first year of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which have led to permanent reductions in fossil fuel dependence.

We are pessimistic that current price dynamics will lead to improved sustainability outcomes in agriculture. Although there are reports that farmers have reduced fertilizer use in 2026 as a reaction to costs, it is most likely short-term rationing rather than a structural change. For example, cutting phosphate and potash creates a two-to-three-year gap before yield losses appear; this is soil mining, not a durable reduction in dependence.

Moreover, after the last surge in fertilizer prices in 2022, there was no meaningful move away from fertilizer and move toward precision tools or regenerative farming. Unlike for solar panels and heat pumps, where the payback period of investing in new energy systems is dropping thanks to improved technology and green energy subsidies, alternatives to heavy fertilizer use have been slow to develop. Indeed, payback periods for investment in precision tools and regenerative farming are far longer than the short-term loss in crop yields from temporary fertilizer reductions. Even worse, current incentives favor dirty farming techniques: as we wrote in our 2022 note (Biodiversity: Valuing the Invaluable, March 31, 2022), 90% of global subsidies given to farmers every year are considered harmful to the environment, including subsidies for fertilizers and pesticides. In other words, agricultural policy is blunting the price signal from the spike in fertilizer prices.

Question 4: If Fertilizer and Fuel Don’t Matter for My Grocery Bill, What Does?

 In the table below, we use the CPI Food categories published by the BLS to highlight those foods with the greatest price rises over the past five years. Readers can see in the final column that climate change and weather – and to a lesser extent tariffs – are driving food price increases.

When climate change affects a specific crop for one or two seasons, it is relatively easy for consumers to find substitutes. However, the list above demonstrates that the impact of extreme weather and climate change is becoming broad and sustained.

How To Invest for Rising Food Prices?

Our approach is to avoid the headline trade and own the businesses that benefit from scarcity of climate-resilient supply, while staying underweight packaged food companies whose margins are squeezed from both sides. The obvious response to a food inflation story is to buy staples with pricing power or to buy fertilizer producers on the Strait of Hormuz disruption. We would not do either, for the reasons set out above: fertilizer and diesel are cyclical and reversible, whereas weather-driven costs and shortages are not, and consumers may have run out of tolerance for further price increases.

Stay underweight margin-exposed branded food. Input costs for cocoa, coffee, sugar and packaging are rising while volumes face structural pressure. As we argued in our June 18 note, “Big Food Goes on a Diet,” food prices will rise while branded manufacturers’ margins fall. We maintain our short views on Mondelez International (MDLZ-US), Hershey (HSY-US) and Pepsi Co (PEP-US), all of which are exposed to crops with supply constraints (cocoa and sugar). A 2026 rally in raw sugar prices has not yet reached U.S. shelves, because U.S. quotas and tariffs insulate the domestic market, but it is a 2027 cost risk.

From an asset allocation perspective, there is a strong likelihood that rising food costs related to climate change will add to structurally higher generalized inflation. Our conclusions from our strategic allocation work in 2023 (Climate Change and Strategic Allocation, August 24, 2023), still hold: investors should consider greater allocation to natural resource assets.

A core principle of economics is that scarcity drives price. But several environmental assets are currently running counter to this principle. As we wrote in Environmental Assets in Short Supply (October 9, 2025), “many environmental assets have not re-priced in times of scarcity or are simply not priced at all.” We have tracked environmental scarcity across seven distinct resources since 2018:

 

Three Investment Strategy Pillars

For each of the resources described above, our research has implicitly relied on the same three pillars to find investable equity opportunities within environmental assets in short supply.

 

We mapped our equity coverage against this framework of beneficiary, solver and protector. The table below highlights sample companies with high revenue alignment to each of the scarce environmental assets and pillars.

The result is a diversified universe, albeit one that is weighted toward Beneficiaries. This is not a surprise: investors can easily buy a phosphate miner or a timber REIT when they expect the price of the underlying commodity to increase. However, it is more difficult to buy exposure to wetland restoration, aquifer recharge, or pollinator habitat protection, since financial vehicles to do so are not prevalent. Indeed, the Protector role has the lightest coverage of our three pillars: where restoration and conservation activity exists, it is overwhelmingly private, philanthropic or embedded as a minor revenue line inside diversified conglomerates (certification bodies, testing labs, satellite monitoring firms) rather than expressed through dedicated public companies.

Why This Matters Now

We believe that two developments in the past eighteen months – the buildout of AI infrastructure and the increase in global trade barriers – have made it more relevant for investors to consider the supply-side of physical inputs within equity portfolio construction.

Regarding artificial intelligence, AI data center buildout is simultaneously accelerating demand for water (cooling load), copper (grid and data center wiring) and critical material (rare earths used in photonic chips for AI data centers and 6G networks). The AI buildout comes on top of what were already separate scarcity stories with independent underlying drivers. Take water. Agriculture usage and more frequent droughts had already been pushing pressure on utilities and industrial companies to improve water efficiency as articulated clearly by executives at Schneider Electric. Water cooling demands from AI act to accentuate these forces and it’s happening across other environmental inputs like rare earths, copper, etc.

Meanwhile, supply side constraints are also occurring due to geopolitics. A less friendly global trade backdrop means that both raw inputs and finished goods flow less freely at a time when greater raw materials are needed to build domestic capacity (reshore). China’s April 2025 rare earth export restrictions provided a glimpse of the potential for supply chain disruption in strategic sectors like defense and technological infrastructure.

Our climate trajectory is now less about what happens if we fail to act and more about how severe are the consequences of the warming already set in motion. Floods, droughts, wildfires, and extreme storms have become present and worsening conditions under which economies, infrastructure, and communities must now operate.

The disconnect between this physical reality and the structure of global capital allocation remains striking: we have noted several times that climate finance has remained overwhelmingly oriented toward mitigation – reducing the emissions that drive further warming – while adaptation, the work of hardening systems against the disruption already underway, continues to attract a fraction of what the scale of the problem demands.

Why is it so difficult to attract capital to climate adaptation solutions? Mainly because it collides with one of the oldest problems in economics: the public goods problem. The benefits of resilient infrastructure – a coastal flood barrier, a drought-resistant water system, an upgraded stormwater network – are largely non-excludable: once built, they protect everyone in the area regardless of whether they contributed to the cost. Private capital cannot capture all of that diffuse value because not all of the beneficiaries will have clean contractual relationships with the investor that built the asset. This is not a market failure that better pricing will fix; it is a structural feature of the asset class that requires public capital to bridge.

A second problem is that climate adaptation investments generate value as avoided costs rather than as positive cash flows. A seawall that prevents hundreds of millions in annual flood damages is enormously valuable but not necessarily as a revenue line for the infrastructure owner. Contrast this with mitigation: a solar farm sells electricity under a long-term power purchase agreement; a carbon capture project generates credits that can be sold on carbon markets. Both produce a monetisable cash flow stream that private capital can underwrite. Adaptation tends to produce the absence of losses that would otherwise have occurred, which is more difficult to price, attribute, and securitise.

 

Adaption and National Security: Two Sides of the Same Coin

The notion that climate adaptation infrastructure is a public good has strong overlap with national defense. Consider what national security requires: a standing army, a naval fleet, an intelligence apparatus, a cyber defense infrastructure. None of these generate a commercial return and none have a paying customer, and yet no serious observer argues that national defense should therefore go unfunded.

This logic has become more acute in an era of accelerating deglobalization. As we documented in previous notes (for example, please see Shift Happens: From Globalization to Reshoring, August 14 2024), the post-Cold War assumption that global interdependence would provide security through mutual economic dependency is being challenged. As we discussed in A Matter of National Security, November 2, 2022, the war in Ukraine revealed how in Europe, governments that had outsourced their energy security to global markets found themselves exposed in ways that no amount of financial hedging could address. Since then, the national security prerogative has intensified for an ever-expanding list of countries; perhaps most notable is the attention accorded to Mark Carney’s “middle power” speech at Davos earlier this year.

The same lesson now applies to climate resilience; a nation whose water supply is degraded by prolonged drought, whose food production is disrupted by extreme heat, whose coastal infrastructure is periodically overwhelmed by storm surge, or whose power grid fails under unprecedented thermal load is suffering more than just an economic inconvenience, it weakens a nation’s ability to defend itself and to act autonomously.

This is not a new concept: in 2007, the term “threat multiplier” was coined by the U.S. Department of Defense and in 2014, climate change was formally designated as a threat multiplier. The most recent DoD climate adaptation plan covers the 2024 -2027 period (although the current administration dismisses global warming). The Pentagon historically funded these plans because the operational exposure is real and quantifiable. In other words, climate adaptation can now be seen as functionally inseparable from national security – therefore the intellectual case for public capital in adaptation is already settled.

Capital Needs a Counterparty

If climate adaptation – or national security – needs are public goods then it’s no wonder public capital should be involved, just like all previous public goods challenges that have been tackled at scale. The interstate highway system, municipal water and sewage networks, electrical grid buildout, are almost never financed purely by private markets; the return structure of public goods investments requires a counterparty willing to absorb diffuse social benefits.

Earlier this month, we addressed the public-private-partnership (PPP) model Outsourcing the Sovereign: The PPP Bailout, April 23 2026). We argued that PPPs were becoming increasingly necessary because governments around the world simply do not have the fiscal fortitude to undertake major works projects without private participation. The global infrastructure funding gap – the difference between what is being spent and what is needed – is projected to reach $15 trillion by 2040 and simply cannot be closed by the public sector alone.

In the case of climate adaptation infrastructure, the PPP model is especially symbiotic: governments may lack the funds to build the required infrastructure, but the private sector lacks the revenue structure to make the investment viable.

An example where this works well is in Australia. The AquaSure consortium built and operates Victoria’s desalination plant under a formal PPP structure. The plant was designed as a drought-proof water supply for Melbourne and Geelong – a rainfall-independent source that complements reservoir storage during dry periods. Melbourne Water, a government entity, pays AquaSure a fixed fee of A$608 million per year for 27 years regardless of how much water is actually ordered – the government pays for the availability of drought-proof water, not for the water itself. The private sector financed construction, bears operational risk, and maintains the asset; the public sector bears the water demand risk and pays for the public good of water security. The model has been criticized during wet years when the plant sits idle and payments continue but this misses the point; the payment is the insurance premium for drought resilience, not a payment for water delivered.

A second model is to have a dedicated public investment vehicle. The most tempting shortcut for governments facing large public goods funding gaps is to eye the pools of long-term capital already sitting in national pension systems and attempt to redirect it toward national priorities, whether it be climate adaptation, defense, or something else. Several governments have acted on this instinct:

Governments are increasingly building separate, dedicated vehicles with explicitly different mandates, and to invite pension capital into those vehicles as a willing commercial co-investor rather than a conscripted one. For example:

In each case, pension funds participate as co-investors on commercial terms, attracted by the de-risked deal structures that public anchor capital makes possible.

A new manifesto came out of Silicon Valley last week from Palantir’s founder Alex Karp. It suggests that Tech executives ought to embrace patriotism to preserve the values of the Republic. For many observers, this contrasts with Big Tech’s original mantra of pluralism and openness. This is especially true if one considers that most of Big Tech companies such as Meta, Google and Tesla have now mostly reverted towards more cooperation with the Trump administration.  

The growing cooperation between Tech and State is getting especially visible on issues pertaining to data privacy – whereby Silicon Valley firms such as Palantir are directly scraping your visual ID – or firms like Meta, Google and Tesla – that indirectly scrape your data – even if it to use it against you at the government’s request. Against this backdrop, it’s no surprise to see that trust vis-à-vis governments and Big Tech firms’ is waning.

A sign of the times is that Google searches for “Data Privacy” (how ironic!) in the U.S, are at a five-year high. We expect this interest to endure as AI continues to scrape the world.

Despite this growing interest in data privacy, users are typically ignoring the fine print regarding what Big Tech and Governments are doing with their data. As early as 2023, a Pew Research survey suggested that as much as six out of ten Americans skip reading privacy policies when signing up to apps. This means that they basically agree to give away whatever data on them that Big Tech firms are looking for. This is somewhat surprising given that about eight-in-ten of those familiar with AI also say that its use by companies will lead to people’s personal information being used in ways they won’t be comfortable with or that weren’t originally intended. Data privacy issues have resurfaced in the past few months during anti-ICE demonstrations across the U.S.: Homeland Security department was using data found on Facebook and Instagram to track, arrest and deport immigrants and arrest protesters.

This prompts a sharper look at the data privacy policies of Big Tech. We examined the policies of major technology firms regarding the sale of personal data, third-party sharing, disclosure to governments, AI training, and consent – only to realize that Big Tech not only owns your data but could also decide to use it against you if requested.

Big Tech & Data Privacy – Pick Your Poison, Choose Your Pain

It is interesting to compare the U.S.’ Big Tech regulation about data privacy to that of their Chinese and EU counterparts. While the EU is the most protective of personal data, there remains a lot of concern for Chinese companies’ proximity to Beijing. According to Beijing’s Cybersecurity Law, every Chinese company – including companies such as BYD and Huawei – are legally obligated to cooperate with state intelligence services. There is no judicial warrant process, no legal mechanism through which either company could refuse a government data request, and no external party can audit compliance or detect covert cooperation. Furthermore, communist party cells are also embedded inside major Chinese companies, providing informal intelligence conduits beyond the formal legal framework. This means the question is not whether Chinese companies would hand over your data, but whether the technical architecture enables them to do so – and the answer is yes on both counts.

Ineffective Investor Pressure: Is Tech Still Investable?

The lack of government oversight over data privacy – and now over the development of AI – forces investors to take a harder look at their Big Tech holdings data privacy policies. That said, given that Big Tech is such a massive chunk of the market – Mag-7 companies still represent about one-third of the market cap in the U.S. equity market – it remains difficult to divest out of these stocks solely based on their data malpractices.

It’s even harder to divest when the Tech sector outperforms the market like it has been doing these past few years. Furthermore, many of these companies have had tailwinds since Trump’s re-election, especially Palantir (which supplies surveillance software to the government) and Google (which knows everything about everyone) – a precious asset in an increasingly repressive world.

Five years of investor engagement with Palantir, Meta, and Google has produced letters, risk briefings, shareholder proposals, one landmark divestment, and a $190 million legal settlement – and virtually zero durable change in corporate behaviour across any of the three firms. The failure operates on three distinct but mutually reinforcing elements.

The first is structural governance. Palantir’s Class F share architecture grants its founders effective veto power over any shareholder resolution; Meta’s dual-class structure allows Mark Zuckerberg to override supermajorities of independent shareholders – including the 62% who voted for the 2022 surveillance advertising proposal – with his personal voting bloc; Alphabet is similarly insulated. These are not governance oversights; they are deliberate and permanent shields, and activist investors have known this for years.

The second element is the absence of a financial transmission mechanism. At Meta and Google, the theory of engagement is that reputational damage translates into advertiser flight, which translates into revenue pressure, which translates into behavioural change. That chain has never closed at scale: both companies continued to grow revenues through every major data privacy controversy, every EU General Data Protection Regulation fine, and every congressional hearing, because their advertising monopolies absorb the cost of controversy without altering the underlying surveillance business model.

The third and most structurally important failure Is that major institutions appear to be throwing in the towel. For example, Norges Bank suspended its own ethics council earlier this year under geopolitical pressure and actually increased its Palantir position despite obvious governance flaws and data privacy issues while simultaneously backing a human rights proposal at Microsoft. We think this highlights reactive positioning and signals that the responsible investment ecosystem lacks the tools and cohesion to hold surveillance-era technology firms to any consistent standard. Taken in this context, Dutch Pension fund ABP’s €825M Palantir divestment and CalSTRS’s $190M Meta settlement appear as rounding errors against the combined market capitalisation and government revenue streams of these firms.

The U.S.-Israel war with Iran has already exacted a massive humanitarian and environmental toll. One can only hope for a swift end to the madness but even if that should occur, the impact on energy markets will be permanent and akin to the aftermath from Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Sustainability investors rarely have direct portfolio exposure to fossil fuels but are always indirectly affected by them. Today’s Macro Meets Sustainability Update addresses key questions on oil markets and what it means for energy transition investments.

1. Fossil Fuels and The Cost of Capital

One of the major differences between fossil fuel and transition energy investments (solar, wind, among others) investments is their sensitivity to the cost of capital: renewable energy projects require large upfront capital and generate stable cash flows over decades, making their economics highly sensitive to interest rates. In contrast, fossil fuel projects have a larger share of costs tied to ongoing fuel expenses and generate more near-term, commodity-driven cash flows, so their value depends less on financing conditions. As a result, changes in the cost of capital have a much bigger impact on renewables than on oil and gas investments.

Why this matters during an oil spike is that depending on central banks’ reaction function, renewable energy prospects will improve or deteriorate.

Historically, central banks view short oil price spikes as a tax on growth, while prolonged rises in oil prices are expected to be inflationary. This means that policy rates, on the margin, go down to “accommodate” the oil price spike when it is a short-term supply shock and go up to dampen in the inflationary effect when prices are expected to be longer lasting.

Recall that during the COVID-19 pandemic, many central bankers initially described the surge in inflation as “transitory”, expecting it to be temporary due to pandemic-related supply chain disruptions. However, many regretted the forecast as inflation persisted – and jumped again- during the early months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Today the Governor of the Bank of Canada described the potential for inflation related to the oil price as transitory, a word we wonder if central bankers will again express regret for choosing. It is unclear how long the current oil price surge will last, but pundits are betting toward a long supply crunch. Earlier this week, the head of the International Energy Agency noted that at least forty energy assets across nine countries in the Middle East have been “severely or very severely” damaged since the Iran war began. In Qatar, the damaged liquefied natural gas processing facilities – considered the world’s largest supplier of seaborne gas cargo – is estimated to take three to five years to repair.

At last week’s meeting the U.S. Fed began backtracking on interest rate cuts; rates were left unchanged at the meeting, as was widely expected, and expectations for future rate cuts have been curtailed. Notably, the FOMC members slightly upgraded U.S. economic growth prospects, albeit not by as much as the upward rating to inflation (expected to stay well above the Fed’s 2% target until 2028).

The reaction in renewable energy stocks’ performance to the news was hardly distinguishable from the broader market; both the Clean Energy ETF (ICLN-US) and S&P 500 both sold off on Powell’s speech that outlined a likely delay in rate accommodation. We chalk this up to low confidence; the rate outlook has been messy for some time and recall that last September, we described how the FOMC members are deviating from the conventional central bank’s playbook by cutting rates and simultaneously upgrading the economic outlook and increasing its expectations for inflation to well over 2%.

Our long-held view (for example, please see August 23, 2023 SAA and Climate Change) is that the global economy is ripe for higher structural inflation and most economies are at or near full-employment; it wouldn’t take much for cyclical inflation pressures to be renewed. In this sense, we believe the risks are tilted to higher inflation – interest rates will, on the margin, be a headwind for renewable energy stocks.

2. Renewables and the Energy Security Tailwind

A somewhat more difficult factor to quantify, albeit equally significant for renewables investments, is whether geopolitics today is destroying demand for fossil fuels longer term and favoring a more aggressive switch to renewables.

Until 2022, the concept of energy security was primarily discussed as a priority for emerging economies. But the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China’s limiting of critical materials in response to Trump tariffs, and the U.S.’ hostile involvement in Venezuela have forced most nations to recalculate their appetite for reliance on foreign energy. Solar, wind, geothermal and even nuclear share an advantage over fossil fuels; once the infrastructure is built, it becomes a long-life domestic asset that is far less dependent on global trading systems.

In the most recent World Energy Outlook (2025), the EIA addressed the uptick in energy security as a priority across nations, but concluded that countries are reaching for very different levers to achieve it: many fuel-importing nations are leaning toward renewables and efficiency as solutions, while other countries are simply focusing more on ensuring ample supplies of traditional fuels.

The IEA notes that tracking the diversification of manufacturing capacity of five key clean energy technologies – batteries, heat pumps, electrolysers, solar PV, wind power and EVs – is an important indicator of energy security. Note in the chart below, we show that the installed manufacturing capacity of these technologies is highly geographically concentrated, notably in China. In 2024, China accounted for over 80% of installed manufacturing capacity in every part of the solar PV value chain, and the majority of global manufacturing capacity for wind power components as well. The position of China in battery manufacturing is even stronger, accounting for at least 85% of global production in all parts of the value chain, and over 95% in the case of battery anodes. Manufacturing capacity is more diversified in the case of heat pumps and electrolysers for hydrogen production.

China stands out not least of all because the country dominates supply of the key materials needed for manufacturing of clean energy technology. In this context, it is logical to expect a doubling down in clean energy efforts from China (a country relatively poor in fossil fuel resources but relatively rich in renewable energy inputs). Conversely, now that climate change objectives are no longer relevant in the U.S., the path of least resistance may be to pursue energy security by further levering domestic fossil fuel resources in that country.

We view China and the U.S. as pursuing two opposite paths to energy independence based on their energy resources (fossil fuel vs renewables). Other countries less endowed will necessarily take some middle road, i.e. diversification both among energy trading partners and energy sources. A case in point is India’s pivot to nuclear energy: last year, the government set a goal to develop 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 from approximately 9 GW today and has allocated $2.3 billion for research and development. Earlier this month, the government signed a signed a $2.6 billion deal with Cameco to ensure sufficient uranium supply for the next nine years.

Overall, renewed pressure to improve domestic energy security means a greater pivot to renewables for some nations and will benefit suppliers of renewable energy equipment, though this is unlikely to be a uniform strategy and significantly depends on domestic energy assets available.

2025 proved to be a pivotal transition year for global carbon markets, marked by geopolitical upheaval and sharply diverging regional dynamics. The total global value of carbon markets declined slightly to €791 billion, representing a modest 4% drop from the €825 billion recorded in 2024 and placing the market broadly in line with levels observed in 2021. At first glance, this contraction may appear surprising given the continued expansion of carbon pricing schemes worldwide. In reality, the slowdown reflects a year in which climate policy temporarily lost political momentum across several major jurisdictions.

Europe itself was not immune to this shift. Political support for climate policy in the European Union weakened during 2025, with a watered-down agreement on the bloc’s 2040 climate targets and the partial unravelling of the EU’s flagship 2035 internal combustion engine ban late in the year. Decarbonization policy increasingly had to compete for political oxygen in a tense geopolitical environment dominated by security concerns, trade tensions, and economic uncertainty.

Across the Atlantic, political turbulence in the United States amplified these headwinds. In April 2025, the Trump administration issued an executive order explicitly targeting state-led cap-and-invest programs, triggering fears of federal intervention in sub-national carbon markets. International climate cooperation also faced significant setbacks. The International Maritime Organization’s proposed Net Zero Framework was effectively shelved following aggressive pushback from the United States, while Washington’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement introduced new uncertainty into global climate diplomacy and contributed to turbulence in the CORSIA aviation carbon framework.

Yet while policy uncertainty slowed momentum in some areas, the year also revealed a striking divergence in carbon price performance across major markets. European Union Allowances (EUAs) rallied strongly, while carbon prices within the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) weakened considerably.

In Europe, EUA prices averaged €74.40 per tonne in 2025, up from €66.50 the previous year. The rally was fueled by growing expectations of structural supply tightening, combined with record long positions accumulated by investment funds ahead of a sharply reduced auction calendar in 2026. In North America, however, WCI prices moved in the opposite direction, falling below the $30 per tonne threshold by the end of the year. This regional decoupling reflects two very different policy environments: Europe continued tightening supply and embedding carbon pricing deeper into its industrial framework, while the WCI faced prolonged regulatory uncertainty tied to delayed rulemaking by the California Air Resources Board and the lingering psychological overhang of federal legal challenges.

As the dust settles on this volatile year, however, 2026 may mark the moment when carbon markets move into structural expansion. In Europe, a major review of the EU Emissions Trading System and the operational launch of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism will further tighten the link between carbon pricing, trade, and industrial policy. In North America, the potential expansion of the Western Climate Initiative suggests that regional carbon markets may continue to grow even in the absence of federal climate leadership.

 

The EU ETS: 2026 Review and the CBAM Reality

The European Union’s carbon market is about to enter another defining phase as it marks its 21st anniversary. In 2026, the European Commission will undertake a comprehensive review of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), examining key structural features including the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), free allocation mechanisms, and the potential expansion of the system to additional sectors. The review will also integrate several recent political compromises, including the newly negotiated 2040 climate targets and broader adjustments to the EU’s decarbonization strategy.

Investors vividly remember the last major ETS overhaul. The 2021 review fundamentally reshaped the system by tightening the emissions cap and strengthening the Market Stability Reserve – changes that helped drive the price of EU carbon allowances to triple over the following two years. The upcoming 2026 review is unlikely to produce changes of the same magnitude; most analysts view it as a fine-tuning exercise ahead of the next phase of the ETS beginning in 2031. Even so, regulatory clarity matters enormously in carbon markets. When emitters and investors gain visibility into the long-term trajectory of supply, they are far more willing to implement sophisticated carbon management strategies that rely on banking, hedging, and actively trading EUAs to optimize compliance costs.

Overlaying this regulatory review is another structural shift: 2026 marks the first operational year of the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). As we stated in our note “Carbon Protectionism: Winners and Losers under EU’s Carbon Border Plan” (July 25, 2024), the mechanism represents one of the most consequential developments in global carbon pricing, fundamentally altering the incentives facing companies that export carbon-intensive goods into the European market.

Under CBAM, importers of products such as steel, cement, aluminum, fertilizers, hydrogen, and electricity must purchase and surrender CBAM certificates reflecting the carbon content of those imports. The price of these certificates is directly linked to EU ETS allowance prices, effectively extending the influence of the EU carbon market beyond the bloc’s borders.

The CBAM phase-in also triggers an equally important transformation within Europe itself. The policy is designed to gradually eliminate the free allocation of EU ETS allowances for sectors covered by CBAM over a nine-year period from 2026 to 2034. The phase-out begins slowly before accelerating toward the end of the transition period and corresponds directly to the CBAM ramp-up. During the transition phase, CBAM will only apply to the portion of emissions that is no longer covered by free allowances under the EU ETS. 

In other words, the incentives game is changing. European industry will progressively lose the buffer of free permits while foreign producers face a growing carbon price at the border. Early commentary around the system suggests this dynamic may already be creating a new category of market activity sometimes referred to as “CBAM proxy hedging.” Industrial importers and traders are beginning to position themselves in the EUA market to hedge future CBAM liabilities, in some cases securing a significant portion of expected carbon exposure several years in advance.

The combined effect of CBAM implementation and the gradual disappearance of free allocations ensures that an ever-larger share of industrial emissions in Europe will be exposed to the full market price of carbon. For companies operating in carbon-intensive sectors, carbon management is no longer a theoretical policy discussion – it is rapidly becoming a central financial variable.

 

WCI: Sub-National Resilience and North American Expansion

While Europe’s carbon market tightens structurally, North America’s Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is quietly demonstrating that sub-national jurisdictions are not waiting for Washington to resolve the climate debate.

The release of a draft linkage agreement on March 3, 2026 outlining the integration of Washington State’s Cap-and-Invest program into the California–Quebec carbon market marks a potentially historic moment for North American carbon pricing. If implemented, the agreement would harmonize compliance instruments, enable joint auctions, and integrate registry systems across participating jurisdictions – effectively expanding the WCI into a larger regional carbon market spanning multiple economies.

For investors watching the political drama unfold in Washington, the move also sends a clear signal: state-level carbon markets are far more resilient than many feared. Despite the Trump administration’s attempts to challenge state cap-and-trade systems, legal scholars and environmental policy experts widely argue that federal executive actions face significant jurisdictional hurdles when attempting to dismantle state-regulated emissions markets. California’s cap-and-trade system is deeply embedded in state law and supported by an established regulatory framework, making it difficult to unwind through federal intervention alone.

At the same time, the broader economic environment could unexpectedly provide support for carbon prices within the WCI system. A new wave of tariffs and industrial policy aimed at reshoring manufacturing to North America is beginning to reshape supply chains across several sectors. As production capacity shifts back toward domestic markets, a greater share of industrial emissions may fall under the jurisdiction of regional cap-and-trade programs.

In a market where emissions caps tighten year after year, increased industrial activity within participating jurisdictions translates directly into greater demand for compliance allowances. If Washington State successfully joins the Western Climate Initiative – with trading potentially beginning as early as 2027 – the expansion of the market, combined with a resurgence in domestic manufacturing, could create the conditions for stronger carbon prices in North America over the coming decade.

For now, however, the key takeaway is simple: while federal climate policy in the United States remains politically contested, regional carbon markets continue to expand and evolve, quietly reinforcing their role as one of the most durable pillars of North American climate policy.

Last week’s analysis focused on Greenland and Greenbacks and examined how escalating geopolitical tensions could influence peripherally developed bond markets. This week, we shift our focus to the global green bond market. Note that your Editors at Sustainable Market Strategies have historically viewed green bonds as primarily a labeling exercise—more beneficial to asset owners than as genuine instruments of environmental change. Though the market continues to grow, our stance remains largely unchanged; we remain sceptical that green bond products offer much in terms of positive environmental outcomes.

The pricing of green debt now generally aligns with that of non-green bonds, with the exception of emerging market (EM) debt, which still carries a slight double-digit spread. Additionally, developed market green sovereign bonds tend to have a 1-2 basis point spread due to their relative illiquidity compared to conventional bonds. We see two main reasons why green bonds now trade more like conventional bonds. First, countries like Germany have pioneered the development of comprehensive green benchmark curves across all maturities, facilitating more accurate pricing of green debt relative to risk-free rates.

 

Second, the ECB now integrates a “Climate Factor” into its collateral framework. As such, as the ECB confirmed that assets with high carbon footprints would face larger “haircuts” (reductions in value) when pledged as collateral, which prompted banks to immediately increase their demand for green bonds to ensure they had high-quality, “climate-safe” collateral to pledge for ECB liquidity. This creates a structural bid for green paper that has driven up interest and secondary market activity.

Green vs. Conventional Bonds: Similar Pricing but Different Impact?

Recent research from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicates that issuing green bonds can lead to measurable environmental benefits, countering the notion that they are merely marketing tools. A key study found that, on average, issuers’ carbon emissions decreased by approximately 10% to 13% within 2 to 4 years following issuance. The reduction in emission intensity—emissions per unit of revenue—was even more significant, dropping by as much as 20% to 30%. These findings suggest that companies are becoming considerably more carbon-efficient, even amid business growth.

Interestingly, the most substantial post-issuance emission reductions are often observed in carbon-intensive sectors such as utilities, energy, and manufacturing. For these industries, green bonds typically finance specific transition projects—like retrofitting power plants or upgrading manufacturing technology—that lead to significant, measurable decreases in carbon output. For these heavy emitters, green bonds serve as a credible signal to investors of their commitment to long-term environmental goals, a trend supported by the data.

Despite a challenging history, interest in green debt remains resilient even after the 2022 ESG market collapse. Indeed, the table below shows that issuance of green, sustainability, sustainability-linked and step-up bonds have been stable to rising in the past five years. Whether this trend continues depends on whether the market can withstand the rise of anti-ESG policies under Trump 2.0 and the global backlash against sustainability initiatives. With governments, corporations, and investors rapidly reversing their sustainability commitments, policy shifts could further weaken this sector’s growth prospects.

 

Green debt instruments vary significantly in their structure and impact. While green bonds and sustainability-linked bonds typically allocate proceeds for specific environmental or social goals, step-up bonds offer a different incentive. They provide issuers with a bonus, such as a reduced interest rate, if they meet predetermined sustainability targets, potentially encouraging more sustainable practices. However, recent research, including a report by IFC/World Bank (2023), questions the effectiveness of sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs). The study highlights a ‘structural design flaw’ related to their optionality and notes that these bonds often fail to drive meaningful behavior change due to weak financial incentives, limiting their overall impact on sustainability goals.

The rapidly expanding segment of the green debt market is Sustainability-Linked Loans (SLLs). Questions arise about whether Treasurers of leading SLL issuers can genuinely lower financing costs by linking sustainability targets to each issuance. Additionally, it is worth considering if these goals had been achieved regardless of issuing an SLL, assuming the company would have continued its existing sustainability path. This raises concerns about the actual impact and motivation behind SLLs.

Looking at the sovereign space, European countries – and Chile – have led the pack in cumulative sovereign green bond issuance over the past five years. With many issuing governments now moving to the right, one can wonder for how long the global sovereign green bond will survive.

The global green bond market has expanded over the past five years, yet its added value in addressing sustainability challenges remains uncertain. After all, if investors face no additional risks when investing in green paper, it’s difficult to argue that their impact surpasses that of non-green debt investments. Consequently, green bonds may offer more financial flexibility or indulgences rather than genuine environmental impact to allocators looking to shade their portfolio in green. This raises questions about their true effectiveness in promoting sustainability, emphasizing the need for clearer metrics and accountability in green bond investments.