Since our last Macro Meets Sustainability update on March 26th, oil prices have crashed back to the levels recorded before the U.S. and Israel invaded Iran. Meanwhile, AI-related stocks are at new all-time highs and have taken many of our preferred electric grid buildout companies with them.
In light of these two macro developments, in today’s Note, we update our views on two key sustainable investment themes: the outlook for renewables and the likelihood of further upside in electrification plays.
Renewables vs. Fossil Fuels: Who is Intermittent Now?
The oil market has produced one of the most dramatic round trips in recent memory. From its pre-conflict level of roughly $80/bbl, Brent crude surged to nearly $120/bbl through mid-March as Strait of Hormuz traffic was severely disrupted, but has since collapsed to under $75/bbl, with WTI down roughly 25% in a single month. Although the situation appears very fragile, the Strait of Hormuz has largely normalized for now and Saudi export capacity has reportedly recovered toward pre-war levels.
The last three months have provided a live stress test by way of China for what the energy transition could look like for nations that pursue electrification and renewable energy production. China’s EV fleet now displaces over 1 million barrels per day of oil demand, equivalent to Oman’s entire output. Its ultra-high-voltage grid delivers domestically generated solar and wind power across the country. Clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025. In March 2026, China exported a record $21.9 billion in solar panels, batteries, and EVs in a single month. All of this means that the Chinese economy was virtually unscathed by the closing of the Strait – according to Goldman Sachs, oil from this region represents less than 6% of China’s energy needs and economists expect that the global oil price spike reduced Chinese GDP by less than 0.2% (compared with 0.5 to 1% for other Asian nations).
Indeed, renewable energy has brought insulation from the oil price shock to the Chinese economy while other nations scramble (governments across four continents enacted various forms of fossil fuel subsidies during the spike). This is because solar, wind, geothermal and even nuclear share an advantage over fossil fuels; once the infrastructure is built, it becomes a long-life domestic asset that is far less dependent on global trading systems.
Ember analyst Kingsmill Bond put it bluntly: “fossil fuels are now intermittent and uncertain, which was the argument levelled against renewables.” The Chinese example indeed suggests that the intermittency risk in energy portfolios has migrated; it now sits in the extraction and logistics infrastructure of fossil fuels, not in the production profile of wind and solar. We stand by our previous conclusion: the path to increased national energy security will be bifurcated. Many nations that have been historically dependent on fuel imports will look to the Chinese example and lean-in to renewables and efficiency, while nations like the U.S. and Canada that are endowed with fossil fuels may double down on extraction of traditional fuels.
For equity portfolios, oil companies’ stock performance mirrors the oil price round trip, with many companies having already given back the gains made since the war began. As the table below highlights, the companies most exposed are those whose long-term oil price assumptions, typically disclosed in annual reports, are sitting above the current forward curve. That said, geopolitical uncertainty argues against attempting to short oil companies at the current juncture.
On the renewable energy side, a more hawkish Fed and sticky inflation means that the rate picture argues for standing aside rather than adding exposure. Renewable energy producers carry significant sensitivity to the discount rate environment since project economics depend on long-dated contracted cash flows financed at capital costs that move directly with yields. We flagged this sensitivity in Q2 as the primary macro risk to the renewable operator thesis, and it has not resolved. A clear Fed pivot signal or durable cooling of core inflation are conditions for revisiting the stand-aside stance.
The rate environment thus argues for patience on renewable energy producers. It has not, however, tempered the market’s appetite for the grid equipment and power management companies that sit upstream of them, where a different set of valuation questions now applies.
Are The Power Plays Overdone?
Last week’s note (“Data Centers: After the Gas Rush,” July 3, 2026) made the case for BESS pure-plays and clean-power developers as a way to capture the AI data center energy buildout from an undervalued entry point.
The flip side of the infrastructure story is grid equipment and power management companies that have made substantial equity price gains alongside AI-related stocks that continue to appreciate despite growing valuation concerns. Indeed, companies like Vertiv have seen eye-watering performance alongside their hyperscale data centre clients. The risk is not that the AI build-out stops, but that it slows or shifts timeline, and at 65-70x trailing earnings there is no valuation cushion for either outcome.
Hyperscaler orders are not irrevocable: Microsoft froze approximately 1.5 gigawatts of self-build data centre projects in April 2025, revising associated equipment orders mid-cycle. The market appears to be drawing its own conclusions: Eaton, a more diversified name in the sector, beat earnings estimates in each of the last two quarters and its stock sold off on both releases; when a company delivers accelerating order growth and raised guidance and the stock declines, expectations have simply become too high to satisfy.
In our last October 23, 2025 Note, Power Hungry: The Real Cost of a Digital Future, we argued that early-cycle beneficiaries in power infrastructure had already re-rated sharply, and the better risk-reward was shifting toward later-cycle optimization and maintenance players. Among the six major infrastructure names tracked since that note, the pattern is unambiguous: the more concentrated the exposure to AI and data centre build-out, the more aggressively the stock has re-rated. In the table below, we show that Vertiv (VRT-US) is up approximately 65% since October 2025, Siemens Energy (ENR-DE) roughly 52%, and ABB (ABBN-CH) around 42%, all while their trailing P/E multiples expanded further into territory that prices execution without error.
For more diversified names, the picture is more nuanced. Eaton (ETN-US) and Schneider Electric (SU-FR) are up 9% and 11% respectively over the same period, from starting points that were already full. Both retain genuine multi-driver revenue bases across grid modernization, industrial electrification, and energy security that are independent of AI capex specifically. The thesis for holding them remains intact. However, at roughly 40x and 35x trailing earnings respectively, both sit at meaningful premiums to their 10-year averages with limited margin for error on execution. Investors should let earnings grow into the multiple rather than add to positions at current levels.
A final group of companies are those that have concentrated exposure to grid optimization, monitoring, and efficiency whose revenues arrive later in the electrification cycle. Emerson Electric (EMR-US), Carrier Global (CAR-US), Honeywell (HON-US), and Daikin Industries (6367-JP) have solid sustainability credentials and most have not yet participated in the recent AI hype swing. As the grid expansion phase matures and attention shifts to maintaining and optimizing an expanded electrical ecosystem, these names offer exposure to the same structural demand with a more comfortable valuation cushion.
Since our last note on Battery, Energy Systems Storage (BESS) in November 2024 (see “What is Store for Energy Storage”) a few trends have accelerated in the industry as the global demand for power continues to grow to supply AI data centers. As such, BESS is now playing a key role in electrification, as evidenced in this week’s news about Spain’s solar power glut and how BESS is changing the economics of renewable power. Although most renewables are now cheaper than gas, the question is how much longer the sector can develop separately from BESS.
Solar is now so cheap that it can undermine its own economics. In sunny regions, it floods the grid at midday, driving prices down just when output peaks. That also makes grid balancing harder and can contribute to outages, as Spain showed last year.
Wind helps because it often produces in the evening, overnight and in winter, when solar output is weak. Together, solar and wind are more valuable than alone. Add batteries, and a hybrid system can deliver firm clean power for $56/MWh today, which is below gas in many markets. With utility-scale storage costs down fourfold since 2016, this advantage should keep improving.
In our last note on batteries (“Beyond Lithium: The Next Battery Boom”, May 21), we discussed how next-generation batteries are moving beyond hard-to-source minerals such as cobalt and lithium. Here we look at the energy mix powering data centers, gas turbines, integrated power developers and BESS pure plays, in a world where the International Energy Agency estimates that two out of every three dollars invested in power now go to renewables.
Gas is Still Winning the Data Center Power Game, but not for long
Natural gas remains the leading power source for U.S. data centers (see chart below). Renewables, already at 24%, are moving up quickly as their LCOE continues to fall.
Current estimates suggest that as much renewable capacity as gas capacity could be added to power U.S. data centers through 2030.
The equation is shifting. Solar+wind+BESS hybrids already beat gas on cost at 95% reliability ($56 vs. $76/MWh), and battery costs are falling faster than any other energy technology. But data centers need power that is always on, instantly responsive, compact and quick to build. On all four counts, gas still wins. Gas turbines can meet 99.9% uptime requirements, handle rapid AI load swings, use far less land and avoid the long interconnection queues that slow solar+storage projects.
But renewables will catch up: by 2030, better interconnection timelines and cheaper storage should narrow the speed and cost gaps. And by 2032–2035, some studies suggest that emerging technologies such as long-duration batteries using technologies such as iron-air and flow systems could close much of the reliability gap. For the remaining edge case – ultra-firm power for the largest AI clusters – is where hyperscalers are placing their bets on Small Modular Reactor (SMR) and have already signed offtake agreements from Amazon, Google, Microsoft and Meta targeting first power from SMRs in the early 2030s.
Until then – and given the probable delay in the large scale deployment of SMRs – several BESS players, clean-power developers and data-center power suppliers remain worth watching as they will remain a key part of the power supply chain for the foreseeable future.
BESS: The Future is Now
BESS is having its “wow” moment as one of the fastest-growing technology segments, scaling at a pace that mirrors AI demand. Four players are gaining share in the U.S. data-center market.
Fluence Energy (FLNC-US): Fluence reported a record contracted backlog of $5.60 billion as of March 31, 2026, helped by its pivot toward AI data centers and MSAs with two major hyperscalers. These deals validate its “Smartstack” platform as a shock absorber for short-duration AI power spikes. Margins are also improving, with adjusted gross margins reaching 11.10% in Q2 2026.
Eos Energy (EOSE-US): Eos is scaling its Z3 zinc-based battery platform. 2025 revenue rose sevenfold to $114.20 million, and Manufacturing Line 2 in Pennsylvania should double annualized capacity to 4 GWh by end-2026. Its Frontier Power USA partnership with Cerberus, backed by a $1.50 billion technology-performance insurance framework, should help address project-finance hurdles for non-lithium systems.
ESS Tech (GWH-US): ESS Tech is commercializing iron-flow technology for 10- to 22-hour storage. Recent milestones include Project New Horizon with Google and Salt River Project, a 50 MWh pilot in Arizona, and a partnership with Alsym Energy to develop sodium-ion solutions. Its iron-flow chemistry was also independently validated by the American Public Power Association after a 21-month utility demonstration.
Merus Power (MERUS-FI) is emerging as a European BESS leader, with 2025 net sales of €54.60 million and a CATL agreement to deliver 3 GWh of storage solutions in Nordic Europe. It is also advancing grid-forming technology, including the first commercial GFM storage facility in the Nordics for Alpiq, alongside recent projects in Finland, Latvia, Poland and Denmark.
Except for Fluence, these companies have mostly underperformed over the past year. As with other emerging technologies, a market-cap-weighted basket may make sense to enter into a position in this fast-moving sector.
Enter Clean Power Suppliers and Integrators
Beyond pure-play BESS companies, several clean-power suppliers are also well positioned to power U.S. data centers. Established names such as NextEra and AES are seeing a growing share of their backlog tied to AI demand.
NextEra Energy (NEE-US) is expanding its “Data Center Hub” strategy, with more than 30 sites representing over 60 GW of potential capacity as of April 2026. It added 4.0 GW to its renewables and storage backlog, now about 33 GW, and was selected by the U.S. Department of Commerce to build 9.5 GW of gas-fired generation in Texas and Pennsylvania for large-scale users such as data centers.
The AES Corp (AES-US) is undergoing a major transition after shareholders approved a $10.7 billion take-private acquisition by a consortium led by Global Infrastructure Partners and EQT. The firm is also pioneering “Powered Land” solutions, including a 20-year PPA with Google for co-located generation in Texas. Its 2025 renewables backlog stood at 12.0 GW.
Clean Max (544717-IN) has grown rapidly in data centers, with contracted capacity for Data and AI customers rising tenfold in two years to 2,380 MW. Key deals include a roughly 900 MW renewable agreement with Meta in India and a 150 MW co-investment with Apple. Its EBITDA run-rate reached ₹1,870 crore in early 2026.
Brookfield Renewable (BEP-US) commissioned over 9 GW of new capacity in the past 12 months and aims for 10 GW per year by 2027. Its Neoen acquisition added 1.5 GW of operating battery storage and a nearly 50 GW development pipeline, making storage its fastest-growing segment.
Most have underperformed the market over the past year, except Clean Max. Given the power-demand outlook, exposure to names such as Clean Max could make sense.
Are we at Peak Gas for Data Centers?
Finally, investors should consider “legacy” data-center power suppliers, especially companies tied to gas turbines. If solar+wind+BESS keeps improving versus gas on LCOE and reliability, the current enthusiasm for turbine makers could fade. This could be especially true if renewables’ ability to close the reliability gap from 95% to 99.9% should improve as battery and solar costs fall and AI-driven load management spreads across utilities.
Unlike BESS and clean-power names, gas turbine makers have sharply outperformed over the past year, though they appear to have lost momentum despite large backlogs. Their recent appreciation could therefore create a short opportunity if renewables+BESS and, later, SMRs begin to displace gas on cost and efficiency. This could be true for companies such as GE Vernova, which is now deriving most of its revenues from selling gas turbines to data centers while still struggling to deliver profits with its wind power division.
Baker Hughes (BKR-US) has repositioned itself from oilfield services toward industrial energy technology. Its NovaLT turbine platform is built for distributed power, allowing data-center operators to bypass grid-connection queues and secure power quickly.
Siemens Energy (ENR-DE) benefits from structural demand in Grid Technologies, driven by the need to connect massive AI loads. Management says gas-turbine pricing remains favorable, with average prices per GW rising by the high teens year-over-year in early 2026 as hyperscalers pay premiums for faster delivery. The company booked nearly €2 billion of data-center-related Grid orders in H1 fiscal 2026.
The sustainable investment industry has spent two years debating whether defence is a sustainable investment. That is the wrong question. Whether Rheinmetall qualifies for an Article 9 fund misses what actually matters: whether investors have the analytical tools to hold defence companies to account for what they make, who their customers are, and what happens when their products reach the battlefield. Responsibility, rather than sustainability, is the appropriate standard, and it is a more demanding one than any taxonomy classification.
Data published this month records 65 active armed conflicts in 2025, the highest count since records began in 1946, with 244,600 people killed in organised violence, the second deadliest total since the Rwanda genocide in 1994. Eight of those conflicts are interstate wars, the most since World War II.
As a logical consequence, world military expenditure reached $2.8 trillion in 2025, up 41% since 2015, with forecasts pointing to $6.6 trillion by 2035. Europe’s ReArm Europe plan commits €800 billion; the United Kingdom has pledged 5% of GDP in defence spending by 2035. The capital flows are real, growing, and unlikely to reverse whether or not an Article 9 fund knows what to call them.
This note builds on the SMS framework introduced in our March 2025 note “The European Defense Offensive: From Peace Dividend to War Premium”, which identified five screening criteria (Controversial Weapons Exclusions, Allied Revenue Alignment, Government Independence, R&D Investment, and Strategic Defence Orientation) and a cohort of European specialists we termed the second wave.
Between July 2022 and the publication of our March 2025 European Defence Offensive, the SMS European Defence Specialists Basket delivered approximately 550% in total return. That performance continued for some time but has corrected heavily since the February 2026 peak. Over the fifteen months since publication, the basket, the S&P 500, and the American Defence Primes delivered 28%, 27%, and 25% respectively – effectively the same trade. The valuation re-rating of underowned European specialists as defence budgets re-accelerated is complete. The entry point that defined the first and second waves is gone.
The chart above is the investment case for this note: the opportunity that justified the first note has closed, and a new one has opened. What follows is where the next leg of returns will come from.
Red Lines That No Longer Hold
There was a time when a blanket defence exclusion was defensible. The sector consisted predominantly of identifiable end-products: tanks, artillery, fighter jets, submarines. Revenue streams were opaque but outputs were not. An investor that decided it did not want to own defence companies could draw a clean line around the category and walk away without much analytical strain.
That is no longer the case. The reason is dual-use, a property that once described finished technology products but now runs the entire length of the value chain, from raw materials to drones.
Upstream, the rare earth elements that power an EV motor, a wind turbine, or a smartphone are chemically identical to those in a drone motor, a missile guidance system, or an electronic warfare suite. Neodymium is neodymium. MP Materials (MP-US) is the only integrated rare earth mine and mill in the United States, indispensable to the domestic clean energy supply chain AND is simultaneously supplying the Pentagon under a ten-year offtake agreement backed by $400 million in government investment. An exclusionary policy that excludes MP Materials while retaining clean energy exposure would apply different standards to identical atoms depending on who writes the purchase order. Some investors will make that choice deliberately, as an expression of values. The point is that it is a values choice, not an analytical finding, and the clean line it tries to draw no longer maps cleanly onto the physical world.
Downstream, the same logic applies in reverse. The satellite constellation that provides broadband internet provides battlefield targeting. The AI platform that optimises logistics for a retailer optimises resupply for a military base. The same imaging system that monitors agricultural land monitors conflict zones. Revenue segmentation by end-use is rarely disclosed at the granularity a meaningful screen requires, and when it is, it rarely captures what happens to the technology once it leaves the company.
This is why the third wave which we discussed in this week’s note is different in character from the first and second.
The Rare Earth Elements (REE) Megatrend
Permanent magnets made from neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium are the enabling component in precision guidance systems, drone motors, missile actuators, electronic warfare equipment, and submarine propulsion. Demand for magnet rare earths has doubled since 2015, with defence among the structural growth drivers alongside EVs and wind. China processes approximately 85-95% of these materials at the midstream metallization and separation stage – a share the IEA projects will remain at 75% by 2035 even under an optimistic build-out scenario.

We have covered the OECD REE investment case in depth across three prior notes, beginning with “Critical Minerals, Critical Moves” (May 2025) and “Rare Opportunities in Rare Earths” (November 2025), and most recently in “From Transition Play to Arms Race: A Critical Materials Reset” (May 28, 2026) – published days before China’s June escalation. Readers seeking the full company-level analysis of the OECD REE basket should refer to these notes. What follows is specific to the defence demand driver and the regulatory timeline it has introduced.
That pressure reached a new peak just a couple weeks ago, in the week of June 15, 2026. The G7 set a target of no single country supplying more than 60% of each member’s rare-earth imports by 2030; the European Council proposed a formal de-risking mechanism; and China responded on June 22 with targeted export controls on US defence companies and rare-earth mining firms. Washington had already anticipated this: from January 1, 2027, a federal rule (DFARS) bans the Pentagon from procuring any system containing permanent magnets originating from China, a deadline China’s own controls have now made considerably harder to ignore. Active inventory depletion sharpens the timeline: the US has reportedly consumed approximately 45% of its Precision Strike Missile stockpile and 30% of its Tomahawk inventory, and restocking every unit requires REE-dependent components that cannot contain Chinese-origin material after that date.
The bottleneck is not mining but the midstream. A separation facility without downstream magnet makers has no local market, and magnet makers need committed offtake from defence, automotive, wind, and industrial customers simultaneously. The mine-to-magnet loop is only investable when all links close at once. The gap between stated policy ambition and physical processing capacity is precisely where the returns are.
The Investable OECD REE Basket
Most of the names below will be familiar to readers of our prior REE note series. Our conviction on the core positions is unchanged.
The three core positions remain MP Materials (MP-US), Lynas Rare Earths (LYC-AU), and Energy Fuels (UUUU-US). MP Materials is the only integrated US rare earth mine and mill, backed by a $400 million Pentagon investment, with REE separation commissioning at Mountain Pass by mid-2026. Lynas, the largest non-Chinese REE company at $13.5 billion, is completing its Texas REE separation facility with DoD funding. Energy Fuels received a $725 million conditional DoD loan commitment on June 18 and disclosed the $1.9 billion acquisition of Vacuumschmelze (VAC), the German precision magnet manufacturer. VAC holds existing qualification relationships with defence OEMs, bypassing the multi-year approval cycles new entrants face. The combined entity is the only OECD operation with a credible mine-to-magnet platform connecting US processing to European defence manufacturing. At $3.5 billion market cap, it looks underpriced relative to the strategic value of the VAC qualification book.
Two smaller names address specific gaps the core three do not cover. NEO Performance Materials (NEO-CA) is ramping its Estonia magnet factory to 2,000 tpa by end-2026, entirely outside Chinese processing influence. REalloys (ALOY-US) is building the largest REE metallization facility outside China in partnership with the Saskatchewan Research Council, with a 15-year offtake from the Tanbreez project in Greenland. It is important to note that REalloys came to market via reverse merger and is the highest-risk name in the basket. 5N Plus (VNP-CA) rounds out the basket with exposure to gallium, germanium, indium, and bismuth – the four materials subject to China’s August 2023 export controls and directly applied in compound semiconductors, radar, and night vision systems.
The REE basket has delivered; but unlike the European defence name re-rating, which converged to S&P 500 performance after March 2025, we do not believe this trade is over. The structural drivers – China’s escalating export control posture, a federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin magnets effective January 2027, and a supply chain buildout still measured in years rather than quarters – have not been resolved by the price action.
Third Defence Wave: Beyond the Primes
The REE basket addresses the supply side of the thesis. The names below address the demand side: platform specialists, systems integrators, and software-adjacent companies whose growth directly drives REE demand. What distinguishes them from the first and second wave is selectivity, not valuation re-rating – that trade is complete. Defence budgets are accelerating in unmanned systems, electronic warfare, naval domain awareness, and AI-assisted decision-making. The five names below are positioned where the spending is going and have not yet been fully absorbed by institutional capital.
- Hensoldt (HAG-DE) is Germany’s pure-play radar, electronic warfare, and optronics specialist. Its TRML-4D radar and Kalaetron electronic warfare suite are on order across multiple NATO allies. Revenue for FY2025 was approximately €2.1 billion against a backlog exceeding three times that figure.
- Renk Group (RENK-DE) is the sole supplier of tank transmissions for the Leopard 2 and propulsion systems for Germany’s Type 212 submarines, with no direct European competitor in naval propulsion at its scale. Revenue is approximately €1.1 billion with an order book accelerating across European navies and armoured forces. The demand trajectory is the strongest of any name in this section.
- Exail Technologies (EXA-FR) operates in the fastest-growing segment of naval spending: underwater domain awareness. Its DriX unmanned surface vessel and Gaps autonomous underwater vehicle serve both oceanographic and military customers, with NATO’s post-Ukraine emphasis on submarine detection providing a direct demand catalyst. The civilian revenue base diversifies against defence budget cyclicality.
- Kratos Defense (KTOS-US) is the closest pure-play on the affordable autonomous systems thesis: drones cheap enough to deploy in volume and lose in combat. This technology sits in a sub-sector where the US Air Force has no incumbent prime to protect. Revenue for FY2025 was approximately $1.2 billion.
- Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH-US) is the primary beneficiary of AI adoption within the US defence and intelligence establishment, bringing the cleared workforce and contract vehicles that pure technology platforms cannot replicate. Revenue for FY2025 was approximately $11.5 billion. The thesis is durable margin expansion as AI tooling reduces contract delivery costs. Government contractor risk is endemic to the category and priced into the current multiple.
Most of the basket has underperformed the MSCI World in the last year. That underperformance is the entry point, not a reason for caution.
The structural case has not deteriorated. It has strengthened. The Bundeswehr’s €100 billion fund is disbursing. NATO navies are ordering. The federal procurement ban on Chinese-origin rare earth magnets takes effect in seven months. Hensoldt and Renk enter this note’s coverage at a correction that their underlying order books do not justify. Booz Allen has been caught in the crossfire of US government IT spending reviews that are, by design, temporary.
The first and second wave re-rated on valuation. The third wave will re-rate on earnings, driven by a procurement cycle accelerating into the specific sub-sectors where these names face no credible competition from the large primes. The gap between the chart above and the order books behind these companies is where the next leg of returns is.
Food sits at the intersection of virtually every sustainability theme we track. The sector is responsible for roughly one-third of global greenhouse gas emissions, is the single largest driver of land use change and biodiversity loss, and places enormous pressure on freshwater systems. At the same time, the products that food companies sell shape the health outcomes of billions of people; the social impact is both direct and, as the obesity epidemic makes clear, financially enormous. Few industries make the case for double materiality as compellingly as food: sustainability factors are reshaping the financial performance of food companies while these companies shape sustainability outcomes.
The modern Big Food conglomerate was built on a simple and highly effective premise: branded consumer staples businesses generate reliable, recurring cash flows that can support significant debt, while scale in manufacturing, distribution, and marketing creates durable competitive advantages that justify paying premium prices for acquisitions. Indeed, from the 1980s through the mid-2010s, companies like Nestlé, Kraft, Unilever, and PepsiCo assembled vast brand portfolios through successive acquisitions, financing them with cheap debt and integrating them through aggressive cost reduction.
This model historically brought investors steady returns in the form of rich dividends and stable prices; food companies traditionally provided a safe harbor during equity bear markets. But the last few years have been wrought with unfulfilled expectations – even in market downturns, food companies have been unable to generate market returns (please see the chart below).
Indeed, even these properties – stability and recession proofing – are now under fire. The financial model of food company success assumed two things that are no longer true: that volumes would remain stable or grow as populations expanded and emerging market consumers traded up, and that brand loyalty in packaged food was durable enough to support perpetual price increases. Both assumptions have been invalidated simultaneously. We identify six forces – the bulk of which are environmental and social issues – that are stacked against Big Food. We then identify the biggest losers: companies that we believe make superior short candidates at the current juncture.
1. GLP-1: Structural Demand Destruction
There is now sufficient evidence that GLP-1 drug adoption is in full swing and related behaviors tend to be long lasting: a person who loses 15-20% of body weight on semaglutide and recalibrates their relationship with food is not coming back as a Frito-Lay customer in the same way.
As we highlighted in our January 2025 note, The Weight Loss Heavyweights Still Lead the GLP-1 Revolution, households with at least one GLP-1 user cut grocery spending by 6%, with the sharpest cuts in calorie-dense processed and snack foods. That number will only grow as penetration expands; semaglutide U.S. prescriptions went from roughly 2 million adults in 2021 to an estimated 15 million in early 2026.
This matters particularly for companies like Mondelez (MDLZ-US), Hershey’s (HSY-US) and PepsiCo (PEP-US) because their revenue is disproportionately concentrated in exactly the product categories GLP-1 users reduce first: chips, cookies, crackers, and sugary beverages. There is no hedge within their portfolios, as the table below highlights: we show the revenue derived from unhealthy snacks and drinks.
2. Input Cost Pressure is Not Going Away
We have written many times about our high conviction view that that climate-linked supply disruptions in key agricultural inputs are a structural, not transitory, phenomenon and that food inflation will chronically outpace other inflation categories (for example, please see our March 2024 note, No Free Lunch: Challenges and Opportunities for Engagement in the Food Supply Chain).
High and volatile prices of coffee, cocoa, oranges, palm oil, and now tomatoes, are direct input costs for food manufacturers. Rising or volatile agricultural prices feed directly into margins, making for sustained downward pressure on profitability.
3. A Decade of Pricing Power Is Exhausted
Big Food spent the first part of the 2020s using inflationary cover to push through price increases to protect margins when agricultural input costs rose. Today, however, there are increasing signs that consumers have exhausted their tolerance for higher shelf prices. Several major players (General Mills (GIS-US), Campbell’s (CPB-US), Kraft Heinz (KHC-US), etc.) have been reporting consecutive quarters of volume declines that increases can no longer offset. Consumers are increasingly opting for store brands: the private label share of grocery sales in the U.S. hit multi-decade highs in 2025.
4. MAHA: Muted but Not Irrelevant
Our August 2025 note “MAHA: All Hat and No Cattle” concluded that MAHA was lacked regulatory teeth on both pesticide use and ultra-processed food consumption, and Big Ag lobbying had effectively defused the most threatening policy proposals.
That conclusion stands, but the impact of the MAHA movement should not be entirely dismissed. It has sustained negative media attention on food additives, dyes, and ultra-processed ingredients, which has pushed some companies into reactive reformulation commitments to remove artificial dyes and reduce sodium that add cost without necessarily winning back consumers who have already changed their purchasing behavior. And it has kept Big Food in a defensive posture at exactly the moment they need to be investing offensively in portfolio repositioning.
5. Interest Rates and the Debt Overhang
Consumer staples were bid up during the zero-rate era as bond proxies because they offered reliable dividends, stable earnings, and inflation pass-through. The repricing of that trade as rates rose has been brutal for the sector. More concretely, the M&A-built balance sheets across Big Food carry substantial debt loads that are now being refinanced at materially higher rates. Kraft Heinz’s long-term debt remains north of $20 billion. For companies facing both revenue pressure and margin compression, the combination of higher interest expense and reduced operating cash flow narrows the room to invest in brand renovation.
6. The Conglomerate Model Has Broken Down
The Big Food conglomerate model is to buy brands, cut costs aggressively, lever up, extract synergies, use pricing power to grow cash flows. This works when volumes are growing or stable and interest rates are low. However, that model seems to have reached its endpoint: companies that built scale through acquisition are sitting on portfolios of brands with very different growth profiles – while some are growing, many are mature or declining, and investors appear no longer willing to reward the diversification.
Divestitures currently represent about half of total consumer products M&A activity, and that share is expected to continue to rise according to a recent Bain survey: 42% of M&A executives in the industry are prepping an asset for sale over the next three years. High-profile examples of recent activity include Kellogg’s split into Kellanova (snacks) and WK Kellogg Co. (cereals), Unilever’s spinoff of its ice cream business (Ben & Jerry’s, Magnum, Wall’s), Nestlé shedding of its water portfolio and underperforming brands, and General Mills’ announcement earlier this month that it will sell its Häagen-Dazs shops in mainland China. Meanwhile, Kraft Heinz, while staying together for now, suffered intense speculation throughout 2025 about a breakup.
To be sure, many of the forces described above have occurred before: it is not the first time that Big Food has navigated input cost spikes, consumer downtrading, private label competition, and leveraged balance sheets. However, it is rare that all these forces happen simultaneously, with a structural demand destruction driver (GLP-1) to boot.
Given this challenging environment, and despite the already poor performance of many food companies, we find it more relevant to pursue opportunities to short sell (rather than buy) food manufacturing companies.
What To Short Now
In previous research, we have identified several food and agri-businesses that we consider solid short candidates from a sustainability perspective, whether it be environmental, labor or governance concerns. On the flipside, we find very few food companies in our long universe: “sustainable winners” are difficult to find since many of the food majors are fraught with controversy risk and derive significant revenue portions from unhealthy and unsustainable business lines (please see our note February 13, 2025 Food Fight: Policy’s Effect on Food Producers & Inflation).
From our universe of short candidates, we screen for those that are most exposed to the headwinds described above: rising input costs, high debt loads, inability to raise prices, sales volume slowdown due to declining popularity of product offerings, current valuations and recent stock price action. The following table ranks the major players:
At the top of the list is Mondelez – the maker of Oreos, Cadbury, Ritz crackers, Toblerone and countless other snacks and desserts. The stock rallied 15% in 2026, sending the stock’s twelve-month trailing P/E to over 31 times, a 30% premium over the 5-year average P/E. We find this rich valuation impossible to defend. First and foremost, in El Nino years like this one, uncertainty about future cocoa prices tend to surge and as described above, consumers’ appetite to absorb higher input costs by way of paying more for junk food has been fully squashed. With little room for volume or price expansion, current valuations suggest a very challenging environment for Mondelez’s new CFO to deliver.
A second favored stock to short is Hershey, which is also trading higher than its historical valuation, remarkable given the company faces a more acute version of Mondelez’s input cost problem: cocoa is Hershey’s primary cost of goods. The stock is about flat YTD, which implies investors may not be worried about the cocoa cost trajectory and/or are downplaying the GLP-1 demand headwind on chocolate. One material factor that could be putting a floor under Hershey stock is possible M&A activity: Mondelez has repeatedly explored a Hershey acquisition, though has so far been unsuccessful. Mondelez’s own balance sheet and the cocoa cost exposure makes the economics of such a deal increasingly questionable.
PepsiCo also ranks highly on our short candidate list using the logic articulated above, although the stock has already corrected from its February highs, suggesting that at least part of this trade has already occurred. Investors should wait for a better opportunity before adding to short positions.
One company that we notably leave off our short list is Monster Beverage. Energy drinks have so far been immune to changing consumption behaviours regarding GLP-1 use. GLP-1 patients frequently report fatigue and seek ways to sustain energy; Monster’s products appear to fit the bill. Q1 2026 was the company’s best quarter ever, with revenue increasing 27% annually.
PFAS (per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances) are a family of more than 10,000 synthetic compounds unified by the carbon-fluorine bond – among the strongest bonds in organic chemistry, and the reason these molecules persist indefinitely in biological tissue, groundwater, and soil. The clinical literature on chronic exposure above threshold concentrations is not in dispute: elevated risk of kidney and testicular cancer, thyroid disruption, immune suppression, and developmental toxicity in infants.
PFAS contamination can in principle be addressed two ways: reduce production at source, or manage the substance once it has been produced and released. The table below maps which path applies to each major use.
Source reduction is viable for consumer products – cookware, food packaging, carpets, textiles – and for new firefighting foam applications. These are also the slowest-growing categories. The categories where substitution is genuinely impossible at commercial scale – semiconductor fabrication, medical implants, precision industrial applications – are among the fastest-growing segments of the global economy. There is no credible substitution timeline for either.
Moreover, the green energy transition adds a specific conundrum. PVDF binders in lithium-ion batteries, Nafion membranes in electrolysers and fuel cells, and fluoropolymer films in solar panels are critical inputs with no current commercial alternative – a textbook wicked problem: the faster the world deploys clean energy infrastructure, the more PFAS are released in the environment.
The scale of contamination is staggering. In the United States, recent analysis found that 176 million Americans drink water from systems containing PFAS, resulting in approximately 6,800 new cancer cases per year. In Europe, an estimated 200 million people are exposed above established safety thresholds. In Asia, the magnitude is unknown due to the lack of credible research but given that Asia is the global centre for the industries most responsible for PFAS pollution – fluorochemical manufacturing, textile finishing, and semiconductor fabrication – which makes the data gap a reason for concern. What started as a U.S.-EU regulatory push has become one of the most unusual examples of global environmental policy collaboration, based on independent scientific research and (mostly) free of political interference.
The practical conclusion for investors is that PFAS end-of-life management – testing, removal, and destruction – carries a structural demand floor that source reduction cannot offset. It is estimated that EUR 226 billion in incremental water treatment and remediation capex will be required in Europe alone through 2040.
The Global Landscape
In May 2026, the EPA rolled back the Biden administration’s 2024 PFAS additions – rescinding limits on four specific compounds – while retaining the core 4 ng/L standards for PFOA and PFOS that cover more than 66,000 public water systems. States are filling the gap immediately; California, New York, and Michigan were already enforcing stricter standards than the federal floor. And the largest single source of U.S. remediation demand – more than 700 contaminated DoD military sites – is governed by congressional mandate, unaffected by EPA rulemaking. The rollback is narrower than the headlines suggest, and the capital obligation for utilities and the federal government remains intact.
Elsewhere in the world:
- Australia presents the starkest near-term country opportunity. The outright national ban on PFOS, PFHxS, and PFOA, effective July 1, 2025, was accompanied by revised national drinking water guidelines covering a broader compound list.
- Japan moved from administrative guidance to legally binding water quality standards under the Waterworks Act in April 2026, covering all regulated utilities. Japan is expected to be the next major PFAS testing growth frontier driven by the same compliance monitoring surge that propelled over 70% year-on-year PFAS revenue growth in Europe through 2025.
- Canada sits earlier in the tightening cycle. Health Canada’s August 2024 objective sets 30 ng/L for the sum of 25 PFAS – advisory rather than binding – and a March 2025 State of PFAS Report recommended binding discharge limits and mandatory wastewater monitoring.
Three Layers, Three Windows
Framing PFAS as a single market dominated by water treatment equipment companies misses the sequential structure of how remediation actually unfolds. The value chain has three distinct layers, each with a different demand trigger and risk profile.

Layer 1: Detect. Before any water utility can remediate PFAS, it must measure concentrations at parts-per-trillion sensitivity – a task requiring specialized liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) and automated sample preparation. Detection spending is the first financial obligation triggered by any new regulatory limit, in any jurisdiction, scaling directly with the number of monitoring points required.
Agilent Technologies (A-US) and Waters Corp. (WAT-US) are the dominant instrument players, reporting PFAS revenue growth of more than 70% and 40% respectively in 2025. Despite the growth of PFAS testing, it still only represents 2–3% of their total revenues. Agilent and Waters were covered in our September 19, 2024 note “Pass or Fail: Investment Opportunities in the Testing Market”.
The only listed company that offers genuine PFAS testing exposure at material scale is ALS Limited (ALQ-AU). Based in Australia but with global operations across 65+ countries, ALS is a global testing, inspection, and certification specialist. Environmental services represent roughly 40% of group revenue, with PFAS testing growing at 2.5x the rate of the rest of the environmental segment.
Layer 2: Remove. This market is dominated by concentration-based filtration: granular activated carbon (GAC) adsorbs PFAS from water, and ion exchange (IX) resins strip them from solution. Both are proven, scalable technologies.
Xylem (XYL-US), Veolia (VIE-FR), and Pentair (PNR-US) are typically the go-to names for water-related investments, but PFAS-related activities represent a rounding error on their revenue line. For instance, Xylem started offering Evoqua’s ion exchange and advanced oxidation treatment capabilities following the 2023 acquisition but it represents single-digit revenue percentage. Veolia, the world’s largest water operator, inaugurated one of Europe’s largest PFAS treatment plants in June 2025 so their PFAS revenues are still recent. And Pentair launched its Everpure PFAS Filtration line for food service and commercial applications in 2025. While PFAS filtration is a growing subset, it is not material on its own for Pentair.
For a truly pure-play PFAS-related name, Zurn Elkay (ZWS-US) could be considered. Its PFAS-certified filtration products account for about 20% of total revenue and are its fastest-growing platform. Their PFAS product line targets the primary buyers facing compliance obligations under both U.S. PFOA/PFOS standards and expanding state-level requirements. The secular tailwinds – aging U.S. water infrastructure, PFAS compliance, lead pipe replacement – support long-term organic growth across economic cycles for Zurn Elkay.
Layer 3: Destroy. Permanent PFAS elimination requires severing the C-F bond through high-temperature incineration (above 1,100°C), electrochemical oxidation, or supercritical water oxidation. The EPA and Pentagon formally endorsed high-temperature incineration as the recommended permanent disposal route in 2025, providing regulatory validation for Clean Harbors’ platform, which is the only company offering a commercially scalable, single-source pathway from PFAS waste receipt to permanent elimination. The strategic logic is direct. Every water utility or industrial operator running activated carbon or ion exchange for PFAS removal eventually generates a concentrated waste stream requiring permanent destruction. Clean Harbors is the most credible, commercially proven destination for that waste. PFAS-related revenues are growing at 25–35% quarter-on-quarter.
Another relevant PFAS elimination company is Onterris Inc. (ONT-US), formerly known as Montrose Environmental Group. It is the highest-conviction name in the PFAS services and technology layer. The critical differentiator is that Onterris owns patented PFAS treatment technologies, separating it from technology-agnostic environmental consulting peers and giving it pricing power that service-only competitors cannot replicate.
Four Companies Worth a Closer Look
The four companies span a wide range of financial maturity within the same theme. Clean Harbors has outperformed the S&P 500 by a significant margin over five years. At 33x forward earnings the market is pricing continued execution on its PFAS pipeline, a premium the pipeline growth and margin expansion trajectory justify, though it leaves little room for disappointment. Zurn Elkay and ALS Limited offer a more straightforward investment case: both trade in the mid-20s forward earnings, with EBITDA margins above 20%, and generate organic growth that traces directly to the global regulatory tightening cycle. Onterris is the outlier. The stock has declined 60% since 2021 while the S&P 500 nearly doubled, the consequence of an acquisition-driven growth model that clashed with a rate-rising cycle while carrying too much debt and insufficient net income. However, EBITDA margins are now expanding, the PFAS pipeline is building, and the stock trades well below analyst consensus targets. The execution risk is real; so is the upside for investors prepared to carry it.
Transition theme valuations peaked in January 2021 and declined through late 2024, even as the Biden administration enacted the Inflation Reduction Act. That legislation is now effectively defunct. Yet from late 2025, transition themes staged a broad recovery and outperformed most benchmarks despite a White House hostile to the sustainability agenda. The lesson: political headwinds were not the primary risk. Inflation and interest rates were – and they may be again.
Although 5- and 10-year inflation breakeven rates have remained relatively stable, survey-based inflation expectations have been rising. A Federal Reserve potentially more hawkish under Kevin Warsh is now weighing the possibility that its next move is a hike, not a cut. The yield curve confirms the shift: the 2-year Treasury yield has risen nearly 50 basis points over the past six months. For long-duration transition equities, even a modest rise in real yields translates directly into multiple compression, as 2022 demonstrated clearly.
Seven Sub-Themes, Seven Different Rate Exposures
We divide the energy transition into seven sub-themes – Utilities/Regulated Power, Renewables Developers/IPPs, Grid/Power Equipment, Energy Storage, Hydrogen/CCUS/DAC, Clean Transport/EV Supply Chain, and Mining/Critical Minerals – and exclude fossil fuel companies whose revenues remain predominantly hydrocarbon-linked.
While all sectors are typically affected by rising rates, we think that some sectors should demonstrate more resilience than others, given three structural differences from 2022:
- AI-driven electrification has created a durable demand floor for grid equipment and power generators. US data center power demand is projected to reach 35-40 GW by 2030, up from roughly 17 GW in 2022, according to EPRI and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimates. Utilities across PJM, MISO, and ERCOT are already reporting multi-year queues of large-load interconnection requests, translating directly into capital programs for transmission, substation upgrades, and distribution hardening. Unlike 2022, where grid equipment revenues were tied to long-cycle utility planning cycles, the current buildout is being pulled forward by hyperscaler commitments with contracted timelines. This demand signal is largely insensitive to the rate cycle: data center construction does not stop because the 10-year Treasury moves 50 basis points.
- The EV supply chain has matured from a growth story into an operating business. In 2021, EV-related equities were priced on total addressable market projections and adoption curves extending a decade forward – the classic long-duration growth setup that gets punished first in a rising rate environment. By 2026, global EV sales exceed 20 million units annually, and companies across the battery, semiconductor, and drivetrain supply chain are generating meaningful revenue and, in many cases, positive FCF. The valuation anchor has shifted from discounted future optionality to current earnings power, which compresses the effective duration of these names and reduces their mechanical sensitivity to discount rate changes. The risk today is cyclical (volume, pricing pressure, Chinese competition) rather than existential.
- Critical minerals supply deficits are structurally driven and largely rate-insensitive. The copper market faces a supply gap of 4-8 million tonnes by 2030 on most credible forecasts (Wood Mackenzie, BloombergNEF, S&P Global Commodity Insights, see our note “From Transition Play to Arms Race: A Critical Materials Reset”, May 28), driven by mine depletion rates, a decade of underinvestment in new project development, and accelerating demand from grid infrastructure and EV batteries. Unlike demand for renewables equipment, which can be deferred when financing costs rise, the physical copper requirement for a transmission cable or a motor winding does not change with interest rates. New mine supply takes 10-16 years from discovery to production, meaning the structural deficit is largely locked in regardless of the rate environment. Producers with low-cost, long-life assets – Freeport, Glencore, Southern Copper – are therefore in an unusual position where their earnings are supported by supply physics, not by policy or financing conditions.
While investing in these sectors could still make sense at this juncture, we would still avoid investing in the hydrogen and carbon capture themes. These remain subsidy-dependent, commercially unproven, and now face a US policy environment that has removed their primary investment support. Wood Mackenzie’s analysis confirms that nascent energy technologies are disproportionately hurt by higher WACC. Their 2025 rally has made the risk-reward worse, not better.
A Look into Transition-Themed ETFs
The overall transition theme has had a difficult time since 2021. Several transition ETFs saw significant AUM attrition between 2021 and 2024. For sustainability minded investors, looking at their performance since 2021 could make sense for those who would like to see the impact that rising rates may have had on the sustainability complex in 2022-23.
The Recovery Is Real but Unfinished
The past twelve months have produced strong returns across most sub-themes, led by copper miners (COPX) and rare earth metals (REMX). Measured from January 2021, however, most themes have only partially recovered relative to the MSCI World, and hydrogen and EVs remain below their absolute 2021 levels in USD. The derating was deep enough that even a strong rally has not restored the transition complex’s relative standing.
Will the sustainability complex prove more resilient this time?
Comparing FCF yield and P/E ratios for roughly 200 transition stocks (those stocks included in the ETFs listed above) between January 2021 and June 2026 produces a mixed picture. A higher FCF yield today buffers against rate-driven multiple compression; a lower P/E implies less duration sensitivity. Looking at the scatter plot, there is no meaningful cluster in the top-right quadrant – which would have suggested a broad-based improvement on both metrics relative to 2021. Individual names in grid equipment and critical minerals show genuine improvement, but it seems the aggregate transition universe offers little more protection against a rate shock than it did three years ago. In this context, selective positioning, not broad thematic exposure, is the right approach.
Where to Position
Grid and power equipment companies benefit from a structural electrification buildout tied to utility capital programs and data center construction, not to rate-sensitive technology adoption curves. Select critical minerals producers in Western countries (please see last week’s note) are supported by geopolitical supply constraints that are unlikely to be affected by higher interest rates. Furthermore, hydrogen and carbon capture should be avoided, as momentum is likely to fizzle once interest rate risks materialize. Selected renewable utilities with inflation-linked or regulated tariffs offer duration-like income with less WACC exposure than project-finance-dependent IPPs. Our preferred companies are listed in the table below.
Grid/Power Equipment: Atkore (ATKR-US) at 13.8x forward P/E with 5.1% FCF yield and first positive YoY volume growth in several quarters. Emerson Electric (EMR-US) at 19.8x forward with the NI Nigel AI platform entering monetization. Hubbell (HUBB-US), a pure-play T&D name with FY2026 guidance raised to 8-11% sales growth.
Renewable Utilities: Ørsted (ORSTED-DK) is down 36% over the twelve months that ICLN gained 85%, with three offshore wind farms completing in 2026 and EBITDA guided above DKK 28 billion. Acciona Energía (ANE-ES) at roughly 10x EV/EBITDA on 2026 guidance of EUR 1.2 billion, with capacity growing toward 17.6 GW. As both companies have been affected by Trump anti-wind power stance – we think that the trend could revert once Trump’s power starts fading and that the U.S. market restarts building wind power projects. A less risky play could be Verbund (VER-AT), which trades at 14.75x trailing P/E on earnings depressed by a below-average hydro coefficient (0.79 in 2025 vs. a long-run average of 1.00), with normalization expected in 2026.
Energy Transition Minerals: Freeport-McMoRan (FCX-US) with copper at all-time highs near $6.44/lb and Grasberg staged for full production recovery by end-2027. SQM (SQM-US), which is expanding into copper mining in addition to lithium, at 10.3x forward P/E on 2026 consensus revenue growth of 58%, with the Codelco partnership resolving a two-year regulatory overhang which should boost copper production.
Critical minerals have been a core investment theme at Sustainable Market Strategies since our founding in 2018. Throughout this time, our thesis was largely anchored to demand: decarbonizing the global economy would require vast quantities of specific metals and minerals, the supply of which was geographically concentrated and environmentally contentious.
By March 2023 (“Copper in Short Supply“), we added a second demand vector, noting that a 30-50% increase in defense spending over five years would layer additional pressure onto already strained supply chains. By May 2025 (“Critical Minerals, Critical Moves: The Scramble for Rare Earth Metals“), China’s April export restrictions on seven rare earth elements confirmed what the national security framing had long implied: these materials are not just inputs to the energy transition, they are also instruments of statecraft.
Today, the bullish transition material thesis is just as much about major supply constraints as it is about structural demand. In today’s note, we update our investment framework and draw out the implications for what is becoming a critical mineral arms race.
Updating the Demand Thesis
The demand story for critical minerals has bifurcated sharply in recent months, and investors who treat all transition materials as a homogeneous basket are being penalized for it. Five years ago, it was common practice to assign equal weight to copper, nickel, cobalt, lithium and rare earths as beneficiaries of the energy transition. Today, the electrification story, which centers on copper, has strengthened considerably, while the battery chemistry story that underpinned nickel and cobalt has meaningfully weakened. And a third demand pillar, artificial intelligence infrastructure, has emerged as a new and underappreciated source of structural demand for a specific subset of materials.
- Copper: Copper remains the single most durable demand story in the critical minerals universe, and the case has grown stronger since our July 2025 note (“Dig, Squeeze and Recycle: Rewiring the Copper Market“). The IEA’s 2025 Global Critical Minerals Outlook projects copper demand growing 30% by 2040 under a stated-policies scenario, driven by grid expansion, industrial electrification, EV deployment and renewable energy build-out. Each of these vectors is intact. What is new is the AI layer: S&P Global estimates the global call on copper rising from approximately 28 million metric tons per year in 2025 to 42 million metric tons by 2040, with AI data center construction alone projected to account for 2-3% of global copper demand by 2030. We continue to view $5/lb as the long-term floor, but the ceiling is increasingly hard to define.
- Nickel & Cobalt: The nickel and cobalt picture is materially different. As we wrote last week (please see Beyond Lithium: The Next Battery Boom May 21, 2026), new battery technologies require neither nickel nor cobalt. This is not a cyclical headwind but a technology substitution, and it removes a demand vector that the original bull thesis depended on.
- Rare earth elements (REEs): Demand for magnet rare earths is intact thanks to the energy transition (EVs, wind turbines and defense applications). AI infrastructure adds a further dimension: certain REEs, such as indium, are essential for photonic chips used in AI data centers and 6G optical networks.
Supply Moves to Centre Stage
The fundamental supply constraint across critical minerals is not, at its core, a geology problem. Reserves of copper, rare earth elements and most battery metals are not running out in any absolute sense. The problem is a processing problem, and it is one that five years of government rhetoric and twelve months of serious capital deployment have not yet resolved. China’s competitive advantage in critical minerals was built deliberately over three decades, starting with Beijing’s 1990 declaration of rare earths as protected strategic minerals. The result is that China today processes approximately 80-90% of the world’s rare earth elements, handles the bulk of battery-grade graphite and cobalt refining, and is systematically expanding its position in copper processing through negative smelter fees that are squeezing rival operators out of the market.
- Copper: Copper supply faces a distinct set of physical constraints on top of the processing concentration problem. Ore grades have fallen from roughly 3% a century ago to an estimated 0.7% today, meaning that miners must move significantly more rock to produce the same quantity of metal, driving up costs, water use and tailings volumes. New copper mines take on average eighteen years from discovery to production, a timeline too long to close the supply gap. Other solutions, like improving recycling will help but provide only partial solutions.
- Nickel and cobalt: These materials present the inverse of the copper problem; the supply story is not one of scarcity but of concentration in jurisdictions that are either geopolitically challenging or actively managed by state actors. Nickel is in its fourth consecutive year of structural oversupply, driven almost entirely by Indonesia’s rapid expansion of processing capacity (Indonesia now accounts for roughly 60% of global output). Companies like BHP have already taken material write-downs on its nickel assets, underscoring how difficult it is for higher-cost, higher-standard OECD producers to compete with state-subsidized Indonesian expansion. The cobalt picture is closely related; The Democratic Republic of Congo holds the dominant share of global reserves and has been the principal swing producer, but the DRC imposed an eight-month export ban that transitioned into a quota system in 2025.
- REEs: For rare earth elements, the supply story has been defined since April 2025 by Beijing’s export control regime, which has now expanded three times and shows no sign of reverting. According to the IEA, removing China from the global REE supply equation leaves only 42% of non-Chinese demand covered. Processing technology itself is additionally controlled; Beijing guards the separation and metallurgical know-how as closely as the raw material flows, which means that even countries with domestic REE deposits cannot simply build their way out of dependence on a short time frame.
Investment Implications: Updating The Universe
Shifting from an environment whereby demand forecasts largely dominated the investment potential to one where supply becomes a key variable implies significant consequences for investment outcomes. For one, traditional DCF heuristics, such as historical valuations, may no longer be the right tool. For example, the valuation premium accorded to government-backed national champions is not a mispricing; it reflects durable access to floor pricing, equity backstops, and below-market financing.
Within the critical metals universe, copper remains the most straightforward and highest-conviction position and one where the physical case has not changed: mine development lags, declining ore grades, and a projected 30% supply deficit by 2035 create a structural floor under prices that no amount of policy intervention can meaningfully alter within the investment horizon.
The table below highlights our top picks for both copper miners and recyclers.
Meanwhile, the shift away from nickel and cobalt demand related to the energy transition, as well as increasing domination of supply by Indonesia, has likely already been absorbed by the mining majors. At BHP and Glencore, nickel now represents only about 5% of revenues, though the adjustment has not necessarily been smooth. That said, as we saw with battery technology, material inputs to a structural energy transition are not static; prudent strategy requires high conviction and strong analysis to identify which metals – like copper – have staying power.
Finally, our investable universe in rare earth elements is narrow by design. The three names that have defined the non-Chinese REE investment case since our May 2025 note – MP Materials, Lynas Rare Earths and NEO Performance Materials – remain the strongest publicly listed companies with the combination of production scale, government backing and processing capability.
- MP Materials: the U.S. Department of War’s equity stake and the guaranteed ten-year NdPr offtake at $110 per kilogram, roughly $40 above recent spot, effectively de-risks the company (albeit policy risk is elevated – a diplomatic thaw between Washington and Beijing would compress that premium quickly).
- Lynas Rare Earths: offers the most meaningful near-term catalyst. The completion of the Texas heavy rare earth separation facility, built in partnership with the Department of Defense, will for the first time give the Western supply chain a domestic processing node for the elements most critical to defense permanent magnets.
- NEO Performance Materials: carries the cleanest geopolitical profile of the three companies. Its Estonian separation facility sits entirely outside Chinese processing influence, and its smaller scale means that any expansion in the security premium commanded by non-Chinese processors would have an outsized impact on its valuation relative to the market cap base.
That said, there are three more companies in this space worth adding to a watchlist:
- Perpetua Resources (PPTA-US) owns the only significant permitted antimony deposit in the U.S. Antimony – a hardener used in ammunition, a flame retardant in electronics and textiles, and increasingly a component in energy storage – was added to China’s export restriction list at the end of 2024. The U.S. currently has no domestic production, but the DoD signed a non-dilutive funding agreement with Perpetua specifically to accelerate mine development. The company has ESG battles ahead because the proposed mine is located in a pristine Idaho watershed, but is worth monitoring because of its unique potential to supply antimony.
- 5N Plus (VNP-CA) is a Canadian specialty materials producer that refines gallium, germanium, indium, and bismuth – precisely the four materials subject to China’s August 2023 export restrictions on semiconductor manufacturing inputs. The company supplies compound semiconductor manufacturers and is one of very few Western sources of high-purity gallium.
- Energy Fuels (UUUU-US) is best known as a uranium company, but has in parallel developed into the only operating REE processor in the U.S., giving it a unique position as a domestic US REE processing asset at a time when the DoD is spending heavily to onshore this capability. The dual uranium/REE exposure is analytically interesting: the same asset benefits from two separate strategic minerals tailwinds.
The war in Iran has overshadowed some interesting news happening in energy transition: The war’s collateral effect on oil prices has made some recent technological breakthroughs even more relevant than ever. Key winners include players in the global battery sector, as batteries are fast becoming cheaper and more easier to build, which is making grid-level Battery, Energy and Solar Storage (BESS) installations and EVs cheaper by the day.
These technological development are happening mostly in Asia (China, Korea and Japan) – not in the U.S – or in any other Western countries. CATL, the world’s most important battery supplier, announced that it will start mass producing its sodium ion battery in 2026. This will remove several choke points in the battery supply chain – such as the need to source and refine rare materials like lithium, nickel and cobalt, which is not an easy and sometimes not an ethical thing to do (we last wrote about advances in BESS in 2024 “What in store for energy storage“, November 28, 2024). In fact, battery cell prices have seen a fourfold reduction since 2015, which has led to increased adoption in EV and BESS applications.
Furthermore, lower battery prices are making EVs relatively cheaper than ICE-based cars as the growth in EV prices is now lower than that of their ICE equivalents. Reports that EV sales are up massively y/y in North America (see our note “Detroit Goes Into Full Reverse”, Feb 26) and also in the rest of the world due to elevated oil prices should continue to stimulate demand for batteries in the auto sector.
In the BESS space, we also see some demand stimulation coming from data centres. As such, global BESS installed capacity is set to double from 2025 to 2026 – suggesting that batteries are increasingly making their way into grid applications – this should sustain demand for battery cells even further.
A Fast-Moving Technology
The battery technology landscape has moved faster in the past 18 months than in the preceding decade. This rapid evolution is also reflected in the stock prices of pure-play battery manufacturers – which have outperformed the MSCI World this past year by a margin – albeit with much more volatility. After all, this sector is highly levered to tariffs and to geopolitical tensions between China and the U.S., and to Trump’s anti clean energy stance.
While the stock price of most companies in the space outperformed, that of BYD, the vertically-integrated EV and battery producers, has suffered from intensifying competition in China and from compressing prices and profit margins this past year. Looking at technological developments, three of them stand out. First, CATL’s Naxtra sodium-ion battery should enter into production in 2026 at 175 Wh/kg — matching Lithium Iron Phosphate (LFP) on energy density while running on sodium carbonate priced at $0.05/kg versus $15/kg for lithium carbonate, a 300x raw material cost differential – with much less physical and ethical supply chain constraints. Second, Samsung SDI’s SolidStack program has moved from laboratory to automotive qualification samples, with a credible 2027 mass production target for sulfide-based solid-state cells. Third, large-format LFP cells for grid storage have crossed a commercial inflection point: EVE Energy’s 628Ah cell and 6.9 MWh cabinet system are being deployed at utility scale globally, with the company signing over 50 GWh of deals in recent months.
However, like for other emerging technologies – investors would be wise to bet on 2-3 players as opposed to pick and choose a single winner in the space. For this, but also for geopolitical reasons, it would be smart to build a basket comprised of Chinese and Korean pure play battery leaders.
CATL : In our view, CATL’s multi-chemistry platform makes it is the only company in this cohort where technology leadership and earnings momentum are simultaneously present. In that, the stock’s 60% price performance is solid but does not appear too stretched while the HK secondary listing will open the register to a materially wider institutional investor base, which is an incremental demand catalyst. The valuation is not cheap, but it is defensible against earnings.
LG Energy Solutions: Another member of that basket should be LG Energy Solution in Korea, which offers an interesting risk/reward profile. The stock is up +32% over the last year in a context of a strong backlog, a new 46-Series orders in a single quarter, and a clear path from operating loss to profitability as 4695 utilisation ramps.
Samsung SDI : For those wanting to be at the leading edge of tech, then a position into Samsung SDI which is emerging as a key leader in the commercialization of its Solid State battery could make sense. The company 236% 1Y performance is almost entirely sentiment-driven on SolidStack — the company is loss-making, the forward P/E is 175x, and solid-state timelines have slipped industry-wide before.
What Lies Ahead: The Next Wave of Battery Technology
The next five years will be defined by four transitions moving from lab to commercial scale. The nearest-term is LMFP (Lithium Manganese Iron Phosphate) — a modest upgrade to the standard lithium iron phosphate chemistry that boosts energy density ~15–20% with no added cost or supply chain risk, using existing manufacturing lines. Firms like CATL and Gotion are already scaling it; the market is projected to grow from $121M in 2024 to nearly $19B by 2034. After that, silicon anodes — where silicon replaces graphite as the negative electrode, storing significantly more energy per gram — are closer to mainstream electric vehicle adoption than most investors assume. Amprius Technologies (AMPX) already ships commercial cells at >400 Wh/kg, and the cost curve is compressing. Lithium-sulfur is the longer-dated but higher-upside bet – but only private companies operate in that space for now. On the manufacturing side, dry electrode processing —which eliminates the expensive solvent-based steps in cell production — is being commercialised by LG Energy Solutions and Tesla and will structurally reduce per-cell cost across the industry over the next three to four years. Cutting across all of this, artificial intelligence-assisted materials discovery is compressing research and development timelines from years to months, meaning the battery technology roadmap through 2030 will likely include surprises not yet in any analyst’s base case.
The practical implication for investors: favour the platform companies with the manufacturing scale to absorb and commercialise whatever comes next — CATL and LG Energy Solution — while maintaining a small allocation to listed technology bets like Amprius (AMPX) or Samsung SDI where the upside is binary, the prices are high, but the technology is real.
Buildings are responsible for approximately 37% of global energy and process-related CO Of course, heat pumps are an integral solution to reducing building carbon emissions and weaning the global economy off fossil fuels – it shouldn’t be a surprise that European sales jumped in q1 in response to the recent energy price surge. But the opportunity set is broader than just heat pumps.
Investing to solve the 37% carbon challenge in buildings requires dividing the opportunity set into embodied and operational carbon. Embodied carbon refers to the CO₂ emitted during the production of the materials that constitute a building – the cement, the steel, the insulation, the glass – and during construction itself. Operational carbon refers to carbon emissions related to the operation of the building. This includes HVAC (heating and cooling) but also the efficiencies that come from the building envelope itself (windows, insulation, etc). It is this latter category where we see value and the least-crowded positions in sustainable investing.
Operational vs. Embodied Carbon
Buildings emit carbon in two fundamentally distinct ways and on different timescales.
Operational carbon is the CO₂ produced each year by the energy used to run a building – heating, cooling, hot water, lighting, etc. It accounts for approximately 28% of global energy-related emissions. These emissions can be reduced through retrofits – better insulation, more efficient HVAC, smarter controls. In addition, related emissions fall automatically as electricity grids decarbonise: the same heat pump powered by renewables emits a fraction of what it emits on a coal-heavy grid. For the existing building stock – operational carbon is the correct priority, since the retrofit pathway is the only lever available once a building is built.
Embodied carbon is the CO₂ emitted during the production of the materials that constitute a building – the cement, the steel, the insulation, the glass – and during construction itself. It accounts for approximately 9 – 11% of global emissions. Unlike operational carbon, it is locked in at the moment of construction; no subsequent efficiency improvement can undo it.
The key point is that as buildings become more energy-efficient and grids become cleaner, the proportion of a new building’s “lifetime” carbon emissions that comes from embodied carbon rises inexorably. In a code-compliant new build today, embodied carbon already represents 35–40% of lifetime emissions. In a near-zero energy building – the standard that European policy is now mandating for new construction – embodied carbon can represent 40–60% of lifetime climate impact, up from roughly 15–20% in pre-1990 stock. As buildings approach true zero-energy status, that proportion may exceed 60%: the operational problem shrinks as we solve it, but the embodied carbon problem does not.
This creates a two-track investment framework. Track one addresses the existing building stock through retrofit – heat pumps, insulation, glazing, controls, etc., while track two addresses new construction through material innovation – low-carbon cement, green steel, mass timber, specialty construction chemistry. We have addressed the latter in a series of notes and the main public equity players in these industries are well known and have not changed meaningfully (please see for example: ‘Wood’ You ‘Steel’ to Save a Life, May 25, 2022 and
Carbon Protectionism: Winners and Losers under EU’s Carbon Border Plan, July 25, 2024. ). The same can not be said for companies related to operational emissions, where there has been tremendous transformation in the opportunity set.
Not Your Father’s HVAC Company
We have written about HVAC companies extensively over the years, and the core thesis – that companies making buildings more thermally efficient would compound well on both financial and sustainability metrics – has played out favorably.
- Comfort Systems (FIX-US) is the starkest case. We noted in our August 2025 note that FIX had “outsized momentum from its exposure to data centre cooling and modular infrastructure.” That framing was accurate but perhaps understated: by Q1 2026, revenue from technology companies – dominated by data centre mechanical and electrical work – accounted for 56% of FIX’s total revenue, up sharply from previous years. The electrical segment grew 88% year-on-year. The company’s $12.5 billion backlog – more than $5 billion of which was added in the past twelve months – reflects multi-year commitments from tech customers. FIX is now a data centre construction contractor: a mechanical and electrical integrator that benefits from the thermal management demands of AI infrastructure.
- Trane Technologies (TT-US) tells a similar, if more nuanced, story. Bookings in the U.S. – predominantly large commercial chillers and, increasingly, data centre cooling systems – rose 160% year-on-year in Q1 2026. A $10.7 billion record backlog underpins multi-year revenue visibility. Its acquisitions of Stellar Energy (modular data centre chiller plants, targeting $1 billion in revenue within three years from a $350 million base) and LiquidStack (direct-to-chip liquid cooling systems) are explicit bets on the data centre thermal opportunity. Although Trane does retain a meaningful commercial building HVAC exposure (roughly one third of revenue), it’s hardly a pure-play HVAC company.
- Carrier Global (CARR-US) has transformed differently. Rather than following the data centre pull, Carrier has shifted its portfolio by divesting fire, security, and access businesses and acquiring Viessman Climate Solutions to reposition itself as a focused climate solutions company. The 2024 $13 billion purchase of Viessmann made Carrier the most accessible large-cap vehicle for investors seeking European residential heat pump exposure. Along with Viessmann, 13% of Carrier revenues stem from climate solutions in the transport industry (e.g. refrigerated trucking and shipping). That said, Carrier’s data centre cooling revenue has scaled from negligible to over $1 billion, with $1.5 billion guided for 2026 and Q1 orders up more than 500% year-on-year. Carrier today is a bifurcated company with a European residential heat pump operator through Viessmann, an important transportation line, and a growing data centre precision cooling provider.
For investors seeking genuine pure-play heat pump exposure – the most credible listed names are Daikin Industries (6367-JP), whose air conditioning business accounts for approximately 95% of revenue, Ariston Group (ARIS-MI), the Italian residential heating and heat pump specialist whose €2.71 billion revenue is entirely concentrated in thermal comfort products and NIBE Industrier (NIBE.B-SE). NIBE featured strongly in our 2022 and 2023 notes on this theme, and is arguably the purest listed vehicle for European residential heat pump exposure, with its Climate Solutions division accounting for approximately 70% of group revenue.
Pushing The Envelope – The Missing Half of the Retrofit Trade
Perhaps the most persistent gap in the sustainable building investment narrative is the thermal envelope: the walls, roof, floor, and glazing that determine how much energy a building requires to maintain a comfortable temperature. Better insulation means a smaller, cheaper heat pump, lower running costs, and lower emissions. After all, installing a high-performance heat pump in a leaking, poorly insulated building is thermodynamically equivalent to filling a bathtub with the drain open.
The EU’s Energy Performance of Buildings Directive mandates progressive renovation of the worst-performing buildings. The dominant guidance from national retrofit programmes and engineering best practice recommend thermal envelope improvements (insulation, glazing, air-sealing) before mechanical system upgrades (e.g. heat pumps). This ‘fabric first’ principle, makes insulation the logical prerequisite for efficient heat pump installation.
- Rockwool International (ROCK.B-DK) is a leading sustainable insulation company. Stone wool insulation, like that produced by Rockwool is made of basalt rock and recycled industrial slag and is inherently durable, fire-resistant, acoustically effective, and partially circular: it does not degrade, compress, or require replacement over a building’s lifetime. Rockwool revenue reached €3.88 billion in 2025, up 3% organically, with EBIT margins of 14.0% excluding the write-off of its Russian operations in January 2026. The European Commission estimates that over 85% of the EU building stock was built before 2000 and will require significant energy renovation. Rockwool is the direct beneficiary of any policy that mandates thermal envelope improvement before or alongside mechanical system upgrades.
- Owens Corning (OC-US): Since we last wrote about OC, the company has acquired door manufacturer Masonite (in 2024) and repositioned itself as a branded building envelope company spanning roofing, insulation, and doors. S&P Global named it a Top 1% sustainability performer in the building products industry for 2026.
- Saint-Gobain (SGO-FR) is perhaps most comprehensive expression of the thermal envelope theme in a single listed company. Its portfolio encompasses float glass (double and triple glazing), stone wool and glass wool insulation, gypsum board, construction mortars, and SageGlass – the globally leading electrochromic smart glazing technology; the glass dynamically tints to reduce solar heat gain by up to 90%, directly reducing the cooling load on HVAC systems. With approximately €47 billion in annual revenue and exposure to virtually every component of a high-performance building envelope, it can be considered an anchor position that ties the thermal envelope thesis together.
Investors wanting to put capital to work in the sustainable building theme should develop a two-pronged strategy that includes both the thermal envelope and heat pumps since, as described above, these two factors together are what equate to low emissions retrofits. In the chart below, we show the two baskets of the names mentioned above. Equity performance has been disappointing, especially over the past year: these names are tied to the U.S. and European housing cycle, which have both been suppressed by elevated interest rates. Heat pumps sales in particular have been sluggish in the past year after record sales earlier in the decade. However, most recently heat pump sales have once again predictably spiked in reaction to this year’s energy price surge related to the U.S-Israel-Iran war.
Global governments have hit a structural fiscal wall. Advanced economies are carrying debt loads that would have been considered a sovereign crisis scenario twenty years ago. Japan has long since departed the realm of conventional fiscal analysis with its 215% debt-to-GDP ratio. Rather than unwinding this burden in the years following the pandemic, governments doubled down with stimulus packages, energy subsidies, and increased defence spending. Now, with interest rates firmly in the “higher for longer” camp, compounding debt service costs is turning this burden into an active crisis.
To make matters worse, governments are currently facing four compounding pressures with no cyclical release valve. Entitlement obligations from an aging population are accelerating against a shrinking tax base, while geopolitical reality has locked in permanent, irreversible defence spending floors. Furthermore, the massive fiscal overhang of the pandemic remains entirely unresolved. Crucially, the era of zero-interest rates that made this leverage manageable has ended. Today, OECD governments spend more on debt service than on defence. In the United States alone, interest payments consumed nearly $1 trillion in 2025. That is money that does not build a single hospital, repair a single bridge, fix a school, or connect a single household to clean water.
Because sovereign balance sheets are now increasingly captured by these legacy obligations, the resulting fiscal deficit is massive. The global infrastructure funding gap – the difference between what is being spent and what is needed – is projected to reach $15 trillion by 2040. The post-war model in which the sovereign state financed, built, and operated public infrastructure is, in most of the world, functionally over.
Private Capital Enters the Chat
When governments cannot write the cheque, they turn to the private sector. This is not a new phenomenon – infrastructure privatization has been happening in waves since the 1980s – but the scale and urgency of the current moment are genuinely without precedent. The fiscal constraint is no longer a temporary condition to be managed through one or two budget cycles; it is a permanent feature of the sovereign landscape.
Private capital can participate in infrastructure through several distinct models, each with a different logic and a materially different risk-return profile.
The PPP model stands out because it is the model that resolves the core problem most directly. The government needs infrastructure it cannot afford to build – and maintain. The private sector gets a long-term contract backed by a sovereign counterparty. Risk is allocated to whoever can best manage it: construction and operational risk to the developer, demand risk either shared or retained by the state depending on the structure.
After a brief COVID-induced pause, global PPP deal flow has accelerated through its previous 2018 ceiling.
The regional breadth of the recovery is telling: Sub-Saharan Africa posted a 133% increase year-on-year, Europe and Central Asia 91%, and Latin America and the Caribbean 36%. In the United States alone, 36 states now have dedicated P3 enabling legislation, up from fewer than 15 a decade ago. The UK’s National Wealth Fund, launched in 2024, has an explicit PPP co-investment mandate. The G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment targets $600 billion in private infrastructure mobilization by 2027. The trend is structural, it is broad-based, and it is accelerating precisely when government balance sheets are least able to offer an alternative.
Beyond the Toll Booth: The New Face of PPPs
The PPP model has existed in modern form since the late 1980s, when developing countries began reversing decades of nationalization. In its early incarnation, it was almost exclusively about economic infrastructure: telecom licenses, power purchase agreements, and toll road concessions. In the World Bank’s PPI database, transport and telecom together accounted for over 60% of all private infrastructure investment through the 1990s.
In the early 2000s, the introduction of the availability payment (AP) model – where governments pay a fixed fee for the private sector to design, build, finance, and operate social infrastructure – opened the doors for PPPs to manage hospitals, schools, prisons, and courthouses.
Post-2010, low-carbon projects in the World Bank PPI database outnumber conventional ones by more than two to one (1,915 low-carbon vs. 815 conventional).
The sector diversification is now visible even in a single market snapshot. In Europe in 2024, education PPPs doubled in project count year-on-year (15 transactions versus 8 in 2023). Italy completed the first sovereign data centre PPP in European history, with €331 million in EIB financing for digital cloud infrastructure serving Italian public administration. The UK closed a €605 million district heating network PPP. The old caricature of PPPs as a motorway financing mechanism for governments that cannot be bothered to collect tolls themselves has been thoroughly overtaken by events.
The SDG Multiplier Effect
For a sustainability-minded investor, the PPP landscape presents an immediate challenge: not all PPP concessions are created equal through an impact lens. A managed toll lane serving commuters in Texas or Melbourne is, without question, a sound investment. The cash flows are contracted, the regulatory framework is mature, and the inflation linkage is explicit. But it would be a stretch to characterize it as SDG-aligned infrastructure. The user is, in most cases, a private motorist with alternatives. The social additionality is limited.
This matters because the case for infrastructure as a sustainable asset class rests on considerably broader foundations. As we documented in our October 2023 note, Inflation-Proofing and SDG-Boosting, research published in Nature Sustainability (Thacker et al.) found that infrastructure either directly or indirectly influences all 17 SDGs, encompassing 121 of the 169 targets – 72% of the entire SDG framework. More pointedly, for five SDGs – SDG 3 (Good Health), SDG 6 (Clean Water), SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities) – every single target is influenced by infrastructure investment.
Infrastructure, in other words, is more than an inflation hedge or a portfolio diversifier. When properly targeted, it is the most direct mechanism available to listed equity investors for deploying capital toward global sustainability commitments. The question is not whether to invest in infrastructure, but which infrastructure.
Toll roads in advanced economies and airports serving leisure tourism in mature markets are excluded from our focus – not because they are poor investments, but because they do not represent the category of infrastructure where the PPP growth wave is most pronounced, nor where the impact additionality is most compelling. Our attention is concentrated on operators and developers whose PPP concession pipelines are anchored in social infrastructure (healthcare, public transit, sanitation, water access) and environmental infrastructure (clean energy, waste treatment).
First Responders to the Infrastructure Deficit
The five operators and developers we favour share three characteristics that distinguish them from the broader infrastructure universe: their revenues flow predominantly from government counterparties under long-term concession or availability-payment structures; their pipelines are expanding, not managing decline; and their assets serve populations where private capital is genuinely additional – not merely convenient.
Acciona (ANA-ES) is the most diversified single expression of this thesis. Its Pernambuco water and sanitation concession – €2.38 billion, 35 years, seven million people in one of Brazil’s poorest states – is the largest SDG 6 PPP transaction closed by any listed company in 2025, and it sits alongside São Paulo Metro Line 6, renewable energy transmission concessions in Peru and Australia, and an active bid pipeline in US managed lanes. Acciona’s EBITDA from concessions grew 103% in FY2025. The market continues to price it as a construction company. Veolia (VIE-FR) completes the environmental picture on the water side: as the world’s largest operator of municipal water systems under delegated public service contracts, it holds the most geographically diversified portfolio of government-backed water PPP revenues available in listed equity markets, spanning France, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.
Sacyr (SCYR-ES) occupies the social infrastructure end of the spectrum that most sustainable infrastructure portfolios systematically miss. Hospital PPPs – availability-based, long-duration, government-backed – are structurally identical to road concessions in their cash flow profile but carry materially stronger SDG 3 alignment. Sacyr has been winning them consistently across Spain, Chile, and Colombia while simultaneously developing water treatment PPPs and bidding US managed lane concessions. Ten new concession wins in 2024–25 across five countries. It is the most prolific listed PPP developer by contract count, in an investment category that most European fund managers have never analyzed.
In Brazil, Motiva (MOTV3-BR) brings urban mobility into the mix. Beyond its four major highway concession wins in 2024–25, Motiva operates São Paulo’s Metro Line 4, the Salvador metro, and multiple BRT corridors – giving it genuine SDG 11 exposure in Brazil’s most underserved urban centres, in a market where the federal government’s R$1.7 trillion infrastructure programme is generating the deepest PPP deal flow of any emerging economy.
Finally, Mota-Engil (EGL-PT) occupies territory no other listed operator will enter: road concessions in Angola and Mozambique, the Lobito Corridor railway maintenance agreement running to 2054, and the operating contract for Luanda’s new international airport. Africa’s infrastructure deficit is the largest in the world. Mota-Engil is, for now, one of the few listed companies being paid to close it.
The EBITDA margin column deserves careful reading. Motiva at 46% reflects a fully concession-derived business: government-contracted revenues, limited variable costs, predictable cash generation. Sacyr at 27% carries a residual construction division that blends the number down, though 93% of its EBITDA originates from concession assets. Acciona and Veolia, both near 15%, operate larger services and construction platforms alongside their concession portfolios.
The group trades between 5.1x and 8.4x EV/EBITDA, which is modest given the contractual duration and government-backed nature of the revenues. Mota-Engil at 5.1x carries a construction multiple, not a concession one. The Lobito corridor, the Luanda airport, and the Santos-Guarujá tunnel generate no visible premium in the current price. Whether that gap closes as concession EBITDA matures is the core of the investment thesis.
Dividends are a hallmark of infrastructure investing, and two distinct approaches appear in this table. Veolia’s 4.3% yield reflects a mature portfolio of long-term municipal service contracts generating stable, predictable cash flows that management is comfortable distributing. Acciona’s 1.9% reflects a deliberate choice to retain capital: with Pernambuco, Metro Line 6, and a €301bn project pipeline actively consuming investment, the priority is deployment over distribution. Both are rational strategies given where each company sits in its concession development cycle.
Acciona has returned roughly 120% over the two-year period shown, against 40% for the MSCI World and mid-single-digit returns for Veolia and Mota-Engil. Acciona’s re-rating reflects the market finally pricing diversified concession pipelines correctly. Sacyr’s recent upward break suggests this recognition is spreading.