There is an old market cliché that investors like divided government because politicians cannot do very much. The logic is straightforward: when neither party can pass its agenda unilaterally, the odds of sweeping changes to taxes, regulation and spending fall, and companies can plan around a narrower range of outcomes. The 2026 midterms provide an unusually revealing test of that idea. Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress while President Trump remains in the White House, leaving neither side with the votes required to impose a broad policy reset. The likely result is not stability in the conventional sense, but a narrower range of federal outcomes, more aggressive congressional oversight, and a larger role for states in determining how energy, infrastructure, and healthcare policy evolves over the next two years.
The initial market response was consistent with this interpretation, although it was far from uniform. We track four SMS policy baskets, labeled B1 to B4 in the chart below: Transition Utilities (B1), Grid & AI Enablers (B2), the Solar Value Chain (B3) and Medicaid & ACA-Exposed (B4). The SMS Solar Value Chain and Medicaid & ACA-Exposed baskets rallied sharply around the election, Transition Utilities also advanced, and the Grid & AI Enablers basket sold off. The split looks like a repricing of political downside where it had been concentrated, alongside a reassessment of areas where expectations, valuations and public resistance had already climbed.
The return of the policy floor
For much of the past two years, investors in clean energy and healthcare faced more than ordinary regulatory uncertainty. Unified Republican control created the possibility that executive actions could be reinforced through budget reconciliation, appropriations and durable statutory changes. Democratic control of Congress does not make policy supportive, but it reduces the probability that another large legislative package will deepen the retrenchment already enacted under the Trump administration.
That difference matters for valuation because a sector does not need a new subsidy or entitlement expansion to rerate. When expectations are depressed, a lower probability of the worst outcome can be sufficient. The immediate rallies in solar and healthcare therefore look less like forecasts of a new progressive policy cycle than recognition that the distribution of possible outcomes has narrowed. Investors are pricing a floor, not yet a catalyst.
Basket 1: Transition Utilities
The Transition Utilities basket captures companies positioned to earn regulated or contracted returns from the buildout of cleaner generation, transmission, distribution, and grid resilience. The basket is less dependent on a new federal subsidy package than the solar manufacturers and installers, but it is highly sensitive to state regulation, allowed returns, permitting, and the allocation of infrastructure costs.
States may matter more than Congress
The federal result will dominate headlines, but the state-level shift may have more direct investment consequences. Five governorships moved from Republican to Democratic control, while Democratic gains in attorney-general and regulatory offices change who shapes implementation, enforcement and utility planning. Energy policy in the United States is already highly federalized: states influence utility rate cases, transmission siting, integrated resource plans, renewable procurement, net metering and building standards.
This creates an important asymmetry for Transition Utilities. The basket does not require Washington to pass another national climate package. The companies need permission to deploy capital, recover investments through rates and earn returns on transmission, generation and resilience spending. A supportive governor or public utility commission can therefore influence earnings visibility even when Congress remains deadlocked.
There is, however, a less comfortable side to the state-policy argument. If voters have become more sensitive to electricity affordability, utilities are not automatically beneficiaries simply because regulators shift costs away from data centers or favor clean investment. The same commissions that approve grid spending also determine how quickly utilities recover that spending and what returns shareholders are allowed to earn. A campaign against electricity bills can therefore become a campaign against the pace of capital spending, cost recovery or allowed returns. The investment question is not simply whether infrastructure is necessary, but whether utilities can demonstrate that it lowers system costs and allocate those costs in a way regulators will continue to accept.
Basket 2: Grid & AI Enablers
The Grid & AI Enablers basket represents the physical layer behind electrification and digital growth. These companies benefit from the need for substations, transformers, switchgear, transmission lines, cooling systems and specialized construction. Their exposure is broader than clean energy, which gives the basket a stronger secular demand base but also links it to data-center capital spending and the politics of electricity affordability.
Why Grid & AI Enablers sold off
The decline in Grid & AI Enablers is the most useful counterweight to a simple blue-wave narrative. The basket had already been one of the strongest trades of 2026, supported by data-center construction, manufacturing investment and the expectation of a long grid-capital cycle.
Campaign politics supports part of the sell-off. Many Democrats ran against data centers: campaigns spent more than $380 million on television ads mentioning them, and Democrats outspent Republicans on the topic by more than three to one. Of the 34 governors elected in races AP called, 32 back stronger regulation and 12 back bans or moratoria. Tougher permitting, ratepayer-protection rules and local moratoria are now more likely, and they land on the demand that Grid & AI Enablers had been valued on.
The size of the move may still overstate the damage to this basket. Developers facing multi-year interconnection queues have been turning to behind-the-meter generation, and one tracker counts roughly 90 GW of announced behind-the-meter capacity, more than a quarter of planned US data-center capacity. Projects that supply their own power sidestep much of the ratepayer-cost argument, but they still need switchgear, transformers and electrical construction. Rules that make data centers pay for their own grid upgrades could push more projects on-site instead of cancelling them
In short, the election results do not eliminate the infrastructure opportunity for Eaton [ETN-US], Quanta Services [PWR-US] or EMCOR Group [EME-US], but it can slow the conversion of a powerful long-term theme into near-term revenue and make elevated valuations more sensitive to disappointment.
Basket 3: Solar Value Chain
The Solar Value Chain basket is the most direct policy-duration trade in the group. It spans domestic manufacturing, utility-scale equipment and residential deployment, so the companies respond differently to tariffs, tax credits, interest rates and state-level rules. What unites the basket is that the probability of further policy deterioration can matter almost as much as the probability of new support.
Solar: a repricing of survival, not a return to the IRA
The post-election solar rally should not be mistaken for a restoration of the Biden-era policy architecture. President Trump retains control of the executive branch and the veto, while many of the incentives weakened under unified Republican government cannot be readily restored. Trade policy, federal permitting and agency implementation also remain important sources of risk.
What changed is that the clean-energy industry now has additional institutional defenses. Democratic committee chairs can conduct oversight, slow appropriations language, scrutinize agency implementation and use must-pass legislation to seek targeted concessions. State governments can also sustain renewable portfolio standards, storage programs, distributed-solar rules and procurement mandates. For a basket that remained deeply negative for the year even after the November rally, reducing the probability of another policy shock can have a disproportionate effect.
Basket 4: Medicaid & ACA-Exposed Healthcare
The healthcare basket combines managed-care organizations, hospital operators and a healthcare property company. The common thread is exposure to insured patient volumes and public reimbursement, but the transmission mechanism differs: Centene and Molina are directly affected by enrollment and rate setting, while hospitals are affected through payer mix, uncompensated care and utilization.
Healthcare: gridlock can still protect earnings
The healthcare basket may be the clearest expression of the policy-floor thesis. Democratic control of Congress does not automatically repeal the Medicaid financing changes and ACA provisions enacted under President Trump. The White House can veto a broad reversal, and Senate rules remain an obstacle to standalone legislation. Providers and managed-care companies should therefore not assume that the pre-2025 policy environment will return.
Nevertheless, the election changes the negotiating environment around additional cuts and implementation. Healthcare affordability was a major voting concern, and Democrats now control the committees, hearings and legislative calendar in Congress. Partial mitigation through budget negotiations, implementation delays, targeted ACA support or relief for hospitals is more plausible than it was before the election. Those changes can matter materially at the company level because managed-care enrollment, reimbursement and hospital uncompensated care respond to policy at the margin.
The next two years are about floors, not catalysts
The four baskets point to a differentiated conclusion. Transition Utilities gain from a lower federal downside tail and potentially friendlier state regulation. Solar receives the largest policy rerating because the sector had absorbed the greatest policy damage, although the rally does not by itself establish a new bull market. Medicaid- and ACA-exposed companies benefit from a reduced probability of further retrenchment and a greater chance of targeted mitigation. Grid & AI Enablers retain the strongest secular demand case, but they also face the clearest risk that electricity affordability and local opposition complicate the investment cycle.
The central question after an election is usually what the winners will do. In this case, investors may get more insight by asking what each side can no longer do alone. Democrats cannot rebuild the old policy regime while Trump controls the White House, but Trump can no longer rely on a compliant Congress to deepen it. For sectors carrying significant policy scars, fragmented government can function as downside protection. The 2026 blue wave may matter less because it puts Democrats in control of Congress than because it fragments control of policy across Washington, state capitals and regulatory bodies.
The NOAA, the key U.S. weather forecaster, gives an 83% chance that El Niño reaches historic strength in October to December, exceeding any event since 1950, and likely persisting into spring 2027, with effects on crops and supply chains running into 2028. Weaker trade winds will let warm water spread east across the Pacific and shift rainfall: drought in Southern Africa, Southeast Asia and Australia, heavy rain on the Peruvian coast, and wind shear that suppresses Atlantic hurricanes.
El Niño is a natural cycle, but climate change raises the cost of each event by amplifying heat, evaporation and rainfall extremes, a pattern that underpins our view that weather is now a lasting driver of food price inflation. This year’s event is already disrupting industries such as fisheries, while for others the shocks will play out later. The table below illustrates when various industries are likely to be affected: we offer three trade ideas that leverage a strong El Niño effect.
Trade #1: Marine Feed: The Visible Shock
One of the first major disruptions from this year’s El Niño to occur is in marine feed. The term marine feed refers to the ingredients derived from marine organisms used in animal feed, particularly for aquaculture (e.g. fishmeal, fish oil and algae). It is produced mainly from small pelagic fish like anchovy, sardine, and herring.
On October 16th, Peru cancelled its second anchovy season, after the first season was stopped in June with only about a quarter of its quota caught. Peru supplies about 20% of global fishmeal and fish oil, and IFFO (The Marine Ingredients Organization) projects 2026 fishmeal supply at its lowest since 2016. According to the IMF, fishmeal prices increased 89% in the past year. Oceanographic conditions were the culprit behind the closure: warm waters caused by El Niño have changed anchovy distribution and forced schools into deeper water.
Fishmeal and fish oil are globally traded, so the shortfall raises feed costs for fish farmers everywhere, but not equally. In the case of Mowi (MOWI-NO), the company manufactures its own feed for its own seafood farms, so Mowi retains the feed margin and has procurement scale and forward cover, whereas Lerøy (LSG-NO) and most other producers buy feed from external manufacturers with no retained margin. Share prices among salmon farmers are highly correlated, but El Niño opens a window for Mowi to outperform in 2027, which we would capture with a pair trade, long Mowi against short Lerøy, or simply by overweighting Mowi.
- Mowi and its competitors both attribute rising feed costs to weak marine fisheries, and Lerøy names El Niño explicitly, expecting the effect in the fourth quarter of 2026 and mostly in 2027. Its third-quarter harvest fell 7% year on year.
- Mowi’s feed is mainly covered through the end of the growth season, and its October 19 third-quarter update beat estimates a record harvest. That result reflects salmon prices and volumes before feed inflation arrived, so it shows operational strength, not yet the feed advantage.
- Mowi ranks first in the FAIRR Protein Producer Index (57) and the World Benchmarking Alliance’s Seafood Stewardship Index also rates Mowi a leader.
Trade #2: Copper in El Niño’s path?
El Niño matters for copper because supply sits in its path. Countries like Chile, Peru, Zambia and Indonesia are known to experience strong El Niño effects and together mine about 42% of the world’s copper: Chile about a quarter, Peru about an eighth, Zambia about 4% and Indonesia about 3%.
The mechanism and timing differ by region. In South America (Chile and Peru), excess rainfall, flooding, landslides, and port closures directly halt or slow mine operations and logistics. Meanwhile in southern Africa the rains fail, the Zambezi basin dries and the hydropower grid feeding the Copperbelt has less water. Similarly, Indonesia is facing severe drought due to El Niño, which perhaps surprisingly, is actually helping Freeport-McMoRan’s repair its Grasberg mine after massive mud slides last year.
The El Niño effect for 2026 in Chile has already largely occurred and total output losses have been relatively subdued. Companies like Antofagasta (ANTO-GB) and Lundin Mining (LUN-CA) were forced to halt production in July after heavy snow and rain and power outages. Both companies slightly cut 2026 production guidance and the Chilean Copper Commission, cut its national 2026 forecast to 5.27 million tonnes, a 2.6% decline from 2025.
In Africa, the impact on copper mining is still ahead of us. In the African Copperbelt, significant production depends on Kariba lake hydropower, which is filled by rain in the upper Zambezi basin and drawn down through the dry season. A severe drought would mean the impact on copper would be felt starting in March, 2027 should lack of hydroelectric power affect mine production. Many companies do have contingency plans in place. For example, First Quantum (FM-CA) has the ability to import much of its power needs from neighbouring companies, albeit at higher prices which add to mining cash costs.
In sum, El Niño is a short-term supply risk for copper. The Chilean disruption has largely played out, while Zambian hydropower risks from March 2027 are still ahead. Investors who want to reduce geopolitical and carbon risk can own copper recyclers rather than miners like Aurubis (NDA-DE), please see Dig, Squeeze and Recycle: Rewiring the Copper Market July 17, 2025. Alternatively, investors can increase exposure to miners that have limited or no operations in Africa such as Freeport McMoRan (FCX-US), Lundin Mining (LUN-CA); they will benefit from a global rise in copper prices while avoiding production challenges related to the remaining Niño weather impacts.
Trade #3: A Palm Oil Squeeze
Palm oil has one of the strongest documented links to El Niño, and its biology means the damage arrives late. Indonesia and Malaysia grow roughly 80% of the world’s palm oil, a crop that provides about a third of global vegetable oil. Palm is a perennial that cannot be replanted in response to a drought: water stress cuts the share of fruit-bearing flowers about two years before harvest and causes flowers to abort in the final months, so a dry spell depresses output across two seasons rather than one.
August rainfall across the palm belt was 53% below normal, and 2027 output estimates are down 4.0% in Malaysia and 3.0% in Indonesia. This is coming at a time when Indonesia’s new B50 biodiesel mandate adds a further claim on supply, with an estimated 35% of Indonesian output about to go to fuel. We therefore expect tightening of palm oil supplies, though it is hard to trade directly because parties that bear the loss are mostly outside our investable universe: smallholders with no price hedge, standalone mills squeezed on fruit costs, and low-income households in importing countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Nonetheless, the El Niño effect on palm oil (and other ag products) supports our house view that climate change and extreme weather is a structural driver of sustained food price inflation, and we have written extensively about the resulting margin squeeze for food manufacturers (please see Weather, Not War: Why Higher Food Inflation is Here to Stay October 15, 2026). Palm is a smaller input than cocoa, sugar and dairy for companies like Mondelez (MDLZ-US) and Hershey (HSY-US), but it is hard to replace in confectionery and bakery fats and it adds to an ingredient basket where costs are already rising. Both companies also face deforestation and sourcing scrutiny, a separate regulatory and reputational exposure. We maintain our negative stance.
Personalization – the use of machine learning models trained on individual-level data to tailor a product, prediction, or treatment to a specific person rather – is not a single phenomenon that artificial intelligence applies uniformly across the economy. Its success is governed by three measurable variables: 1. the cost of acquiring data, 2. the cost of a wrong prediction, and 3. the speed of the feedback loop between action and outcome.
Health care is simultaneously the sector with the strongest scientific justification for personalization and the sector most prone to expensive overpromising, since the same conditions that make personalization valuable also make it slow, costly, and difficult to validate.
Why Personalization by AI isn’t Fungible Across Sectors
The “personalization of everything” narrative incorrectly suggests that Netflix’s recommendation engine, Amazon’s product suggestions, and an AI-matched cancer therapy as points on the same continuum. Media and retail personalization succeeded quickly and cheaply because the underlying data is abundant and continuously regenerated by user behavior, a wrong recommendation costs the company almost nothing (the user simply scrolls past it), and the feedback loop between a suggestion and its outcome is measured in seconds. An industry like precision agriculture occupies a middle position: sensor and satellite data are becoming cheap, but the feedback loop is a full growing season, and an error costs real yield, which is why adoption has been steady rather than explosive.
Health care sits at the opposite pole: clinical and genomic data are expensive to generate, fragmented, and constrained by privacy regulation that has no analogue in ad-tech: a wrong prediction risks patient fatality rather than simply waste an advertising impression. In addition, the feedback loop connecting a treatment decision to its true outcome, survival, recurrence, or long-term toxicity, can run into years, far too slow to train and correct a model the way a recommendation algorithm corrects itself in real time.
Health care outcomes are surely one of the most impactful use for artificial intelligence, with personalization an important pathway. Earlier this summer, financial participants confirmed this view: in August, Moderna stock surged because its personalized mRNA cancer vaccine – AI helps identify the right targets for each patient – showed success in a pivotal trial. Of course, the story is larger than AI in medicine: investors cheered because it provided clinical validation that mRNA can work in cancer, not just infectious diseases.
Whether the optimism is warranted is yet to be seen, as real-world failures also do exist: between 2025 and 2022, IBM spent roughly $4 billion building Watson Health on the premise that a system trained the way Watson beat Jeopardy! could generalize to oncology. Internal documents later showed the system generating “unsafe and incorrect” treatment recommendations, with failures traced directly to training on a small number of synthetic cases that reflected one hospital’s practice patterns rather than diverse, real-world outcomes data. IBM sold off the unit’s data and analytics assets in 2022 for roughly $1 billion, a fraction of what had been invested.
Nonetheless, it’s becoming clear that artificial intelligence has the potential to personalize treatments and therefore significantly improve outcomes in a high impact sector like health care. Today’s Note identifies the companies and investment opportunities related to this theme.
Health Care Personalization: Who Does What
To evaluate “AI plus health care”, we immediately notice that a lower risk strategy is to own the “picks and shovels” (or infrastructure) of personalized medicine rather than the biotech companies that own the therapies. The table below highlights why this is the case, but put simply, biotech companies own the regulatory and clinical risk and commercial risk whereas the suppliers of the inputs to the final drug treatments, i.e. the picks and shovels, are relatively shielded from these unknowns.
Below, we separate the three layers that must each work for personalized medicine to reach a patient: the data that makes personalization possible, the software and diagnostics that turn that data into a decision, and the manufacturing capacity that actually produces a personalized product at scale.
1. Data Generation
When it comes to personalized medicine, the first step requires data generation companies that produce the raw genomic, single-cell, or spatial biology data, through sequencing instruments and sample-preparation tools, that all downstream personalization applications depend on. The clearest illustration of the importance of this layer occurred in August 2026, when Merck (MRK-US) and Moderna (MRNA-US) reported the first positive Phase 3 result for any individualized neoantigen therapy, in resected melanoma. The therapy is, in effect, one drug per patient: each dose requires that bioinformatics pipeline that selects which specific mutations to encode. This essential manufacturing input enables the therapy to exist and falls outside the category of discretionary diagnostic tests subject to payer discretion. Two companies in this space stand out:
- Illumina (ILMN-US) develops and manufactures life science tools and integrated systems for large-scale analysis of genetic variation and function. It is considered a mature, profitable incumbent whose sequencing platforms generate the raw genomic data every downstream application depends on. Second-quarter 2026 revenue grew 9.5% year-over-year, and the business is comfortably profitable.
- 10x Genomics (TXG-US) provides single-cell and spatial biology tools that capture the kind of granular data bulk sequencing cannot. Its 2026 revenue guidance implies roughly flat to modestly positive growth, but gross margin improved to 70% in the first quarter and net losses narrowed meaningfully. It is a smaller and more cyclical business than Illumina but one sitting directly upstream of the next generation of personalization applications: most of 10x’s workflows are ultimately sequenced on Illumina instruments, but Illumina has also built competing single-cell and spatial product lines.
2. Data-to-Decision
Data-to-decision companies turn raw data into an actionable clinical choice, such as which diagnostic test result, drug, or dose is right for a specific patient. This is the layer generating the most investor attention, partly because of its reliance on AI in specific products and partly because the category has adopted “AI” as a branding convention. The companies doing this work have divergent financial profiles, making for a tricky backdrop for investors:
- Natera (NTRA-US) is a diagnostics company, which engages in the discovery, development, and commercialization of genetic testing services. Second-quarter 2026 revenue grew 37%, management raised full-year revenue guidance and reiterated guidance for positive full-year cash flow, a rare combination of hypergrowth and a credible, near-term path to self-funding.
- Tempus AI (TEM-US) is a precision medicine company, historically centered on oncology, that runs two linked businesses: diagnostics and data. Diagnostics account for about three quarters of revenue, running genomic and molecular test on tumor samples. (about three-quarters of revenue). The data division keeps de-identified clinical and molecular patient records. It licenses that data, and the AI tools built on it, to pharmaceutical companies for drug discovery, trial design, and finding patients for trials. The company grew revenue 22% in the second quarter and posted a small profit, its first,
- Guardant Health (GH-US) is a “precision” oncology company, which provides treatment selection for cancer through the use of proprietary blood-based tests, vast data sets, and advanced analytics. In their most recent earnings results, they reported oncology test volume up 63% year-over-year, although net losses widened over the same period.
- Certara (CERT-US) provides software and technology-enabled services for drug developers including cell and gene therapy, clinical pharmacology, complex biologics, decision analytics and modeling. The company reported roughly flat second-quarter 2026 revenue and reported a small loss (compare to a profit gains in the previous quarters).
3. Manufacturing at Scale
Manufacturers physically produce personalized or small-batch biologic therapies (mRNA vaccines, cell and gene therapies). This is the bottleneck that determines whether personalized medicine can move beyond rare-disease niches into broader clinical use.
Bespoke, per-patient biologic manufactured in small batches is the structural opposite of the blockbuster-drug economics that built the modern pharmaceutical business model.
- Lonza (LONN-CH) is a Swiss company founded in 1897 that is a manufacturing partner for biopharmaceuticals. Historically, the company has “mass produced” popular treatments, but they now have a dedicated line of business develops, de-risk, commercializes, and scales emerging therapies. Sales growth was reported at over 20% in 2025, across mRNA, cell and gene therapy, and biologics manufacturing capacity.
The summary table above shows the large dispersion in the financial performance of the major actors in health care personalization. Revenue growth, gross margin, and profitability vary significantly; owning a basket of companies may be a more appropriate strategy than bearing single name risk.
Copper hit an intraday record of US$14,875 per tonne on September 10th, as planned U.S. tariff increases prompted hoarding across the global supply chain. In real terms, prices remain close to a 25-year high. Although recent demand has benefited from data centres riding the AI boom, AI still accounts for less than 5% of global copper consumption. Prices could therefore climb further: U.S. growth remains strong – the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow estimate stands at 3.7% year on year – and demand from EVs, construction and defence shows little sign of easing.
Furthermore, military rearmament has emerged as a genuine, additive driver of copper demand, layering on top of the electrification and AI-driven grid buildout already straining supply. Industry estimates put the current incremental demand from rising military spending at roughly 500,000 tonnes per year, about 1.5% of global consumption.
Global copper inventories have nevertheless risen recently, even as declining ore grades and production difficulties constrain mine supply and deepen bottlenecks. Pressure on prices are therefore likely to persist.
Meanwhile, global copper demand is forecast to grow at roughly twice the pace of supply over the next decade. That imbalance underscores the market’s strength, even with prices already elevated by historical standards.
Can copper be replaced?
Substitution is a genuine but limited risk. Aluminum is the only viable alternative, yet its conductivity is roughly 61% that of copper. It is also only one-third as dense, making it attractive where weight matters. That is why aluminum already dominates high-voltage transmission and is gaining share in EV wiring harnesses, particularly with copper trading at about 4.2 times its price.
Industry estimates put aluminum substitution at approximately 2% of global copper demand in 2026, rising to about 6% by 2030 and concentrated almost entirely in low-voltage automotive circuits. EV battery busbars, where current density and thermal reliability are critical, remain roughly 85% copper. Traction-motor windings have seen almost no substitution because bulkier aluminum windings would sacrifice the power density manufacturers are working to preserve.
More importantly, the largest incremental source of demand – AI-driven data centre and grid construction – is largely immune to substitution. Copper represents less than 0.5% of total data centre project costs, leaving hyperscale developers relatively indifferent to its price when specifying grid connections. Other alternatives, including silver, graphene and superconducting materials, are either too expensive at scale or commercially immature. Copper will remain difficult to displace for the foreseeable future.
Copper: the case for a bull market
First, both copper and copper miners have outperformed the S&P 500 so far this year.
Second, market participants have remained net long copper for the past two years, and current positioning points to an increasingly bullish stance. This suggests that asset managers and speculators are still invested in the market and expect prices to remain elevated for some time.
Against this backdrop, diversified miners have outperformed pure-play copper producers year to date even if enthusiasm around AI has cooled, leading by nearly ten percentage points. In our May 26, 2026, note, “From Transition Play to Arms Race: A Critical Materials Reset”, we argued for pure-play copper companies over diversified groups within the broader critical-materials universe.
That call has yet to pay off. Much of the AI enthusiasm was already embedded in leading copper miners, and investors are now questioning whether valuations across AI – and the associated data centre build-out – can be sustained, even for indirect beneficiaries such as the copper “complex”. Even so, copper stocks still look relatively inexpensive: their average price-to-earnings ratio remains below that of the S&P 500, which trades at 26 times earnings.
Copper recyclers such as Aurubis, however, retain solid fundamentals and trade at attractive valuations within the “Copper Kings” universe. They have lagged diversified miners, some of which have risen by 1.5 to 2 times over the past year. Higher copper prices also bring more scrap to market, giving recyclers easier access to feedstock than miners confronting steadily declining ore grades. We therefore continue to prefer recyclers to diversified copper miners.
For six years, Shein, the world’s largest fast fashion retailer, wandered from New York to London to Hong Kong before finally completing its stock market debut on September 1, 2026, an odyssey that ended in a muted trading debut and a valuation of roughly $26 billion – a fraction of the $100 billion it commanded at its 2022 funding peak. ESG scrutiny genuinely contributed to that delay. The company faced scrutiny from U.S. lawmakers over supply chain labor practices and forced-labor allegations tied to Xinjiang cotton. In the U.K., risk-disclosure requirements tied to Shein’s Chinese supply chain killed the London listing option. When Shein finally debuted in Hong Kong, the offering raised $1.7 billion, at a fraction of prior valuations.
It would be a fantasy to believe that Shein’s difficulty to secure a listing as proof that the fast fashion business model is failing. After all, Shein remains the world’s largest fast fashion retailer, and the industry of fast fashion has consistently outgrown the broader apparel market over the past several years.
When consumers spend money at Shein, they are doing so with little concern for environmental and social considerations. The implication is that consumers, voting with their pocketbooks, have not embraced eco-conscious choices on any great scale: the worst fashion polluters with the most environmentally destructive business models continue to gain market share. And if consumer sentiment is not enough to shift the needle in an ESG-indefensible industry, what can? In today’s Note, we argue that fast fashion’s business model IS more vulnerable today: policy, technology, and regulation are three levers that are working in place of consumers’ good intentions.
Trade Policy: A Fast Fashion Faux Pas
For the first time in fast fashion’s two-decade run, the mechanism forcing a cost increase on the sector’s most environmentally reckless business models is not activist pressure or consumer preference. It is trade policy pursued for reasons that have nothing to do with sustainability. First, the U.S. imposed steep Section 301 tariffs on Chinese-origin apparel and footwear, then extended sweeping “reciprocal” tariffs to nearly every other apparel-exporting nation under an April 2025 executive order. Companies operating in China rerouted supply chains through Vietnam, Cambodia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia to avoid the steepest China-specific rates. Then, in August 2025, the U.S. ended its de minimis exemption, the rule that let packages under $800 enter duty-free, and which Shein and Temu had built their entire unit economics around: garments now face tariffs as high as 46% depending on country of origin and product classification. The weighted average U.S. tariff on apparel and footwear imports spiked from 13% to 54% in spring 2025 before settling around 36%, still roughly double the broader U.S. import tariff average, in a sector where the U.S. imports 89% of the apparel and leather goods it sells. The European Union is following with its own repeal of the €150 de minimis exemption in 2026, closing the same loophole on the other side of the Atlantic.
Note that tariffs are a blunt instrument with no environmental objective behind them. Tariffs raise the cost of doing business in one jurisdiction; they do nothing to address overproduction, hazardous chemical use, or the underlying twenty-four-season production cycle. Tariffs may be working to stymy the sales of fast fashion brands, and therefore indirectly (and temporarily?) curb related environmental and social woes. However, they are a blunt instrument, easily reversed should the political winds change.
Technology: Making Apparel Circularity Feasible, But Not Inevitable
The single biggest change in the past five years when it comes to environmental impacts in the textile industry is arguably the technology that enables recycling. Fiber-to-fiber recycling has moved from laboratory concept to commercial reality. For example, Econyl is a branded regenerated nylon yarn made by the Italian company Aquafil, which chemically recycles nylon waste (like discarded fishing nets, carpet scraps, and industrial plastic) into new nylon fiber that is chemically identical to virgin nylon and can be reused infinitely without loss of quality; it’s already integrated at commercial volume into products from major fashion and swimwear brands rather than existing only as a pilot or lab-scale demonstration. Meanwhile, chemical recycling platforms like Circulose and Circ are running functioning pilot-to-commercial operations for cellulosic fibers and polyester-cotton blends, the two hardest categories to recycle. McKinsey estimates that with €6 to €7 billion of capital expenditure, fiber-to-fiber recycling could reach 18% to 26% of gross textile waste in Europe by 2030, up from under 1% today.
That said, readiness is not the same as adoption, and the industry’s own recent history is the clearest warning against declaring victory. Renewcell, the most heavily publicized textile-to-textile recycling company in the sector, filed for bankruptcy in February 2024 despite years of branded partnership announcements with major retailers. The brands signed offtake agreements, but they did not buy enough actual volume to keep the Renewcell solvent. That gap between announced ambition and executed procurement is the major bottleneck: industry-wide recycled fiber content remains stuck under 8%, Collection infrastructure, the unglamorous prerequisite for feeding any of this technology, still captures only 30% to 35% of textile waste in Europe, the most advanced market globally. The conclusion for investors is that circularity is now technically possible in a way it was not five years ago, which removes the industry’s best-worn excuse, but the constraint has shifted from engineering to capital allocation and brand purchasing commitment.
EU Regulation: Making Fast Fashion Unprofitable
Where technology has matured and tariffs remain a blunt, environmentally agnostic instrument, the European Union is the first jurisdiction to pair financial penalties directly with design incentives. Extended Producer Responsibility schemes rolling out under the EU’s Sustainable and Circular Textiles Strategy use eco-modulated fees: producers pay more for garments that are less durable, less recyclable, or contain less recycled content.
France has gone furthest and fastest. Coincidentally, its anti-ultra-fast-fashion law took effect on the same day as Shein’s IPO (September 1, 2026), imposing fees of up to 50% of a garment’s pre-tax selling price and banning advertising for platforms explicitly named in the legislative debate, Shein and Temu among them. France’s law targets the business model directly: it is designed around overproduction and environmental damage, not import protectionism or fiscal revenue. The EU’s parallel move to end its €150 de minimis exemption in 2026 closes the same loophole the U.S. closed a year earlier, but layered on top of EPR and the French penalty regime, it represents a more coordinated attempt to make the ultra-fast-fashion model structurally unprofitable in the EU market specifically.
Investment Implications
In the section below, we identify apparel retailers considered the biggest winner and losers from ongoing tariffs, recycling technology and EU regulation.
Losers:
- Structurally exposed to the de minimis/tariff mechanism: PDD Holdings (PDD-US), owner of Temu, and Shein (0625-HK) face the most direct hit, since their entire cost advantage was built on duty-free small-parcel shipping, no longer possible in both the U.S. and EU. Stanford GSB research shows they’re diversifying markets rather than restructuring the underlying model, which caps the damage but doesn’t reverse it.
- Asia-sourcing-concentrated apparel manufacturers with thin margins and limited pricing power: G-III Apparel Group (GIII-US, withdrew guidance entirely), VF Corporation (VFC-US, down roughly 20% since May 2026), Gap Inc. (GAP-US, $200-300 million quantified tariff cost), Columbia Sportswear (COLM-US), and American Eagle Outfitters (AEO-US, down 37% YTD). None of these carry the brand pricing power to fully pass costs to consumers, and their Vietnam and China sourcing concentration puts them squarely in the highest-tariff bracket.
- Companies with pledges but no capital behind them: as we discussed, brands whose recycled-content commitments are percentage targets without disclosed offtake agreements are exposed to reputational and potentially regulatory risk under the EU’s eco-modulated EPR fee structure, which will increasingly reward demonstrable recycled content and durability, not stated ambition. Nike, Inc. (NKE-US) face an active class action lawsuit alleging that up to 90% of items in its own “Sustainability” collection are not actually made with recycled fibers as advertised, and the company overstated recycled content claims. Meanwhile, Shein was fined €1 million by Italy’s Competition Authority in August 2025 specifically for misleading sustainability claims.
Winners:
- Brands with genuine pricing power and premium positioning are passing through tariff costs: Ralph Lauren (RL-US) has pushed through explicit price increases with limited demand destruction, and as a premium brand tariff costs are small as a share of retail price makes the entire tariff regime close to immaterial for them financially. Note that on an operational basis, Ralph Lauren is an industry leader, based on CSRHub score metrics.
- Nearshored or diversified-sourcing manufacturers: Gildan Activewear Inc. (GIL-CA), with manufacturing concentrated in Central and North America, it is a beneficiary of USMCA and CAFTA preferential treatment, and carries structurally lower Asia tariff exposure than peers. Like Ralph Lauren, Gildan is an operational leader, according to CSRHub scores.
- Brands that made real capital commitments to recycling infrastructure early: Inditex (ITX-ES) and H&M (HMB-SE) – once considered the worst fast fashion offenders – are now best positioned to benefit from EU eco-modulated EPR fees specifically because their offtake agreements with recycled textile manufacturers give them defensible, auditable recycled-content claims exactly when regulators start checking. This is a case where genuine capital deployed years before the regulation bites becomes a real competitive moat rather than a marketing line.
Commercially mature recycling technology suppliers: Unifi (UFI-US), through its REPREVE fiber business, and Lenzing AG (LNZ-AT), through Refibra/TENCEL, sit downstream of both the EU regulatory push and brand offtake demand, positioned to capture volume regardless of which individual apparel brand wins market share, a more diversified way to express the circularity thesis than betting on any single retailer.
Four years ago, we argued that nuclear was coming back (please see Back to the Future: A Nuclear Revival, 9 June 2022). The thesis was, and still is, that nuclear is a necessary source of firm, low-carbon electricity in a system trying to exit coal and gas. The investments we recommended were uranium miners in geopolitically safer jurisdictions, above all Canada (CCO-CA), and small modular reactor vendors such as NuScale Power SMR-US, GE (now GEV-US), Hitachi 6501-JP and Rolls Royce (RR-GB).
The mining leg has played out as expected. The SMR contribution to the electricity grid has not. Stock-market performance reflects that split: CCO-CA and CEG-US have rerated sharply over four years, while NuScale, the listed name most levered to an SMR buildout, has not. Without that buildout, nuclear’s share of global electricity has declined from about 10% in 2022 to under 9% today. Today’s note examines what has changed in the outlook and where we would (and would not) put money between now and 2030.
The scorecard
Nuclear remains the principal widely deployed, low-carbon source of firm power that is not constrained by river geography or weather. That was true in 2022, and it is true now. Our 2022 expectation was that by the second half of this decade, high fossil-fuel prices, regulation and national-security concerns would make new reactors financeable relative to other sources, and that SMRs would be near ready for operation.
Oil prices were not uniformly high. However, the other supports (policy, security of supply, and now AI-driven electricity demand) have largely been in place; the long-run case for nuclear is intact. What did not happen is the SMR buildout. The most closely watched projects in North America were cancelled or delayed:
- NuScale’s Carbon Free Power Project with UAMPS was cancelled in November 2023 after estimated project cost rose from about $5 billion to about $9 billion on inflation and higher rates.
- The first North American grid-scale SMR actually under construction, GE Vernova Hitachi’s BWRX-300 at Ontario Power Generation’s Darlington site, is now aimed at commercial operation around 2030, later than first discussed.
Factory fabrication and modular add-on capacity remain the theoretical attractions. In practice, most of the 80-plus SMR designs are still at conceptual or detailed design. Only two SMR plants are in operation: Russia’s Akademik Lomonosov (floating) and China’s HTR-PM, which entered commercial operation in December 2023. A handful more are under construction in Argentina, China and Russia. The technology is still largely untested at commercial scale in North America.
So what happened?
Global electricity demand rose on the order of 3% in 2025, faster than total energy demand, with AI and data centres a visible incremental driver. Hyperscalers are demanding power as fast as it can be added to the grid. Earlier this summer we wrote why natural gas plus renewables (solar and batteries) is the current go-to for new U.S. data-centre load (please see July 2026, Data Centers: After the Gas Rush). SMRs are a long-term firm-power option but can’t address the needs today.
The four largest U.S. hyperscalers (GOOGL-US, AMZN-US, META-US, MSFT-US) have signed nuclear offtake. According to a recent Carnegie report, hyperscalers generally prefer buying needed energy through power purchase agreements (PPAs), which has resulted in restarts, life extensions, and uprates of existing plants. Thus far, their interest has not translated into the financial backing that would be required to generate an “order book” to build a fleet of new reactors.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ July 2026 accounting is blunter: nuclear has played no meaningful role in meeting the AI load already on the grid, and many SMR announcements are feasibility funding and options, not engineering, procurement and construction cheques. Amazon’s plan with Energy Northwest in Washington is a case in point. Amazon has funded the initial feasibility phase and secured the right to purchase power from the first project (four modules), with no obligation to take that power if it is too expensive. Delivery is “some time in the 2030s”; no construction permit has been filed.
Google’s partnership with privately held Kairos Power in Tennessee is likely to be the first of these advanced-reactor data-centre deals to produce power, aimed at 2030. The project broke ground in April 2026. It is a 50 MW demonstration plant selling into the TVA system, not the 500 MW fleet originally advertised.
SMRs are therefore unlikely to fill hyperscaler demand this decade. The nuclear equity story through 2030 is primarily restarts, uprates and life extensions of existing plants, plus the fuel those plants burn (large new reactors continue to be built in Asia, which supports uranium demand even if Western SMRs slip). With that backdrop, we update the listed opportunities.
Investing in Nuclear: Today To 2030
Despite a slower timeline for small modular reactors, nuclear will remain part of the energy mix. In the section below we walk through the listed names in the nuclear chain, from the mine to the electricity that comes out of the plant, and where we would (and would not) put money between now and 2030.
The physical chain is simple. Uranium starts as ore, is milled to yellowcake, converted to UF6 so U-235 can be concentrated, then returned to ceramic pellets in fuel assemblies. Most listed stocks sit at the two ends, the mine and the power1. Mining and milling steps matter but are hard to buy as public equities.
Mining and milling. Our preferred uranium miner since 2022 has been CCO-CA, because most of its uranium is sold under long-term contracts and because the mines are in Canada. KAP-GB is the larger competitor, but Kazakhstan is a harder jurisdiction for an ESG-constrained book.
Alongside these established companies, there are four developers with potential to supply more uranium in the future: NexGen (NXE-CA), Denison (DML-CA), Uranium Energy (UEC-US) and Paladin (PDN-AU). The first two are not yet producing uranium, while UEC is in early production in the U.S. and PDN is producing in Namibia and developing assets in Canada.
Conversion. Only a handful of plants can convert yellowcake to UF6. Cameco operates one of them, while the other large Western converter, France’s Orano, is unlisted.
Enrichment. About 95% of world capacity sits with private companies. Centrus Energy (LEU-US) is the listed US exception.
Fuel fabrication. Utilities do not switch suppliers lightly, so this is a stable business. Incumbents are mostly private or inside larger groups. Westinghouse (Cameco and Brookfield) makes fuel for the common US reactor type. GE Vernova (GEV-US) and Hitachi (6501-JP) make fuel for boiling-water reactors. BWX Technologies (BWXT-US) makes fuel for the U.S. Navy and some advanced designs.
Designing and building new reactors. This layer is paid when a plant is actually built. GE Vernova and Hitachi are building the BWRX-300 at Darlington, aimed at 2030. Mitsubishi (7011-JP) and Doosan Enerbility (034020-KR) are large-reactor hardware in Asia. BWX Technologies (BWXT-US) and Curtiss-Wright (CW-US) sell into plants that already run. NuScale (SMR-US), Oklo (OKLO-US) and Rolls Royce (RR-GB) are the main listed SMR expressions.
Construction contractors. Once a reactor is financed: Jacobs (J-US), Fluor (FLR-US), Atkins Realis (ATRL-CA), Aecon (ARE-CA) and Samsung (028260-KR). Bechtel, often the lead, is private.
Generating electricity. In North America, since new plants are not being built, the main activity is restarting previously decommissioned plants, improving output from current plants and licence extensions.
The specialist is Constellation Energy (CEG-US). Microsoft is paying for the restart of Three Mile Island Unit 1; Meta’s contract keeps Clinton in Illinois running. Vistra (VST-US) is in the same business and is also a gas generator. Talen Energy (TLN-US) has a PPA with Amazon for Pennsylvania data centres.
Outside the US, longer operation of existing fleets is the same idea: KEPCO (015760-KR), Kansai Electric (9503-JP), CEZ (CEZ-CZ Fortum (FORTUM-FI). CGN Power (1816-H) is the China large-fleet name, with the usual ESG-jurisdiction caveat.
Waste and decommissioning. Used fuel is stored, usually on site; reactors are eventually taken apart. There is no satisfactory listed way to own the waste step. The liability stays with the generator. Cloud companies that enter power purchase agreements do not take the long-term environmental or community risk, nor the nuclear-safety residual.
Given the value chain and our view that SMRs will not be a material 2026–30 solution, the best listed exposure is at steps 1 (mining) and 7 (generating). Cameco is the only listed name that reaches from the mine through conversion and, via Westinghouse, into fuel and plant services. Centrus and BWXT are small ways to own the scarce middle. Constellation, and to a lesser extent Vistra, have customers for any extra megawatt-hour they can extract from plants that already exist.
As of mid-August, Canada was on track for its fourth-worst forest fire season. The U.S. is faring little better, with national acreage burnt running at roughly double the ten-year average early in the season and air quality alerts active across more than a dozen states. France, Spain, and Portugal have all experienced worse than average wildfire seasons in 2026 and the consensus is now to expect increasingly devastating forest fire seasons as climate change progresses. Indeed, data from Global Nature Watch confirms that forest fires are becoming more widespread and destructive around the globe; annual forest fires now burn more than twice as much tree cover as in the early 2000s.
Why This Particle is Different
Forest fire smoke is not a diluted version of urban air pollution, and treating the two as interchangeable understates the health burden. Toxicological and epidemiological evidence indicates wildfire particulate is more harmful per unit mass than PM2.5 from other sources (PM2.5 is fine particulate matter of 2.5 micrometres or smaller, able to penetrate deep into the lungs and bloodstream).
Recent studies, using Southern California data, found that a 10 µg/m³ increase in forest fire-specific PM2.5 was associated with a 1.3% to 10% rise in respiratory hospitalisations, compared with 0.67% to 1.3% for the same increment of non-forest fire PM2.5. The per-unit-mass effect is on the order of ten times larger. One implication is that mass-based Air Quality Indexes systematically understate the health consequence of a smoke episode.
This matters because forest fire pollution sits largely outside the regulatory architecture that created the last generation of air-quality capex. In the United States, under the Clean Air Act’s Exceptional Events Rule, state and local air quality authorities may petition the EPA to exclude data collected during forest fire smoke episodes. Forest fire-driven exceedances can be struck from the record, so that areas affected by smoke are not flagged as failing national ambient air quality standards, even when concentrations were, in fact, over the limit.
An important corollary is that, unlike stack and tailpipe pollution, ambient forest fire smoke does not benefit from the Porter Hypothesis. Strict environmental regulations can force innovation and the introduction of cleaner technologies. As we wrote previously (please see June 1, 2023 note “Clearing the Air”), pollutants such as sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides come out of identifiable stacks and tailpipes owned by identifiable regulated entities, so exceedances translate into permit conditions, enforcement actions, and compliance deadlines. That legal obligation is what converts an environmental problem into capital expenditure, and it is what built the addressable markets for flue-gas desulphurisation, selective catalytic reduction, and diesel aftertreatment, which we examined through companies such as Alfa Laval (ALFA-SE), Cummins (CMI-US), and Johnson Matthey (JMAT-GB).
For forest fire smoke, that mechanism is missing. There is no compliance-driven capital expenditure and no obvious “environmental winner” analogous to the scrubber cycle: ambient smoke has no permit holder, so the same physical exposure produces no mandated spending on abatement. Ignition is a different matter: where a utility, a railroad, or a landowner can be shown to have started the fire, liability and wildfire-mitigation rules do create a defendant and a capex cycle. That distinction is the difference between the filtration discussion below and the grid-hardening discussion that follows.
What Can Investors Do
Unlike industrial air pollution, which created compliance obligations, forced capital expenditure, and therefore investable demand for control equipment, wildfire smoke creates health problems at scale with little regulatory consequence. Governments tend to treat wildfire pollution as an act of nature to be excluded from the record. Investors looking for the equivalent of the next scrubber cycle will not find it here.
That does not mean wildfires are without investment implications. We identify three investable sectors affected by more frequent forest fires in Western countries. We do not address voluntary carbon credit markets; we will do so in a future note.
1. Reinsurance repricing
For most reinsurers, wildfire remains classified as a secondary, or non-peak, peril. The economics no longer match that label. According to Swiss Re, North American wildfire insured losses have been growing at more than 14% per year, among the faster-growing catastrophe loss lines.
The January 2025 California fires showed that wildfire can materially affect reinsurer profitability. Renaissance Re (RNR-US) is a pure-play P&C reinsurer; the stock sold off sharply in the first quarter of 2025 as the company reported a large underwriting loss.
To be sure, not all wildfire seasons produce such large stock price declines. Stock prices of reinsurers continued to climb through the 2026 season because fires in Canada, France, and Spain largely avoided dense urban areas unlike California in 2025.With RNR as the notable exception, reinsurers tend to have diversified businesses (see the table below).
Another risk to reinsurers is that they, and the primary companies they support, will be increasingly compelled to hold exposure they would rather shed. In California, the Department of Insurance’s Sustainable Insurance Strategy has begun conditioning rate approvals on commitments to write in wildfire-distressed areas.
The implication is that forest fire is migrating, in economic if not in formal labelling terms, from a secondary to a primary risk. Several large P&C reinsurers have outperformed the S&P 500 over the past five years. A repricing of forest fire risk does not mean the end of that bull market, but it does mean underwriting results and California take-up commitments now deserve more weight in the thesis than they did when wildfire losses were considered a rounding error.
2. Utility wildfire liability and grid hardening
Earlier this month, Los Angeles County fire officials confirmed that Southern California Edison (EIX-US), the primary electric utility for much of Southern California, ignited the 2025 Eaton fire. Electrical arcing on an idle, out-of-service transmission tower sent hot metal into dry vegetation, killing 19 people and destroying more than 9,000 homes and businesses. Over the past decade, Edison has paid out billions in claims related to equipment-sparked fires. Utilities are a relatively common ignition source in North America. In 2019, Pacific Gas and Electric filed for bankruptcy after its equipment ignited wildfires that killed more than 100 people and destroyed entire towns.
These cases illustrate the need for grid hardening: upgrading and reinforcing the electrical system against wildfire ignition and against other physical disruptions. Budgets for wildfire-related grid hardening in California alone are already in the billions, large enough to sustain contractor backlogs at firms such as Quanta Services (PWR-US) and MasTec (MTZ-US), whose businesses include undergrounding, vegetation management, and system reinforcement for utilities.
Both stocks have suffered major sell-offs this summer after a strong prior twelve months. That decline should not be read as the market rejecting the grid-hardening thesis. Trailing earnings multiples remain elevated relative to history, so a correction was overdue.
3. Filtration and indoor air quality
Because ambient smoke has no permit holder, the only private response is to filter the air after it has already entered buildings. Demand for air filtration products (furnace filters and portable HEPA units) is visible in retail spikes during forest fire episodes. However, back of the envelope calculations suggest the total addressable market is $0.3–0.6 billion of forest fire-attributable North American revenue in a particularly smoky year. That is paltry compared with California wildfire-mitigation and undergrounding budgets, which are already in the billions per year and are mandated. For investors, gaining exposure to the indoor air filtration market is not straightforward. Category leaders that tend to capture the spike in sales are mostly private, while air purifying products make up only a small portion of revenues of publicly listed companies that sell them.
With AI agents now roaming the virtual corridors of the services industry, it’s fair to ask how far this technology ultimately displaces workers across finance, legal, accounting, and HR functions at larger organizations. Agentic AI platforms let firms create and train agents in a way that effectively builds “digital twins” of entire services’ workforces. Where firms used to add headcount, often through temp staffing agencies, they can now nurture agents natively trained on their own context and workflows. In this not-so-utopian world, now at our doorstep, it’s fair to wonder whether temp staffing companies retain a durable role, and whether the sector’s historically controversial labor model becomes a smaller share of how large employers fill gaps.
The most rigorous data point on employer intent comes from the Adecco Group’s Workforce Trends 2026 Report, a survey of roughly 2,000 C-suite executives and 37,500 workers across 13 countries. Forty-five percent of business leaders expect AI agents to be fully integrated into workflows within twelve months, yet only 36% say their talent strategy clearly communicates that AI will create opportunities for employees rather than displace them, and just 22% are confident they are building the digital capabilities their workforce actually needs.
The gap cuts the other way too: 70% of non-managerial employees say they would be comfortable collaborating with AI agents, compared with only 39% of leaders who believe their staff feel that way. The implication is that AI agent execution risk sits with management confidence and change management, not worker resistance. PwC’s AI agent survey corroborates this pattern: 75% of executives report confidence in their AI agent strategy, but describe the near-term effect as redeploying staff to new tasks rather than eliminating headcount outright. Census Bureau firm-level tracking adds a useful reality check: among companies currently using AI, 87% report it displaces only a small number of tasks, with large-scale task replacement still confined to under 1% of firms.
Taken together, the evidence does not support a clean substitution thesis in which AI agents are displacing temporary or contingent labor at scale today. Instead, it points to a slower, uneven redesign of work in which the binding constraint is organizational trust and skills investment, not the technology’s raw capability to replace tasks currently filled by temp staffing.
Build vs. Buy, and the “Enshittification” Risk
Outsourcing to temp staffing versus building in-house AI agents is a classic build-versus-buy tradeoff, with each option carrying a distinct risk profile rather than one being categorically superior. Temp staffing converts labor into a variable cost, transfer screening, compliance, and turnover risk to the agency, and, critically, carries a network effect: a temp worker arrives having already seen how dozens of other employers solve the same problem, so each placement imports cross-company best practice and gives the employer an external market check on quality. A temp’s output is benchmarked against a market rate and a market skill pool, and underperformance is cheap to terminate.
In-house AI agents have no equivalent mechanism. They are trained and reinforced almost entirely on one company’s own data, KPIs, and management preferences, so they tend to optimize for pleasing the existing hierarchy rather than for ground truth. The upfront cost is largely sunk (data infrastructure, fine-tuning, integration, governance), but the marginal cost of each additional task approaches zero once built, which is the entire investment case for agentic automation. The catch is that there is no natural market discipline, forcing a reset the way a temp worker’s next assignment does. An agent fine-tuned on a company’s own historical decisions and success metrics will tend to reproduce and amplify that company’s existing blind spots and internal politics.
For investors evaluating a company’s AI agent buildout, the diligence question is not simply how much capex is going into it, but whether implementing agents can occur while avoiding enshittification – the idea that your employees start drinking the corporate kool aid a bit too much, i.e., whether the company has built independent evaluation benchmarks, external data grounding, and adversarial red teaming to substitute for the cross-employer network effect that in-house agents structurally lack.
ESG: The Temp Staffing Risks that AI Agents Sidestep
Temp staffing practices typically split legal employment (the agency) from operational control (the client), which creates accountability gaps. For instance, temp staffing companies have been historically accused of precarious pay and hours, wage theft, discrimination, weak safety training for high-risk placements, and even recruitment-fee debt bondage or forced labor among migrant workers, alongside erosion of union bargaining power. These risks translate financially into litigation exposure, joint-employer liability, regulatory fines, higher insurance costs, and lost contracts, especially as supply-chain due-diligence rules tighten globally. By deploying AI agents in lieu of temp workers, a company can sidestep this entire risk category.
How Big is the Temp Market, Really?
Temp employment peaked at 2.5% of total U.S. non-farm employment in 2020 and now stands at roughly 1.5% of the employed workforce. With job openings now back near 2019 levels, the current low level of temp staffing may be explained as much by the temporary sluggishness of the broader job market as by any AI-driven substitution effect.
Looking at the past six months, BLS data offers a more nuanced picture than the popular “AI is gutting white-collar jobs” narrative suggests: temp staffing employment has in fact increased by 34,800 jobs (+1.4%).
That said, there is considerable dispersion across industries. Temp staffing for financial activities and information services show genuine, broadening contraction, down 57,000 (-0.6%) and 35,000 (-1.2%) respectively over six months. This contraction is concentrated in insurance carriers, credit intermediation, and computer systems design, precisely the automatable back-office and technical functions linked to the fastest AI adoption rates. Legal services and accounting, by contrast, show no aggregate displacement at all: legal payrolls are up 11,300 (+0.9%) and accounting is roughly flat over the same window. Healthcare remains the only sector still driving overall job growth (+2.9% YoY through March 2026, across all healthcare employment, not just temp placements), while temp staffing specifically has stabilized after last year’s slide, both supporting the case that clinical staffing demand is more insulated from AI substitution than white-collar temp placement. The Dallas Federal Reserve and Anthropic research suggest the likely explanation is that AI’s labor impact so far shows up as a freeze in entry-level hiring, associates, junior auditors, rather than incumbent layoffs, a dynamic that is invisible in aggregate industry headcount data but very real for the cohort it affects.
Agents Are Priced In
Publicly listed temp staffing companies have derated substantially over the past year and underperformed the broader indices. Thin profit margins, flattening revenue growth, and a slower overall job market have taken the air out of the post-Covid staffing bubble.
Within the group, Robert Half looks most vulnerable to agentic AI, given its strong exposure to back-office financial functions, precisely the roles most likely to be automated within the next five years. AMN Healthcare, by contrast, provides staff that remain far harder to replace given the clinical nature of the work, which should make it more resilient to AI displacement, at least until humanoid robotics make meaningful inroads into care settings.
From an operational standpoint, most staffing firms now have an explicit AI strategy, often centered on using AI tools to streamline their own HR and placement processes. In addition, they will increasingly compete for client budgets with management consultants and IT integrators, which are also pitching “build your agentic workforce” engagements to the same corporate buyers, as the strategies highlighted in the table below suggest.
Equity market participants have reacted quickly to the disruption narrative. Short interest in Robert Half has reached 24%, reflecting a deep-seated conviction that AI will permanently erode demand for white-collar placement services, even as domestic staffing trends are inflecting toward recovery, a combination that could set up a short squeeze as sentiment catches up to improving operational realities. ManpowerGroup carries more moderate short interest of roughly 15%.
The Paradox at the Heart of the Grid
AI is both a source of the problem and the most credible solution to it. Global data center electricity consumption reached approximately 415 TWh in 2024, growing at 12% per year since 2017, and the IEA projects this figure could reach up to 1,200 TWh by 2030. A single AI-focused data center today consumes as much electricity as 100,000 households. At the same time, the electricity grid is increasingly unreliable: the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) flagged rising shortfall risk under both extreme and normal conditions in its latest Long-Term Reliability Assessment, and grid outages already cost U.S. businesses roughly $150 billion annually.
The irony is that the same computing paradigm generating this demand surge is also the most capable tool available to manage it. The question for investors is not whether AI will change how electricity is produced, distributed, and consumed. It will. The question is which companies in the stack are positioned to capture durable, recurring revenue from that shift.
Two Domains, Two Mechanisms
Grid Optimization
AI’s most direct contribution to grid efficiency operates at the level of real-time sensing, forecasting, and control. Smart meters and IoT sensors generate continuous operational data; AI algorithms process that data to build a live picture of grid state and issue control signals in milliseconds, far faster than human operators can respond.
The IEA’s 2025 “Energy and AI” report identifies AI-based fault detection as one of the highest-impact near-term applications, with documented reductions in outage durations of 30-50%. Given the $150 billion annual cost of outages, a 30% improvement represents tens of billions in recoverable economic value, even before accounting for carbon savings from avoided backup generation.
Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) represent the next frontier. These systems aggregate small-scale distributed resources, including behind-the-meter solar, batteries, demand-response loads, and EV chargers, and coordinate them through AI to respond to grid signals in real time. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that tripling VPP scale in America alone could reduce grid costs by $10 billion per year, primarily by deferring expensive peak capacity additions. As the share of intermittent renewables grows, the economic case for AI-driven aggregation and dispatch becomes progressively stronger.
Industrial Process Optimization
Industry and commercial buildings together account for roughly 64% of U.S. electricity demand, making them the largest addressable market for AI efficiency tools. Here, the applications are more granular but no less material. We see 4 key industrial sectors where AI could markedly optimize production and reduce energy costs:
Steel: Steel is an instructive case. ArcelorMittal (MT-US) partnered with energy AI specialist Energiency to deploy machine learning models that predict and control energy consumption continuously across its smelting operations, achieving 2-5% annual energy savings on an energy bill that represents roughly one quarter of total production costs. A separate deployment using C3.ai’s energy management platform at a different major steel producer generated $14 million in annual energy cost savings at a single hot roll mill, alongside a 40 MW reduction in monthly utility demand charges.
Cement : Cement, which another thermodynamically constrained industry, can also achieve more efficiency using AI. A 2026 peer-reviewed analysis found 3-9% net energy and CO2 reductions from AI-optimized kiln controls, after explicitly subtracting the energy cost of running the AI itself. For an industry running near thermodynamic limits, 5% is financially significant and competes favorably with far more expensive physical decarbonization options.
Cooling : For cooling and facility management, the IEA independently cites a 23% cooling energy saving from AI-optimized controls as a representative industrial deployment benchmark. Across optimizable industrial subsystems more broadly, documented savings commonly reach 20-30% of the targeted system’s energy consumption, though total plant-level savings are typically 5-15% given that no single subsystem represents the entire load.
Chemicals: Chemical production offers one of the highest AI optimization ceilings in heavy industry. Energy costs represent 40-60% of variable production costs at specialty chemical and petrochemical facilities, and process complexity (multi-variable reactor management, distillation train sequencing, heat integration across unit operations) creates exactly the conditions where narrow ML models identify non-obvious savings that rule-based controls miss. AI-optimized process control at chemical plants has demonstrated sustained energy reductions of 3-8% on targeted units, with the strongest results on distillation columns where temperature and pressure gradients interact in ways that respond well to continuous model retraining. At industrial scale, a 5% energy reduction at a large petrochemical complex running 200-400 GWh annually translates to $3-8 million per year at current industrial power prices, with no capital expenditure on physical equipment.
A useful way to frame AI’s efficiency contribution is to ask what energy is consumed by the AI relative to what it saves. The answer varies dramatically depending on the type of AI deployed, and investors who treat all AI as equivalent in energy intensity will systematically misread this opportunity.
Industrial process optimization does not rely on large language models. It uses narrow, purpose-built machine learning models, often small enough to run on edge hardware or modest on-premise servers. A factory consuming 100 GWh per year that deploys a continuous ML optimization model on local hardware might consume 0.01-0.1 GWh annually on inference. If that model saves 5% of plant energy, or 5 GWh, the implied leverage ratio is 50:1 to 500:1 in energy saved per unit of AI energy consumed. This is not marginal: it is strongly net positive, and it is precisely why the IEA’s analysis of well-scoped industrial applications concludes that AI is energy-additive rather than energy-neutral.
The energy paradox narrative applies to large language models and generative AI, where a single query consumes 3-30 times the energy of a typical web search, and training runs consume electricity equivalent to small towns. But these architectures are not what drives a cement kiln or optimizes a steel furnace. The AI that matters most for industrial efficiency is lean, specialized, and deployed close to the process. The companies building and selling that software are not competing against data center scale-up; they are competing against the baseline of unoptimized industrial operations, and winning.
Where the Investment Opportunity Sits
The most defensible long-term positions across this theme sit with the large-cap infrastructure companies in the coverage universe. Their combination of certified field service networks, multi-decade customer relationships, and systems integration depth creates a moat that pure software entrants cannot replicate quickly.
Schneider Electric (SU-FR) is the most fully integrated play in the coverage universe. Its EcoStruxure platform spans building management, grid automation, and industrial control as a unified software stack, and recurring software and services revenue is growing as a share of EBITA. The company’s dominant position in data center power distribution gives it direct exposure to the AI infrastructure build-out, independent of any efficiency software thesis.
GE Vernova (GEV-US) sells grid software through a customer base it already serves with physical grid hardware and services contracts, which substantially lowers sales friction. GridOS, GEV’s advanced distribution management system, addresses dispatch optimization, fault detection, and VPP orchestration directly, covering the three highest-value AI grid applications identified by the IEA.
Eaton (ETN-US) is the most hardware-proximate name in the group, but its power management franchise is increasingly software-defined. Its fastest-growing segments (data center and industrial power quality) are exactly where AI-driven efficiency generates the clearest and most measurable ROI for end customers.
ABB (ABBN-CH) brings the deepest industrial automation capability in the group. Its ABB Ability digital suite is most concentrated in process industries (chemicals, mining, pulp and paper) where energy optimization ROI is highest and willingness to pay for proven software is well established. ABB’s multi-year portfolio restructuring has improved capital returns without eroding its technical position.
C3.ai (AI-US) is the primary enterprise software plays with revenue concentrated in industrial energy management. C3.ai’s documented results in steel energy forecasting are among the most quantified in the public domain.
Itron (ITRI-US) and Landis+Gyr (LAND-CH) offer small-cap exposure to the smart metering and grid sensing layer, which is foundational infrastructure without which AI optimization algorithms have no data to work with. Landis+Gyr is exclusively a smart grid company; Itron earns approximately 67% of revenues from smart grid products. Both carry higher execution risk than the large-cap names, but provide concentrated exposure to grid digitization spending.
Vertiv (VRT-US) manufactures the thermal management systems and power distribution infrastructure that sit inside data centers and determine how efficiently electricity is converted into compute. As AI chips generate five to ten times more heat per rack than conventional servers, the hardware required to cool them becomes more complex and more expensive, expanding Vertiv’s addressable market with every GPU cluster installed.
The YTD performance dispersion within the coverage universe is instructive. Vertiv’s 75% gain reflects the market’s pricing of several years of AI cooling demand; the thesis is sound but execution risk is now fully reflected in the price. The large-cap infrastructure names (Schneider, GE Vernova, Eaton, and ABB) have been relative laggards and offer better risk-adjusted entry given backlog-supported earnings visibility and growing recurring revenue. The pure software layer (AI-US, AZPN-US) requires higher conviction on near-term revenue inflection; C3.ai in particular has not yet demonstrated a durable path to profitability despite strong individual customer case studies.
Sustainability-oriented equity mandates have spent a decade building around a practical constraint: ESG data for small cap companies is less available and less reliable than its large cap counterparts. Third-party ratings agencies often concentrate their analytical resources on large caps, where disclosure is richer and the revenue-per-company economics make coverage worthwhile. The consequence has been a structural underweight in small caps across ESG portfolios that is a data artifact rather than a deliberate investment judgment.
Over the twelve months ending June 30, 2026, that underweight cost money. The Russell 2000 returned 40% and in the first half of 2026 alone, the Russell 2000 outperformed the S&P 500 by more than 12 percentage points, its best start to a year since 1991.
The deeper issue for sustainability mandates is that low scores and missing scores are treated as equivalent signals of ESG risk, when in most cases they reflect nothing more than the disclosure practices of a company with less staff dedicated to the investor relations function.
We propose a different entry point: rather than relying on ratings coverage that does not exist, we identify small cap companies where observable, verifiable sustainability events have recently occurred or are imminent – first ESG reports, CDP initiation, SBTi validation, board-level governance upgrades, etc. These triggers do not require proprietary data infrastructure. They require reading company filings, sustainability reports, and proxy statements, which is what active small cap managers already do. The re-rating that follows is systematic and documented: research published in 2025 found that MSCI ESG rating changes drive abnormal returns over multiple months after the change, with institutional investor repositioning as the primary transmission mechanism.
The implication is actionable: in small caps, identify the companies that are publishing the required data and own them before the agencies react.
The Investment Thesis
When a company improves its sustainability posture in a material, verifiable way, the re-rating tends to follow a predictable sequence. First, the company appears in sustainability-focused screening databases (MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, ISS) with an upgraded score. This typically takes 12 to 24 months from the triggering event. Second, institutional mandates with ESG minimum screens begin to include the name in their eligible universe, generating incremental demand that is largely independent of traditional fundamental catalysts. Third, coverage by sustainability-focused analysts follows, compounding the effect.
Companies know that improving their sustainability posture is good for their stock price; the survey results showed in the chart below highlight that companies believe the main opportunities related to ESG ratings are acquiring and retaining interest in their stock.
It is logical that the re-rating premium would be amplified in small caps relative to large caps because the starting ownership base is dominated by generalist managers who have not priced sustainability improvement into their valuation. There are some practical signals that investors can track to anticipate a re-rating:
- First publication of a sustainability report (particularly if structured around SASB materiality topics)
- Adoption of science-based emissions targets or commitment to SBTi validation
- Board composition changes (addition of an independent director with sustainability credentials; board-level committee dedicated to ESG oversight)
- First participation in CDP disclosure (Carbon Disclosure Project questionnaire responses carry significant weight in downstream rating models)
- Emissions intensity reduction documented over two consecutive years (a single year is insufficient signal; agencies require a trend)
Where to Look
The most fertile ground for the improvers investment thesis sits in sectors where SASB-defined material sustainability topics are operationally manageable at scale for a small company, but where disclosure has historically been minimal. Industrial services, specialty chemicals, and building products are all areas where energy intensity, waste management, and worker health and safety are financially material (under SASB) and operationally addressable without the capital requirements that make transition difficult. A small industrial company that installs remote energy monitoring across its facilities, reduces its recordable incident rate, and publishes a first SASB-aligned sustainability report is doing all three things at once – and doing them in a way that is both financially rational and likely to trigger a meaningful ESG re-rating within two years.
The Counter-Argument
A skeptic may point to three things that undermine the arguments above:
- The re-rating timeline of 12 to 24 months is long, and the path is uncertain: a company can publish a sustainability report without triggering any rating agency review if the report is judged insufficiently substantive.
- The sustainability reporting landscape is not frictionless: first-time reporters routinely publish reports of uneven quality, and a poorly constructed first report can lock in a low score rather than improve it.
- The liquidity premium embedded in small caps is not always fully compensated: if a sustainability-driven re-rating coincides with a broad risk-off environment, the demand lift from ESG-screened mandates may be insufficient to offset market-wide selling.
These are real risks, but they can be mitigated by concentrating on companies whose underlying operational improvements are genuine and financially material, rather than those pursuing disclosure as a cosmetic exercise. For example, an emissions intensity trend that tracks with capital investment in energy efficiency is credible, while an emissions intensity trend that appears only in the sustainability report – without corresponding capex – is not.
Investment Implications
For small cap equity managers, a systematic scan for the leading indicators listed above (sustainability report publication, CDP participation, SBTi commitment, and board changes) applied across the portfolio universe can generates a watchlist of names likely to re-rate within 24 months.
In the section below, we highlight companies that qualify for a “sustainability re-rating” based on the criteria identified above.
Small Cap Sustainability Improvers Ripe for Re-Rating
- Onterris Inc (ONT-US)
Market cap: $750M | SASB sector: Waste Management / Environmental Services
Onterris, an environmental and engineering consulting firm, had its near-term SBTi target and long-term net-zero target formally validated by the Science Based Targets initiative in early 2025. SBTi validation is arguably the most credible sustainability event a company can execute. Ratings agencies like MSCI operate on annual review cycles, meaning a company that validates SBTi targets today is unlikely to see a formal rating upgrade until the next scheduled assessment, usually annually.
Onterris has published annual SASB-aligned sustainability reports for three consecutive years and participates in CDP. Revenue approached $900M in 2025 and 2026 guidance is above that level. The business is growing into the disclosure infrastructure rather than shrinking, which gives the rating upgrade a durable foundation.
It is also worth noting that until recently, the company operated under the name Montrose Environmental Group, but rebranded as Onterris in April 2026. Corporate identity resets of this kind often precede a broader ESG narrative refresh and tend to attract new analyst attention.
- Dexterra Group (DXT-CA)
Market cap: CAD $880M | SASB sector: Professional & Commercial Services / Industrial Support Services
Dexterra provides supports services for the creation, management and operation of infrastructure. The company published its first-ever comprehensive, GRI-aligned sustainability report in March 2025, including a quantified Scope 1 and Scope 2 baseline following the GHG Protocol Corporate Standard. Prior reports were informal communications without a quantified emissions baseline.. Importantly, the business is financially robust: Q1 2026 revenue grew 15% year on year, and earnings beat estimates by approximately 40%. This removes the risk that sustainability commitments get deprioritized because of financial stress.
- John B. Sanfilippo & Son (JBSS-US)
Market cap: ~$990M | SASB sector: Processed Food
JBSS, a leading American processor of tree nuts and related snacks, has quietly built one of the more comprehensive environmental disclosure programs among U.S. food small caps without having published a formal consolidated sustainability report. The company participates in CDP across all three disclosure streams simultaneously (climate change, water security, and forests), which is rare at this market cap. The company discloses scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. In fiscal year 2025, total emissions intensity declined 8.3%. The company updated its Environmental Policy in May 2024, conducts water risk analysis using WRI’s Aqueduct Atlas across all six production facilities, and holds Energy Star Partner of the Year recognition. It reached 89.5% recyclable packaging by weight. SASB material topics for processed food (energy, water management, packaging waste, food safety) are each being actively addressed. The re-rating catalyst here is specific: MSCI and Sustainalytics currently rate JBSS without a published PDF sustainability report to anchor on, meaning the quantitative data sitting on its website is likely being partially discounted or missed. Publication of a first formal consolidated report would immediately elevate the company’s data quality score.
- Ag Growth International (AFN-CA)
Market cap: CAD $450M | SASB sector: Industrial Machinery & Goods
AGI makes grain handling, aeration, and storage equipment, placing it in a sustainability-adjacent commercial position (food security infrastructure) that creates natural demand for ESG transparency. Their 2024 Sustainability Report, released in June 2025, was the first to include a SASB Index and a standalone TCFD-aligned supplemental disclosure, neither of which appeared in the 2023 report. This is a meaningful escalation from narrative-only sustainability communication to framework-indexed disclosure, which is exactly what most ratings agencies require to move from qualitative to quantitative scoring. The Board operates a Governance and Sustainability Committee. On the quantitative side, AGI set a target in 2023 to reduce Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions intensity by 25% by 2030 against a 2021 baseline; in 2024, it had already achieved a 16% reduction, keeping the trajectory on track. Safety performance improved sharply: lost-time incident rate down 46% and total recordable incident rate down 49% year on year, both SASB material metrics for this sector.
It is important to note that the names highlighted here are cited uniquely based on an expectation that financial market participants will latently give credit to their sustainability efforts; For example, AGI carries a highly leveraged balance sheet and has been under financial stress from agricultural equipment cycle headwinds: the sustainability re-rating is an independent catalyst, but the equity thesis depends on stabilization of the underlying business.
In the table below, we summarize the main sustainability re-rating triggers for the aforementioned companies, plus six more that we believe could benefit from the same dynamic.