Sustainability-oriented equity mandates have spent a decade building around a practical constraint: ESG data for small cap companies is less available and less reliable than its large cap counterparts. Third-party ratings agencies often concentrate their analytical resources on large caps, where disclosure is richer and the revenue-per-company economics make coverage worthwhile. The consequence has been a structural underweight in small caps across ESG portfolios that is a data artifact rather than a deliberate investment judgment.
Over the twelve months ending June 30, 2026, that underweight cost money. The Russell 2000 returned 40% and in the first half of 2026 alone, the Russell 2000 outperformed the S&P 500 by more than 12 percentage points, its best start to a year since 1991.
The deeper issue for sustainability mandates is that low scores and missing scores are treated as equivalent signals of ESG risk, when in most cases they reflect nothing more than the disclosure practices of a company with less staff dedicated to the investor relations function.
We propose a different entry point: rather than relying on ratings coverage that does not exist, we identify small cap companies where observable, verifiable sustainability events have recently occurred or are imminent – first ESG reports, CDP initiation, SBTi validation, board-level governance upgrades, etc. These triggers do not require proprietary data infrastructure. They require reading company filings, sustainability reports, and proxy statements, which is what active small cap managers already do. The re-rating that follows is systematic and documented: research published in 2025 found that MSCI ESG rating changes drive abnormal returns over multiple months after the change, with institutional investor repositioning as the primary transmission mechanism.
The implication is actionable: in small caps, identify the companies that are publishing the required data and own them before the agencies react.
The Investment Thesis
When a company improves its sustainability posture in a material, verifiable way, the re-rating tends to follow a predictable sequence. First, the company appears in sustainability-focused screening databases (MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, ISS) with an upgraded score. This typically takes 12 to 24 months from the triggering event. Second, institutional mandates with ESG minimum screens begin to include the name in their eligible universe, generating incremental demand that is largely independent of traditional fundamental catalysts. Third, coverage by sustainability-focused analysts follows, compounding the effect.
Companies know that improving their sustainability posture is good for their stock price; the survey results showed in the chart below highlight that companies believe the main opportunities related to ESG ratings are acquiring and retaining interest in their stock.
It is logical that the re-rating premium would be amplified in small caps relative to large caps because the starting ownership base is dominated by generalist managers who have not priced sustainability improvement into their valuation. There are some practical signals that investors can track to anticipate a re-rating:
- First publication of a sustainability report (particularly if structured around SASB materiality topics)
- Adoption of science-based emissions targets or commitment to SBTi validation
- Board composition changes (addition of an independent director with sustainability credentials; board-level committee dedicated to ESG oversight)
- First participation in CDP disclosure (Carbon Disclosure Project questionnaire responses carry significant weight in downstream rating models)
- Emissions intensity reduction documented over two consecutive years (a single year is insufficient signal; agencies require a trend)
Where to Look
The most fertile ground for the improvers investment thesis sits in sectors where SASB-defined material sustainability topics are operationally manageable at scale for a small company, but where disclosure has historically been minimal. Industrial services, specialty chemicals, and building products are all areas where energy intensity, waste management, and worker health and safety are financially material (under SASB) and operationally addressable without the capital requirements that make transition difficult. A small industrial company that installs remote energy monitoring across its facilities, reduces its recordable incident rate, and publishes a first SASB-aligned sustainability report is doing all three things at once – and doing them in a way that is both financially rational and likely to trigger a meaningful ESG re-rating within two years.
The Counter-Argument
A skeptic may point to three things that undermine the arguments above:
- The re-rating timeline of 12 to 24 months is long, and the path is uncertain: a company can publish a sustainability report without triggering any rating agency review if the report is judged insufficiently substantive.
- The sustainability reporting landscape is not frictionless: first-time reporters routinely publish reports of uneven quality, and a poorly constructed first report can lock in a low score rather than improve it.
- The liquidity premium embedded in small caps is not always fully compensated: if a sustainability-driven re-rating coincides with a broad risk-off environment, the demand lift from ESG-screened mandates may be insufficient to offset market-wide selling.
These are real risks, but they can be mitigated by concentrating on companies whose underlying operational improvements are genuine and financially material, rather than those pursuing disclosure as a cosmetic exercise. For example, an emissions intensity trend that tracks with capital investment in energy efficiency is credible, while an emissions intensity trend that appears only in the sustainability report – without corresponding capex – is not.
Investment Implications
For small cap equity managers, a systematic scan for the leading indicators listed above (sustainability report publication, CDP participation, SBTi commitment, and board changes) applied across the portfolio universe can generates a watchlist of names likely to re-rate within 24 months.
In the section below, we highlight companies that qualify for a “sustainability re-rating” based on the criteria identified above.
Small Cap Sustainability Improvers Ripe for Re-Rating
- Onterris Inc (ONT-US)
Market cap: $750M | SASB sector: Waste Management / Environmental Services
Onterris, an environmental and engineering consulting firm, had its near-term SBTi target and long-term net-zero target formally validated by the Science Based Targets initiative in early 2025. SBTi validation is arguably the most credible sustainability event a company can execute. Ratings agencies like MSCI operate on annual review cycles, meaning a company that validates SBTi targets today is unlikely to see a formal rating upgrade until the next scheduled assessment, usually annually.
Onterris has published annual SASB-aligned sustainability reports for three consecutive years and participates in CDP. Revenue approached $900M in 2025 and 2026 guidance is above that level. The business is growing into the disclosure infrastructure rather than shrinking, which gives the rating upgrade a durable foundation.
It is also worth noting that until recently, the company operated under the name Montrose Environmental Group, but rebranded as Onterris in April 2026. Corporate identity resets of this kind often precede a broader ESG narrative refresh and tend to attract new analyst attention.
- Dexterra Group (DXT-CA)
Market cap: CAD $880M | SASB sector: Professional & Commercial Services / Industrial Support Services
Dexterra provides supports services for the creation, management and operation of infrastructure. The company published its first-ever comprehensive, GRI-aligned sustainability report in March 2025, including a quantified Scope 1 and Scope 2 baseline following the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard. Prior reports were informal communications without a quantified emissions baseline.. Importantly, the business is financially robust: Q1 2026 revenue grew 15% year on year, and earnings beat estimates by approximately 40%. This removes the risk that sustainability commitments get deprioritized because of financial stress.
- John B. Sanfilippo & Son (JBSS-US)
Market cap: ~$990M | SASB sector: Processed Food
JBSS, a leading American processor of tree nuts and related snacks, has quietly built one of the more comprehensive environmental disclosure programs among U.S. food small caps without having published a formal consolidated sustainability report. The company participates in CDP across all three disclosure streams simultaneously (climate change, water security, and forests), which is rare at this market cap. The company discloses scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. In fiscal year 2025, total emissions intensity declined 8.3%. The company updated its Environmental Policy in May 2024, conducts water risk analysis using WRI’s Aqueduct Atlas across all six production facilities, and holds Energy Star Partner of the Year recognition. It reached 89.5% recyclable packaging by weight. SASB material topics for processed food (energy, water management, packaging waste, food safety) are each being actively addressed. The re-rating catalyst here is specific: MSCI and Sustainalytics currently rate JBSS without a published PDF sustainability report to anchor on, meaning the quantitative data sitting on its website is likely being partially discounted or missed. Publication of a first formal consolidated report would immediately elevate the company’s data quality score.
- Ag Growth International (AFN-CA)
Market cap: CAD $450M | SASB sector: Industrial Machinery & Goods
AGI makes grain handling, aeration, and storage equipment, placing it in a sustainability-adjacent commercial position (food security infrastructure) that creates natural demand for ESG transparency. Their 2024 Sustainability Report, released in June 2025, was the first to include a SASB Index and a standalone TCFD-aligned supplemental disclosure, neither of which appeared in the 2023 report. This is a meaningful escalation from narrative-only sustainability communication to framework-indexed disclosure, which is exactly what most ratings agencies require to move from qualitative to quantitative scoring. The Board operates a Governance and Sustainability Committee. On the quantitative side, AGI set a target in 2023 to reduce Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions intensity by 25% by 2030 against a 2021 baseline; in 2024, it had already achieved a 16% reduction, keeping the trajectory on track. Safety performance improved sharply: lost-time incident rate down 46% and total recordable incident rate down 49% year on year, both SASB material metrics for this sector.
It is important to note that the names highlighted here are cited uniquely based on an expectation that financial market participants will latently give credit to their sustainability efforts; For example, AGI carries a highly leveraged balance sheet and has been under financial stress from agricultural equipment cycle headwinds: the sustainability re-rating is an independent catalyst, but the equity thesis depends on stabilization of the underlying business.
In the table below, we summarize the main sustainability re-rating triggers for the aforementioned companies, plus six more that we believe could benefit from the same dynamic.
Since our last Macro Meets Sustainability update on March 26th, oil prices have crashed back to the levels recorded before the U.S. and Israel invaded Iran. Meanwhile, AI-related stocks are at new all-time highs and have taken many of our preferred electric grid buildout companies with them.
In light of these two macro developments, in today’s Note, we update our views on two key sustainable investment themes: the outlook for renewables and the likelihood of further upside in electrification plays.
Renewables vs. Fossil Fuels: Who is Intermittent Now?
The oil market has produced one of the most dramatic round trips in recent memory. From its pre-conflict level of roughly $80/bbl, Brent crude surged to nearly $120/bbl through mid-March as Strait of Hormuz traffic was severely disrupted, but has since collapsed to under $75/bbl, with WTI down roughly 25% in a single month. Although the situation appears very fragile, the Strait of Hormuz has largely normalized for now and Saudi export capacity has reportedly recovered toward pre-war levels.
The last three months have provided a live stress test by way of China for what the energy transition could look like for nations that pursue electrification and renewable energy production. China’s EV fleet now displaces over 1 million barrels per day of oil demand, equivalent to Oman’s entire output. Its ultra-high-voltage grid delivers domestically generated solar and wind power across the country. Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025. In March 2026, China exported a record $21.9 billion in solar panels, batteries, and EVs in a single month. All of this means that the Chinese economy was virtually unscathed by the closing of the Strait – according to Goldman Sachs, oil from this region represents less than 6% of China’s energy needs and economists expect that the global oil price spike reduced Chinese GDP by less than 0.2% (compared with 0.5 to 1% for other Asian nations).
Indeed, renewable energy has brought insulation from the oil price shock to the Chinese economy while other nations scramble (governments across four continents enacted various forms of fossil fuel subsidies during the spike). This is because solar, wind, geothermal and even nuclear share an advantage over fossil fuels; once the infrastructure is built, it becomes a long-life domestic asset that is far less dependent on global trading systems.
Ember analyst Kingsmill Bond put it bluntly: “fossil fuels are now intermittent and uncertain, which was the argument levelled against renewables.” The Chinese example indeed suggests that the intermittency risk in energy portfolios has migrated; it now sits in the extraction and logistics infrastructure of fossil fuels, not in the production profile of wind and solar. We stand by our previous conclusion: the path to increased national energy security will be bifurcated. Many nations that have been historically dependent on fuel imports will look to the Chinese example and lean-in to renewables and efficiency, while nations like the U.S. and Canada that are endowed with fossil fuels may double down on extraction of traditional fuels.
For equity portfolios, oil companies’ stock performance mirrors the oil price round trip, with many companies having already given back the gains made since the war began. As the table below highlights, the companies most exposed are those whose long-term oil price assumptions, typically disclosed in annual reports, are sitting above the current forward curve. That said, geopolitical uncertainty argues against attempting to short oil companies at the current juncture.
On the renewable energy side, a more hawkish Fed and sticky inflation means that the rate picture argues for standing aside rather than adding exposure. Renewable energy producers carry significant sensitivity to the discount rate environment since project economics depend on long-dated contracted cash flows financed at capital costs that move directly with yields. We flagged this sensitivity in Q2 as the primary macro risk to the renewable operator thesis, and it has not resolved. A clear Fed pivot signal or durable cooling of core inflation are conditions for revisiting the stand-aside stance.
The rate environment thus argues for patience on renewable energy producers. It has not, however, tempered the market’s appetite for the grid equipment and power management companies that sit upstream of them, where a different set of valuation questions now applies.
Are The Power Plays Overdone?
Last week’s note (“Data Centers: After the Gas Rush,” July 3, 2026) made the case for BESS pure-plays and clean-power developers as a way to capture the AI data center energy buildout from an undervalued entry point.
The flip side of the infrastructure story is grid equipment and power management companies that have made substantial equity price gains alongside AI-related stocks that continue to appreciate despite growing valuation concerns. Indeed, companies like Vertiv have seen eye-watering performance alongside their hyperscale data centre clients. The risk is not that the AI build-out stops, but that it slows or shifts timeline, and at 65-70x trailing earnings there is no valuation cushion for either outcome.
Hyperscaler orders are not irrevocable: Microsoft froze approximately 1.5 gigawatts of self-build data centre projects in April 2025, revising associated equipment orders mid-cycle. The market appears to be drawing its own conclusions: Eaton, a more diversified name in the sector, beat earnings estimates in each of the last two quarters and its stock sold off on both releases; when a company delivers accelerating order growth and raised guidance and the stock declines, expectations have simply become too high to satisfy.
In our last October 23, 2025 Note, Power Hungry: The Real Cost of a Digital Future, we argued that early-cycle beneficiaries in power infrastructure had already re-rated sharply, and the better risk-reward was shifting toward later-cycle optimization and maintenance players. Among the six major infrastructure names tracked since that note, the pattern is unambiguous: the more concentrated the exposure to AI and data centre build-out, the more aggressively the stock has re-rated. In the table below, we show that Vertiv (VRT-US) is up approximately 65% since October 2025, Siemens Energy (ENR-DE) roughly 52%, and ABB (ABBN-CH) around 42%, all while their trailing P/E multiples expanded further into territory that prices execution without error.
For more diversified names, the picture is more nuanced. Eaton (ETN-US) and Schneider Electric (SU-FR) are up 9% and 11% respectively over the same period, from starting points that were already full. Both retain genuine multi-driver revenue bases across grid modernization, industrial electrification, and energy security that are independent of AI capex specifically. The thesis for holding them remains intact. However, at roughly 40x and 35x trailing earnings respectively, both sit at meaningful premiums to their 10-year averages with limited margin for error on execution. Investors should let earnings grow into the multiple rather than add to positions at current levels.
A final group of companies are those that have concentrated exposure to grid optimization, monitoring, and efficiency whose revenues arrive later in the electrification cycle. Emerson Electric (EMR-US), Carrier Global (CAR-US), Honeywell (HON-US), and Daikin Industries (6367-JP) have solid sustainability credentials and most have not yet participated in the recent AI hype swing. As the grid expansion phase matures and attention shifts to maintaining and optimizing an expanded electrical ecosystem, these names offer exposure to the same structural demand with a more comfortable valuation cushion.
Since our last note on Battery, Energy Systems Storage (BESS) in November 2024 (see “What is Store for Energy Storage”) a few trends have accelerated in the industry as the global demand for power continues to grow to supply AI data centers. As such, BESS is now playing a key role in electrification, as evidenced in this week’s news about Spain’s solar power glut and how BESS is changing the economics of renewable power. Although most renewables are now cheaper than gas, the question is how much longer the sector can develop separately from BESS.
Solar is now so cheap that it can undermine its own economics. In sunny regions, it floods the grid at midday, driving prices down just when output peaks. That also makes grid balancing harder and can contribute to outages, as Spain showed last year.
Wind helps because it often produces in the evening, overnight and in winter, when solar output is weak. Together, solar and wind are more valuable than alone. Add batteries, and a hybrid system can deliver firm clean power for $56/MWh today, which is below gas in many markets. With utility-scale storage costs down fourfold since 2016, this advantage should keep improving.
In our last note on batteries (“Beyond Lithium: The Next Battery Boom”, May 21), we discussed how next-generation batteries are moving beyond hard-to-source minerals such as cobalt and lithium. Here we look at the energy mix powering data centers, gas turbines, integrated power developers and BESS pure plays, in a world where the International Energy Agency estimates that two out of every three dollars invested in power now go to renewables.
Gas is Still Winning the Data Center Power Game, but not for long
Natural gas remains the leading power source for U.S. data centers (see chart below). Renewables, already at 24%, are moving up quickly as their LCOE continues to fall.
Current estimates suggest that as much renewable capacity as gas capacity could be added to power U.S. data centers through 2030.
The equation is shifting. Solar+wind+BESS hybrids already beat gas on cost at 95% reliability ($56 vs. $76/MWh), and battery costs are falling faster than any other energy technology. But data centers need power that is always on, instantly responsive, compact and quick to build. On all four counts, gas still wins. Gas turbines can meet 99.9% uptime requirements, handle rapid AI load swings, use far less land and avoid the long interconnection queues that slow solar+storage projects.
But renewables will catch up: by 2030, better interconnection timelines and cheaper storage should narrow the speed and cost gaps. And by 2032–2035, some studies suggest that emerging technologies such as long-duration batteries using technologies such as iron-air and flow systems could close much of the reliability gap. For the remaining edge case – ultra-firm power for the largest AI clusters – is where hyperscalers are placing their bets on Small Modular Reactor (SMR) and have already signed offtake agreements from Amazon, Google, Microsoft and Meta targeting first power from SMRs in the early 2030s.
Until then – and given the probable delay in the large scale deployment of SMRs – several BESS players, clean-power developers and data-center power suppliers remain worth watching as they will remain a key part of the power supply chain for the foreseeable future.
BESS: The Future is Now
BESS is having its “wow” moment as one of the fastest-growing technology segments, scaling at a pace that mirrors AI demand. Four players are gaining share in the U.S. data-center market.
Fluence Energy (FLNC-US): Fluence reported a record contracted backlog of $5.60 billion as of March 31, 2026, helped by its pivot toward AI data centers and MSAs with two major hyperscalers. These deals validate its “Smartstack” platform as a shock absorber for short-duration AI power spikes. Margins are also improving, with adjusted gross margins reaching 11.10% in Q2 2026.
Eos Energy (EOSE-US): Eos is scaling its Z3 zinc-based battery platform. 2025 revenue rose sevenfold to $114.20 million, and Manufacturing Line 2 in Pennsylvania should double annualized capacity to 4 GWh by end-2026. Its Frontier Power USA partnership with Cerberus, backed by a $1.50 billion technology-performance insurance framework, should help address project-finance hurdles for non-lithium systems.
ESS Tech (GWH-US): ESS Tech is commercializing iron-flow technology for 10- to 22-hour storage. Recent milestones include Project New Horizon with Google and Salt River Project, a 50 MWh pilot in Arizona, and a partnership with Alsym Energy to develop sodium-ion solutions. Its iron-flow chemistry was also independently validated by the American Public Power Association after a 21-month utility demonstration.
Merus Power (MERUS-FI) is emerging as a European BESS leader, with 2025 net sales of €54.60 million and a CATL agreement to deliver 3 GWh of storage solutions in Nordic Europe. It is also advancing grid-forming technology, including the first commercial GFM storage facility in the Nordics for Alpiq, alongside recent projects in Finland, Latvia, Poland and Denmark.
Except for Fluence, these companies have mostly underperformed over the past year. As with other emerging technologies, a market-cap-weighted basket may make sense to enter into a position in this fast-moving sector.
Enter Clean Power Suppliers and Integrators
Beyond pure-play BESS companies, several clean-power suppliers are also well positioned to power U.S. data centers. Established names such as NextEra and AES are seeing a growing share of their backlog tied to AI demand.
NextEra Energy (NEE-US) is expanding its “Data Center Hub” strategy, with more than 30 sites representing over 60 GW of potential capacity as of April 2026. It added 4.0 GW to its renewables and storage backlog, now about 33 GW, and was selected by the U.S. Department of Commerce to build 9.5 GW of gas-fired generation in Texas and Pennsylvania for large-scale users such as data centers.
The AES Corp (AES-US) is undergoing a major transition after shareholders approved a $10.7 billion take-private acquisition by a consortium led by Global Infrastructure Partners and EQT. The firm is also pioneering “Powered Land” solutions, including a 20-year PPA with Google for co-located generation in Texas. Its 2025 renewables backlog stood at 12.0 GW.
Clean Max (544717-IN) has grown rapidly in data centers, with contracted capacity for Data and AI customers rising tenfold in two years to 2,380 MW. Key deals include a roughly 900 MW renewable agreement with Meta in India and a 150 MW co-investment with Apple. Its EBITDA run-rate reached ₹1,870 crore in early 2026.
Brookfield Renewable (BEP-US) commissioned over 9 GW of new capacity in the past 12 months and aims for 10 GW per year by 2027. Its Neoen acquisition added 1.5 GW of operating battery storage and a nearly 50 GW development pipeline, making storage its fastest-growing segment.
Most have underperformed the market over the past year, except Clean Max. Given the power-demand outlook, exposure to names such as Clean Max could make sense.
Are we at Peak Gas for Data Centers?
Finally, investors should consider “legacy” data-center power suppliers, especially companies tied to gas turbines. If solar+wind+BESS keeps improving versus gas on LCOE and reliability, the current enthusiasm for turbine makers could fade. This could be especially true if renewables’ ability to close the reliability gap from 95% to 99.9% should improve as battery and solar costs fall and AI-driven load management spreads across utilities.
Unlike BESS and clean-power names, gas turbine makers have sharply outperformed over the past year, though they appear to have lost momentum despite large backlogs. Their recent appreciation could therefore create a short opportunity if renewables+BESS and, later, SMRs begin to displace gas on cost and efficiency. This could be true for companies such as GE Vernova, which is now deriving most of its revenues from selling gas turbines to data centers while still struggling to deliver profits with its wind power division.
Baker Hughes (BKR-US) has repositioned itself from oilfield services toward industrial energy technology. Its NovaLT turbine platform is built for distributed power, allowing data-center operators to bypass grid-connection queues and secure power quickly.
Siemens Energy (ENR-DE) benefits from structural demand in Grid Technologies, driven by the need to connect massive AI loads. Management says gas-turbine pricing remains favorable, with average prices per GW rising by the high teens year-over-year in early 2026 as hyperscalers pay premiums for faster delivery. The company booked nearly €2 billion of data-center-related Grid orders in H1 fiscal 2026.
PFAS (per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances) are a family of more than 10,000 synthetic compounds unified by the carbon-fluorine bond – among the strongest bonds in organic chemistry, and the reason these molecules persist indefinitely in biological tissue, groundwater, and soil. The clinical literature on chronic exposure above threshold concentrations is not in dispute: elevated risk of kidney and testicular cancer, thyroid disruption, immune suppression, and developmental toxicity in infants.
PFAS contamination can in principle be addressed two ways: reduce production at source, or manage the substance once it has been produced and released. The table below maps which path applies to each major use.
Source reduction is viable for consumer products – cookware, food packaging, carpets, textiles – and for new firefighting foam applications. These are also the slowest-growing categories. The categories where substitution is genuinely impossible at commercial scale – semiconductor fabrication, medical implants, precision industrial applications – are among the fastest-growing segments of the global economy. There is no credible substitution timeline for either.
Moreover, the green energy transition adds a specific conundrum. PVDF binders in lithium-ion batteries, Nafion membranes in electrolysers and fuel cells, and fluoropolymer films in solar panels are critical inputs with no current commercial alternative – a textbook wicked problem: the faster the world deploys clean energy infrastructure, the more PFAS are released in the environment.
The scale of contamination is staggering. In the United States, recent analysis found that 176 million Americans drink water from systems containing PFAS, resulting in approximately 6,800 new cancer cases per year. In Europe, an estimated 200 million people are exposed above established safety thresholds. In Asia, the magnitude is unknown due to the lack of credible research but given that Asia is the global centre for the industries most responsible for PFAS pollution – fluorochemical manufacturing, textile finishing, and semiconductor fabrication – which makes the data gap a reason for concern. What started as a U.S.-EU regulatory push has become one of the most unusual examples of global environmental policy collaboration, based on independent scientific research and (mostly) free of political interference.
The practical conclusion for investors is that PFAS end-of-life management – testing, removal, and destruction – carries a structural demand floor that source reduction cannot offset. It is estimated that EUR 226 billion in incremental water treatment and remediation capex will be required in Europe alone through 2040.
The Global Landscape
In May 2026, the EPA rolled back the Biden administration’s 2024 PFAS additions – rescinding limits on four specific compounds – while retaining the core 4 ng/L standards for PFOA and PFOS that cover more than 66,000 public water systems. States are filling the gap immediately; California, New York, and Michigan were already enforcing stricter standards than the federal floor. And the largest single source of U.S. remediation demand – more than 700 contaminated DoD military sites – is governed by congressional mandate, unaffected by EPA rulemaking. The rollback is narrower than the headlines suggest, and the capital obligation for utilities and the federal government remains intact.
Elsewhere in the world:
- Australia presents the starkest near-term country opportunity. The outright national ban on PFOS, PFHxS, and PFOA, effective July 1, 2025, was accompanied by revised national drinking water guidelines covering a broader compound list.
- Japan moved from administrative guidance to legally binding water quality standards under the Waterworks Act in April 2026, covering all regulated utilities. Japan is expected to be the next major PFAS testing growth frontier driven by the same compliance monitoring surge that propelled over 70% year-on-year PFAS revenue growth in Europe through 2025.
- Canada sits earlier in the tightening cycle. Health Canada’s August 2024 objective sets 30 ng/L for the sum of 25 PFAS – advisory rather than binding – and a March 2025 State of PFAS Report recommended binding discharge limits and mandatory wastewater monitoring.
Three Layers, Three Windows
Framing PFAS as a single market dominated by water treatment equipment companies misses the sequential structure of how remediation actually unfolds. The value chain has three distinct layers, each with a different demand trigger and risk profile.

Layer 1: Detect. Before any water utility can remediate PFAS, it must measure concentrations at parts-per-trillion sensitivity – a task requiring specialized liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) and automated sample preparation. Detection spending is the first financial obligation triggered by any new regulatory limit, in any jurisdiction, scaling directly with the number of monitoring points required.
Agilent Technologies (A-US) and Waters Corp. (WAT-US) are the dominant instrument players, reporting PFAS revenue growth of more than 70% and 40% respectively in 2025. Despite the growth of PFAS testing, it still only represents 2–3% of their total revenues. Agilent and Waters were covered in our September 19, 2024 note “Pass or Fail: Investment Opportunities in the Testing Market”.
The only listed company that offers genuine PFAS testing exposure at material scale is ALS Limited (ALQ-AU). Based in Australia but with global operations across 65+ countries, ALS is a global testing, inspection, and certification specialist. Environmental services represent roughly 40% of group revenue, with PFAS testing growing at 2.5x the rate of the rest of the environmental segment.
Layer 2: Remove. This market is dominated by concentration-based filtration: granular activated carbon (GAC) adsorbs PFAS from water, and ion exchange (IX) resins strip them from solution. Both are proven, scalable technologies.
Xylem (XYL-US), Veolia (VIE-FR), and Pentair (PNR-US) are typically the go-to names for water-related investments, but PFAS-related activities represent a rounding error on their revenue line. For instance, Xylem started offering Evoqua’s ion exchange and advanced oxidation treatment capabilities following the 2023 acquisition but it represents single-digit revenue percentage. Veolia, the world’s largest water operator, inaugurated one of Europe’s largest PFAS treatment plants in June 2025 so their PFAS revenues are still recent. And Pentair launched its Everpure PFAS Filtration line for food service and commercial applications in 2025. While PFAS filtration is a growing subset, it is not material on its own for Pentair.
For a truly pure-play PFAS-related name, Zurn Elkay (ZWS-US) could be considered. Its PFAS-certified filtration products account for about 20% of total revenue and are its fastest-growing platform. Their PFAS product line targets the primary buyers facing compliance obligations under both U.S. PFOA/PFOS standards and expanding state-level requirements. The secular tailwinds – aging U.S. water infrastructure, PFAS compliance, lead pipe replacement – support long-term organic growth across economic cycles for Zurn Elkay.
Layer 3: Destroy. Permanent PFAS elimination requires severing the C-F bond through high-temperature incineration (above 1,100°C), electrochemical oxidation, or supercritical water oxidation. The EPA and Pentagon formally endorsed high-temperature incineration as the recommended permanent disposal route in 2025, providing regulatory validation for Clean Harbors’ platform, which is the only company offering a commercially scalable, single-source pathway from PFAS waste receipt to permanent elimination. The strategic logic is direct. Every water utility or industrial operator running activated carbon or ion exchange for PFAS removal eventually generates a concentrated waste stream requiring permanent destruction. Clean Harbors is the most credible, commercially proven destination for that waste. PFAS-related revenues are growing at 25–35% quarter-on-quarter.
Another relevant PFAS elimination company is Onterris Inc. (ONT-US), formerly known as Montrose Environmental Group. It is the highest-conviction name in the PFAS services and technology layer. The critical differentiator is that Onterris owns patented PFAS treatment technologies, separating it from technology-agnostic environmental consulting peers and giving it pricing power that service-only competitors cannot replicate.
Four Companies Worth a Closer Look
The four companies span a wide range of financial maturity within the same theme. Clean Harbors has outperformed the S&P 500 by a significant margin over five years. At 33x forward earnings the market is pricing continued execution on its PFAS pipeline, a premium the pipeline growth and margin expansion trajectory justify, though it leaves little room for disappointment. Zurn Elkay and ALS Limited offer a more straightforward investment case: both trade in the mid-20s forward earnings, with EBITDA margins above 20%, and generate organic growth that traces directly to the global regulatory tightening cycle. Onterris is the outlier. The stock has declined 60% since 2021 while the S&P 500 nearly doubled, the consequence of an acquisition-driven growth model that clashed with a rate-rising cycle while carrying too much debt and insufficient net income. However, EBITDA margins are now expanding, the PFAS pipeline is building, and the stock trades well below analyst consensus targets. The execution risk is real; so is the upside for investors prepared to carry it.
Buildings are responsible for approximately 37% of global energy and process-related CO Of course, heat pumps are an integral solution to reducing building carbon emissions and weaning the global economy off fossil fuels – it shouldn’t be a surprise that European sales jumped in q1 in response to the recent energy price surge. But the opportunity set is broader than just heat pumps.
Investing to solve the 37% carbon challenge in buildings requires dividing the opportunity set into embodied and operational carbon. Embodied carbon refers to the CO₂ emitted during the production of the materials that constitute a building – the cement, the steel, the insulation, the glass – and during construction itself. Operational carbon refers to carbon emissions related to the operation of the building. This includes HVAC (heating and cooling) but also the efficiencies that come from the building envelope itself (windows, insulation, etc). It is this latter category where we see value and the least-crowded positions in sustainable investing.
Operational vs. Embodied Carbon
Buildings emit carbon in two fundamentally distinct ways and on different timescales.
Operational carbon is the CO₂ produced each year by the energy used to run a building – heating, cooling, hot water, lighting, etc. It accounts for approximately 28% of global energy-related emissions. These emissions can be reduced through retrofits – better insulation, more efficient HVAC, smarter controls. In addition, related emissions fall automatically as electricity grids decarbonise: the same heat pump powered by renewables emits a fraction of what it emits on a coal-heavy grid. For the existing building stock – operational carbon is the correct priority, since the retrofit pathway is the only lever available once a building is built.
Embodied carbon is the CO₂ emitted during the production of the materials that constitute a building – the cement, the steel, the insulation, the glass – and during construction itself. It accounts for approximately 9 – 11% of global emissions. Unlike operational carbon, it is locked in at the moment of construction; no subsequent efficiency improvement can undo it.
The key point is that as buildings become more energy-efficient and grids become cleaner, the proportion of a new building’s “lifetime” carbon emissions that comes from embodied carbon rises inexorably. In a code-compliant new build today, embodied carbon already represents 35–40% of lifetime emissions. In a near-zero energy building – the standard that European policy is now mandating for new construction – embodied carbon can represent 40–60% of lifetime climate impact, up from roughly 15–20% in pre-1990 stock. As buildings approach true zero-energy status, that proportion may exceed 60%: the operational problem shrinks as we solve it, but the embodied carbon problem does not.
This creates a two-track investment framework. Track one addresses the existing building stock through retrofit – heat pumps, insulation, glazing, controls, etc., while track two addresses new construction through material innovation – low-carbon cement, green steel, mass timber, specialty construction chemistry. We have addressed the latter in a series of notes and the main public equity players in these industries are well known and have not changed meaningfully (please see for example: ‘Wood’ You ‘Steel’ to Save a Life, May 25, 2022 and
Carbon Protectionism: Winners and Losers under EU’s Carbon Border Plan, July 25, 2024. ). The same can not be said for companies related to operational emissions, where there has been tremendous transformation in the opportunity set.
Not Your Father’s HVAC Company
We have written about HVAC companies extensively over the years, and the core thesis – that companies making buildings more thermally efficient would compound well on both financial and sustainability metrics – has played out favorably.
- Comfort Systems (FIX-US) is the starkest case. We noted in our August 2025 note that FIX had “outsized momentum from its exposure to data centre cooling and modular infrastructure.” That framing was accurate but perhaps understated: by Q1 2026, revenue from technology companies – dominated by data centre mechanical and electrical work – accounted for 56% of FIX’s total revenue, up sharply from previous years. The electrical segment grew 88% year-on-year. The company’s $12.5 billion backlog – more than $5 billion of which was added in the past twelve months – reflects multi-year commitments from tech customers. FIX is now a data centre construction contractor: a mechanical and electrical integrator that benefits from the thermal management demands of AI infrastructure.
- Trane Technologies (TT-US) tells a similar, if more nuanced, story. Bookings in the U.S. – predominantly large commercial chillers and, increasingly, data centre cooling systems – rose 160% year-on-year in Q1 2026. A $10.7 billion record backlog underpins multi-year revenue visibility. Its acquisitions of Stellar Energy (modular data centre chiller plants, targeting $1 billion in revenue within three years from a $350 million base) and LiquidStack (direct-to-chip liquid cooling systems) are explicit bets on the data centre thermal opportunity. Although Trane does retain a meaningful commercial building HVAC exposure (roughly one third of revenue), it’s hardly a pure-play HVAC company.
- Carrier Global (CARR-US) has transformed differently. Rather than following the data centre pull, Carrier has shifted its portfolio by divesting fire, security, and access businesses and acquiring Viessman Climate Solutions to reposition itself as a focused climate solutions company. The 2024 $13 billion purchase of Viessmann made Carrier the most accessible large-cap vehicle for investors seeking European residential heat pump exposure. Along with Viessmann, 13% of Carrier revenues stem from climate solutions in the transport industry (e.g. refrigerated trucking and shipping). That said, Carrier’s data centre cooling revenue has scaled from negligible to over $1 billion, with $1.5 billion guided for 2026 and Q1 orders up more than 500% year-on-year. Carrier today is a bifurcated company with a European residential heat pump operator through Viessmann, an important transportation line, and a growing data centre precision cooling provider.
For investors seeking genuine pure-play heat pump exposure – the most credible listed names are Daikin Industries (6367-JP), whose air conditioning business accounts for approximately 95% of revenue, Ariston Group (ARIS-MI), the Italian residential heating and heat pump specialist whose €2.71 billion revenue is entirely concentrated in thermal comfort products and NIBE Industrier (NIBE.B-SE). NIBE featured strongly in our 2022 and 2023 notes on this theme, and is arguably the purest listed vehicle for European residential heat pump exposure, with its Climate Solutions division accounting for approximately 70% of group revenue.
Pushing The Envelope – The Missing Half of the Retrofit Trade
Perhaps the most persistent gap in the sustainable building investment narrative is the thermal envelope: the walls, roof, floor, and glazing that determine how much energy a building requires to maintain a comfortable temperature. Better insulation means a smaller, cheaper heat pump, lower running costs, and lower emissions. After all, installing a high-performance heat pump in a leaking, poorly insulated building is thermodynamically equivalent to filling a bathtub with the drain open.
The EU’s Energy Performance of Buildings Directive mandates progressive renovation of the worst-performing buildings. The dominant guidance from national retrofit programmes and engineering best practice recommend thermal envelope improvements (insulation, glazing, air-sealing) before mechanical system upgrades (e.g. heat pumps). This ‘fabric first’ principle, makes insulation the logical prerequisite for efficient heat pump installation.
- Rockwool International (ROCK.B-DK) is a leading sustainable insulation company. Stone wool insulation, like that produced by Rockwool is made of basalt rock and recycled industrial slag and is inherently durable, fire-resistant, acoustically effective, and partially circular: it does not degrade, compress, or require replacement over a building’s lifetime. Rockwool revenue reached €3.88 billion in 2025, up 3% organically, with EBIT margins of 14.0% excluding the write-off of its Russian operations in January 2026. The European Commission estimates that over 85% of the EU building stock was built before 2000 and will require significant energy renovation. Rockwool is the direct beneficiary of any policy that mandates thermal envelope improvement before or alongside mechanical system upgrades.
- Owens Corning (OC-US): Since we last wrote about OC, the company has acquired door manufacturer Masonite (in 2024) and repositioned itself as a branded building envelope company spanning roofing, insulation, and doors. S&P Global named it a Top 1% sustainability performer in the building products industry for 2026.
- Saint-Gobain (SGO-FR) is perhaps most comprehensive expression of the thermal envelope theme in a single listed company. Its portfolio encompasses float glass (double and triple glazing), stone wool and glass wool insulation, gypsum board, construction mortars, and SageGlass – the globally leading electrochromic smart glazing technology; the glass dynamically tints to reduce solar heat gain by up to 90%, directly reducing the cooling load on HVAC systems. With approximately €47 billion in annual revenue and exposure to virtually every component of a high-performance building envelope, it can be considered an anchor position that ties the thermal envelope thesis together.
Investors wanting to put capital to work in the sustainable building theme should develop a two-pronged strategy that includes both the thermal envelope and heat pumps since, as described above, these two factors together are what equate to low emissions retrofits. In the chart below, we show the two baskets of the names mentioned above. Equity performance has been disappointing, especially over the past year: these names are tied to the U.S. and European housing cycle, which have both been suppressed by elevated interest rates. Heat pumps sales in particular have been sluggish in the past year after record sales earlier in the decade. However, most recently heat pump sales have once again predictably spiked in reaction to this year’s energy price surge related to the U.S-Israel-Iran war.
Our climate trajectory is now less about what happens if we fail to act and more about how severe are the consequences of the warming already set in motion. Floods, droughts, wildfires, and extreme storms have become present and worsening conditions under which economies, infrastructure, and communities must now operate.
The disconnect between this physical reality and the structure of global capital allocation remains striking: we have noted several times that climate finance has remained overwhelmingly oriented toward mitigation – reducing the emissions that drive further warming – while adaptation, the work of hardening systems against the disruption already underway, continues to attract a fraction of what the scale of the problem demands.
Why is it so difficult to attract capital to climate adaptation solutions? Mainly because it collides with one of the oldest problems in economics: the public goods problem. The benefits of resilient infrastructure – a coastal flood barrier, a drought-resistant water system, an upgraded stormwater network – are largely non-excludable: once built, they protect everyone in the area regardless of whether they contributed to the cost. Private capital cannot capture all of that diffuse value because not all of the beneficiaries will have clean contractual relationships with the investor that built the asset. This is not a market failure that better pricing will fix; it is a structural feature of the asset class that requires public capital to bridge.
A second problem is that climate adaptation investments generate value as avoided costs rather than as positive cash flows. A seawall that prevents hundreds of millions in annual flood damages is enormously valuable but not necessarily as a revenue line for the infrastructure owner. Contrast this with mitigation: a solar farm sells electricity under a long-term power purchase agreement; a carbon capture project generates credits that can be sold on carbon markets. Both produce a monetisable cash flow stream that private capital can underwrite. Adaptation tends to produce the absence of losses that would otherwise have occurred, which is more difficult to price, attribute, and securitise.
Adaption and National Security: Two Sides of the Same Coin
The notion that climate adaptation infrastructure is a public good has strong overlap with national defense. Consider what national security requires: a standing army, a naval fleet, an intelligence apparatus, a cyber defense infrastructure. None of these generate a commercial return and none have a paying customer, and yet no serious observer argues that national defense should therefore go unfunded.
This logic has become more acute in an era of accelerating deglobalization. As we documented in previous notes (for example, please see Shift Happens: From Globalization to Reshoring, August 14 2024), the post-Cold War assumption that global interdependence would provide security through mutual economic dependency is being challenged. As we discussed in A Matter of National Security, November 2, 2022, the war in Ukraine revealed how in Europe, governments that had outsourced their energy security to global markets found themselves exposed in ways that no amount of financial hedging could address. Since then, the national security prerogative has intensified for an ever-expanding list of countries; perhaps most notable is the attention accorded to Mark Carney’s “middle power” speech at Davos earlier this year.
The same lesson now applies to climate resilience; a nation whose water supply is degraded by prolonged drought, whose food production is disrupted by extreme heat, whose coastal infrastructure is periodically overwhelmed by storm surge, or whose power grid fails under unprecedented thermal load is suffering more than just an economic inconvenience, it weakens a nation’s ability to defend itself and to act autonomously.
This is not a new concept: in 2007, the term “threat multiplier” was coined by the U.S. Department of Defense and in 2014, climate change was formally designated as a threat multiplier. The most recent DoD climate adaptation plan covers the 2024 -2027 period (although the current administration dismisses global warming). The Pentagon historically funded these plans because the operational exposure is real and quantifiable. In other words, climate adaptation can now be seen as functionally inseparable from national security – therefore the intellectual case for public capital in adaptation is already settled.
Capital Needs a Counterparty
If climate adaptation – or national security – needs are public goods then it’s no wonder public capital should be involved, just like all previous public goods challenges that have been tackled at scale. The interstate highway system, municipal water and sewage networks, electrical grid buildout, are almost never financed purely by private markets; the return structure of public goods investments requires a counterparty willing to absorb diffuse social benefits.
Earlier this month, we addressed the public-private-partnership (PPP) model Outsourcing the Sovereign: The PPP Bailout, April 23 2026). We argued that PPPs were becoming increasingly necessary because governments around the world simply do not have the fiscal fortitude to undertake major works projects without private participation. The global infrastructure funding gap – the difference between what is being spent and what is needed – is projected to reach $15 trillion by 2040 and simply cannot be closed by the public sector alone.
In the case of climate adaptation infrastructure, the PPP model is especially symbiotic: governments may lack the funds to build the required infrastructure, but the private sector lacks the revenue structure to make the investment viable.
An example where this works well is in Australia. The AquaSure consortium built and operates Victoria’s desalination plant under a formal PPP structure. The plant was designed as a drought-proof water supply for Melbourne and Geelong – a rainfall-independent source that complements reservoir storage during dry periods. Melbourne Water, a government entity, pays AquaSure a fixed fee of A$608 million per year for 27 years regardless of how much water is actually ordered – the government pays for the availability of drought-proof water, not for the water itself. The private sector financed construction, bears operational risk, and maintains the asset; the public sector bears the water demand risk and pays for the public good of water security. The model has been criticized during wet years when the plant sits idle and payments continue but this misses the point; the payment is the insurance premium for drought resilience, not a payment for water delivered.
A second model is to have a dedicated public investment vehicle. The most tempting shortcut for governments facing large public goods funding gaps is to eye the pools of long-term capital already sitting in national pension systems and attempt to redirect it toward national priorities, whether it be climate adaptation, defense, or something else. Several governments have acted on this instinct:
- The UK’s Mansion House Accord (2025) committed 17 major pension providers to allocate a minimum 5% to UK private markets by 2030
- Malaysia’s Prime Minister publicly urged the government-managed retirement savings scheme, known as EPF, to raise domestic holdings to 70% of the portfolio
- Canada eliminated its 30% cap on pension fund investments in Canadian entities (December 2024) and launched a Major Projects Office to fast-track infrastructure approvals for institutional investors
- Australia mandated that its Future Fund explicitly consider energy transition and housing in allocation decisions
- In South Korea, pension funds have been asked to increase their risk exposure by beefing up investments in the country’s junior bourse, KOSDAQ. The problem is that using regulatory or political leverage to steer pension capital toward national priorities conflates two mandates. A pension fund trustee’s legal obligation (fiduciary duty) typically runs exclusively to the beneficiaries – the retirees who depend on the fund. The moment that obligation is diluted by a secondary national interest mandate, beneficiaries who had no say in the political decision bear the risk.
Governments are increasingly building separate, dedicated vehicles with explicitly different mandates, and to invite pension capital into those vehicles as a willing commercial co-investor rather than a conscripted one. For example:
- The UK’s National Wealth Fund explicitly incorporates flood defences and climate-resilient water infrastructure into its investment mandate alongside clean energy.
- Australia’s Clean Energy Finance Corporation has demonstrated over twelve years that this model works at scale, mobilising nearly three dollars of private capital for every public dollar deployed.
- The Canada Growth Fund is fiscally-neutral, managed at arm’s length by PSP Investments, and can use contracts for difference and offtake contracts to absorb certain risks that typically keep private capital on the sidelines.
In each case, pension funds participate as co-investors on commercial terms, attracted by the de-risked deal structures that public anchor capital makes possible.
Global governments have hit a structural fiscal wall. Advanced economies are carrying debt loads that would have been considered a sovereign crisis scenario twenty years ago. Japan has long since departed the realm of conventional fiscal analysis with its 215% debt-to-GDP ratio. Rather than unwinding this burden in the years following the pandemic, governments doubled down with stimulus packages, energy subsidies, and increased defence spending. Now, with interest rates firmly in the “higher for longer” camp, compounding debt service costs is turning this burden into an active crisis.
To make matters worse, governments are currently facing four compounding pressures with no cyclical release valve. Entitlement obligations from an aging population are accelerating against a shrinking tax base, while geopolitical reality has locked in permanent, irreversible defence spending floors. Furthermore, the massive fiscal overhang of the pandemic remains entirely unresolved. Crucially, the era of zero-interest rates that made this leverage manageable has ended. Today, OECD governments spend more on debt service than on defence. In the United States alone, interest payments consumed nearly $1 trillion in 2025. That is money that does not build a single hospital, repair a single bridge, fix a school, or connect a single household to clean water.
Because sovereign balance sheets are now increasingly captured by these legacy obligations, the resulting fiscal deficit is massive. The global infrastructure funding gap – the difference between what is being spent and what is needed – is projected to reach $15 trillion by 2040. The post-war model in which the sovereign state financed, built, and operated public infrastructure is, in most of the world, functionally over.
Private Capital Enters the Chat
When governments cannot write the cheque, they turn to the private sector. This is not a new phenomenon – infrastructure privatization has been happening in waves since the 1980s – but the scale and urgency of the current moment are genuinely without precedent. The fiscal constraint is no longer a temporary condition to be managed through one or two budget cycles; it is a permanent feature of the sovereign landscape.
Private capital can participate in infrastructure through several distinct models, each with a different logic and a materially different risk-return profile.
The PPP model stands out because it is the model that resolves the core problem most directly. The government needs infrastructure it cannot afford to build – and maintain. The private sector gets a long-term contract backed by a sovereign counterparty. Risk is allocated to whoever can best manage it: construction and operational risk to the developer, demand risk either shared or retained by the state depending on the structure.
After a brief COVID-induced pause, global PPP deal flow has accelerated through its previous 2018 ceiling.
The regional breadth of the recovery is telling: Sub-Saharan Africa posted a 133% increase year-on-year, Europe and Central Asia 91%, and Latin America and the Caribbean 36%. In the United States alone, 36 states now have dedicated P3 enabling legislation, up from fewer than 15 a decade ago. The UK’s National Wealth Fund, launched in 2024, has an explicit PPP co-investment mandate. The G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment targets $600 billion in private infrastructure mobilization by 2027. The trend is structural, it is broad-based, and it is accelerating precisely when government balance sheets are least able to offer an alternative.
Beyond the Toll Booth: The New Face of PPPs
The PPP model has existed in modern form since the late 1980s, when developing countries began reversing decades of nationalization. In its early incarnation, it was almost exclusively about economic infrastructure: telecom licenses, power purchase agreements, and toll road concessions. In the World Bank’s PPI database, transport and telecom together accounted for over 60% of all private infrastructure investment through the 1990s.
In the early 2000s, the introduction of the availability payment (AP) model – where governments pay a fixed fee for the private sector to design, build, finance, and operate social infrastructure – opened the doors for PPPs to manage hospitals, schools, prisons, and courthouses.
Post-2010, low-carbon projects in the World Bank PPI database outnumber conventional ones by more than two to one (1,915 low-carbon vs. 815 conventional).
The sector diversification is now visible even in a single market snapshot. In Europe in 2024, education PPPs doubled in project count year-on-year (15 transactions versus 8 in 2023). Italy completed the first sovereign data centre PPP in European history, with €331 million in EIB financing for digital cloud infrastructure serving Italian public administration. The UK closed a €605 million district heating network PPP. The old caricature of PPPs as a motorway financing mechanism for governments that cannot be bothered to collect tolls themselves has been thoroughly overtaken by events.
The SDG Multiplier Effect
For a sustainability-minded investor, the PPP landscape presents an immediate challenge: not all PPP concessions are created equal through an impact lens. A managed toll lane serving commuters in Texas or Melbourne is, without question, a sound investment. The cash flows are contracted, the regulatory framework is mature, and the inflation linkage is explicit. But it would be a stretch to characterize it as SDG-aligned infrastructure. The user is, in most cases, a private motorist with alternatives. The social additionality is limited.
This matters because the case for infrastructure as a sustainable asset class rests on considerably broader foundations. As we documented in our October 2023 note, Inflation-Proofing and SDG-Boosting, research published in Nature Sustainability (Thacker et al.) found that infrastructure either directly or indirectly influences all 17 SDGs, encompassing 121 of the 169 targets – 72% of the entire SDG framework. More pointedly, for five SDGs – SDG 3 (Good Health), SDG 6 (Clean Water), SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities) – every single target is influenced by infrastructure investment.
Infrastructure, in other words, is more than an inflation hedge or a portfolio diversifier. When properly targeted, it is the most direct mechanism available to listed equity investors for deploying capital toward global sustainability commitments. The question is not whether to invest in infrastructure, but which infrastructure.
Toll roads in advanced economies and airports serving leisure tourism in mature markets are excluded from our focus – not because they are poor investments, but because they do not represent the category of infrastructure where the PPP growth wave is most pronounced, nor where the impact additionality is most compelling. Our attention is concentrated on operators and developers whose PPP concession pipelines are anchored in social infrastructure (healthcare, public transit, sanitation, water access) and environmental infrastructure (clean energy, waste treatment).
First Responders to the Infrastructure Deficit
The five operators and developers we favour share three characteristics that distinguish them from the broader infrastructure universe: their revenues flow predominantly from government counterparties under long-term concession or availability-payment structures; their pipelines are expanding, not managing decline; and their assets serve populations where private capital is genuinely additional – not merely convenient.
Acciona (ANA-ES) is the most diversified single expression of this thesis. Its Pernambuco water and sanitation concession – €2.38 billion, 35 years, seven million people in one of Brazil’s poorest states – is the largest SDG 6 PPP transaction closed by any listed company in 2025, and it sits alongside São Paulo Metro Line 6, renewable energy transmission concessions in Peru and Australia, and an active bid pipeline in US managed lanes. Acciona’s EBITDA from concessions grew 103% in FY2025. The market continues to price it as a construction company. Veolia (VIE-FR) completes the environmental picture on the water side: as the world’s largest operator of municipal water systems under delegated public service contracts, it holds the most geographically diversified portfolio of government-backed water PPP revenues available in listed equity markets, spanning France, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.
Sacyr (SCYR-ES) occupies the social infrastructure end of the spectrum that most sustainable infrastructure portfolios systematically miss. Hospital PPPs – availability-based, long-duration, government-backed – are structurally identical to road concessions in their cash flow profile but carry materially stronger SDG 3 alignment. Sacyr has been winning them consistently across Spain, Chile, and Colombia while simultaneously developing water treatment PPPs and bidding US managed lane concessions. Ten new concession wins in 2024–25 across five countries. It is the most prolific listed PPP developer by contract count, in an investment category that most European fund managers have never analyzed.
In Brazil, Motiva (MOTV3-BR) brings urban mobility into the mix. Beyond its four major highway concession wins in 2024–25, Motiva operates São Paulo’s Metro Line 4, the Salvador metro, and multiple BRT corridors – giving it genuine SDG 11 exposure in Brazil’s most underserved urban centres, in a market where the federal government’s R$1.7 trillion infrastructure programme is generating the deepest PPP deal flow of any emerging economy.
Finally, Mota-Engil (EGL-PT) occupies territory no other listed operator will enter: road concessions in Angola and Mozambique, the Lobito Corridor railway maintenance agreement running to 2054, and the operating contract for Luanda’s new international airport. Africa’s infrastructure deficit is the largest in the world. Mota-Engil is, for now, one of the few listed companies being paid to close it.
The EBITDA margin column deserves careful reading. Motiva at 46% reflects a fully concession-derived business: government-contracted revenues, limited variable costs, predictable cash generation. Sacyr at 27% carries a residual construction division that blends the number down, though 93% of its EBITDA originates from concession assets. Acciona and Veolia, both near 15%, operate larger services and construction platforms alongside their concession portfolios.
The group trades between 5.1x and 8.4x EV/EBITDA, which is modest given the contractual duration and government-backed nature of the revenues. Mota-Engil at 5.1x carries a construction multiple, not a concession one. The Lobito corridor, the Luanda airport, and the Santos-Guarujá tunnel generate no visible premium in the current price. Whether that gap closes as concession EBITDA matures is the core of the investment thesis.
Dividends are a hallmark of infrastructure investing, and two distinct approaches appear in this table. Veolia’s 4.3% yield reflects a mature portfolio of long-term municipal service contracts generating stable, predictable cash flows that management is comfortable distributing. Acciona’s 1.9% reflects a deliberate choice to retain capital: with Pernambuco, Metro Line 6, and a €301bn project pipeline actively consuming investment, the priority is deployment over distribution. Both are rational strategies given where each company sits in its concession development cycle.
Acciona has returned roughly 120% over the two-year period shown, against 40% for the MSCI World and mid-single-digit returns for Veolia and Mota-Engil. Acciona’s re-rating reflects the market finally pricing diversified concession pipelines correctly. Sacyr’s recent upward break suggests this recognition is spreading.
When it comes to water risks, investor attention has increasingly gravitated toward the water intensity of artificial intelligence and data centers. This is perhaps unsurprising – financial markets tend to overweight fast-growing, uncertain risks, particularly when tied to new technologies. Based on estimates from the IEA and company disclosures, data center water usage represents well below 1% of industrial demand and a negligible share of total consumption. But data centers are often in direct competition with municipal water needs, making them prime political fodder. And while forecasts project water demand rising with the expansion of AI, we think data centers are a red herring: solutions exist and economic incentives to curb water use are falling into place. Water usage in data centers is a relatively small problem and one that is highly investable.
Conversely, agriculture dominates global freshwater withdrawals, accounting for roughly 70% of usage, and is uniquely exposed to both chronic scarcity and acute volatility. There is no substitute for water in the food supply chain, which creates systemic and underappreciated risks – the problem is vast but direct investment opportunities are limited.
Water Terminology
To understand where real water scarcity risk sits, one must first distinguish between consumptive and non-consumptive water use. Consumptive use represents water effectively removed from the hydrological system – absorbed by crops, evaporated, or incorporated into products – not to be replenished on any reasonable timeline. Non-consumptive use involves withdrawals largely returned to the same watershed, typically at a different time, temperature, or quality.
Agricultural water use is consumptive. Most industrial processes and data centers are non-consumptive.
From a purely volumetric perspective, agriculture exerts a far more structural and cumulative pressure on freshwater resources than any industrial or municipal user. Non-consumptive use is not benign – discharge timing and quality create real localized constraints – but consumptive use drives long-term, system-level scarcity risk. This is the foundational distinction that investor discourse around AI water has almost entirely overlooked.
Data Centres: An Exaggerated Water Risk?
Data center water usage is by and large non-consumptive. In a recent by Global Water Intelligence webcast, analysts quantified the water impact of 30 minutes of AI usage at 616 ml – of which 91% is returned and only 9% consumed. So why has data center water use become such a point of contention? The answer lies in geography: data centers and municipalities frequently draw from the same local freshwater systems, creating direct competition for shared resources in basins where even non-consumptive competition matters.
Data center sites are typically selected based on power availability and cost, land and permitting feasibility, proximity to clients, and fiscal incentives. Water availability is a tertiary concern at best – which is precisely why data centers so often end up in water-stressed areas. To assess the full footprint, three components must be considered:
Power generation accounts for a remarkable ~74% of total data center water usage. Since most U.S. data centers are powered by water-intensive fossil fuels (thermal power), significant reductions in AI’s water intensity could be achieved simply by switching to renewable energy – solar and wind are among the least water-intensive generation types.
Semiconductor manufacturing requires ultrapure water, produced at a ratio of up to 4m³ of feedwater per 1m³ of output. Fabs cluster in Taiwan and the U.S. Southwest – water-stressed regions chosen for infrastructure access, regulatory incentives, and supply chain proximity, not water availability. Because fab relocation is effectively impossible, there is a strong economic incentive to innovate in large-scale water reuse and zero-liquid-discharge (ZLD) systems. The ultrapure water ecosystem spans large, diversified players (Ecolab ECL-US, Xylem XYL-US) and high-purity specialists (Kurita Water 6370-JP, Organo Corporation 6368-JP) that offer more targeted exposure.
Onsite cooling is increasingly shifting from air to liquid systems, improving water efficiency per unit of compute. We cover the liquid cooling investment landscape in detail in our note Hot Picks for the Heat Economy, August 7, 2025. Schneider Electric (SU-FR) and Vertiv (VRT-US) are the most liquid public-market expressions of this theme; several pure-play specialists remain private or have recently been acquired.
The data center water challenge is real but structurally tractable. The exponential demand growth that is frequently forecasted is avoidable: renewable energy, closed-loop cooling, and advanced water recycling together address the largest components of the footprint.
Water and Ag: The real risk
The scale of the structural imbalance in agriculture deserves more than a passing reference. The Ogallala Aquifer – underlying eight U.S. states from South Dakota to Texas and supplying roughly one-quarter of all U.S. agricultural water – has been declining since the mid-20th century at rates orders of magnitude faster than its natural recharge. In southwest Kansas, aquifer levels dropped 1.52 feet in 2024, and northwest Kansas saw a 1.34-foot decline, nearly three times its 2023 pace. As a result, some portions of western Kansas are estimated to have fewer than 25 years of viable groundwater remaining – a timeline well within most institutional investment horizons. The aquifer supports roughly 20% of U.S. wheat, corn, cotton, and cattle production.
The Ogallala is not an isolated case. Another example is India’s Indo-Gangetic Plain – producing most of the country’s wheat and rice – faces among the fastest groundwater depletion rates in the world. In each case, the political response has lagged the physical reality by years or decades. The investment risk is not linear depletion – it is the regulatory or physical threshold that forces a discontinuous adjustment in water allocation, land productivity, and input costs.
Unlike industrial or municipal demand, agricultural water use is poorly priced, weakly regulated, and highly sensitive to climate variability. Declining snowpack and shifting precipitation patterns are already eroding supply reliability – witness the current record early drought in the U.S., which is already wreaking havoc on expected crop yields for this year. These dynamics translate directly into yield volatility, rising input costs, stranded land values, and food price inflation.
We consider four partial solutions – pricing reform, precision irrigation, drought-resistant genetics, and dietary shift – none of which fully resolves the problem, but each of which carries distinct investment implications.
Pricing reform: Water is often the most efficiently addressed via pricing, and yet it remains the least taxed of all environmental inputs. For the one-third of the world’s irrigated crops, a credible price signal would rationalize allocation in ways that current subsidies suppress entirely. The investment implication is step-change risk: when allocation tightens abruptly – as it did in Australia when water trading markets were forced into existence – the adjustment is sudden and disorderly, creating stranded asset risk for water-intensive operations and opportunity for efficiency providers. That said, water demand has proven considerably less price-elastic than carbon (see our note Portfolio Strategy With (Water) Constraints, October 30, 2025): pricing reform is necessary but not sufficient, and investors should not expect it to function as a clean market-clearing mechanism.
Precision irrigation: With or without price signals, precision irrigation reduces consumptive losses through evaporation and runoff. Advanced sensors and data analytics determine optimal timing and volume per plant; drip systems can reduce agricultural water use by 30–50% relative to flood irrigation. The technology is commercially proven. Valmont Industries (VMI-US) and Lindsay Corporation (LNN-US) offer the most direct listed exposure in center-pivot and smart irrigation systems, respectively; Netafim (Orbia subsidiary) leads in drip irrigation but is not independently listed.
Drought-resistant seeds: The commercial genetically modified (GM) seed market is overwhelmingly oriented around herbicide tolerance (HT) traits – not water efficiency. Over 90% of U.S. cotton and large shares of corn and soybean acreage carry HT traits that have no meaningful impact on water demand; their bundled seed-herbicide business models actively reinforce chemical input dependency. Genuine drought-resistance traits – which improve water-use efficiency through stomatal regulation and root architecture modifications – remain a small and largely pre-commercial segment, estimated at ~$136M globally in 2024. Investors should not assume that exposure to major agri-science companies confers meaningful exposure to the water-efficiency solution set. Screen specifically for companies with commercially deployed drought-tolerance products whose revenue model does not depend on maximizing chemical input sales alongside them.
Dietary shift and alternative protein: The most structurally impactful lever on agricultural water demand is diet. Producing one kilogram of beef requires approximately 15,000 liters of water, compared to 1,500–2,000 liters for wheat. Even modest population-level shifts in protein consumption would dwarf the aggregate impact of precision irrigation and GM seed programs combined. For investors, dietary shift is not a direct pure-play water thesis – but it surfaces a critical risk screen. Consumer staples companies with heavy exposure to beef and feed grain supply chains, without credible transition strategies toward lower-water-intensity proteins, carry embedded and underpriced water transition risk. Diversified food companies with growing alternative protein exposure (Nestlé NESN-CH, Unilever ULVR-GB) offer partial alignment with this transition, though dedicated pure-play public-market liquidity in alternative proteins remains limited. The FAIRR Initiative’s water-stress screening framework for livestock supply chains is the most rigorous tool available for applying this lens directly to portfolio holdings.
On March 4, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz closed. Within days, Brent crude crossed $120 per barrel. By March 31st, oil prices had registered one of the steepest monthly gains on record. Against this backdrop, energy stocks posted their best-ever quarterly performance in Q1.
What is less appreciated is that the most direct beneficiaries of a sustained Brent around $100 are not the oil majors. Rather, it is the companies that produce liquid fuels that compete, molecule-for-molecule, against petroleum products at the pump – i.e., biofuel producers. As a result, many investors are starting to look again to alternative fuels as a potential way to diversify their portfolios out of fossil fuels in an increasingly unstable world.
After all, the world is already witnessing shortages in diesel and jet fuel – for which biofuel alternatives can be created using vegetable sources. Renewable diesel, biodiesel, Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF), and bioethanol are typically priced as a spread to their petroleum equivalents: Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel (ULSD), jet fuel, and gasoline respectively. Hence, every dollar Brent holds above its pre-war baseline widens that spread, which favors biofuels over their fossil equivalents.
One caveat to the table above is that current geopolitical tensions are also putting pressure on fertilizer prices – especially urea and nitrogen, which are key inputs in ethanol-based biofuels, representing approximately 59 percent of the energy generated from biofuels. One-third of global fertilizer transits through the Strait of Hormuz, and the resulting supply disruption is one reason fertilizer company stocks have surged in the past month.
A second caveat: while biofuels such as ethanol can be seen as a less damaging source of energy compared to fossil fuels, they still put pressure on the food system by consuming both land and fertilizer. The food-fuel trade-off is material double-sided risk: first-generation biofuels divert cropland and fertilizer from food production at precisely the moment food prices are surging, and governments that over-extend biofuel mandates risk a political backlash that could reverse the very policies underpinning these companies’ margins.
Biofuels Are Politically Smart
Subsidizing biofuels remains a politically savvy move even for a pro-fossil-fuel Trump administration, delivering tangible mid-term wins such as locking in farm-state loyalty through sustained demand for corn ethanol and soy biodiesel – key to holding the Midwest in the 2026 midterms and beyond. It positions Trump as delivering on “America First” energy by blending more domestic biofuels to shave a few cents off pump prices, shielding consumers from import shocks while boosting rural jobs. We believe that support for the sector in the U.S. – but also in the EU and Brazil – will increase in the coming months, acting as an additional tailwind.
What makes the U.S. economics particularly compelling is that rising oil prices are layered on top of a policy incentive stack that operates independently of the Brent price. There are three distinct credit streams:
- RINs (Renewable Identification Numbers): Under the EPA’s Renewable Fuel Standard, fuel blenders must purchase credits from biofuel producers to meet mandated volumes. D4 RINs – the category covering renewable diesel and biodiesel – currently trade at approximately $1.00–1.60 per credit, adding roughly $0.35–0.55 per gallon to producer margins.
- LCFS (Low Carbon Fuel Standard): California rewards fuels with low carbon intensity with tradeable credits. These currently range from $50–80 per tonne of CO₂ avoided, worth $0.20–0.50 per gallon for the lowest-carbon fuels such as used cooking oil (UCO)-based renewable diesel.
- 45Z Clean Fuel Production Credit (IRA, effective January 2025 through 2027 with potential extensions): This new federal credit provides up to $0.35/gallon for sustainable aviation fuel and $0.20/gallon for ground transportation fuels at base rates – rising to $1.75/gallon for SAF and $1.00/gallon for other fuels for producers meeting prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements. The credit scales with carbon intensity, so the cleanest producers capture the most.
Together, these three layers can add $1.00–2.00 per gallon to margins for best-in-class producers – a structural floor that holds even if crude retreats from its current elevated levels. This is the real economic story behind the sector’s re-rating.
The list of investable (>$1B market cap) companies in the biofuel space remains limited. Neste is one of the largest suppliers of SAF in the world, though it also runs a profitable downstream oil business. Darling Ingredients supplies the waste greases and fats that are refined into fuel by other players. Smaller emerging-market pure plays like Sao Martinho offer direct exposure to the Brazilian biofuel market.
Biofuel names have silently outperformed the broader market by a substantial margin over the past year. That said, recent outperformance should be interpreted in light of the fact that the valuation of the whole sector had collapsed in 2022 alongside much of the broader “ESG complex.”
Higher feedstock costs and regulatory shifts are nonetheless creating a stark divide between more established, diversified players and emerging pure plays.
Neste: Shares remain supported despite leverage concerns, as investors focus on Neste’s SAF refinery expansion in Rotterdam. Recent news flow keeps the narrative centered on future capacity and policy-driven demand, outweighing near-term balance sheet risks.
Darling Ingredients: The stock rally reflects strong momentum driven by tight feedstock supply and robust renewable diesel margins. The key engine here is the Diamond Green Diesel (DGD) joint venture with Valero Energy – one of the world’s largest renewable diesel facilities, with capacity of approximately 1.2 billion gallons per year. Valero’s downstream distribution network and refining infrastructure give DGD a structural advantage in capturing the full RIN and LCFS credit stack, while the JV structure limits Darling’s capital exposure and maximizes its leverage as the feedstock-supply partner.
Verbio SE: Recovery is underway, but price action is capped by execution risks at new U.S. biofuel plants. Markets are reacting to delays and ramp-up costs, keeping sentiment cautious despite improving cash flow and higher biodiesel prices.
Borregaard: Less tied to fuel markets, Borregaard trades as a defensive bio-based chemicals play. Its limited exposure to volatile biofuel margins explains its stable valuation relative to more cyclical peers.
REX American Resources: Outperformance is driven by carbon capture and ethanol-linked tax credits (45Q). News on project progress is shifting the story from ethanol margins to policy-backed, high-margin decarbonization revenue.
Sao Martinho: Benefiting from strong Brazilian ethanol prices and corn ethanol expansion, with supportive domestic policy. The stock remains inexpensive relative to peers despite solid growth, partly reflecting commodity exposure and BRL currency risk.
Green Plains: Still lagging due to weak ethanol margins and declining revenues, but early traction in high-protein feed (a biofuel co-product) is improving sentiment. Best viewed as a turnaround story within the ethanol segment.
Investment Conviction Hierarchy
Not all names in this sector deserve equal treatment at current prices. Our preference ranking, based on risk-adjusted exposure to the thesis:
Highest conviction – Darling Ingredients (DAR-US). The DGD/Valero JV gives Darling the best combination of scale, waste-based feedstock advantage (animal fats, UCO), and U.S. policy credit capture in the peer group. UCO-based feedstocks generate the lowest carbon intensity scores, maximizing 45Z and LCFS credit capture simultaneously.
High conviction – Sao Martinho (SMTO3-BR). The cheapest name in the peer group, with Brazilian ethanol prices at multi-year highs and RenovaBio CBIO credits providing an additional domestic income layer. Less exposed to any single regulatory regime than U.S. or EU peers, with domestic consumption growth providing a demand floor.
Selective – Neste (NESTE-FI). The undisputed global quality compounder in renewable fuels, but the current valuation already prices in much of the upside. The Rotterdam SAF expansion is the critical catalyst to watch; confirmation of an on-schedule ramp-up would resolve the leverage overhang.
Avoid near-term – Green Plains (GPRE-US). Corn ethanol margins remain structurally compressed, and the high-protein feed pivot is not yet sufficient to rerate the stock.
The U.S.-Israel war with Iran has already exacted a massive humanitarian and environmental toll. One can only hope for a swift end to the madness but even if that should occur, the impact on energy markets will be permanent and akin to the aftermath from Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Sustainability investors rarely have direct portfolio exposure to fossil fuels but are always indirectly affected by them. Today’s Macro Meets Sustainability Update addresses key questions on oil markets and what it means for energy transition investments.
1. Fossil Fuels and The Cost of Capital
One of the major differences between fossil fuel and transition energy investments (solar, wind, among others) investments is their sensitivity to the cost of capital: renewable energy projects require large upfront capital and generate stable cash flows over decades, making their economics highly sensitive to interest rates. In contrast, fossil fuel projects have a larger share of costs tied to ongoing fuel expenses and generate more near-term, commodity-driven cash flows, so their value depends less on financing conditions. As a result, changes in the cost of capital have a much bigger impact on renewables than on oil and gas investments.
Why this matters during an oil spike is that depending on central banks’ reaction function, renewable energy prospects will improve or deteriorate.
Historically, central banks view short oil price spikes as a tax on growth, while prolonged rises in oil prices are expected to be inflationary. This means that policy rates, on the margin, go down to “accommodate” the oil price spike when it is a short-term supply shock and go up to dampen in the inflationary effect when prices are expected to be longer lasting.
Recall that during the COVID-19 pandemic, many central bankers initially described the surge in inflation as “transitory”, expecting it to be temporary due to pandemic-related supply chain disruptions. However, many regretted the forecast as inflation persisted – and jumped again- during the early months of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Today the Governor of the Bank of Canada described the potential for inflation related to the oil price as transitory, a word we wonder if central bankers will again express regret for choosing. It is unclear how long the current oil price surge will last, but pundits are betting toward a long supply crunch. Earlier this week, the head of the International Energy Agency noted that at least forty energy assets across nine countries in the Middle East have been “severely or very severely” damaged since the Iran war began. In Qatar, the damaged liquefied natural gas processing facilities – considered the world’s largest supplier of seaborne gas cargo – is estimated to take three to five years to repair.
At last week’s meeting the U.S. Fed began backtracking on interest rate cuts; rates were left unchanged at the meeting, as was widely expected, and expectations for future rate cuts have been curtailed. Notably, the FOMC members slightly upgraded U.S. economic growth prospects, albeit not by as much as the upward rating to inflation (expected to stay well above the Fed’s 2% target until 2028).
The reaction in renewable energy stocks’ performance to the news was hardly distinguishable from the broader market; both the Clean Energy ETF (ICLN-US) and S&P 500 both sold off on Powell’s speech that outlined a likely delay in rate accommodation. We chalk this up to low confidence; the rate outlook has been messy for some time and recall that last September, we described how the FOMC members are deviating from the conventional central bank’s playbook by cutting rates and simultaneously upgrading the economic outlook and increasing its expectations for inflation to well over 2%.
Our long-held view (for example, please see August 23, 2023 SAA and Climate Change) is that the global economy is ripe for higher structural inflation and most economies are at or near full-employment; it wouldn’t take much for cyclical inflation pressures to be renewed. In this sense, we believe the risks are tilted to higher inflation – interest rates will, on the margin, be a headwind for renewable energy stocks.
2. Renewables and the Energy Security Tailwind
A somewhat more difficult factor to quantify, albeit equally significant for renewables investments, is whether geopolitics today is destroying demand for fossil fuels longer term and favoring a more aggressive switch to renewables.
Until 2022, the concept of energy security was primarily discussed as a priority for emerging economies. But the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China’s limiting of critical materials in response to Trump tariffs, and the U.S.’ hostile involvement in Venezuela have forced most nations to recalculate their appetite for reliance on foreign energy. Solar, wind, geothermal and even nuclear share an advantage over fossil fuels; once the infrastructure is built, it becomes a long-life domestic asset that is far less dependent on global trading systems.
In the most recent World Energy Outlook (2025), the EIA addressed the uptick in energy security as a priority across nations, but concluded that countries are reaching for very different levers to achieve it: many fuel-importing nations are leaning toward renewables and efficiency as solutions, while other countries are simply focusing more on ensuring ample supplies of traditional fuels.
The IEA notes that tracking the diversification of manufacturing capacity of five key clean energy technologies – batteries, heat pumps, electrolysers, solar PV, wind power and EVs – is an important indicator of energy security. Note in the chart below, we show that the installed manufacturing capacity of these technologies is highly geographically concentrated, notably in China. In 2024, China accounted for over 80% of installed manufacturing capacity in every part of the solar PV value chain, and the majority of global manufacturing capacity for wind power components as well. The position of China in battery manufacturing is even stronger, accounting for at least 85% of global production in all parts of the value chain, and over 95% in the case of battery anodes. Manufacturing capacity is more diversified in the case of heat pumps and electrolysers for hydrogen production.
China stands out not least of all because the country dominates supply of the key materials needed for manufacturing of clean energy technology. In this context, it is logical to expect a doubling down in clean energy efforts from China (a country relatively poor in fossil fuel resources but relatively rich in renewable energy inputs). Conversely, now that climate change objectives are no longer relevant in the U.S., the path of least resistance may be to pursue energy security by further levering domestic fossil fuel resources in that country.
We view China and the U.S. as pursuing two opposite paths to energy independence based on their energy resources (fossil fuel vs renewables). Other countries less endowed will necessarily take some middle road, i.e. diversification both among energy trading partners and energy sources. A case in point is India’s pivot to nuclear energy: last year, the government set a goal to develop 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 from approximately 9 GW today and has allocated $2.3 billion for research and development. Earlier this month, the government signed a signed a $2.6 billion deal with Cameco to ensure sufficient uranium supply for the next nine years.
Overall, renewed pressure to improve domestic energy security means a greater pivot to renewables for some nations and will benefit suppliers of renewable energy equipment, though this is unlikely to be a uniform strategy and significantly depends on domestic energy assets available.